Proof of Immortality III

[Jabba]

Whether there is a soul or not would not change that numerator and that denominator.

js,
- I didn’t mean to claim that it would. I meant to claim just that OOFLam being incorrect would imply that there are immaterial souls.

Given that the probability of your physical existence is independent of any soul, you cannot show what you want using the method you've chosen.

- Once again, I’m not sure that I understand your point -- but if I do, my answer is the same as before: OOFLam is, in effect, addressing the possibility of an immaterial soul, and implying that there is no such thing. And therefore, OOFLam being wrong would imply that there is such a thing as an immaterial soul.

 

[Jabba]

To me it's the same, if you want to discuss it further that's fine, if you don't that's fine too.

caveman,
- In case it counts, my vote is that you continue the discussion.

 

[Jabba]

Were there 7 billion humans alive when you were born?

Dave,
- No. But using the number that were alive would serve only to reduce the numerator. And maybe, I should just include the number of living humans that are about 74 years old today.

The *possible* existence. If there are no immaterial souls then infinity in your denominator makes even less sense.

- But 1) we don't know whether there is such a thing or not, 2) probability is based upon the info we have and 3) the likelihood of me being here -- given OOFLam -- is so small as to essentially discount (evaporate?) the prior probability of OOFLam.

 

[jsfisher]

js,
- I didn’t mean to claim that it would. I meant to claim just that OOFLam being incorrect would imply that there are immaterial souls.

Your claim is false.

- Once again, I’m not sure that I understand your point -- but if I do, my answer is the same as before: OOFLam is, in effect, addressing the possibility of an immaterial soul, and implying that there is no such thing. And therefore, OOFLam being wrong would imply that there is such a thing as an immaterial soul.

The point is that your probability calculation for your existence (as presented) does not change. It would be the same with or without souls.

In addition, your base logic is wrong. If A then ~B does not lead you to if ~A then B.

 

[JayUtah]

I meant to claim just that OOFLam being incorrect would imply that there are immaterial souls.

False dilemma.

OOFLam is, in effect, addressing the possibility of an immaterial soul, and implying that there is no such thing.

No, it simply embodies the null hypothesis for your claim.

And therefore, OOFLam being wrong would imply that there is such a thing as an immaterial soul.

Overcoming the null hypothesis cannot be a statistical exercise in this case. You're trying to show that a certain thing must exist -- even though you don't know what it is or how it works -- based on nothing more than effects you speculatively attributed to that thing as a cause.

 

[godless dave]

So your reasoning for OOFLam being incorrect is that if OOFLam were incorrect, the likelihood of OOFLam being correct would be unimaginably small. Have I got that right?

 

[Mojo]

js,
- I didn’t mean to claim that it would.

Jabba,
- If it doesn't, then your argument disproves immortality just as much* as it disproves "OOFLam".




*i.e. not at all.

 

[JayUtah]

So your reasoning for OOFLam being incorrect is that if OOFLam were incorrect, the likelihood of OOFLam being correct would be unimaginably small. Have I got that right?

Well, jsfisher said it best. Jabba starts with the premise that he has a grape and ends with the computed probability that he has a grape.

 

[Mojo]

Well, jsfisher said it best. Jabba starts with the premise that he has a grape and ends with the computed probability that he has a grape.

That means that he's less certain that he has a grape when he's finished than he was when he started, doesn't it?

 

[JayUtah]

That means that he's less certain that he has a grape when he's finished than he was when he started, doesn't it?

Not if the computation is gimmicked to produce a probability of grapeness that is "virtually 1."

 

[Mojo]

Even if it's "virtually 1", he's still gone from "I have a grape" to "I almost certainly have a grape".

 

[JayUtah]

Even if it's "virtually 1", he's still gone from "I have a grape" to "I almost certainly have a grape".

Your point was, is, and remains valid. From a few steps away it does indeed appear that Jabba's assurance indeed drops by virtue of his model. However, in his argument the computed value -- the "answer" -- is qualitatively different than the premise, even though they represent exactly the same concept and thus create a circular argument.

But as you well know, this isn't the first time it's been pointed out to him that his misuse of Bayes always results in this same circularity. Again, we wonder how many people -- including people outside this forum whom Jabba has specifically approached for endorsement -- need to tell him he's formulating the problem incorrectly before the glimmer of the possibility of his own error illuminates even a tiny corner of his brain.

 

[Mojo]

But as you well know, this isn't the first time it's been pointed out to him that his misuse of Bayes always results in this same circularity. Again, we wonder how many people -- including people outside this forum whom Jabba has specifically approached for endorsement -- need to tell him he's formulating the problem incorrectly before the glimmer of the possibility of his own error illuminates even a tiny corner of his brain.

It isn't as if this is his only error. There's also the prosecutor's fallacy, the Texas sharpshooter fallacy, the false dilemma, just to name three.

His argument is a spherical failure.

 

[JoeMorgue]

It's almost as if Jabba is trying to form the argument as if probability is somehow higher evidence for something than certainty.

 

[Jabba]

So your reasoning for OOFLam being incorrect is that if OOFLam were incorrect, the likelihood of OOFLam being correct would be unimaginably small. Have I got that right?

Dave,
- Almost.
- My reasoning for OOFLam being incorrect is that if OOFLam were reasonably possibly incorrect, the likelihood of OOFLam being correct would be unimaginably small (when applying the Bayesian formula).

 

[John Jones]

Dave,
- Almost.
- My reasoning for OOFLam being incorrect is that if OOFLam were reasonably possibly incorrect, the likelihood of OOFLam being correct would be unimaginably small (when applying the Bayesian formula).

That makes about as much sense as most of your arguments - none.

 

[Mojo]

Dave,
- Almost.
- My reasoning for OOFLam being incorrect is that if OOFLam were reasonably possibly incorrect, the likelihood of OOFLam being correct would be unimaginably small (when applying the Bayesian formula).

But so would the likelihood of the hypothesis that you have an "immaterial self" being correct if you define H as that hypothesis rather than "OOFLam". We went through this in a previous iteration of this thread, and your only response was to arbitrarily change the numbers you were using so you got the answer you wanted.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- Almost.
- My reasoning for OOFLam being incorrect is that if OOFLam were reasonably possibly incorrect, the likelihood of OOFLam being correct would be unimaginably small (when applying the Bayesian formula).

Do you not see the problem with that?

 

[Loss Leader]

Dave,
- Almost.
- My reasoning for OOFLam being incorrect is that if OOFLam were reasonably possibly incorrect, the likelihood of OOFLam being correct would be unimaginably small (when applying the Bayesian formula).

1. The scientific model predicts the existence of self-aware biological organisms at some time in done places.
2. You are a self-aware organism.
3. The scientific model adequately explains ýour existence.

With what do you disagree? What evidence do you have for an alternate explanation?

 

[sackett]

Why would an immaterial self necessarily be immortal? Immateriality sounds pretty fragile. A puff of logic might blow it up.