Proof of Immortality III

[JayUtah]

How the hell would that even work?

It would work if your goal was to show that skeptics were unfair, closed-minded, limited, dishonest, mean-spirited, hypocritical -- or any combination thereof.

 

[Loss Leader]

It would work if your goal was to show that skeptics were unfair, closed-minded, limited, dishonest, mean-spirited, hypocritical -- or any combination thereof.

Well, there is a good reason to debate skeptics: one cannot fail. After all, if they closed-mindedly refuse to believe in anything, then your argument is just as good as any other. Test this against those who already believe in a soul - some Christian forum or other - and their rejection would be devastating.

 

[Jabba]

The likelihood of you given no immaterial selves is not unimaginably small. It's no smaller than the likelihood of Mount Rainier.

If immaterial selves do exist, then we don't know the likelihood of a particular immaterial self existing, because we don't know anything about the processes that result in the existence of an immaterial self.

Dave,
- But "no immaterial selves" is not part of the given.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Dave,
- But "no immaterial selves" is not part of the given.

Says who?

 

[Loss Leader]

Dave,
- But "no immaterial selves" is not part of the given.

That's right. Your given includes immaterial souls. That's why it's wrong.

Four people sit down at 1 long table to eat steak. Jack will not sit next to John. Jay must sit on an end seat. Jill will only sit next to Jack. Remembering all of that, what did Jay have to eat?

 

[Jabba]

The likelihood of you given no immaterial selves is not unimaginably small. It's no smaller than the likelihood of Mount Rainier.

If immaterial selves do exist, then we don't know the likelihood of a particular immaterial self existing, because we don't know anything about the processes that result in the existence of an immaterial self.

Dave,
- But "no immaterial selves" is not part of the given.

Says who?

Joe,
- The formula.
- The given in the formula is OOFLam -- which doesn't say anything about immaterial (or, material) selves.

 

[Jabba]

- If the prior probability of immaterial selves is .001, and the likelihood of ME, given no immaterial selves, is unimaginably small, since I do currently exist, there must be immaterial selves.
- Put those figures into the formula and see what you get.

Why do you think that?

I have a grape. We can discuss the likelihoods of the grape being purple, or seedless, or Concord, or whatever. And given new information about the grape (perhaps its color), we can adjust our likelihood estimates.

You'd agree with that, right?

Ok, so what is the likelihood it is a grape?

js,
- I think that you're suggesting that in your scenario, having a grape is analogous to one of the variables in my scenario. If I'm right, which of my variables is the analogous one?

No. The analogy was addressing you assigning probabilities to your existence. The analogy started with "I have a grape" and ended with the question "what is the likelihood I have a grape?" The answer is 1, of course, since the grape was a given.

You scenario starts with you, an existing human.

js,
- ME isn't the "given" in my scenario. My given is OOFLam (the hypothesis).

 

[Mojo]

Dave,
- But "no immaterial selves" is not part of the given.

You're trying to beg the question again. Immaterial souls are not part of the model you are trying to disprove.

 

[jsfisher]

js,
- ME isn't the "given" in my scenario. My given is OOFLam (the hypothesis).

There can be more than one given. You have an hypothesis with an estimated likelihood, and you have your very existence. Both are "given."

 

[Jabba]

There can be more than one given. You have an hypothesis with an estimated likelihood, and you have your very existence. Both are "given."

js,
- As far as I know, the "given" in conditional probability always refers to the hypothesis being considered. The "event" is "given" in a sense, but not the technical sense used in conditional probability...

 

[Mojo]

js,
- As far as I know, the "given" in conditional probability always refers to the hypothesis being considered. The "event" is "given" in a sense, but not the technical sense used in conditional probability...

Your existence is not a new piece of information.

 

[jsfisher]

js,
- As far as I know, the "given" in conditional probability always refers to the hypothesis being considered. The "event" is "given" in a sense, but not the technical sense used in conditional probability...

You are raising a semantic quibble. Totally unnecessary, and it doesn't result in any change to the fundamentals.

With respect to the result you seek, your existence is a given. You may consider some hypothesis of existence first, but your existence is still a given somewhere along that path to a conclusion.

As Mojo succinctly put it:

Your existence is not a new piece of information.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- But "no immaterial selves" is not part of the given.

Bolding mine:

- If the prior probability of immaterial selves is .001, and the likelihood of ME, given no immaterial selves, is unimaginably small, since I do currently exist, there must be immaterial selves.
- Put those figures into the formula and see what you get.

 

[abaddon]

Jabba,

You have strayed a long way from anything remotely christian. Why is that?

 

[Loss Leader]

Your existence is not a new piece of information.

That's the maddening aspect. Bayes' is best when we have new information to evaluate. Splitting up ideas into little bits and asigning each a place in a formula is more like a bar trick than statistics.

As has been widely commented: reversing the numbers would gjve us an opposite answer. And there's no reason not to do so.

 

[JayUtah]

That's the maddening aspect. Bayes' is best when we have new information to evaluate. Splitting up ideas into little bits and asigning each a place in a formula is more like a bar trick than statistics.

This needs to be said through a bullhorn pressed firmly against Jabba's ear.

As has been widely commented: reversing the numbers would gjve us an opposite answer. And there's no reason not to do so.

And that's part of Jabba's ploy. He wants to disregard that this is no more than a pseudo-mathematical parlour trick. He wants the discussion to mire down in debates over what the numerical values should be, taking as read the validity and applicability of the method he has chosen.

 

[Mojo]

- But "no immaterial selves" is not part of the given.

Jabba, do you accept that it is possible that immaterial selves do not exist?

 

[JoeMorgue]

What the are odds that Jabba will ever present his argument in a way that doesn't require us to already agree with him before he starts.

 

[JayUtah]

As far as I know, the "given" in conditional probability always refers to the hypothesis being considered.

A conditional probability problem consists in further bifurcating the probability of some outcome based on the probability of an antecedent dependent event. Which is to say, you have one side of the problem where the antecedent did not happen, and another side of the problem where the antecedent did happen. Then on each of those sides, you arrive at the ultimate probability of the consequent. The problem you have is that the hypothesis you're trying to test -- the existence of an immortal soul -- appears on both sides of the antecedence. If your one-finite-life concept includes or allows for an immortal soul, it's not a well formed model.

You have tried to escape from this necessary fact by complaining that such a model would force you to concede your primary thesis. This is not correct. It only forces you to concede, for the sake of argument, that it is possible an immortal soul doesn't exist. If you cannot do that, then you have wasted everyone's time.

The "event" is "given" in a sense, but not the technical sense used in conditional probability...

As has been copiously pointed out to you, your existence is not a consequent or new information. Your existence in your present form (however constituted) is a given. You may not conflate that with the existence of an immortal soul and have a well formed model.

So in your probabilistic model you're back to begging the question. And you're still trying to apply a probabilistic model under subjective priors in place of actual evidence for existence.

 

[JayUtah]

What the are odds that Jabba will ever present his argument in a way that doesn't require us to already agree with him before he starts.

A virtual certainty. It appears it's the only way he knows how to argue. He shows no aptitude for the discovery of fact or the testing of a hypothesis. Instead he shows considerable interest only in compelling the appearance of agreement, by dishonest means if necessary.

Besides, if he can convince people that his argument was rejected before it was even out of the gate, he can make the point he's really trying to make: that skeptics are unfair, closed-minded, and prejudicial.