Proof of Immortality III

[Agatha]

Mine too.

And the xkcd shows us that Jabba is really a frequentist, not a Bayseian at all.

 

[kmortis]

Whilst I fully understand the impulse to address a seemingly recalcitrant poster when they do not seem to respond to your posts in any meaningful way, it is still against the Membership Agreement to make the subject of your post about that poster and not the arguments they put forth. This is true no matter what the quality of their argument is. Please refrain from doing so in the future.

Thank you,
The Management.

Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic  Posted By: kmortis

 

[JayUtah]

Thank you for this post.

Ditto; he did a better job of getting at the nugget. The audacity to quantify prior knowledge without necessarily dissecting its source reductionistically is where Bayesian methods really shine. In classical statistics you really can't ever avoid thinking about a model variable in terms of repeated trials.

Now there's nothing verboten about using frequentist methods to estimate nebulous priors. In the example of testing two drugs, where you don't know their relative effectiveness a priori, you can still look at historical rates of success from that lab, or with that class of pharmaceuticals. That's frequentist reasoning, but the overall approach is still Bayesian if you weight experimental results heavily, as suggested.

 

[JayUtah]

And the xkcd shows us that Jabba is really a frequentist, not a Bayseian at all.

His latest statements indicate he's not trying to reason statistically at all. Neither a frequentist nor a Bayesian would look at some outcome that has probability p = 0.00001 and say it therefore must happen. On the contrary, we put people on top of rockets that have orders of magnitude more chance of exploding. While the occasional tragic launch failure occurs, it's far from a "must be" scenario.

And I should have thought of this earlier, since it's right up my alley. We proudly note that the Saturn V had a perfect operational record. That doesn't mean it's perfectly reliable. Had it been used for more than Apollo and Skylab, we in the business accept that it likely would have eventually experienced a catastrophic failure. Hence this is one case where I would ignore the historical data and use a more subjectively guided estimate for a Bayesian prior probability of failure for a launch.

 

[abaddon]

His latest statements indicate he's not trying to reason statistically at all. Neither a frequentist nor a Bayesian would look at some outcome that has probability p = 0.00001 and say it therefore must happen. On the contrary, we put people on top of rockets that have orders of magnitude more chance of exploding. While the occasional tragic launch failure occurs, it's far from a "must be" scenario.

And I should have thought of this earlier, since it's right up my alley. We proudly note that the Saturn V had a perfect operational record. That doesn't mean it's perfectly reliable. Had it been used for more than Apollo and Skylab, we in the business accept that it likely would have eventually experienced a catastrophic failure. Hence this is one case where I would ignore the historical data and use a more subjectively guided estimate for a Bayesian prior probability of failure for a launch.

I can almost hear it in advance.

"Aha, you agree that only god can create perfection."

The fact that the putative god made a horses bum of it will, of course, be ignored.

 

[Jabba]

...
But the only way you get "unimaginably small" is by using the likelihood of an immaterial self existing.

Dave,

- I think I see your point – i.e. the reason I claim that the likelihood of my current existence, given OOFLam, is virtually zero (unimaginably small) is that the ME in "my current existence" is ambiguous. And, one of the ME concepts is immaterial and the "who" of the immaterial concept seems obviously, totally unpredictable. Which is why, in determining the likelihood of my current existence, I need to take into account the probability of all the different events that led to it. Which adds up to a virtually zero likelihood. So, yeah.

- However, when evaluating the likelihood of something, we can't dismiss one of the possible meanings of the something without pointing that out. Again, I have no argument with being able to predict the person's material characteristics (be they physical, mental or emotional). The argument I have has to do with predicting the "identity" of what appears to be an immaterial "self," or "who” (that regarding which, I can’t be sure we’re on the same page).

 

[snoop_doxie]

There is a controversy among statisticians over which method works best. I view it largely as a tempest in a teapot because both methods have valid applications and the only mistake you can make is to use one method when you should be using the other. That said, among fringe theorists Bayesian inference is attractive because they can posture it simplistically as a "rigorous" treatment of subjective beliefs. Since much of what constitutes the fringe is subjective belief, it is often erroneously claimed that Bayesian analysis can confirm the truth of a subjective belief without the use of evidence or data.

The clouds have parted and the sun is shining through.

Thank you.

What I am understanding now, trying to prove a subjective belief (for example, a soul) with Bayesian statistics fails at the start with "belief".

 

[Agatha]

So we have:
Prior probability of Jabba existing given Jabba's model of OOFLam, including an immaterial self = virtually zero.

Prior probability of Jabba existing given the scientific model of one finite life, with no immaterial selves being part of the model - xxx. How do you suggest we calculate this, Jabba? And will it be more or less likely than your model?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,

- I think I see your point – i.e. the reason I claim that the likelihood of my current existence, given OOFLam, is virtually zero (unimaginably small) is that the ME in "my current existence" is ambiguous.

It's only ambiguous in some kind of model where there's an immaterial self distinct from the physical self.

And, one of the ME concepts is immaterial and the "who" of the immaterial concept seems obviously, totally unpredictable.

It's not predictable in any material model of consciousness because those models don't include such a thing existing at all.

- However, when evaluating the likelihood of something, we can't dismiss one of the possible meanings of the something without pointing that out. Again, I have no argument with being able to predict the person's material characteristics (be they physical, mental or emotional). The argument I have has to do with predicting the "identity" of what appears to be an immaterial "self," or "who” (that regarding which, I can’t be sure we’re on the same page).

We're not on the same page because I don't think the "identity" you're talking about exists at all. In the model I subscribe to, a person's material characteristics are the whole person. There is no other aspect of a person to predict or explain.

If your OOFLam model includes what you're calling the identity, self, or who, then I already don't accept that model.

 

[abaddon]

Dave,

- I think I see your point – i.e. the reason I claim that the likelihood of my current existence, given OOFLam, is virtually zero (unimaginably small) is that the ME in "my current existence" is ambiguous. And, one of the ME concepts is immaterial and the "who" of the immaterial concept seems obviously, totally unpredictable. Which is why, in determining the likelihood of my current existence, I need to take into account the probability of all the different events that led to it. Which adds up to a virtually zero likelihood. So, yeah.

Yet still you dodge the fact that your progenitors were more people than could ever have existed. Why do you avoid that?

- However, when evaluating the likelihood of something, we can't dismiss one of the possible meanings of the something without pointing that out. Again, I have no argument with being able to predict the person's material characteristics (be they physical, mental or emotional). The argument I have has to do with predicting the "identity" of what appears to be an immaterial "self," or "who” (that regarding which, I can’t be sure we’re on the same page).

Something which has actually happened has a probability of 1. Why do you avoid that?

Bizarrely, having wasted thousands of posts failing to support the shroud, you are now arguing a distinctly non-christian belief in reincarnation. What the actual <bleep>? You are no longer christian or what? A-la-carte new ager pseudo christian? Full on hippy? Dyed in the wool catholic?

At this point, it is unclear what, if anything, you actually believe.

Surely you must understand that if your particular faith and claims appear to be entirely made up on the spot depending upon to whom you deign to respond, nobody will take you seriously, right?

Surely you realise that the views you have propounded in this thread directly conflict with the views you propounded in your largely abandoned shroud thread, right?

I mean, in the shroud thread you are espousing catholicism, which implies no re-incarnation. In this thread you are claiming re-incarnation.

WTF? Can't you make up your mind which philosophy you want?

 

[JayUtah]

...the ME in "my current existence" is ambiguous.

No, it isn't. It may be the result of complex natural laws at work, but that complexity is not the same thing as ambiguity. You have identified no part of "you" that requires an immaterial component to generate, transmit, or exhibit.

And, one of the ME concepts is immaterial and the "who" of the immaterial concept seems obviously, totally unpredictable.

In exactly the same way any given manifestation of Mt. Ranier would be unpredictable, given first principles only, yet be completely the product of natural law.

Which is why, in determining the likelihood of my current existence, I need to take into account the probability of all the different events that led to it.

No. That is incorrect, and it has been explained to you at great length by many people why it is incorrect. Do not simply ignore them and bluster onward as if that premise is self-evident.

Again, I have no argument with being able to predict the person's material characteristics (be they physical, mental or emotional). The argument I have has to do with predicting the "identity" of what appears to be an immaterial "self,"...

Once again you're simply making stuff up that you say can only be explained by "immaterial" means. You show no evidence that such stuff exists, hence you are once again simply assuming your desired conclusion.

...I can’t be sure we’re on the same page.

No, the problem is that you realize that you are exactly on the same page as your critics, and that that page does not entail the existence of an immaterial self. You have spend the last several pages trying very hard to pretend you're on a different page. It can be plainly seen -- at least by anyone who's actually reading the thread -- that no one is buying your quite transparent efforts at obfuscation and misdirection. You are simply replaying the same fallacies using different language each time.

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- I see your point, but this is one of the wheres where probability can become so confusing...

- If OOFLam stipulated material selves, who would argue?
- But since
1) it doesn’t, and
2) many of us sense, or imagine, an immaterial self, and
3) there are no natural laws governing the who of an immaterial self,
- if there is an immaterial "who" to be born, science has no idea who it will be.
- And, the likelihood of any particular current immaterial who -- given OOFLam -- would be infinitesimal. Virtually zero.

It's only ambiguous in some kind of model where there's an immaterial self distinct from the physical self.




It's not predictable in any material model of consciousness because those models don't include such a thing existing at all.





We're not on the same page because I don't think the "identity" you're talking about exists at all. In the model I subscribe to, a person's material characteristics are the whole person. There is no other aspect of a person to predict or explain.

If your OOFLam model includes what you're calling the identity, self, or who, then I already don't accept that model.

Dave,
- So the prior probability of ~H is zero?

 

[JayUtah]

So the prior probability of ~H is zero?

Given what he wrote and you quoted, why would you think this is even remotely a relevant question?

 

[godless dave]

That's not what I said.

 

[Mojo]

So we have:
Prior probability of Jabba existing given Jabba's model of OOFLam, including an immaterial self = virtually zero.

Prior probability of Jabba existing given the scientific model of one finite life, with no immaterial selves being part of the model - xxx. How do you suggest we calculate this, Jabba? And will it be more or less likely than your model?

Both require Jabba's body to exist. Under "the scientific model" this is all that is required, because Jabba's consciousness is produced by his body. Under the "immaterial soul" scenario Jabba favours, the soul also needs to exist independently, and Jabba's particular soul needs to infest his particular body. Jabba's existence cannot possibly be more likely under Jabba's scenario than it is under the scientific model, and given that he has proposed numbers like 7 billion as the number of potential competing souls it has to be much less likely.

 

[Mojo]

The argument I have has to do with predicting the "identity" of what appears to be an immaterial "self," or "who” (that regarding which, I can’t be sure we’re on the same page).

Under the model that you are supposed to be disproving, this question doesn't come up. The brain produces the consciousness it produces. That's all. It is only under your desired scenario in which the soul exists independently of the body, that the question of which soul gets lucky arises.

You are begging the question.

 

[jond]

Both require Jabba's body to exist. Under "the scientific model" this is all that is required, because Jabba's consciousness is produced by his body. Under the "immaterial soul" scenario Jabba favours, the soul also needs to exist independently, and Jabba's particular soul needs to infest his particular body. Jabba's existence cannot possibly be more likely under Jabba's scenario than it is under the scientific model, and given that he has proposed numbers like 7 billion as the number of potential competing souls it has to be much less likely.

Indeed, as has been pointed out and ignored several times. And, he then needs to address the notion of an immaterial soul interacting with a material brain, something he also ignores. Funny that.

 

[Jabba]

That's not what I said.

- How about the prior probability of an immaterial self is zero?

 

[godless dave]

- How about the prior probability of an immaterial self is zero?

Sure.

 

[JayUtah]

How about the prior probability of an immaterial self is zero?

That would be a defensible way to treat the null hypothesis, but a probabilistic formulation for your proof is not indicated. It doesn't matter that you express your unevidenced belief as a subjective estimate of probability, whatever its numerical value. You still must provide evidence.