Proof of Immortality III

[Jabba]

Dave,
- Sorry about that...
- But, there is some kind, or aspect, of "who," or "self," that you say cannot be reproduced. You say that you and I, for instance, have only one life apiece to live, and neither of us could be reproduced. Can you name that kind, or aspect?

Our brains. If you made a copy of my brain, you would have two identical brains, and thus two identical selves. So they can be reproduced in that sense.

Dave,
- So theoretically, our brains can be reproduced.
- But, from an earlier clash...

- So, nothing could make the self become re-aware?

Only reanimating the body.

So Dave,
- Can you put a name to this "self" that cannot be reproduced without reanimating the same body?
- That way, I can know when we're talking about the same "self."

 

[Filippo Lippi]

Dave,

- Can you put a name to this "self" that cannot be reproduced without reanimating the same body?

How about "Jabba?"

 

[Agatha]

Dave,
- Sorry about that...
- But, there is some kind, or aspect, of "who," or "self," that you say cannot be reproduced. You say that you and I, for instance, have only one life apiece to live, and neither of us could be reproduced. Can you name that kind, or aspect?

Our brains. If you made a copy of my brain, you would have two identical brains, and thus two identical selves. So they can be reproduced in that sense.

Dave,
- So theoretically, our brains can be reproduced.

Here, you are talking about two separate but identical selves (which, by the way would only be identical at the moment of replication, as their experiences diverge from that instant).

- But, from an earlier clash...

- So, nothing could make the self become re-aware?

Only reanimating the body.

Here, you are talking about one self being re-aware, reincarnate, reanimated (however you want to describe it. One self, not two identical ones.

So Dave,
- Can you put a name to this "self" that cannot be reproduced without reanimating the same body?
- That way, I can know when we're talking about the same "self."

In the first bit of your post, you talk about replicating a currently existing self [or consciousness]. If it were possible, you would end up with two identical selves. With the caveat that the selves would cease to be identical after the moment of replication, and would diverge further as time progressed.

In the second, you talk about re-animating a self [or consciousness] after death. If it were possible, you end up with one self. At the moment of re-animation, this self would be not be identical to both of the selves you obtained in your first thought experiment, as the re-animated one has gone through a different experience.

There is no contradiction here. In both you do currently impossible things. In one you replicate an existing body, in the other you re-animate a dead body. There is nothing missing or different about any of the selves you would obtain, other than the obvious thing of the replicated ones having gone through the experience of replication, and the re-animated one having gone through the experience of death and re-animation.

 

[jond]

Here, you are talking about two separate but identical selves (which, by the way would only be identical at the moment of replication, as their experiences diverge from that instant).

Here, you are talking about one self being re-aware, reincarnate, reanimated (however you want to describe it. One self, not two identical ones.



In the first bit of your post, you talk about replicating a currently existing self [or consciousness]. If it were possible, you would end up with two identical selves. With the caveat that the selves would cease to be identical after the moment of replication, and would diverge further as time progressed.

In the second, you talk about re-animating a self [or consciousness] after death. If it were possible, you end up with one self. At the moment of re-animation, this self would be not be identical to both of the selves you obtained in your first thought experiment, as the re-animated one has gone through a different experience.

There is no contradiction here. In both you do currently impossible things. In one you replicate an existing body, in the other you re-animate a dead body. There is nothing missing or different about any of the selves you would obtain, other than the obvious thing of the replicated ones having gone through the experience of replication, and the re-animated one having gone through the experience of death and re-animation.

As always, Agatha, you've concisely and eloquently summed it up. And, as always, I'm sure you'll be ignored as well!

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- So theoretically, our brains can be reproduced.
- But, from an earlier clash...


So Dave,
- Can you put a name to this "self" that cannot be reproduced without reanimating the same body?
- That way, I can know when we're talking about the same "self."

The brain.

A copy of something is identical to the original but is separate from the original.

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- Sorry about that...
- But, there is some kind, or aspect, of "who," or "self," that you say cannot be reproduced. You say that you and I, for instance, have only one life apiece to live, and neither of us could be reproduced. Can you name that kind, or aspect?

Our brains. If you made a copy of my brain, you would have two identical brains, and thus two identical selves. So they can be reproduced in that sense.

Dave,
- So theoretically, our brains can be reproduced.
- But, from an earlier clash...


So Dave,
- Can you put a name to this "self" that cannot be reproduced without reanimating the same body?
- That way, I can know when we're talking about the same "self."

The brain.

A copy of something is identical to the original but is separate from the original.

Dave,
- What can I call that sense of the brain that cannot be reproduced?

 

[jond]

Dave,
- What can I call that sense of the brain that cannot be reproduced?

The sum of your experiences.

Eta: seriously, Jabba: read Agatha's post. Then read it again until you understand it.

 

[Jabba]

Dave and Agatha,
- How about if I call this concept of "self," the "soul" -- with the stipulation that it may be a null class?

 

[ComfySlippers]

Dave and Agatha,

- How about if I call this concept of "self," the "soul" -- with the stipulation that it may be a null class?

How about you stop asking questions in an attempt to get people to agree with your nonsense?

Say "soul", then prove immortality without arguing about how to argue.

 

[Mojo]

Jabba, we all know that what you have been talking about all along is the concept that is generally referred to as the soul.

 

[Pixel42]

Dave,
- What can I call that sense of the brain that cannot be reproduced?

What makes you think there is a sense of the brain that cannot be reproduced?

 

[Mojo]

By the way, you don't know that reanimating a body would produce a consciousness that is a continuation of the body's previous consciousness, because it has never been done. Your consciousness only seems to be continuous because it has your memories. You have no idea whether a reanimated body would have a consciousness incorporating the earlier memories.

 

[Agatha]

Dave and Agatha,
- How about if I call this concept of "self," the "soul" -- with the stipulation that it may be a null class?

Call it what you want. Call it a suffusion of yellow, or a soul, or a self, or consciousness - the label is not the issue. The issue remains that consciousness/self/soul/s.o.y. is a process which arises from a living brain. When the brain is damaged, it changes in a predictable way depending on the nature, location and extent of the damage. When the brain is gone (at death), the process stops.

The notion that a particular c/s/s/s arises again after death but with no memories or characteristics of that c/s/s/s is not supportable - if it has none of the memories or characteristics of the previous existence, it cannot be the same consciousness.

 

[Loss Leader]

Dave,
- What can I call that sense of the brain that cannot be reproduced?

The brain. The soul is nothing other than the processes of the brain. Even if you science-fictioned a way to exactly reproduce your brain, you would still end up with your brother. Not you.

 

[Jabba]

What makes you think there is a sense of the brain that cannot be reproduced?

Pixel,
- Ask Dave.

 

[Mojo]

Pixel,
- Ask Dave.

Jabba,
- What makes you think Dave is better qualified to explain your own reasoning than you are?

 

[Jabba]

- People who believe in reincarnation believe that a certain kind of self survives and reappears after bodily death. Can you guys define that concept?

 

[Mojo]

- People who believe in reincarnation believe that a certain kind of self survives and reappears after bodily death. Can you guys define that concept?

Nonsense.

 

[Agatha]

- People who believe in reincarnation believe that a certain kind of self survives and reappears after bodily death. Can you guys define that concept?

Wishful thinking with no evidence to support it.

 

[Mojo]

Seriously, Jabba? You are asking us to define the concept that is central to your entire argument?