Immediately after collapse initiation, the potential energy of the structure (physical mass of the tower) above the impact floors (94th to 99th in WTC 1 and 77th to 85th in WTC 2) was re- leased, developing substantial kinetic en- ergy. The impact of this rapidly accelerating mass on the floors directly below led to overloading and subsequent failure of these floors. The additional mass of the failed floors joined that of the tower mass from above the impact area, adding to the kinetic energy impinging on the subsequent floors. The failure of successive floors was apparent in images and videos of the towers’ collapse by the compressed air expelled outward as each floor failed and fell down onto the next. This mechanism appears to have continued until dust and debris obscured the view of the collapsing towers.
As the composite floor decking was most likely quite rigid due to the continuous concrete floor, the transverse bridging trusses, and the intermediate deck support angles, failure of the floor as a whole would be expected at the connections attaching the floor to the exterior wall and core. This paper characterizes the floor truss connections on recovered structural elements of the exterior wall. Damage is reported on only the exterior wall connections as the location of the exterior panels to which they were attached was known. The failure mode survey was supported with metallographic analyses of undamaged and failed welded joints to determine the location of metallurgical failure of the main loadbearing seats. The connections used in the core area are not discussed in this paper, as few were recovered and the as-built location of those that were could not be ascertained; information on these seats can be found in Ref. 4.