Some of what you have posted here is true and some is false.
The information about the reform of Article 533.1 in 2006 to conform to the BARD standard and complete the transformation of the Italian inquisitional system to an adversarial system comes from an essay by Professor Mitja Gialuz, Professor of Criminal Procedure at the University of Trieste.
If you believe that you can inform him of any errors in his essay, please contact him. Here is what I believe to be his web page:
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/gliautori/82-mitja_gialuz/
He seems to have only about 40 publications on law listed - I didn't try to translate their titles - but I'm sure you'll be able to set him on the right legal path. Of course, who knows, he may be in one of those conspiracies of the Masons or Friends of Amanda so he won't be able to appreciate your legal arguments.
It's not necessary for me to argue with one scholar. It is sufficient to report the argumentations in the doctrine on this point:
(...) La giurisprudenza ha precisato che con la previsione della regola per la quale il giudice pronuncia sentenza di condanna solo se l’imputato risulta colpevole del reato contestatogli “al di là di ogni ragionevole dubbio”, di cui all’art. 5 l. n. 46/2006 modificativo del comma 1 dell’art. 533 c.p.p., il legislatore ha formalizzato un principio già acquisito in tema di condizioni per la condanna, stante la preesistente regola, di cui all’art. 530 c. 2 c.p.p., per la quale in caso di insufficienza o contraddittorietà della prova l’imputato va assolto (Cass. pen., sez. I, 30402/2006).
Anche una parte della dottrina, criticando aspramente la legge Pecorella nel suo complesso, ha minimizzato la valenza di detta novità normativa, sostenendone la portata meramente ricognitiva di una regola di giudizio già presente in un sistema che, abolita la vecchia formula dell’assoluzione per insufficienza di prove, impone al giudice di assolvere ex art. 530 comma 2 c.p.p. quando si ritenga insufficiente la prova di reità.(...)
The introduction of "BARD" formula - known as "Pecorella law" - is considered by part of the doctrine as without effect, being a mere ridefinition of the already existing standard. As it is also reported: "si tratta di un principio che permea l’intero ordinamento processuale" (it is a principle that is inherent to the *whole* ordenment, not something determined by art. 533).
It is also true however that since the Pecorella law, the SC has ruled specifically on the definition of the new wording, so that, albeit there is no change between the "standards" if you compare it with the previous SC case law, the SC re-defines the standard using the new words. In particular, in the 2008 ruling SC explains the limit negatively, by a ruling that explains (as it did in the previous jurisprudence) what kind of "doubts" are *not reasonable:
il citato dettato normativo impone di pronunciare condanna quando il dato probatorio acquisito lascia fuori solo eventualità remote, pur astrattamente formulabili e prospettabili come possibili in rerum natura, ma la cui concreta realizzazione nella fattispecie concreta non trova il benché minimo riscontro nelle emergenze processuali, ponendosi al di fuori dell’ordine naturale delle cose e della normale razionalità umana (Cass. pen., sez. I, sent. 21 maggio - 29 luglio 2008 n. 31456
It is because this "better definition" of what is "not reasonable", or definition through "new wording", the reason why some scholars, in opposition to others, call the Pecorella principle an "innovation".
But there isn't any "change in standard".
The art. 530.1 is very diferent from 530.2 as for what concern its effects in civil law.
Cass. 17401/2004 and Cass. 20325/2006 establish that:
il giudicato penale di assoluzione ha effetto preclusivo nel giudizio civile di danni solo quando contenga un effettivo e specifico accertamento circa l’insussistenza o del fatto o della partecipazione dell’imputato, e non anche quando l’assoluzione sia determinata dal diverso accertamento dell’insussistenza di sufficienti elementi di prova circa la commissione del fatto o l’attribuibilità di esso all’imputato, e cioè quando l’assoluzione sia stata pronunziata a norma dell’art. 530 c.p.p., comma 2
A res judicata (definitive verdict) of acquittal has effect to prevent civil damage action only when contains an effective and specific finding of facts that the crime didn't take place or that the suspect was not involved in it, and has *not* such legal consequence in the event that the acquittal is determined by the non-existence of sufficient elements of proof, that is when it is issued in accord with 530 second paragraph.
CPP Article 652 provides the binding end to any civil action against all persons finally acquitted under the specification "the accused did not commit the crime" as long as the civil action occurred during the criminal proceedings.
You are wrong, as I just proved.
If you maintain your statement is somehow true, please provide the citations from the CPP to prove your point.
As you can see, relevant citatios are not from CPP, but from SC case law.
