Suddenly
No Punting
I don't see where the Constitution bars a retrial based on new evidence, either. What was Scalia's point, exactly, what was the context?
Doesn't bar it, sure. Doesn't require it is more the point.
The case is Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)
link
Guy is convicted of murder in Texas. Files a habeas petition in federal court ten plus years later alleging actual innocence. Rehnquist writes a somewhat odd petition that doesn't say or not say, just assumes for sake of argument, that actual innocence is a ground for habeas relief. He then says the guy's case wouldn't qualify under any hypothetical standard because the new evidence it is just a bunch of affidavits and affirms the lower court's denial.
Scalia joins the majority opinion but writes separately to more or less make fun of Rehnquist's opinion for being less than direct. This is the language, with the quotation that is often used in bold:
We granted certiorari on the question whether it violates due process or constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for a State to execute a person who, having been convicted of murder after a full and fair trial, later alleges that newly discovered evidence shows him to be "actually innocent." I would have preferred to decide that question, particularly since, as the Court's discussion shows, it is perfectly clear what the answer is: There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if that were enough), for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction. In saying that such a right exists, the dissenters apply nothing but their personal opinions to invalidate the rules of more than two thirds of the States, and a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure for which this Court itself is responsible. If the system that has been in place for 200 years (and remains widely approved) "shocks" the dissenters' consciences, post, at 1, perhaps they should doubt the calibration of their consciences, or, better still, the usefulness of "conscience shocking" as a legal test.
I nonetheless join the entirety of the Court's opinion,including the final portion (pages 26-28)--because there is no legal error in deciding a case by assuming arguendo that an asserted constitutional right exists, and because I can understand, or at least am accustomed to, the reluctance of the present Court to admit publicly that Our Perfect Constitution [n.1] lets stand any injustice, much less the execution of an innocent man who has received, though to no avail, all the process that our society has traditionally deemed adequate. With any luck, we shall avoid ever having to face this embarrassing question again, since it is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today's opinion requires would fail to produce an executive pardon.
Personally, I think "conscience shocking" would be a pretty good test as to determining whether the Constitution allows the execution of innocent people, but I'm a liberal.