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Split Thread Foreknowledge of events on 9/11

President of the US: We need to blow up three buildings in NYC so we can remove the liberties of the American people.



Henchman: We'll crash airliners into them, allow fires to rage then set off explosives.





P of US: Sounds good, make it so.


CIA: Those jerks in Malaysia want to fly aircraft into our headquarters. Can we take them out?

President: No, I think we'd get in more trouble if we screw it up like Africa, let's not do that.

CIA: Can we just use these brand new drones we got?

President and Pentagon: Nope

..... wheels turning.......


Sent from our shared looking glass platform
 
The DoJ lists them as an organised crime syndicate. A different list than terrorists perhaps, but is there much practical difference in how they are handled?


Yes, the Red&White aren't armed and funded by NATO to destabilize their neighbors.


Sent from our shared looking glass platform
 
CIA: Those jerks in Malaysia want to fly aircraft into our headquarters. Can we take them out?

President: No, I think we'd get in more trouble if we screw it up like Africa, let's not do that.

CIA: Can we just use these brand new drones we got?

President and Pentagon: Nope

..... wheels turning.......


Sent from our shared looking glass platform

You of course have evidence this conversation actually happened. You just forgot to post the link. I'm sure you will rectify this omission without delay.
If this was true- and I await your evidence with eagerness- would you then support the assassination of people before they have committed a crime?
 
NATO did 911. Or drones? (:}


Sent from 911 truth's fictional anti-intellectual platform built on BS, lies and delusional claims born in ignorance.
 
No information was kept from the Bureau.

That's not what the record shows

The FBI knew when the CIA knew.

A short list of who disagrees with you...

FBI USS Cole Lead Investigator Ali Soufan
FBI ALEC station officer Mark Rossini

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzkd0C2t2s8

Your own link posted earlier:


The CIA admits that it did not inform the bureau that after the Malaysia meetings ended, it tracked Almidhar and Alhazmi to Los Angeles.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/could/

FBI OIG Report:

The FBI failed to receive from the CIA three critical pieces of intelligence about Mihdhar and Hazmi in a timely manner:

Mihdhar’s possession of a valid, multiple-entry U.S. visa;

Hazmi’s travel to the United States; and

[INFORMATION REDACTED]

The CIA became aware of these three pieces of intelligence in January 2000, March 2000, and January 2001. Despite claims to the contrary, we found that none of this information was passed from the CIA to the FBI until August 2001

https://oig.justice.gov/special/0506/chapter5.htm

The 9-11 Commission:

This information was not shared with FBI headquarters until August 2001. An FBI agent detailed to the Bin Ladin unit at CIA attempted to share this information with colleagues at FBI headquarters. A CIA desk officer instructed him not to send the cable with this information. Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI. She admitted she did not personally share the information and cannot identify who told her they had been shared. We were unable to locate anyone who claimed to have shared the information. Contemporaneous documents contradict the claim that they were shared.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Notes.pdf

A CIA desk officer instructed him not to send the cable with this information.

Mark Rossini was there.......

“When I confronted this person...she told me that ‘this was not a matter for the FBI. The next al-Qaeda attack is going to happen in Southeast Asia and their visas for America are just a diversion. You are not to tell the FBI about it. When and if we want the FBI to know about it, we will.’”

Another FBI colleague, Doug Miller tried to inform the FBI.....

Rossini recalled going to Miller’s cubicle right after his conversation with Casey. “He looked at me like I was speaking a foreign language.… We were both stunned and could not understand why the FBI was not going to be told about this."
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html

Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI.

The CIA has lied quite a bit about this...

Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Notes.pdf

The CIA became aware of these three pieces of intelligence in January 2000, March 2000, and January 2001. Despite claims to the contrary, we found that none of this information was passed from the CIA to the FBI until August 2001
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0506/chapter5.htm

Head of CIA explaining to Joint Inquiry why the CIA couldn't have notified the FBI about Al Qaeda operatives coming to America because "he knows nobody read the cables".....

https://youtu.be/IF38P58-rdo?t=1m15s

CIA IOG report showed he lied about that......

"In the period January through March 2000, some 50 to 60 individuals read one or more of six Agency cables containing travel information related to these terrorists."
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/Executive Summary_OIG Report.pdf

Tenet then uses the OIG report that showed he lied to the Joint Inquiry, to try and claim that the FBI officers knew about the information and they didn't share this with their own agency. He leaves out the part that they were ordered by CIA not to......

It is unclear why the OIG has selectively focused accountability on a few CTC officers when the field has primary responsibility and the FBI officers had the information about both men as soon as CTC learned of it. As the OIG report points out, dozens of officers opened and/or read the cable. page 10/18
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC_0001229684_0.pdf

"You are not to tell the FBI about it. When and if we want the FBI to know about it, we will.’”
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html

Do you think these Al Qaeda Operatives, the first of the 9-11 hijackers to arrive, who couldn't speak English, and had never set foot in America before, would have a contact here? Or do you think KSM/Bin Ladin/Al Qaeda, are so stupid they would send them here to fend for themselves and hope they don't blow the operation?

If they did have a contact already in America, do you think that would be important information?
 
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That's not what the record shows



A short list of who disagrees with you...

FBI USS Cole Lead Investigator Ali Soufan
FBI ALEC station officer Mark Rossini

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzkd0C2t2s8

Your own link posted earlier:



The CIA admits that it did not inform the bureau that after the Malaysia meetings ended, it tracked Almidhar and Alhazmi to Los Angeles.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/could/

FBI OIG Report:

The FBI failed to receive from the CIA three critical pieces of intelligence about Mihdhar and Hazmi in a timely manner:

Mihdhar’s possession of a valid, multiple-entry U.S. visa;

Hazmi’s travel to the United States; and

[INFORMATION REDACTED]

The CIA became aware of these three pieces of intelligence in January 2000, March 2000, and January 2001. Despite claims to the contrary, we found that none of this information was passed from the CIA to the FBI until August 2001

https://oig.justice.gov/special/0506/chapter5.htm

The 9-11 Commission:

This information was not shared with FBI headquarters until August 2001. An FBI agent detailed to the Bin Ladin unit at CIA attempted to share this information with colleagues at FBI headquarters. A CIA desk officer instructed him not to send the cable with this information. Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI. She admitted she did not personally share the information and cannot identify who told her they had been shared. We were unable to locate anyone who claimed to have shared the information. Contemporaneous documents contradict the claim that they were shared.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Notes.pdf

A CIA desk officer instructed him not to send the cable with this information.

Mark Rossini was there.......

“When I confronted this person...she told me that ‘this was not a matter for the FBI. The next al-Qaeda attack is going to happen in Southeast Asia and their visas for America are just a diversion. You are not to tell the FBI about it. When and if we want the FBI to know about it, we will.’”

Another FBI colleague, Doug Miller tried to inform the FBI.....

Rossini recalled going to Miller’s cubicle right after his conversation with Casey. “He looked at me like I was speaking a foreign language.… We were both stunned and could not understand why the FBI was not going to be told about this."
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html

Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI.

The CIA has lied quite a bit about this...

Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Notes.pdf

The CIA became aware of these three pieces of intelligence in January 2000, March 2000, and January 2001. Despite claims to the contrary, we found that none of this information was passed from the CIA to the FBI until August 2001
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0506/chapter5.htm

Head of CIA explaining to Joint Inquiry why the CIA couldn't have notified the FBI about Al Qaeda operatives coming to America because "he knows nobody read the cables".....

https://youtu.be/IF38P58-rdo?t=1m15s

CIA IOG report showed he lied about that......

"In the period January through March 2000, some 50 to 60 individuals read one or more of six Agency cables containing travel information related to these terrorists."
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/Executive Summary_OIG Report.pdf

Tenet then uses the OIG report that showed he lied to the Joint Inquiry, to try and claim that the FBI officers knew about the information and they didn't share this with their own agency. He leaves out the part that they were ordered by CIA not to......

It is unclear why the OIG has selectively focused accountability on a few CTC officers when the field has primary responsibility and the FBI officers had the information about both men as soon as CTC learned of it. As the OIG report points out, dozens of officers opened and/or read the cable. page 10/18
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC_0001229684_0.pdf

"You are not to tell the FBI about it. When and if we want the FBI to know about it, we will.’”
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html

Do you think these Al Qaeda Operatives, the first of the 9-11 hijackers to arrive, who couldn't speak English, and had never set foot in America before, would have a contact here? Or do you think KSM/Bin Ladin/Al Qaeda, are so stupid they would send them here to fend for themselves and hope they don't blow the operation?

If they did have a contact already in America, do you think that would be important information?

:thumbsup:
 
1. Which is a lame excuse. Al Qaeda was put on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list on 10/8/1999. Al Qaeda had already attacked the U.S. on several occasions prior to Almidhar entering the U.S. And Almidhar was known as an al Qaeda operative. He did not need to commit a crime in the U.S. before U.S. counterterrorism officials could apprehend him because being a terrorist from a group on the official terrorist list is enough of a punishable crime already.

2. Or the pleas from the agents in Minnesota. Weird how all of this threat warning about al Qaeda was going on but F.B.I. management buried the leads.

And yet huge swathes of your brethren will tell us that AQ are made up, or weren't involved at all or are really US government assets.

Look at all these really dangerous people that hate the US who were ignored by authorities...oh, they weren't actually involved in the attacks but the government sure did ignore them! :D

It's similar to my other favourite where US intelligence/policing agencies ignored all this intel re an impending attack and did nothing to act on it. The US discovered that it was going to attack itself and decided to help itself by not stopping itself or outing itself. Luckily those that discovered the cat out of the bag promptly stuffed it back in and were co-opted into the impossibly vast and capable team that had let the cat escape in the first place.

(No need to respond, I wasn't really talking to you.)
 
T...
If they did have a contact already in America, do you think that would be important information?

Is this like the shoot down means a stand down stuff? lol

What is the point? There is no point. After the dumbed down inside job failed, this is all that is left. Making up BS stand down nonsense based on BS logic, and this pile of BS which means nothing.

You post a Gish Gallop of stuff and never tie it together with more than "do you think"... never getting to a point.
How did the stand down BS turn out over at woo world on fire, aka prison planet? Prison Planet? lol
 
Do you think these Al Qaeda Operatives, the first of the 9-11 hijackers to arrive, who couldn't speak English, and had never set foot in America before, would have a contact here? Or do you think KSM/Bin Ladin/Al Qaeda, are so stupid they would send them here to fend for themselves and hope they don't blow the operation?

If they did have a contact already in America, do you think that would be important information?

That is the FBI's job, not the CIA.

The FBI, after Waco, was also on a tight leash for the Clinton Justice Department. AQ had a good network on contacts in the U.S. thanks to Saudi, Kuwaiti, and UEA sympathizers. The FBI leadership tended to handle anything Saudi-related with kid gloves, usually bringing in DoS, issuing flaccid warnings, and dropping the matter as quickly as possible.

This was all about putting careers ahead of National Security. Nobody wanted to take risks at the FBI or at CIA for fear of being hauled in front of a House or Senate Committee to explain that there are bad people in the world who don't play nice. The laws and procedural guidelines were vague enough to insulate both agencies from not doing more, and that's all thanks to the Congress and the White House. The CIA and FBI do not make the rules, the elected body of US Government does, and thanks to their tendency to overreact the intelligence agencies had been cowed into hoping nothing bad happened.

We are seeing this again today, right now, with the arguments over the torture allegations, and the NSA's almost impossible to understand data collection practices. Both of which were signed off on by the vary people now persecuting them. It must be hard to commit to a risky intelligence operation when you have no idea weather your superiors will back you up if things go bad...or if things go well.

I guarantee that in five years there will be an investigation into the Targeted Drone Strikes and "Kill List" we've been prosecuting in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen, even though - right now - everybody knows about them. The CT-loons on the Hill will start digging, and then claim that we've been lied to, and we get yet another circus that ends with good people losing their jobs and our intelligence agencies being less intelligent.

To be blunt: The 9-11 attacks happened because CTists had stripped the Intel Communities of valuable tools, and erected procedural barriers that confused or simply kept FBI and CIA middle management from taking those next steps.
 
Meanwhile, the NSA had collected and intercepted Al Qaeda communications, but due to the volume that agency collects daily they actually had no idea that they had it:

And what did you find out?

Extraordinary amounts of information that NSA didn't even know it had in terms of Al Qaeda-associated movements, vast amounts. ...

We're talking about critical information about the safe houses, about other parts of Al Qaeda-associated movements that were actually resident in these databases the NSA didn't even know they had. We're talking about indications and warning information pre- and post-9/11. ...

Now, we reported this. I did, because that was my responsibility as the executive program manager. The reaction was unfortunately tragically predictable. They shut the program down. ...

What month is this?

This is in February, early March now, of 2002. …
- Thomas Drake


In fact, this PBS Frontline page not only has amazing damning information on how the NSA was so far out of the loop (not reading e-mail) pre-9-11, it underscores just how impossible it is to keep a secret:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/oral-history/united-states-of-secrets/

These interviews also show how committed those who work in the intelligence agencies are to following the law and the Constitution.
 
FBI OIG Report:

The FBI failed to receive from the CIA three critical pieces of intelligence about Mihdhar and Hazmi in a timely manner:

Mihdhar’s possession of a valid, multiple-entry U.S. visa;

Hazmi’s travel to the United States; and

[INFORMATION REDACTED]

The CIA became aware of these three pieces of intelligence in January 2000, March 2000, and January 2001. Despite claims to the contrary, we found that none of this information was passed from the CIA to the FBI until August 2001

https://oig.justice.gov/special/0506/chapter5.htm

So, what is being classified here?
[INFORMATION REDACTED]
that the CIA learned in January 2001, and didn't pass on to the FBI?

The answer is in this NY Times article written by DAVID JOHNSTON and JAMES RISEN....

Published: November 23, 2002

"Mr. Midhar and Mr. Alhazmi, who were aboard the American Airlines plane that crashed into the Pentagon, were identified as Qaeda operatives by the C.I.A. in January 2001."

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/23/international/middleeast/23TERR.html

This is where the 28 pages come in.

The CIA seems to be working more with Saudi Intelligence, than they are with the FBI in this situation. According to Lawrence Wright, in the Pulitzer Prize winning book The Looming Tower, the CIA knew these two were Al Qaeda Operatives even before Jan 2001, because Saudi Arabia Intelligence told them they were.....

"The CIA already had the names of Mihdhar and Hazmi, however. Saeed Badeeb, Prince Turki's chief analyst in Saudi intelligence, had previously alerted his American colleagues that they were members of al-Qaeda in one of the monthly meetings in Riyadh." page 351
http://www.amazon.com/The-Looming-Tower-Al-Qaeda-Road/dp/1400030846#reader_1400030846

Saudi Intelligence Agents Bayoumi and Basnan were babysitters for these known Al Qaeda terrorists in San Diego, helping them enroll into flight schools, getting IDS, opening up bank accounts, and getting housing. Saudi Intelligence and the CIA, are helping known Al Qaeda operatives when they arrive in the United States. The CIA by keeping this information from the FBI, and not putting their names on watch-lists, and the Saudis with everything else. But these Al Qaeda operatives flew into Los Angeles and didn't go to San Diego until 2 weeks later. If they had a contact in America, it was at Los Angeles.

Do you think these Al Qaeda Operatives, the first of the 9-11 hijackers to arrive, who couldn't speak English, and had never set foot in America before, would have a contact here? Or do you think KSM/Bin Ladin/Al Qaeda, are so stupid they would send them here to fend for themselves and hope they don't blow the operation?

If they did have a contact already in America, do you think that would be important information?

The FBI Penttbomb investigators know who the contact was....

FBI Los Angeles Investigative Results:

Los Angeles has determined that __________________ may be a potential contact of the hijackers and _________ in Los Angeles. _______________is an administrative officer at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and may have diplomatic status. ______________is also believed to be one of the Imams at the King Fahad mosque. ____________also fits the description, as provided__________ of the individual that _____________met at the Saudi consulate prior to _________________ "chance" meeting with the hijackers at the restaurant.
page 4/8
https://web.archive.org/web/2014092...plex.com/2002-09-04-FBI-Fahad-Al-Thumairy.pdf

Filling in the blanks in order:

Fahad al-Thumairy
Bin Attash
Fahad al-Thumairy
Fahad al-Thumairy
Fahad al-Thumairy
Bin Don
Omar al-Bayoumi
Bayoumi's

Someone who knows what's being kept from the American people(and rest of the world)with these redactions, including 28 pages of their own Inquiry into the matter.......

"I further believe that al Bayoumi was acting at the direction of elements of the Saudi government and that an official from the Islamic and Cultural Affairs section of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, Fahad al Thumairy, likely played some role in the support network for the 9/11 Attacks. In May 2003, the United States revoked al Thumairy's diplomatic visa and banned him from the United States." -Former U.S. Senator Bob Graham who led a joint 2002 Congressional inquiry into the attacks
http://webcache.googleusercontent.c...84215436&z=b65a925c+&cd=9&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

Since Fahad al-Thumairy isn't mentioned in the released version of the Joint Inquiry report, do you think he is mentioned in the 28 pages? Or do you think Graham forgot to mention him in their 858 page report?

This failure, along with the support the hijackers received from Saudi Arabia, were two of the main concerns and unanswered questions, the 9-11 victims family members wanted answers to, and was a major reason for their demand for an "Independent 9-11 Commission".

And the Commission was a failure - as far as resolving these two issues....

“The FBI is telling the truth,” Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, told Newsweek. As for why the CIA not only failed to share pre-9/11 information on Al-Qaeda operatives but forbade the FBI agents in Alec Station from sharing it, Zelikow said, “We don’t know.”
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html

The 9-11 Commission after interviewing Thumairy twice:

Our general impression of Thumairy is that he was deceptive during both interviews. Page 2
https://cryptome.org/2014/09/saudi-911-interviews.pdf
 
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A quick reminder about the "Gorelick Wall" that prevented effective information sharing between the CIA and FBI can be found here.
 
A quick reminder about the "Gorelick Wall" that prevented effective information sharing between the CIA and FBI can be found here.


And a quote from your reminder...

"nothing Jamie Gorelick wrote had the slightest impact on the Department of Defense or its willingness or ability to share intelligence information with other intelligence agencies."

The CIA had lawfully acquired intelligence that it could have shared with the DOJ. The "wall" policy meant that the DOJ couldn't legally accept criminal information obtained by illegal means, and was a policy that existed to strengthen cases that might reach trial, while at the same time tacitly saying to the intelligence community "please continue protecting us and find ways to pass on legally obtained Intel".

The above was arguably a flawed system, so as I've said before, restructuring needed to happen. I DO believe that's why there was a deliberate failure to act, a tactical stand down.

An interesting consequence of the "fall of the wall" is that the DOJ cannot now run any sort of investigation on anything without the intelligence community knowing about it.

Not that it matters, but I remember meeting Gorelick (pronounced 'gor-relic') and Reno at my Dad's goodbye party before his assignment in Brussels. So there's some bias....


Sent from our shared looking glass platform
 
And a quote from your reminder...

"nothing Jamie Gorelick wrote had the slightest impact on the Department of Defense or its willingness or ability to share intelligence information with other intelligence agencies."

The problem is that he was wrong:

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108198447949083135

Mr. Ashcroft pointed out that the wall was raised even higher in the mid-1990s, in the midst of what was then one of the most important antiterror investigations in American history -- into the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. On Tuesday the Attorney General declassified and read from a March 4, 1995, memo in which Jamie Gorelick -- then Deputy Attorney General and now 9/11 Commissioner -- instructed then-FBI Director Louis Freeh and United States Attorney Mary Jo White that for the sake of "appearances" they would be required to adhere to an interpretation of the wall far stricter than the law required.

And more specifically:

The memo is a clear indication that there was pressure then for more intelligence sharing. Ms. Gorelick's response is an unequivocal "no":

"We believe that it is prudent to establish a set of instructions that will more clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation."

This is why the management of both agencies was gun-shy about pushing the investigation beyond clear boundaries.
 
A quick reminder about the "Gorelick Wall" that prevented effective information sharing between the CIA and FBI can be found here.

LOL! Yes, the dastardly "wall".

There was no wall that prevented effective information sharing between the CIA and FBI. You link to a wiki page on Gorelick as proof of something. But didn't link to the most in depth study of the issue. How come?

In 2009 the definitive report on this so called "wall" was finally released. Nearly 8 years after 9-11, and 5 years after it was written. To release it earlier would have caused serious damage to National Security.........right? LOL!

And here is the Gorelick memo.....

https://web.archive.org/web/2011051...her.com/media/paper441/documents/5nkzph1t.pdf

A quick reminder about the "Gorelick Wall" that prevented effective information sharing between the CIA and FBI

Why don't you point out the part(s) that say the CIA is prevented from telling FBI that known Al Qaeda terrorists are coming to America, or the part that says the CIA can't tell the FBI about known Al Qaeda terrorists are in America. How about just pointing out that the CIA is mentioned at all?

SLADE GORTON wrote the following when that report was still being kept secret.....

She had nothing to do with any “wall” between law enforcement and our intelligence agencies. The 1995 Department of Justice guidelines at issue were internal to the Justice Department and were not even sent to any other agency. The guidelines had no effect on the Department of Defense and certainly did not prohibit it from communicating with the FBI, the CIA or anyone else.

Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft’s department reissued and reaffirmed those guidelines in 2001, before September 11.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/aug/17/20050817-101757-6420r/?page=all


Your link is to an opinion piece, written before that investigation and report had even started.

He isn't wrong. The 35 page report and the memo itself show that he wasn't wrong. Why are you still peddling this BS? Because you got duped by the political sideshow. This report was classified in 2004, and 2005, and 2006, and 2007, and 2008, and only after a new Administration came, in 2009, was it released. On May 20, 2009. Keeping this classified, kept us free and safe. LOL! It also allowed you to be duped, by political BS. How does it feel to be manipulated? What happened, to basic common sense? You've actually convinced yourself that The CIA can't tell the FBI that known Al Qaeda operatives, and co-horts of the mastermind of the USS Cole bombing, are in the United States?

Because you fell for Ashcrofts political dog and pony show.

If you have a better source than the following report, that has studied the issue more, and released it's report, lets see it? Gorelick Wiki page proves nothing.

Legal Barriers to Information Sharing:
The Erection of a Wall Between Intelligence and Law Enforcement Investigation

August 20, 2004
Declassified May 20 2009

https://fas.org/irp/eprint/wall.pdf

It said:

The July 1995 procedures were intended to permit a reasonable degree of information sharing between FBI agents conducting intelligence investigations and Criminal Division prosecutors.

Neither the NSA nor the CIA information regarding Mihdhar and the Kuala Lumpur meeting had been generated as part of an FBI intelligence investigation. The 1995 procedures by their terms governed only information collected by the FBI in the course of its intelligence investigations. Thus, the procedures were not applicable to sharing information gathered by the NSA and CIA. Indeed, the photographs that were shared were from the CIA and there was no need to obtain special permission to share them with the criminal agents.
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/wall.pdf

Second, the issue at the June 11 meeting was whether the information could be shared with FBI agents, not criminal prosecutors. Again, the July 1995 procedures were silent on the issue of sharing among FBI agents and thus had no application to the information in question. Although there were internal FBI walls contained in some particular FISA orders, none of this information had been generated pursuant to such FISAs. Thus, even those internal walls did not apply.
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/wall.pdf

The CIA analyst could have shared all of the information he had about Mihdhar's visa and travels without consideration of the July 1995 procedures. He merely believed it was not his role to share such information. He did not go back and ask his superiors for permission to share the information. The lost opportunity for information sharing in June 2001 was due to the failures of the two respective analysts to seek ways to share the information, not the July 1995 procedures.
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/wall.pdf

One of the Cole case agents read the lead with interest and contacted the analyst to obtain more information. The analyst argued, however, that because the agent was a designated criminal FBI agent, not an FBI intelligence agent, the wall kept him from participating in any search for Mihdhar. In fact, she felt he had to destroy his copy of the lead because it contained NSA information from reports that bore the sharing caveats. The agent asked the analyst to get an opinion from the FBI's National Security Law Unit (NSLU) on whether he could open a criminal case on Mihdhar.
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/wall.pdf

Subsequently, the analyst sent an email to the Cole case agent explaining that according to the NSLU, the case could only be opened as an intelligence matter, and that if Mihdhar was found, only designated intelligence agents could conduct or even be present at any interview. The case agent angrily responded that there seems to be some confusion regarding the wall because in his view it only applied to FISA information. The analyst replied that she was not making up the rules;
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/wall.pdf

But she was making up the rules--once again it appears to be deliberate deception

What she did not tell the agent was that she had sought and received permission to share the NSA information with criminal agents. Thus, there was no reason for her continued insistence that the New York agent could not keep a copy of the lead.
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/wall.pdf

Finally:

Conclusion

As the review of the facts demonstrates, whatever the merits of the March 1995 Gorelick memorandum and the Attorney General's July 1995 procedures on information sharing, they did not control the decisions that were made in the summer of 2001. The Gorelick memorandum applied to only two specific cases, neither of which was involved (or even still existed) in the summer of 2001.


It is clear, therefore, that the information sharing failures in the summer of 2001 were not the result of legal barriers but of the failure of individuals to understand that the barriers did not apply to the facts at hand. Simply put, there was no legal reason why the information could not have been shared.
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/wall.pdf

Have carlitos and Axxman300, considered contacting Zelikow? He doesn't know that "The Wall" is what
prevented effective information sharing between the CIA and FBI

As for why the CIA not only failed to share pre-9/11 information on Al-Qaeda operatives but forbade the FBI agents in Alec Station from sharing it, Zelikow said, “We don’t know.”
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html

"The Wall" is awesome!

"The Wall"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKMJ6H9SSms
 
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So do you agree as long as the FBI was not prosecuting (or trying to detain) these individuals mentioned in the shared intel it would be OK?

Second, the issue at the June 11 meeting was whether the information could be shared with FBI agents, not criminal prosecutors. Again, the July 1995 procedures were silent on the issue of sharing among FBI agents and thus had no application to the information in question. Although there were internal FBI walls contained in some particular FISA orders, none of this information had been generated pursuant to such FISAs. Thus, even those internal walls did not apply.
 
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