DGM
Skeptic not Atheist
I'm just going to drop this here:
President of the US: We need to blow up three buildings in NYC so we can remove the liberties of the American people.
Henchman: We'll crash airliners into them, allow fires to rage then set off explosives.
P of US: Sounds good, make it so.
The DoJ lists them as an organised crime syndicate. A different list than terrorists perhaps, but is there much practical difference in how they are handled?
CIA Headquarters are, of course, not at the Pentagon nor in New York City.CIA: Those jerks in Malaysia want to fly aircraft into our headquarters.
CIA: Those jerks in Malaysia want to fly aircraft into our headquarters. Can we take them out?
President: No, I think we'd get in more trouble if we screw it up like Africa, let's not do that.
CIA: Can we just use these brand new drones we got?
President and Pentagon: Nope
..... wheels turning.......
Sent from our shared looking glass platform
No information was kept from the Bureau.
The FBI knew when the CIA knew.
CIA Headquarters are, of course, not at the Pentagon nor in New York City.
https://www.google.com/maps/search/cia+langley/@38.9520445,-77.1540852,15z
Carry on.
That's not what the record shows
A short list of who disagrees with you...
FBI USS Cole Lead Investigator Ali Soufan
FBI ALEC station officer Mark Rossini
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzkd0C2t2s8
Your own link posted earlier:
The CIA admits that it did not inform the bureau that after the Malaysia meetings ended, it tracked Almidhar and Alhazmi to Los Angeles.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/could/
FBI OIG Report:
The FBI failed to receive from the CIA three critical pieces of intelligence about Mihdhar and Hazmi in a timely manner:
Mihdhar’s possession of a valid, multiple-entry U.S. visa;
Hazmi’s travel to the United States; and
[INFORMATION REDACTED]
The CIA became aware of these three pieces of intelligence in January 2000, March 2000, and January 2001. Despite claims to the contrary, we found that none of this information was passed from the CIA to the FBI until August 2001
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0506/chapter5.htm
The 9-11 Commission:
This information was not shared with FBI headquarters until August 2001. An FBI agent detailed to the Bin Ladin unit at CIA attempted to share this information with colleagues at FBI headquarters. A CIA desk officer instructed him not to send the cable with this information. Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI. She admitted she did not personally share the information and cannot identify who told her they had been shared. We were unable to locate anyone who claimed to have shared the information. Contemporaneous documents contradict the claim that they were shared.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Notes.pdf
A CIA desk officer instructed him not to send the cable with this information.
Mark Rossini was there.......
“When I confronted this person...she told me that ‘this was not a matter for the FBI. The next al-Qaeda attack is going to happen in Southeast Asia and their visas for America are just a diversion. You are not to tell the FBI about it. When and if we want the FBI to know about it, we will.’”
Another FBI colleague, Doug Miller tried to inform the FBI.....
Rossini recalled going to Miller’s cubicle right after his conversation with Casey. “He looked at me like I was speaking a foreign language.… We were both stunned and could not understand why the FBI was not going to be told about this."
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html
Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI.
The CIA has lied quite a bit about this...
Several hours later, this same desk officer drafted a cable distributed solely within CIA alleging that the visa documents had been shared with the FBI.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Notes.pdf
The CIA became aware of these three pieces of intelligence in January 2000, March 2000, and January 2001. Despite claims to the contrary, we found that none of this information was passed from the CIA to the FBI until August 2001
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0506/chapter5.htm
Head of CIA explaining to Joint Inquiry why the CIA couldn't have notified the FBI about Al Qaeda operatives coming to America because "he knows nobody read the cables".....
https://youtu.be/IF38P58-rdo?t=1m15s
CIA IOG report showed he lied about that......
"In the period January through March 2000, some 50 to 60 individuals read one or more of six Agency cables containing travel information related to these terrorists."
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/Executive Summary_OIG Report.pdf
Tenet then uses the OIG report that showed he lied to the Joint Inquiry, to try and claim that the FBI officers knew about the information and they didn't share this with their own agency. He leaves out the part that they were ordered by CIA not to......
It is unclear why the OIG has selectively focused accountability on a few CTC officers when the field has primary responsibility and the FBI officers had the information about both men as soon as CTC learned of it. As the OIG report points out, dozens of officers opened and/or read the cable. page 10/18
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC_0001229684_0.pdf
"You are not to tell the FBI about it. When and if we want the FBI to know about it, we will.’”
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html
Do you think these Al Qaeda Operatives, the first of the 9-11 hijackers to arrive, who couldn't speak English, and had never set foot in America before, would have a contact here? Or do you think KSM/Bin Ladin/Al Qaeda, are so stupid they would send them here to fend for themselves and hope they don't blow the operation?
If they did have a contact already in America, do you think that would be important information?
1. Which is a lame excuse. Al Qaeda was put on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list on 10/8/1999. Al Qaeda had already attacked the U.S. on several occasions prior to Almidhar entering the U.S. And Almidhar was known as an al Qaeda operative. He did not need to commit a crime in the U.S. before U.S. counterterrorism officials could apprehend him because being a terrorist from a group on the official terrorist list is enough of a punishable crime already.
2. Or the pleas from the agents in Minnesota. Weird how all of this threat warning about al Qaeda was going on but F.B.I. management buried the leads.
T...
If they did have a contact already in America, do you think that would be important information?
Do you think these Al Qaeda Operatives, the first of the 9-11 hijackers to arrive, who couldn't speak English, and had never set foot in America before, would have a contact here? Or do you think KSM/Bin Ladin/Al Qaeda, are so stupid they would send them here to fend for themselves and hope they don't blow the operation?
If they did have a contact already in America, do you think that would be important information?
- Thomas DrakeAnd what did you find out?
Extraordinary amounts of information that NSA didn't even know it had in terms of Al Qaeda-associated movements, vast amounts. ...
We're talking about critical information about the safe houses, about other parts of Al Qaeda-associated movements that were actually resident in these databases the NSA didn't even know they had. We're talking about indications and warning information pre- and post-9/11. ...
Now, we reported this. I did, because that was my responsibility as the executive program manager. The reaction was unfortunately tragically predictable. They shut the program down. ...
What month is this?
This is in February, early March now, of 2002. …
FBI OIG Report:
The FBI failed to receive from the CIA three critical pieces of intelligence about Mihdhar and Hazmi in a timely manner:
Mihdhar’s possession of a valid, multiple-entry U.S. visa;
Hazmi’s travel to the United States; and
[INFORMATION REDACTED]
The CIA became aware of these three pieces of intelligence in January 2000, March 2000, and January 2001. Despite claims to the contrary, we found that none of this information was passed from the CIA to the FBI until August 2001
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0506/chapter5.htm
that the CIA learned in January 2001, and didn't pass on to the FBI?[INFORMATION REDACTED]
Do you think these Al Qaeda Operatives, the first of the 9-11 hijackers to arrive, who couldn't speak English, and had never set foot in America before, would have a contact here? Or do you think KSM/Bin Ladin/Al Qaeda, are so stupid they would send them here to fend for themselves and hope they don't blow the operation?
If they did have a contact already in America, do you think that would be important information?
This failure, along with the support the hijackers received from Saudi Arabia, were two of the main concerns and unanswered questions, the 9-11 victims family members wanted answers to, and was a major reason for their demand for an "Independent 9-11 Commission".
And the Commission was a failure - as far as resolving these two issues....
“The FBI is telling the truth,” Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, told Newsweek. As for why the CIA not only failed to share pre-9/11 information on Al-Qaeda operatives but forbade the FBI agents in Alec Station from sharing it, Zelikow said, “We don’t know.”
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/information-could-have-stopped-911-299148.html
A quick reminder about the "Gorelick Wall" that prevented effective information sharing between the CIA and FBI can be found here.
And a quote from your reminder...
"nothing Jamie Gorelick wrote had the slightest impact on the Department of Defense or its willingness or ability to share intelligence information with other intelligence agencies."
Mr. Ashcroft pointed out that the wall was raised even higher in the mid-1990s, in the midst of what was then one of the most important antiterror investigations in American history -- into the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. On Tuesday the Attorney General declassified and read from a March 4, 1995, memo in which Jamie Gorelick -- then Deputy Attorney General and now 9/11 Commissioner -- instructed then-FBI Director Louis Freeh and United States Attorney Mary Jo White that for the sake of "appearances" they would be required to adhere to an interpretation of the wall far stricter than the law required.
The memo is a clear indication that there was pressure then for more intelligence sharing. Ms. Gorelick's response is an unequivocal "no":
"We believe that it is prudent to establish a set of instructions that will more clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation."
A quick reminder about the "Gorelick Wall" that prevented effective information sharing between the CIA and FBI can be found here.
A quick reminder about the "Gorelick Wall" that prevented effective information sharing between the CIA and FBI
prevented effective information sharing between the CIA and FBI
Second, the issue at the June 11 meeting was whether the information could be shared with FBI agents, not criminal prosecutors. Again, the July 1995 procedures were silent on the issue of sharing among FBI agents and thus had no application to the information in question. Although there were internal FBI walls contained in some particular FISA orders, none of this information had been generated pursuant to such FISAs. Thus, even those internal walls did not apply.