“Materialism” is an empty word. An incendiary article.

[Nick227]

Nonsense - it has nothing to do with dualism. The reason that you can only 'infer' someone else's subjective experience is quite mundane. Unlike a computer, every human brain becomes 'randomly' wired as it grows and gathers information. Therefore it is not possible to 'jack into' another person's brain and make sense of their thoughts. That is why we have developed language - to communicate ideas and experiences in a common format that can be understood between minds.

Except that there is not a self that is observing your experience or thoughts. There is no point of observation, either in the brain or emerging from it. These things simply cannot exist under monist materialism. It's a physical impossibility.

All the brain can do is constantly construct the visual field to create the sense that there is a point of observation some inches back from the eyes. It's an optical illusion, one that's highly favoured for survival. The brain could equally present the visual field to imply a locus somewhere over there by the bookshelf, outside of your body looking towards it.

Thus, Fudbucker's assertion that we can never be sure that someone else actually experiences conscious awareness is false under monist materialism. Because actually no one experiencing the conscious awareness he is labelling "his."

 

[David Mo]

I don't know what a moral emotion is. Most emotions have representative facial expressions which are recognizable to both pre-speaking babies and to people of widely varying cultures. This suggests that facial expressions and emotions are part of the basic brain structure.


What is a physicalist program? And are you suggesting a dualist model?

Moral emotions, also called "self-conscious", are the emotions implied in the evaluation of the self and moral judgements. Main examples: shame, guilt, pride, embarrassment. You can see here: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3083636/ . June Price Tangney is one of the most important authors on this issue. I have studied this subject and I can assure you that the majority of experts agree in that the moral emotions are not securely recognizable by means of corporal expressions. First of all because they are too fleeting. Secondly, because different emotions can produce the same corporal expression. See Masaccio's Expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Eden: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe...ExpulsionOfAdamAndEveFromEden-Restoration.jpg . Shame or guilt? Who knows! Even Darwin recognized that the facial expression of shame is only visible under specific circumstances. Perhaps we can identify an emotion under these circumstances but measuring it is another story.

Some facial expressions of emotions, not all, are common to diverse cultures. But this is not an argument in favour of monism, because this can be explained even with the distinction between emotion and its expression.

No. I am not dualist in the classical sense of this word. I don’t believe in the existence of a kind of independent substance called spirit or soul. In general, we have sufficient evidence of the mind dependence on the brain. But I think that we have not means to translate our concepts about mind in the terms of biological or neurological concepts. Therefore, I am not physicalist. (Physicalism affirms that the translation of mental concepts from physical concepts is possible. It is usually conceived as synonym of materialism in contemporary version).

 

[Nick227]

Moral emotions, also called "self-conscious", are the emotions implied in the evaluation of the self and moral judgements. Main examples: shame, guilt, pride, embarrassment. You can see here: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3083636/ . June Price Tangney is one of the most important authors on this issue. I have studied this subject and I can assure you that the majority of experts agree in that the moral emotions are not securely recognizable by means of corporal expressions. First of all because they are too fleeting. Secondly, because different emotions can produce the same corporal expression. See Masaccio's Expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Eden: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe...ExpulsionOfAdamAndEveFromEden-Restoration.jpg . Shame or guilt? Who knows! Even Darwin recognized that the facial expression of shame is only visible under specific circumstances. Perhaps we can identify an emotion under these circumstances but measuring it is another story.

Don't they have machines these days that can interpret "micro-expressions?" Or was that in a movie?

 

[Fudbucker]

No! That perspective is pure dualism. In a monist system there cannot exist a point of observation.

This sounds like something you get from those online post-modernist essay generators. Either that, or I'm too stupid to parse this.

 

[Fudbucker]

Except that there is not a self that is observing your experience or thoughts. There is no point of observation, either in the brain or emerging from it. These things simply cannot exist under monist materialism. It's a physical impossibility.

All the brain can do is constantly construct the visual field to create the sense that there is a point of observation some inches back from the eyes. It's an optical illusion, one that's highly favoured for survival. The brain could equally present the visual field to imply a locus somewhere over there by the bookshelf, outside of your body looking towards it.

Thus, Fudbucker's assertion that we can never be sure that someone else actually experiences conscious awareness is false under monist materialism. Because actually no one experiencing the conscious awareness he is labelling "his."

I am experiencing my own conscious awareness.

But is "I" a coherent thing, or a bundle of perceptions, or a global workspace, or a disembodied soul, or information integration, or a bit of simulation code?...and we can see why people get exasperated with philosophy.

I go with my intuitions on this one. I am not a zombie. There is something that is like to be me (me), and I experience and observe things. One of the things I experience is my own conscious awareness.

 

[Fudbucker]

(This is very apparent in the case of moral emotions when the cultural determinant is stronger). The observation of the behaviour is only valid for standard situations and in the cases of strong emotions.

I don't know what a moral emotion is. Most emotions have representative facial expressions which are recognizable to both pre-speaking babies and to people of widely varying cultures. This suggests that facial expressions and emotions are part of the basic brain structure.

This is why the physicalist (strictly materialist) program is not currently feasible. I am materialist because I think all the mental states are caused by brain alterations. But I cannot say that all mental states are brain alterations.

What is a physicalist program? And are you suggesting a dualist model?

That's the take-away I got too. There are brain states and mental states, and while there may be a casual relationship between the two, they are not identical. That's property-dualism.

 

[annnnoid]

Don't they have machines these days that can interpret "micro-expressions?" Or was that in a movie?

Given your habit of lambasting the skeptic herd for their ignorance (often quite rightly so) this conclusion is rather funny. No…there does not exist any such machine (not even remotely)…and even if there were such a thing, it would still not be measuring emotions, it would simply be measuring a response to emotion. Big difference.

 

[Nick227]

I am experiencing my own conscious awareness.

Not according to materialism, you're not.

But is "I" a coherent thing, or a bundle of perceptions, or a global workspace, or a disembodied soul, or information integration, or a bit of simulation code?...and we can see why people get exasperated with philosophy.

Those notions mostly refer to the contents of consciousness, not the idea of an observing self.

I go with my intuitions on this one. I am not a zombie. There is something that is like to be me (me), and I experience and observe things. One of the things I experience is my own conscious awareness.

The notion of a p zombie makes no statement about an experiencer. It makes a statement about what is experienced.

 

[Nick227]

This sounds like something you get from those online post-modernist essay generators. Either that, or I'm too stupid to parse this.

It's not to do with intelligence. You could be a genius or quite dumb, it wouldn't make much difference here.

It's just not easy for a memeplex-dominated mind to deal with reality according to materialism. I mean no disrespect or denigration with this comment. Just pointing things out.

 

[Nick227]

Given your habit of lambasting the skeptic herd for their ignorance (often quite rightly so) this conclusion is rather funny. No…there does not exist any such machine (not even remotely)…and even if there were such a thing, it would still not be measuring emotions, it would simply be measuring a response to emotion. Big difference.

Well, it might be tricky to establish a really concrete difference here. Turn that frown upside down and, yes, you do start to feel happy.

But I wasn't actually proposing that this would be a means of measuring emotion as it's experienced. I think another poster was trying that one.

 

[Nick227]

Given your habit of lambasting the skeptic herd for their ignorance (often quite rightly so) this conclusion is rather funny. No…there does not exist any such machine (not even remotely.

Ah yes, I think it was Johnny English 2 now I come to think of it!

(sent using rogue memeplex 1.1 via Sony and Tapatalk)

 

[David Mo]

Don't they have machines these days that can interpret "micro-expressions?" Or was that in a movie?

Do you know any article on this subject? I don't.

 

[Roger Ramjets]

How are you not creating an infinite regression? My brain interprets my brain's interpretation of my brain's interpretation?

Does the conscious part of your brain interpret its own interpretation? No. There is no infinite regression!

No, all computers today are non-cognitive systems.

More semantic games.

cog·ni·tion (kŏg-nĭsh′ən)
n.
1. The mental process of knowing, including aspects such as awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgment.
2. That which comes to be known, as through perception, reasoning, or intuition; knowledge.

men·tal 1 (mĕn′tl)
adj.
1. Of or relating to the mind;

mind (mīnd)
n.
1. The part or faculty of a person by which one feels, perceives, thinks, remembers...​

So you see, it is impossible for a computer, or an animal, or anything else except a person to have cognition - by definition!

It's fundamental. You can't make a computer or neural network cognitive by making it faster or increasing its processing power.

Yep, it's fundamental because only people can be cognitive. Why? Simply because that is how the word is defined - nothing more.

 

[Roger Ramjets]

Except that there is not a self that is observing

self (sĕlf)
n. pl. selves (sĕlvz)
1. The total, essential, or particular being of a person; the individual

ob·serve (əb-zûrv′)
v. ob·served, ob·serv·ing, ob·serves
v.tr.
1.
a. To be or become aware of, especially through careful and directed attention; notice

So you are saying that people are not aware of anything they perceive? Are we all zombies?

All the brain can do is constantly construct the visual field to create the sense that there is a point of observation some inches back from the eyes. It's an optical illusion, one that's highly favoured for survival. The brain could equally present the visual field to imply a locus somewhere over there by the bookshelf, outside of your body looking towards it.

Wrong. The reason for putting the point of observation 'some inches back from the eyes' is because that is where the body is. Putting the locus somewhere else doesn't make sense. Not only would the perspective be all wrong, but the brain knows where the body is from other clues (so you can't get away with imagining that your eyes have been plucked from their sockets and put on the bookshelf!).

Thus, Fudbucker's assertion that we can never be sure that someone else actually experiences conscious awareness is false under monist materialism.

We can never be sure of anything that we don't have direct evidence for. I think the chances that other people think like me is extremely high, but I can't prove it.

Because actually no one experiencing the conscious awareness he is labelling "his."

Consciousness is the state or quality of awareness

So you are saying that no one is conscious? Someone invented a couple of useless words that have no meaning?

 

[phiwum]

More semantic games.

cog·ni·tion (kŏg-nĭsh′ən)
n.
1. The mental process of knowing, including aspects such as awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgment.
2. That which comes to be known, as through perception, reasoning, or intuition; knowledge.

men·tal 1 (mĕn′tl)
adj.
1. Of or relating to the mind;

mind (mīnd)
n.
1. The part or faculty of a person by which one feels, perceives, thinks, remembers...​

So you see, it is impossible for a computer, or an animal, or anything else except a person to have cognition - by definition!

This particular argument by dictionary seems to be all your own.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Ron, that's no where near as clever or as witty as you may like to think it is.

A lot of arguments require a clarification about the definition of terms being used. You cannot understand "natural selection" by simply looking up "natural" and "selection" in the dictionary. So it should not be assumed that looking up the three words in "semantic word games" will be very helpful either. In fact, it seems likely that you have not looked up the meaning of these words either or you may have simply said "semantic games" or "word games". Why "semantic word games" unless you thought it made you sound cleverer?

Essentially, phiwum is correct, isn't he. You are using the term "semantic word games" to dismiss something you are not interested in.

Yes, I am in fact not interested in semantic word games, so I am certainly dismissing that. And I'm not buying the whole "what do you mean by semantic word games"? You may be right that looking up the definition of individual words doesn't always add up to understand the meaning of all those words in a sentence... But in this cases , I think it's pretty obvious.

In fact, the very fact that we are having this discussion, illustrates my point about what I mean. Now you and I are having a discussion about how to define a sentence, which definition is pretty easy to figure out. Regardless of the context, that sentence has a very clear meaning. And in this forums, This is not the first time that someone accuses philosophers of playing semantic games, so to even claim that the concept needs definition is a joke.

 

[Roger Ramjets]

This particular argument by dictionary seems to be all your own.

You are right and I was wrong. It turns out that 'cognitive' no longer applies only to people.

how cognitive robots will change the world

Alec Ross: It's really interesting. Because of two developments, robotics is going to be able to shift from being manual and repetitive to [being] cognitive and nonrepetitive. The significant events this year are 1) mathematical breakthroughs in modeling, [where] tasks that were once very complex to model for robots, like grasping, [are now] able to be done; and 2) cloud robotics: The notion that a robot has to have an enormous amount -- tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth -- of hardware and software has been rendered moot by cloud robotics. This essentially has made machine learning and powerful AI a much more accessible commodity than we would have imagined five years ago.

 

[David Mo]

What do you mean with "word games" or "semantic games"? I think the expression is not clear. A little vague.
I am interested in verbal discussions and persuasive use of the language, but I am not sure this is what you call "word games".

 

[Dancing David]

Some people have different views of language and do not appreciate the long threads taken in certain areas for clarity

 

[angrysoba]

Yes, I am in fact not interested in semantic word games, so I am certainly dismissing that. And I'm not buying the whole "what do you mean by semantic word games"? You may be right that looking up the definition of individual words doesn't always add up to understand the meaning of all those words in a sentence... But in this cases , I think it's pretty obvious.

In fact, the very fact that we are having this discussion, illustrates my point about what I mean. Now you and I are having a discussion about how to define a sentence, which definition is pretty easy to figure out. Regardless of the context, that sentence has a very clear meaning. And in this forums, This is not the first time that someone accuses philosophers of playing semantic games, so to even claim that the concept needs definition is a joke.

You are out to lunch if you think I am having an argument about how to define a sentence.

But anyway, what you think of as "semantic word games" are what others might call "conceptual analysis". This is not at all restricted to philosophy, but is also important in such things as biology, psychology, linguistics and other subjects.

If such things are unimportant for you then maybe it is best not to wade into the discussions about those things.