“Materialism” is an empty word. An incendiary article.

[Nonpareil]

You insisted on the other thread that consciousness has some manner of phenomenal existence. Is that 'external' as well?

That depends on how you define "external" in this context. Usually no, simply because we are most commonly talking about our own consciousness to begin with, and saying that we are external to ourselves is rather nonsensical.

So what is the evidence that this universe thingy exists as a singular substrate (as you asserted above and below)...besides your vague fantasy that this is the case.

It behaves exactly, in every instance, as though it does.

The statement is disingenuous as best…and outright misrepresentation at worst. Science currently has not the slightest idea what ‘basic reality’ actually is.

Because the question is not coherent.

This has already been addressed in previous posts by other users. The only meaningful way to describe reality is through examination of its properties. Asking "but what is it really" is inherently pointless. It is a syntactically proper sentence, but the question has no actual meaning.

If you ask an incoherent question, it is not the rest of the world's fault when you fail to get an answer.

Particles sound vaguely ‘materialish’ (until you get into QM at least...then all bets are off)…but what variety of material are things called ‘properties’????

Properties are the ways that matter behaves.

 

[theprestige]

To others aiming to turn this into another dull "science vs. philosophy" tussle: this is a purely philosophical question about a certain foundational claim regarding science. It does not appear to be an attempt to show that science is wrong and hence we ought to do philosophy instead.

Some persons are interested in such arguments. Others are not. It really is as simple as that.

I'm not interested in such arguments, but I do want to understand what the OP is about.

Would you mind stating in simple language the "purely philosophical question" being asked, and the "foundational claim in science" it's being asked about?

Thanks in advance.

 

[phiwum]

The universe exists, is external, and is monist in nature. We call this monist substance "matter".

Quite straightforward, really.

There are two problems I see here.

First, I don't know what you mean by "is external". External to what? If the answer is "to our minds", then either these minds are material or not. If so, they are part of the universe, so again externality seems hard to understand. If not, then we're committed to the existence of something non-material (namely minds) and hence deny materialism.

More significantly, you seem to have made the materialist claim more or less empty, if I understand.

Definition: "Matter" is the term denoting everything that exists.

Thesis: Everything which exists is matter.

The thesis would be true, but say nothing. It is true by stipulative definition and hence conveys no information at all. I think that the materialist claim cannot be analytically true, or else there is no point to the thesis at all.

 

[fuelair]

Does all this philosophical sturm und drang really mean anything in the real world?

No. I occasionally enjoy using philosophical stuff to prove that real things are impossible, but I do not actually believe that. Words are so easy to bend, reality is not.

 

[phiwum]

I'm not interested in such arguments, but I do want to understand what the OP is about.

Would you mind stating in simple language the "purely philosophical question" being asked, and the "foundational claim in science" it's being asked about?

Thanks in advance.

I will try my best, but please keep in mind that I have not read anything about this topic aside from the OP.

I presume there are many different theses called materialism, but when I referred to the foundational claim in science, I meant something like this: All concepts appearing in scientific theories must be essentially material in nature. This is, roughly, the restriction which prohibits scientific theories involving miracles and the like.

The philosophical question is whether this claim is meaningful. You probably have already balked, since I used the term "material" without defining it. As I understand it, the difficulty of clearly defining this term is the very heart of Mouline's argument that the thesis is meaningless.

One may ask whether this is, in fact, a claim at the foundation of science at all. Perhaps it is not, in which case Mouline's point that it is meaningless is irrelevant to philosophy of science, but it does seem to me quite common that people (philosophers, scientists, skeptics, etc.) do claim that science is restricted to material causes, effects, etc. quite commonly and that if Mouline is right, such claims are regrettable since they are meaningless.

Take everything I said above with a grain of salt, since I'm not educated on this subject. I'm taking my best shot at interpreting a second-hand summary of the article. (I think that Mouline was not just talking about the foundation of science thesis, by the way, but materialism in various other contexts as well, but I chose to focus on so-called scientific materialism.)

I hope that helps. Obviously, I'm not one to speak with any authority on this article.

 

[Nonpareil]

First, I don't know what you mean by "is external".

Not contained entirely within our own minds. That is, ideas such as solipsism and so forth are not valid; see my posts elsewhere for further expansion upon this.

More significantly, you seem to have made the materialist claim more or less empty, if I understand.

Definition: "Matter" is the term denoting everything that exists.

Thesis: Everything which exists is matter.

The thesis would be true, but say nothing. It is true by stipulative definition and hence conveys no information at all.

Empty, no. Trivial, yes.

The position is, by its very nature as an ontological proposition, nearly meaningless. It is a label, not a predictive model.

 

[phiwum]

Not contained entirely within our own minds. That is, ideas such as solipsism and so forth are not valid; see my posts elsewhere for further expansion upon this.

But if minds are material, then the universe (of which they are a part) are not external to them, and if they are not material, then materialism is false.

Empty, no. Trivial, yes.

The position is, by its very nature as an ontological proposition, nearly meaningless. It is a label, not a predictive model.

If the thesis is merely an analytic conclusion of a stipulative definition, it doesn't really assert anything at all. This is, I take it, Mouline's conclusion: that materialism is an empty assertion.

Far from rebutting Mouline, you have agreed with him, near as I can figger.

 

[Nonpareil]

But if minds are material, then the universe (of which they are a part) are not external to them, and if they are not material, then materialism is false.

This is merely splitting semantic hairs. Again, the meaning of my original statement was that the universe has objective existence and is not dependent on the mind to create it.

If the thesis is merely an analytic conclusion of a stipulative definition, it doesn't really assert anything at all. This is, I take it, Mouline's conclusion: that materialism is an empty assertion.

Far from rebutting Mouline, you have agreed with him, near as I can figger.

Only inasmuch as I agree that ontological questions are innately trivial in nature, and that materialism as a position does not come with the mechanical details pre-sorted. His conclusion that pluralism possesses more explanatory power is nonsensical and incoherent, his presentation of materialism as "what the scientists say" is a straw man, and the assertion that the existence of things such as telepathy would necessarily violate materialism is a non sequitur as well as baseless speculation.

 

[phiwum]

This is merely splitting semantic hairs. Again, the meaning of my original statement was that the universe has objective existence and is not dependent on the mind to create it.

I can live with that restatement. It was the word "external" that seemed incoherent in context.

Only inasmuch as I agree that ontological questions are innately trivial in nature, and that materialism as a position does not come with the mechanical details pre-sorted. His conclusion that pluralism possesses more explanatory power is nonsensical and incoherent, his presentation of materialism as "what the scientists say" is a straw man, and the assertion that the existence of things such as telepathy would necessarily violate materialism is a non sequitur as well as baseless speculation.

I have no opinion about his conclusion regarding pluralism.

I also don't think he said that materialism would be violated by telepathy, but rather used telepathy as an example that every possible discovery would be consistent with materialism and hence the thesis says nothing at all. I tend to disagree with that part of his argument, since the existence of a supernatural deity seems inconsistent with materialism, but I concede his point that "materialism" requires a clear definition in order to draw the conclusion I'm suggesting.

As far as materialism being "what the scientists say (talk about?)", I think he's drawn to that working definition because no clear definition has been offered. Your own definition amounts to "matter is what there is", which doesn't really exclude any possible observations or make any clear commitments. (It seems to me that, on your definition, any "supernatural" deity capable of changing physical laws on a whim would also be material, which strikes me as an indication that this definition of matter doesn't clarify or contribute in any way.)

 

[Nonpareil]

I have no opinion about his conclusion regarding pluralism.

Ultimately, there isn't much to say about it. It's just more semantics. He prefers to label all of the different forces and such in the universe as different types of entities. It's not invalid, precisely. It's just pointless.

The actual issue is that it fails to offer any more explanatory power than materialism, as he claims.

I also don't think he said that materialism would be violated by telepathy, but rather used telepathy as an example that every possible discovery would be consistent with materialism and hence the thesis says nothing at all.

3-1-3-1 asserts that saying telepathy could be a material force would be a non sequitur. The confusion on this point is likely due to unclear phrasing, however.

As far as materialism being "what the scientists say (talk about?)", I think he's drawn to that working definition because no clear definition has been offered. Your own definition amounts to "matter is what there is", which doesn't really exclude any possible observations or make any clear commitments. (It seems to me that, on your definition, any "supernatural" deity capable of changing physical laws on a whim would also be material, which strikes me as an indication that this definition of matter doesn't clarify or contribute in any way.)

Well, no. It doesn't. It's utterly trivial. All ontological positions are, by definition. They have no explanatory power whatsoever. The only requirement they have is to be coherent.

 

[tsig]

This is merely splitting semantic hairs. Again, the meaning of my original statement was that the universe has objective existence and is not dependent on the mind to create it.



Only inasmuch as I agree that ontological questions are innately trivial in nature, and that materialism as a position does not come with the mechanical details pre-sorted. His conclusion that pluralism possesses more explanatory power is nonsensical and incoherent, his presentation of materialism as "what the scientists say" is a straw man, and the assertion that the existence of things such as telepathy would necessarily violate materialism is a non sequitur as well as baseless speculation.

The essence of philosophy. Philosophers believe that the words we use to describe reality somehow are reality.

 

[tsig]

But if minds are material, then the universe (of which they are a part) are not external to them, and if they are not material, then materialism is false.



If the thesis is merely an analytic conclusion of a stipulative definition, it doesn't really assert anything at all. This is, I take it, Mouline's conclusion: that materialism is an empty assertion.

Far from rebutting Mouline, you have agreed with him, near as I can figger.

Clearly they are materiel. are you claiming that things made of matter cannot think?

 

[Sideroxylon]

Clearly they are materiel. are you claiming that things made of matter cannot think?

I some people's minds were materiel they couldn't blow their hats off.

 

[angrysoba]

This is partly why I think the term "physicalism" works better than "materialism". The idea is that whatever exists in the universe operates according to physical laws rather than supernatural ones.

 

[Nonpareil]

This is partly why I think the term "physicalism" works better than "materialism". The idea is that whatever exists in the universe operates according to physical laws rather than supernatural ones.

Also a valid label. Most people just tend to default to "materialism" simply because it has been used for so long to describe the same central concept.

 

[phiwum]

Ultimately, there isn't much to say about it. It's just more semantics. He prefers to label all of the different forces and such in the universe as different types of entities. It's not invalid, precisely. It's just pointless.

The actual issue is that it fails to offer any more explanatory power than materialism, as he claims.



3-1-3-1 asserts that saying telepathy could be a material force would be a non sequitur. The confusion on this point is likely due to unclear phrasing, however.



Well, no. It doesn't. It's utterly trivial. All ontological positions are, by definition. They have no explanatory power whatsoever. The only requirement they have is to be coherent.

I am not certain what you mean by "ontological position" or why such positions are "trivial by definition". Could you explain?

Thanks.

 

[phiwum]

The essence of philosophy. Philosophers believe that the words we use to describe reality somehow are reality.

No, but philosophers do try to understand one's meaning as precisely as they reasonably can, and so some care in choosing words is useful.

 

[phiwum]

Clearly they are materiel. are you claiming that things made of matter cannot think?

I think that even a casual reading will show I made no such claim.

I merely pointed out that either minds are material or not. If they are material, then the universe is not external to them and if not, then materialism is false.

I wonder why you cannot distinguish a conditional statement from a positive assertion that the antecedent is true.

ETA: Actually, the highlighted part read, "But if minds are material...". How one gets from that statement to the conclusion I'm claiming minds are *not* material is really beyond me.

Perhaps, Tsig, you should learn a thing or two from philosophy about reading one's words carefully in order to understand what the author is saying.

 

[phiwum]

This is partly why I think the term "physicalism" works better than "materialism". The idea is that whatever exists in the universe operates according to physical laws rather than supernatural ones.

Possibly, though I wonder what advantage is achieved. One still has to give a clear definition of "physical" that distinguishes it from supernatural, or else be subject to the same claim of meaninglessness.

 

[Nonpareil]

I am not certain what you mean by "ontological position" or why such positions are "trivial by definition". Could you explain?

Any sort of philosophical position about what the universe "really" is. Materialism, idealism, physicalism, naturalism, solipsism, dualism, neutral monism, pluralism, and so forth.

And "trivial by definition" is just what I have been saying for the duration of this thread: they are labels, not explanatory models. They possess no ability to explain anything in and of themselves. The only requirement for an ontological position to be valid is that it be coherent. Past that point, the only discussion to be had is one of semantics.

Actually, pretty much all of it is semantics.