Materialism - Devastator of Scientific Method! / Observer Delusion

[tsig]

Marplots,

You can't actually have an observer under monist materialism. It's a physical impossibility.

This is something a fairly basic machine intelligence could tell you in about a millisecond. But the human brain has been so conditioned by aeons of natural selection it's very, very hard for it to examine this possibility.

I can tell you where the main remaining challenge will come from - the possibility that monist materialism only applies at the level of neural representation. That it is actually only phenomenal consciousness that is monist. That the underlying reality is not, and that the observer exists but is outside phenomenality.

You keep confusing your philosophical meanderings with reality. your confusing conundrums are only confusing yourself (which doesn't exist according to you).

 

[Cl1mh4224rd]

Has Nick explained how one would tell the difference between "an observer" and "a sense of an observer" yet? Or even what significance that difference has to our observation or understanding of the world?

Seems to me these are very important things when trying to determine or argue the usefulness of one's philosophy.

 

[Nonpareil]

In strict materialist terms, I don't! The brain constructs both phenomenal consciousness

In which case it possesses phenomenal consciousness.

How many times do we have to explain that semantic games are not going to fly here, Nick?

I'm asking if there is anyone that sees the neural representation.

The neural representation is the seeing. This has been explained before.

How so? Please explain.

That is what observation means, Nick: the construction of neural representations of a given entity or entities through the gathering, processing, and interpretation of sensory data.

This is not complicated.

No. That notion is just an artefact of using language.

No. You cannot have a sensation without an entity capable of sensing. Sensing is observation. You cannot have a sense of being an observer without an observer to have that sense.

Your argument is utterly incoherent.

There are still issues here. The Cartesian model of an observer is, I submit, how it seems. This is how we traditionally envisage an observer existing. Someone that acquires information about our surroundings and acts upon it.

You are saying that aspects of the brain's behaviour fulfill the same function and thus the brain can be considered an observer.

But Descartes was wrong. There is no rens cogitans in the pineal. No one looking.

It may have escaped your notice thus far, but I am not Descartes.

Observation is the act of gathering and interpreting data regarding one's surroundings. The brain does this, via neural representation and processing. It is therefore, by definition, an observer.

No one cares about the pineal gland. There is no argument for a Cartesian theater inside the head taking place.

Stop strawmanning.

But this does not make it an observer.

It is quite telling that, while you constantly assert this in your posts, you have not so much as begun to actually justify it.

You can't, of course. Because it is incoherent. The brain meets the definition of "observer". Therefore, it is an observer. Saying "but it isn't really" changes nothing, and only serves to make you look extremely silly.

You can't actually have an observer under monist materialism. It's a physical impossibility.

False, unjustified, incoherent, requiring an alternate definition of "observer" that has yet to be supplied, et cetera.

Do you have anything to say, Nick, or are you just going to keep repeating the same already-refuted nonsense?

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

35 pages of semantic nonsense. Meanwhile, scientists around the world continue doing science that works perfectly fine

 

[Nick227]

Agreed.

Thank you.

How about this: agreed the science says nothing/cares not/doesn't look for an observer,

Well, there are people in neuroscience who clearly do see through the illusion, and are no longer looking. There are also those who seem to still be in trouble here. The way you put it out above one might think it's not even an issue, or even recognised as an issue. It is, I submit, an issue in neuroscience.

and nothing matching the description of a homunculus has been found, nor is likely to be, ever. This does not mean there is no science indicating intentional autonomous behavior in the case of agents is real and can be tested for.

Agreed.

All that still does not mean empiricism is shakier than before, at least not on this basis.

Well, if we drop the issue with neural representation for a moment and focus solely on the observer illusion. If we do this then what I see is that objectivity, in the sense of there actually existing subject-object boundaries, is gone, defunct. Yet, objectivity, in the sense of being able to create reproducible experimentation, survives. Here I'm still pondering as I do sense there's more but I can't quite put my finger on it yet.

Of course, if we pick up the neural representation issue again then both these aspects of objectivity are in trouble.

 

[Nick227]

Since you dismiss any other possibilities as 'memeplexes' no wonder there's nothing left.

I only dismiss in this manner if that fits the bill. Provide one shred of tangible, empiric evidence and I will happily throw up my hands in defeat.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

Well, if we drop the issue with neural representation for a moment and focus solely on the observer illusion. If we do this then what I see is that objectivity, in the sense of there actually existing subject-object boundaries, is gone, defunct. Yet, objectivity, in the sense of being able to create reproducible experimentation, survives. Here I'm still pondering as I do sense there's more but I can't quite put my finger on it yet.

Of course, if we pick up the neural representation issue again then both these aspects of objectivity are in trouble.

This relates to the difference between scientific and philosophical realism. Because we are able to count on observations that give every indication of being the same or similar enough to each observer, science is possible and we really needn't worry about the issues involved in the differences between models and some purported veridical substrate. This means reliance on objective reality as a consensual result of common experience, and science moves along just fine.

Philosophical realism has more trouble, as, like most conundrums, you can go on forever and never reach a satisfactory solution. The nature of observers and their knowledge is, well, a really short topic that, regardless, makes for infinite thread posts, which is why I am loathe to have another go.

 

[Nick227]

In which case it possesses phenomenal consciousness.

That is a semantic game, Nonpareil. Brains do not necessarily possess consciousness. If you start to ground your observations in what we know about neural activity, it might help. We actually don't know the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and brain activity. For a while it's been said that the former emerges from the latter. Now we have more models based around the notion that phenomenal consciousness is actually information. But we don't know.

You are tying things together semantically, in to me what is clearly a dubious fashion, and then claiming that the presence of one means the other must be present too.

The neural representation is the seeing. This has been explained before.

I'm afraid that simple repetition of erroneous thinking does not change anything. It does not make it true. It does not lend it weight. You can repeat it as many times as you like. Until you start to provide tangible empiric evidence for your proposal it remains weak and unproven no matter how many times you repeat it.

No. You cannot have a sensation without an entity capable of sensing.

That is correct, but you have to be careful how you tie together the entity and the sense.

Yes, the sense arises or emerges from the processing activity of system. But it is only attributed as its own by another aspect of the system's processing. The human brain creates phenomenal consciousness, also creates a sense of personal selfhood, and also attributes the one to the other.

Sensing is observation.

Observation is observing. In this context, the term can either refer to an utterly passive state - witnessing; or to an arguably more interactive state - seeing.

You cannot have a sense of being an observer without an observer to have that sense.

You can and do. It's the only way a fundamentally monist system can give itself a seemingly dual experience.

Observation is the act of gathering and interpreting data regarding one's surroundings. The brain does this, via neural representation and processing. It is therefore, by definition, an observer.

No one cares about the pineal gland. There is no argument for a Cartesian theater inside the head taking place.

It's relevant because you're giving a behaviour a name whose meaning originates in a now dismissed scientific perspective. How it seems is that there is a locus of attention inside the head.

But even if I drop this, it is still the case that all you are doing is defining the brain as an observer because of aspects of its behaviour. It's nothing new. I've heard the same position years ago from PixyMisa, RandFan, Darat and all the old faithfuls on this forum.

The problem for me is that it doesn't account for how things appear. And any meaningful, material theory needs to do this. It seems as though there is someone that is observing these hands typing these words. Simply saying it's the brain is actually not much use. Because it seems like there is someone there. Saying it's the brain to me is just word games. I want to know, if it's an illusion, then how is that illusion coming about. That is why I studied these things. And that is why I now know. And I'm still not entirely 100% happy with the explanation!

 

[Nick227]

35 pages of semantic nonsense. Meanwhile, scientists around the world continue doing science that works perfectly fine

Well, the bit about it working fine depends who you ask, I submit. And I doubt you'll be quite so excited about science Come the Singularity.

[laughs] Rather like how old marxists used to say Come the Revolution.

 

[tsig]

That is a semantic game, Nonpareil. Brains do not necessarily possess consciousness. If you start to ground your observations in what we know about neural activity, it might help. We actually don't know the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and brain activity. For a while it's been said that the former emerges from the latter. Now we have more models based around the notion that phenomenal consciousness is actually information. But we don't know.

You are tying things together semantically, in to me what is clearly a dubious fashion, and then claiming that the presence of one means the other must be present too.




I'm afraid that simple repetition of erroneous thinking does not change anything. It does not make it true. It does not lend it weight. You can repeat it as many times as you like. Until you start to provide tangible empiric evidence for your proposal it remains weak and unproven no matter how many times you repeat it.



That is correct, but you have to be careful how you tie together the entity and the sense.

Yes, the sense arises or emerges from the processing activity of system. But it is only attributed as its own by another aspect of the system's processing. The human brain creates phenomenal consciousness, also creates a sense of personal selfhood, and also attributes the one to the other.



Observation is observing. In this context, the term can either refer to an utterly passive state - witnessing; or to an arguably more interactive state - seeing.




You can and do. It's the only way a fundamentally monist system can give itself a seemingly dual experience.



It's relevant because you're giving a behaviour a name whose meaning originates in a now dismissed scientific perspective. How it seems is that there is a locus of attention inside the head.

But even if I drop this, it is still the case that all you are doing is defining the brain as an observer because of aspects of its behaviour. It's nothing new. I've heard the same position years ago from PixyMisa, RandFan, Darat and all the old faithfuls on this forum.

The problem for me is that it doesn't account for how things appear. And any meaningful, material theory needs to do this. It seems as though there is someone that is observing these hands typing these words. Simply saying it's the brain is actually not much use. Because it seems like there is someone there. Saying it's the brain to me is just word games. I want to know, if it's an illusion, then how is that illusion coming about. That is why I studied these things. And that is why I now know. And I'm still not entirely 100% happy with the explanation!

Yes, we know that your insight is so much deeper than anyone elses' insight and that this gives the you that does not exist much pleasure.

Yet in spite of the fact that you argue so fervently that there is no observer you keep observing and responding and when it is pointed out that without an observer there can be no response your reply is memeplex101, neuroscience proves me right and simple denial.

 

[Nonpareil]

That is a semantic game, Nonpareil.

It's really not.

Brains do not necessarily possess consciousness.

Yes, they really do. Or they produce it, or whatever term you wish to use.

Do we know precisely how? No. But there is no coherent argument, scientific or otherwise, against the idea that consciousness is brain activity.

I'm afraid that simple repetition of erroneous thinking does not change anything. It does not make it true. It does not lend it weight. You can repeat it as many times as you like. Until you start to provide tangible empiric evidence for your proposal it remains weak and unproven no matter how many times you repeat it.

The lack of self-awareness here is staggering.

That is correct

Then we're done here. The brain is an observer.

Observation is observing. In this context, the term can either refer to an utterly passive state - witnessing; or to an arguably more interactive state - seeing.

This is meandering nonsense and does not answer the point raised in any form.

You can and do. It's the only way a fundamentally monist system can give itself a seemingly dual experience.

Seemingly is not the same as actually.

Dualism is not required for the existence of observers. You have yet to provide any coherent argument as to why it would be. You simply assert that it is, then run about in circles, utterly failing to provide any reasoning to support that whatsoever.

Meanwhile, materialistic models are still having no problem accounting for it.

It's relevant because you're giving a behaviour a name whose meaning originates in a now dismissed scientific perspective. How it seems is that there is a locus of attention inside the head.

No one said this. No one has argued this. This is your own inability to understand what has been said to you at fault.

The brain is an observer. No one but you has brought up the idea of the Cartesian theater as an explanation for this.

But even if I drop this, it is still the case that all you are doing is defining the brain as an observer because of aspects of its behaviour.

Yyyyyyes. Because that's what a definition is for.

The problem for me is that it doesn't account for how things appear.

You have yet to show any way that it fails to.

It seems as though there is someone that is observing these hands typing these words. Simply saying it's the brain is actually not much use. Because it seems like there is someone there.

And there is. It's the brain.

We are still waiting on any sort of coherent objection to this.

 

[Nick227]

This relates to the difference between scientific and philosophical realism. Because we are able to count on observations that give every indication of being the same or similar enough to each observer, science is possible and we really needn't worry about the issues involved in the differences between models and some purported veridical substrate. This means reliance on objective reality as a consensual result of common experience, and science moves along just fine.

As I see it, you are confusing the two issues now. I could be wrong, but that's how it appears to me. The reproducibility of experimentation, and the evidential weight this accrues, refers only to this Observer Illusion argument. It says, essentially, OK so there is no subject, but there is still reproducibility.

But the issue surrounding veridicality is not the same as I see it. The belief is that we are investigating reality, not merely neural behaviour. So we do need to be to able quantify any deviation between the two, otherwise all bets are off. Being able to reproduce experiments makes no difference if we can't find a way to assess how accurate neural representations are.

Philosophical realism has more trouble, as, like most conundrums, you can go on forever and never reach a satisfactory solution. The nature of observers and their knowledge is, well, a really short topic that, regardless, makes for infinite thread posts, which is why I am loathe to have another go.

Nevertheless you seem to have the behaviour of continuing to take part in this discussion!
Though I do divine from your responses that you do prefer to hang back until you feel I've really stepped over a line - a popular theme in martial arts movies by the way!

 

[Nick227]

Yes, we know that your insight is so much deeper than anyone elses' insight and that this gives the you that does not exist much pleasure.

I just don't accept utterly feeble explanations, that's all.

Yet in spite of the fact that you argue so fervently that there is no observer you keep observing and responding and when it is pointed out that without an observer there can be no response ...

You are asserting then that a bimetallic strip that makes a rad circuit is an observer of temperature?

 

[Hlafordlaes]

... You have yet to provide any coherent argument as to why it would be. You simply assert that it is, then run about in circles, utterly failing to provide any reasoning to support that whatsoever.... No one said this. No one has argued this. This is your own inability to understand what has been said to you at fault.

The brain is an observer. No one but you has brought up the idea of the Cartesian theater as an explanation for this.

For my part, I get what Nick227 is trying to accomplish, which is to come to terms with a realization that is in itself an important one. I grant there is a mix of elements that he is drawing from and that is getting him into difficulties, but my impression is that there is an ongoing exploration that he might yet find fruitful. We may have been there and done that, but the exact when and how were aleatory and fortuitous. How about a little patience?

 

[Hlafordlaes]

The reproducibility of experimentation, and the evidential weight this accrues, refers only to this Observer Illusion argument. It says, essentially, OK so there is no subject, but there is still reproducibility.

Good enough for our work.

But the issue surrounding veridicality is not the same as I see it. The belief is that we are investigating reality, not merely neural behaviour. So we do need to be to able quantify any deviation between the two, otherwise all bets are off. Being able to reproduce experiments makes no difference if we can't find a way to assess how accurate neural representations ideas/concepts are.

By moving just a step more away from references to neuroscience and using the changed term above, you have defined the philosophical issue: Is there a gap between references and referents, what is it, can it be closed, and if all knowledge is ever models, including the results from experiment, what then is real? Or, in short for now, what does veridical mean for you?

Nevertheless you seem to have the behaviour of continuing to take part in this discussion! Though I do divine from your responses that you do prefer to hang back until you feel I've really stepped over a line - a popular theme in martial arts movies by the way!

I only have an acquired habit from the guy who I used to debate this sort of thing with all the time on another board (physicist), which is to be always careful not to mix science and philosophy, or if unavoidable, to be clear about terms and domains. Had I his chops, you might indeed have to fear some flying drop kicks. I may step on a toe or two, though.

 

[Nick227]

Dualism is not required for the existence of observers. You have yet to provide any coherent argument as to why it would be.

The only non-dualist means of creating an observer I know of are (1) through defining system behaviour as observation and then saying if there's observation there must be an observer, or (2) allowing the definition to be so loose that pretty much anything which monitors and can change the environment can be termed an observer.

And both these approaches rely on ignoring how the observer appears to be and simply redefining terms or redescribing systems.

As soon as you examine how the observer appears to be and try to account for that you need dualism. That's why Cartesian Dualism was so popular, I imagine. That's why we look for how a monist system creates the illusion of duality.

Meanwhile, materialistic models are still having no problem accounting for it.

Accounting for the illusion, you mean? Yes, I've been explaining how it happens.

The illusion is that there seems to be someone in the brain looking out. Simply defining observation a certain way does not, I'm afraid, account for this illusion. And endlessly repeating the definition does not for me cause it to gain value.

 

[Nick227]

By moving just a step more away from references to neuroscience and using the changed term above, you have defined the philosophical issue: Is there a gap between references and referents, what is it, can it be closed, and if all knowledge is ever models, including the results from experiment, what then is real? Or, in short for now, what does veridical mean for you?

Well, nearly. Actually the point I'm making is that our understanding here is changing over time, as we accrue more knowledge. Rather like a see-saw where evidence for veridicality sits on one side and evidence for non-veridicality sits on the other. As I see it the latter is getting heavier.

So I really don't see it as a philosophical debate to be honest.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

Well, nearly. Actually the point I'm making is that our understanding here is changing over time, as we accrue more knowledge. Rather like a see-saw where evidence for veridicality sits on one side and evidence for non-veridicality sits on the other. As I see it the latter is getting heavier.

Keep going. More detail. What, for example, do you mean with the word itself, veridical?

 

[Nick227]

Keep going. More detail. What, for example, do you mean with the word itself, veridical?

I mean an accurate representation of reality.

For me, what causes weight to go on the other side of the see-saw are things like...

* predictive coding
* the ability to artificially induce a change in the locus of attention
* the tracking of optical illusions to neural activity

All relatively recent discoveries.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

I mean an accurate representation of reality.

For me, what causes weight to go on the other side of the see-saw are things like...

* predictive coding
* the ability to artificially induce a change in the locus of attention
* the tracking of optical illusions to neural activity

All relatively recent discoveries.

OK, I have to sign off. But here is me stepping on a toe, perhaps. I wish for you to do some homework. Knowing we will come back to address recent perspectives in neuroscience, consider the topic prohibited for now. Because you later wish to use these ideas to address the subject/object dichotomy and also question empiricism, you need to deal with that. This is best done in the proper realm of discourse.

I will then quickly cheat and bring in some things as I see fit. However, if you wish to use science to make points in philosophy, which is the domain questioning empiricism leads to, you have to take the long road, or risk having things blow up logically.

So, what do you mean by an accurate representation? What is represented, how is it represented (referring to minds, not brains, for now), and how does all this relate back to empiricism?

Now you can bring in observers, who we are, and what we can accomplish, or what "unmanned" observations allow. Or question either notion. But all within the realm of philosophy, that is, reasoning based on shared introspection and shared experiential descriptions.

If we survive the detour, then back to what it means to map any of these notions to brains, and finally, fun conclusions from neuroscience.

ETA: May not be too active for a couple of days; much work. It depends, so maybe sooner.