Materialism - Devastator of Scientific Method! / Observer Delusion

[Cl1mh4224rd]

And that is where Nick's argument falls to bits.

He knows it, too. You'll observe that, while responding to that same post, he deliberately cut out the "How?" and made no attempt to respond to it.

 

[Nonpareil]

He knows it, too. You'll observe that, while responding to that same post, he deliberately cut out the "How?" and made no attempt to respond to it.

Quite. Because there is no answer possible, from his position. That would require coherent definitions to work from.

He does not have those.

 

[abaddon]

He knows it, too. You'll observe that, while responding to that same post, he deliberately cut out the "How?" and made no attempt to respond to it.

This is why I dislike philosophy in general.

Sure, some of it is useful in limited ways.

But as the proponent is attempting to apply it, it ends up as useless navel gazing crap.

Proposing that all scientific research be suspended and the scientific method be revoked on the basis of a random brain-fart is simply moronic. I have never happened upon anyone proposing such a thing as real.


Until recently.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

Well, my interest was in examining to what degree the significance of scientific method might be undermined by two factors relating to modern neuroscience...

OK, let's see how they play out.

1) mounting evidence that perception, certainly visual perception, is non-veridical and essentially just neural representation engineered by evolution.

Neuroscience is not involved in determining the match between perception and 'pure' reality. One reason is that there are no mind-free standards of comparison. Vision is a good example of how brains model reality, using when possible short-cuts and past experience.

But your point is one of philosophy, specifically the mind-dependence of reality, given that one deals with mind-massaged data only, etc.

2) the absence of an observer, or the absence of any limited observer

Definitely way outside neuroscience.

Personally, I figure it's clear that (1) is potentially troublesome for science. It could be that space, time and all sorts of other phenomena actually exist only within the dynamics of neural representation.

Google anti-realism for once, please. That is what seems to fascinate you.

 

[Aridas]

A bit belatedly, but I'll revisit this because I get more annoyed by bad arguments than bad conclusions. The turtles all the way down references could only potentially be relevant if Nick227 himself was also claiming certain other things. Merely claiming that observers cannot exist under a particular paradigm can't really lead to that particular objection. Other problems are certainly in play, given his arguments, but I don't think that I've seen Nick227 meet the requirements for infinite regress to be invoked, anywhere. It is, of course, tempting to demand that he hold positions that are true by definition as true, but he's made it clear that he does not desire to do so.

 

[Mojo]

Merely claiming that observers cannot exist under a particular paradigm can't really lead to that particular objection.

How about claiming that observers don't exist, but illusions of observers do?

 

[Aridas]

How about claiming that observers don't exist, but illusions of observers do?

Nope. If you recall, using "turtles all the way down" is only valid in the more usual context because the premises of the logic force the choice between endless recursion and special pleading. Leaving open the possibility that there simply are no actual observers or that the specific paradigm addressed isn't necessarily the case, as Nick227 seems to have done, avoids that particular dilemma. It invites other objections, yes, but not that particular one.

 

[Nick227]

And the process of creating this neural representation is observation.

Consider this question... what makes our brains so sure there's an observer, when no empiric evidence can be found for one?

One thing, I submit, is that neural representations are invariably constructed to create the impression that there is someone within them. That there is this fixed "observer" somewhere roughly a few inches back from the eyes, somewhere around the centre of the head. This is how most people report it.

We move around, and some elements of our visual field remain relatively unchanged - the locus, as mentioned above, and the body. Thus it certainly seems that there is a fixed locus of perception, contained within the body.

However, it has been demonstrated that applying electrical current to a certain brain region, the temporal-parietal junction, causes this apparent locus to shift, creating an out-of-body experience.

How could we account for this? The answer, I submit, is that the brain is normally constructing neural representations a certain way - to suggest this locus just back from the eyes. But that this is not something that is intrinsic to this apparent phenomenon of observation, rather something evolution has engineered.

The brain is constructing a pseudo-dualistic perspective because that is so favoured. But a small electrical interference in a crucial part of the brain disturbs how this representation is constructed, and the locus shifts.

IMO it's likely that the brain is actually using a "perspective schema" and simply placing informational articles upon it. Because it is constantly being presented in the same manner the brain believes that there must be an "observer" inside the head.

 

[Nick227]

Neuroscience is not involved in determining the match between perception and 'pure' reality.

No. I agree. But our developing understanding of how sensory awareness is constructed by the brain can affect science as a whole.

As I see it, a couple of millenia ago we had Plato's Cave. Maybe we don't see reality but just mind-constructed images dancing on the wall.

Well, this "maybe" is all very well, but of course just a "maybe." Anti-realists might want to declaim science on the basis of this "maybe," but pragmatically science might as well continue to investigate and formulate hypotheses, test them etc. This is how I see things.

However, as time and science progresses, so this "maybe" starts to get stronger, starts to become "probably", starts to become "almost certainly." This is because the more we research, the more we discover evidence that brain is creating representations of reality. Looking at Necker cubes or neon colour spreading under fMRI; artificially shifting the locus of perception; discovering things like bayesian predictive coding. The evidence stacks up.

And this evidence actually undermines the very principles that are uncovering it. Leading some to proclaim that we can ignore neuroscience here! But I don't see it that way. I'm pragmatic. We need constant assessment of the implications of a neurally-constructed reality schema to science as a whole.

If space and even perhaps time are just aspects of some neurally-constructed schema of perception or attention, this is I submit extremely relevant to many, many fields of science.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

No. I agree. But our developing understanding of how sensory awareness is constructed by the brain can affect science as a whole.

As I see it, a couple of millenia ago we had Plato's Cave. Maybe we don't see reality but just mind-constructed images dancing on the wall.

Well, this "maybe" is all very well, but of course just a "maybe." Anti-realists might want to declaim science on the basis of this "maybe," but pragmatically science might as well continue to investigate and formulate hypotheses, test them etc. This is how I see things.

However, as time and science progresses, so this "maybe" starts to get stronger, starts to become "probably", starts to become "almost certainly." This is because the more we research, the more we discover evidence that brain is creating representations of reality. Looking at Necker cubes or neon colour spreading under fMRI; artificially shifting the locus of perception; discovering things like bayesian predictive coding. The evidence stacks up.

And this evidence actually undermines the very principles that are uncovering it. Leading some to proclaim that we can ignore neuroscience here! But I don't see it that way. I'm pragmatic. We need constant assessment of the implications of a neurally-constructed reality schema to science as a whole.

If space and even perhaps time are just aspects of some neurally-constructed schema of perception or attention, this is I submit extremely relevant to many, many fields of science.

These are some of the issues that the anti-realist debate brings up. The relevance of neuroscience, in my view, is only at the level of arguing for the relative merit of sensory signaling. Otherwise, pure philosophy. Which is fine; just not to be confused with doing science.

 

[Nick227]

There's no reason here that at all addresses how the observer you propose is viable under dualism would be any less subject to the logic that you're employing to say that there's no possible observer under a monistic system.

Well, as I see it, if we did live in a Cartesian Dualistic universe the observer would be fine, certainly in principle and to a degree. Someone is observing, or there is a point of observation, a point of witnessing somewhere in a field of rens cogitans or whatever back behind the pineal gland. I mean we have combination issues, mind-body stuff, but still it seems viable.

But in a monist system, you can't do it. All you can do, as this thread is demonstrating, is re-describe neural processing to call it observation! That's the best that can be done - adhere to a memetically-created narrative that justifies the notion of observation. And then just keep on repeating this narrative in the hope that you succeed in convincing yourself!

I prefer to ask the question - how does a monist system give itself this pseudo-dualistic perspective? And this to me is fairly clear...

1) it constantly constructs visual representations so that they appear to have a locus within the head.

2) it adheres to narratives that constantly construct subject-object relationships - an "I" observing or experiencing an outer world.

These two things are, I submit, enough to convince the vast majority of brains that an observer exists within it.

 

[Nick227]

These are some of the issues that the anti-realist debate brings up. The relevance of neuroscience, in my view, is only at the level of arguing for the relative merit of sensory signaling. Otherwise, pure philosophy. Which is fine; just not to be confused with doing science.

Well, personally, I feel you are introducing a level of separation between philosophy and science which is unrealistic in this situation.

 

[Nick227]

He knows it, too. You'll observe that, while responding to that same post, he deliberately cut out the "How?" and made no attempt to respond to it.

That's because in some 1332 posts still not one shred of evidence has been presented that an observer can exist under monism.

Meanwhile, I'm providing both an uncontested neural explanation for the apparent phenomenon of observation, and additionally pointing out how visual consciousness can seem to reinforce the idea of an observer, without there actually being one.

 

[Nonpareil]

Consider this question... what makes our brains so sure there's an observer, when no empiric evidence can be found for one?

Except the evidence which has already been presented - i.e., that you exist and are provably an observer - you mean.

Thirty-second verse, same as the first...

IMO it's likely that the brain is actually using a "perspective schema" and simply placing informational articles upon it. Because it is constantly being presented in the same manner the brain believes that there must be an "observer" inside the head.

As has already been pointed out many times, in order to have this belief, the brain must be an observer. You seem to be under the impression that the brain's perceptions being fallible somehow alters this.

It does not.

This is because the more we research, the more we discover evidence that brain is creating representations of reality.

Observing, in other words.

And this evidence actually undermines the very principles that are uncovering it.

You have yet to show how this is in any way true.

We need constant assessment of the implications of a neurally-constructed reality schema to science as a whole.

It has been assessed.

The answer is "pretty much none, because science already takes into account that people aren't necessarily seeing things exactly as they are". That is, as has again been pointed out to you repeatedly, pretty much the point of science.

If space and even perhaps time are just aspects of some neurally-constructed schema of perception or attention

This idea is incoherent. It is an attempted appeal to solipsism, which, as has again been pointed out repeatedly, nothing but pointless semantic games.

Well, as I see it, if we did live in a Cartesian Dualistic universe the observer would be fine, certainly in principle and to a degree. Someone is observing, or there is a point of observation, a point of witnessing somewhere in a field of rens cogitans or whatever back behind the pineal gland. I mean we have combination issues, mind-body stuff, but still it seems viable.

But in a monist system, you can't do it.

You can. Quite easily, in fact.

All you can do, as this thread is demonstrating, is re-describe neural processing to call it observation!

No. Again, observation is not just processing; it is the gathering and interpretation of sensory data.

And you have yet to form any actual coherent objection to this, other than waving your hands and saying "b-but that's not really observation! real observation requires magic!" without ever even beginning to justify it.

 

[Nonpareil]

On yet another oft-repeated note: this could all be dealt with very simply if you were actually willing to provide a coherent definition of "observation".

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

"Mr Parker, on the night of the murder, did you see mrs Kellaway take the gun?"

"Nope. I didn't observe anything. My brain performed a neural representation of the image of mrs Kellaway holding the gun... But that is not observation, so I didn't in fact see anything"

"Thank you, Mr Parker. No more questions, your Honor"

 

[Nick227]

On yet another oft-repeated note: this could all be dealt with very simply if you were actually willing to provide a coherent definition of "observation".

Someone that experiences phenomenal consciousness.

The laptop in front of you right now... is it being seen by anyone... or it is just there? There's a neural representation in front of you, correct? Is that representation witnessed by anyone?

I'm saying that this sense of there being "someone that sees the laptop" is emerging from brain activity, but that this is just a sense of an observer emerging, not an actual observer emerging.

I'm saying that under monism you cannot have someone that experiences phenomenal consciousness. No matter how powerful the illusion may seem, it's not possible that it's real.

As this thread has shown, there exists precisely zero empiric evidence for an observer of phenomenal consciousness.

 

[Nick227]

No. Again, observation is not just processing; it is the gathering and interpretation of sensory data.

And you have yet to form any actual coherent objection to this, other than waving your hands and saying "b-but that's not really observation! real observation requires magic!" without ever even beginning to justify it.

OK, well let's try and make some progress here then.

You seem to be saying that as long as a system has behaviour consistent with observation (presumably in the Cartesian sense) then it can be deemed an observer.

So, let's pop back a few pages to one of those Henry hoovers with the eyes on the front. We've added an eye motion detector and wired up a little servo so that it can jiggle around as though tracking the movements of an exterior agency. Is the hoover thus modified an observer?

How about a bi-metallic strip that makes a circuit switching on a radiator? Is it an observer?

Are you happy that even if a system has nowhere near the processing complexity to construct phenomenal consciousness it can still be an observer?

 

[Nonpareil]

Someone that experiences phenomenal consciousness.

So still you, then. Presumably, anyway, unless you want to argue that you don't possess phenomenal consciousness. Which could be an interesting discussion, but seems rather silly to bring up if you don't think it's true.

The laptop in front of you right now... is it being seen by anyone... or it is just there?

Both.

There's a neural representation in front of you, correct?

No. There is a computer in front of me, and a neural representation of that computer inside my brain.

Is that representation witnessed by anyone?

The representation is the witnessing.

We have been over this multiple times in the past few pages. It is an exceptionally simple and straightforward matter. You have still not presented any sort of coherent objection to the existence of an observer.

I'm saying that this sense of there being "someone that sees the laptop" is emerging from brain activity, but that this is just a sense of an observer emerging, not an actual observer emerging.

Yes. You have also said this multiple times. It has been utterly incoherent every time. In order for there to be a sensation, there must be a consciousness capable of sensing - which is an observer.

I'm saying that under monism you cannot have someone that experiences phenomenal consciousness.

And utterly failing to justify this claim.

No matter how powerful the illusion may seem, it's not possible that it's real.

Define "real" in this context.

As this thread has shown, there exists precisely zero empiric evidence for an observer of phenomenal consciousness.

Except that you exist, and possess consciousness.

You seem to be saying that as long as a system has behaviour consistent with observation (presumably in the Cartesian sense) then it can be deemed an observer.

Obviously. That is what it means to be something.

Are you happy that even if a system has nowhere near the processing complexity to construct phenomenal consciousness it can still be an observer?

Possibly. The answer to this is largely dependent upon semantics, and how narrowly you define "consciousness" and "observation".

Whatever the answer to the above, you are still no closer to disproving the existence of observers.

 

[Aridas]

Well, as I see it, if we did live in a Cartesian Dualistic universe the observer would be fine, certainly in principle and to a degree. Someone is observing, or there is a point of observation, a point of witnessing somewhere in a field of rens cogitans or whatever back behind the pineal gland. I mean we have combination issues, mind-body stuff, but still it seems viable.

But in a monist system, you can't do it. All you can do, as this thread is demonstrating, is re-describe neural processing to call it observation! That's the best that can be done - adhere to a memetically-created narrative that justifies the notion of observation. And then just keep on repeating this narrative in the hope that you succeed in convincing yourself!

You're missing the basic nature of how "observing" works under any paradigm, though, through all of this. "Observing," to actually qualify as "observing" in the first place, requires a couple parts. First, there needs to be some way of gathering data, and then there needs to be the processing/interpreting of the gathered data in some manner. No need to get bogged down by insisting on specific forms of gathering input or specific methods of processing. Your line of argument here, is basically that because there is also processing and output, rather than directly 'seeing' (or using the input to get output without any processing of any kind, apparently, feel free to correct me if that's not what you intended with your insistence in that direction, because it is indeed ridiculous to be insisting that even could actually count as observation) it's not actually observation, in direct contradiction to the inherently required parts. For that matter, under dualism, by what you're actually arguing, the only actual difference is that there's an addition layer of processing involves. More technically, instead of the monist version of gather input, process input, output, you're saying that a dualistic gather input, process input, output, gather input from the output, and then processing it again before getting to the output would be what's actually going on in that scenario. Bearing in mind that "seeing," by it's nature, can only be just a more specific form of observation that follows the same most basic requirements required for "observing," your attempt to say that neural processing isn't observation but the processing, whatever its form, that the dualistic observer employs on information that has already been separately processed to some extent on the way there is observation, begs the question of why the processing employed by the dualistic "observer" would be any less subject to the fact that it unavoidably is still processing, and not even direct processing of the data, at that, and thus not actually observation by the logic you're invoking.

ETA: For the record, any "but there's no someone to observe" attempts to dodge the actual issue being raised here will be summarily ignored, both because of lack of relevance and because of your complete inability so far to validly back such up in any relevant way. The discussion about what actually constitutes a person can indeed be an interesting one, but it is, to be completely frank, of no bearing on the issues and logic that you've actually raised.

I prefer to ask the question - how does a monist system give itself this pseudo-dualistic perspective? And this to me is fairly clear...

1) it constantly constructs visual representations so that they appear to have a locus within the head.

2) it adheres to narratives that constantly construct subject-object relationships - an "I" observing or experiencing an outer world.

These two things are, I submit, enough to convince the vast majority of brains that an observer exists within it.

This is still irrelevant to the actual issues that you're invoking with your logic that were being pointed at, unless, of course, you actually want to be trying to be doing the Gish Gallop method of throwing out so much trash that it's rather difficult to address it all and claiming victory when it's not all addressed. That would just make it irrelevant AND have more issues, though.