Materialism - Devastator of Scientific Method! / Observer Delusion

[Nick227]

Oh, hmm... I think, after all this time, Nick's basically arguing that there's no such thing as an emergent property (in materialism?). Every example he tries to give of... something... relies on a physical object.

Nope. I'm saying that there are emergent properties. I'm saying the observer isn't one. The sense of there being an observer is an emergent property.

 

[Mojo]

Nope. I'm saying that there are emergent properties. I'm saying the observer isn't one. The sense of there being an observer is an emergent property.

How would you tell a being with an observer from a being with a sense of there being an observer?

 

[Nick227]

What would be the difference between the scientific method as practised by beings with an "observer", and the scientific method as practised by beings with a "sense of an observer", or even by automata with neither? What difference would it make to procedures or results?

Well, my interest was in examining to what degree the significance of scientific method might be undermined by two factors relating to modern neuroscience...

1) mounting evidence that perception, certainly visual perception, is non-veridical and essentially just neural representation engineered by evolution.

2) the absence of an observer, or the absence of any limited observer

Personally, I figure it's clear that (1) is potentially troublesome for science. It could be that space, time and all sorts of other phenomena actually exist only within the dynamics of neural representation.

(2) is not so clear. No limited observer means no subject. This means that objectivity must collapse. However, as several posters have pointed out, experimentation can still be reproducible and thus it is needed to figure out what this difference here might mean. Frankly it's a tough one to get my head around, but I ponder here and there!

 

[Nick227]

How would you tell a being with an observer from a being with a sense of there being an observer?

The first would require dualism.

 

[Mojo]

The first would require dualism.

But how would you tell the difference?

 

[Nick227]

But how would you tell the difference?

Well I guess first you'd need to have a dualistic universe. Then have one being that had a point of observation on the mental plane, if we use Descartes' model as an example. And another that merely believed he did - had an internalised narrative repeatedly suggesting he did. I'd say they'd behave the same.

ETA: and of course in this dualistic universe scientific method would be absolutely fine.

 

[Mojo]

Well I guess first you'd need to have a dualistic universe. Then have one being that had a point of observation on the mental plane, if we use Descartes' model as an example. And another that merely believed he did - had an internalised narrative repeatedly suggesting he did. I'd say they'd behave the same.

You're still not explaining how you would tell the difference between a being with an observer and a being with the sense of an observer.

What difference would it make to the observable universe?

 

[Nonpareil]

Well, you are obviously happy with the way you describe brain activity and ascribe to it certain qualities. And I am not. That much hopefully we can agree upon.

Yes, we can certainly agree on the point that you are playing pointless semantic games.

We can also agree that you have utterly failed to answer any of the points raised. Which is rather telling, considering that you spent the last few pages trying to pretend that no answer was given at all.

Nope. I'm saying that there are emergent properties. I'm saying the observer isn't one. The sense of there being an observer is an emergent property.

This is utterly incoherent. Again, sensation is observation; an entity with a sense of being an observer is necessarily an observer, by definition.

You are playing pointless semantic games in an attempt to crowbar in a distinction where none exists.

The first would require dualism.

No. Just functional definitions.

How would you tell a being with an observer from a being with a sense of there being an observer?

This is a central question, Nick, and your inability to answer it is due to the fact that your definition of "observer" is completely incoherent.

 

[Nonpareil]

So... The brain is a selective observer. You haven't the foggiest notion of how this could be true neurally. Yet you're boggled that I can't see it.

Essentially. Because, whether or not you or I understand the fine details of why, it remains demonstrably true.

I could sit here and speculate wildly on why the brain behaves the way it does, and why the particular thoughts taking place in, say, the prefrontal cortex seem much more vivid to our conscious minds, but there's no point in it. The why, as fascinating as it is, is irrelevant to the fact that it demonstrably does happen.

Why you have such a problem understanding this is beyond me.

Could I just ask you... Is this one of your group efforts, as you intimated before? Am I to take it that all the other posters agree with your position?

Not a clue. You'll have to ask them.

 

[Nick227]

You're still not explaining how you would tell the difference between a being with an observer and a being with the sense of an observer.

OK. In a dualistic universe I would be unable to tell the difference. In a monist universe I would know the first was lying or deluded.

What difference would it make to the observable universe?

Well in the dualistic universe it would be clear that the universe was outside the observer. In a monist universe this could not be empirically validated, not least though not solely because there could not be an actual observer

 

[Nonpareil]

OK. In a dualistic universe I would be unable to tell the difference. In a monist universe I would know the first was lying or deluded.

How?

Well in the dualistic universe it would be clear that the universe was outside the observer. In a monist universe this could not be empirically validated.

Yes, it could.

Any argument to the contrary is just more pointless semantic games.

 

[Aridas]

The first would require dualism.

Out of curiousity, even in a dualistic universe, how could the observer that you claim could exist observe without processing the information in some form itself and thus be just as vulnerable to the exact same objection that you're raising as a neurally-based "observer?" The information being funneled to the observer is, in your description so far, under the exact same constraints, after all, and it couldn't be considered "seeing" in the manner that you keep demanding must be used, anyways. Unless, of course, you're trying to demand that we suddenly accept the Cartesian Theater as valid, just so you can try to knock it down?

Either way, I do grow rather bored of this. Your presented arguments are so flawed as to be ridiculous. As charming as it can be at first to engage such things, lack of substance tends to grow dull.

 

[Nick227]

Yes, it could.

Well, what actually exists in a monist universe is a neural representation. This representation is engineered through evolution to appear in such a way as to suggest that an observer exists within it. However this cannot actually be validated empirically, and indeed cannot actually be this way under monist materialism.

 

[Nick227]

Out of curiousity, even in a dualistic universe, how could the observer that you claim could exist observe without processing the information in some form itself and thus be just as vulnerable to the exact same objection that you're raising as a neurally-based "observer?" The information being funneled to the observer is, in your description so far, under the exact same constraints, after all.

Well, I think Cartesian dualism hypothesises some sort of "point of witnessing" via the pineal. Not sure if this answers your q. Don't know that I can otherwise!

 

[MRC_Hans]

Well I guess first you'd need to have a dualistic universe. Then have one being that had a point of observation on the mental plane, if we use Descartes' model as an example. And another that merely believed he did - had an internalised narrative repeatedly suggesting he did. I'd say they'd behave the same.

ETA: and of course in this dualistic universe scientific method would be absolutely fine.

In other words, You couldn't tell the difference.

You know, Nick, this is the basis of materialsm:

We know that the material world exists.

As long as nobody can tell the difference, we therefore assume the most parsimonious solution, namely that the material world is responsible for a given phenomenon.

So far, nobody has been able to explain how you could tell the difference (so you are in grand company here), except by conjecure.

And might I add, science has achieved great results working from this paradigm, so till such time as somebody comes up with some substantial evidence to the contrary, I guess this is the way science will continue to work.

Hans

 

[Nonpareil]

Well, what actually exists in a monist universe is a neural representation.

And the process of creating this neural representation is observation.

This is a painfully simple point, Nick. The fact that I have had to repeat it this often is frankly astonishing, let alone the fact that you still don't seem to grasp it.

This representation is engineered through evolution to appear in such a way as to suggest that an observer exists within it.

The neural representation does not contain the observer. Again, the system responsible for creating the neural representation is the observer.

However this cannot actually be validated empirically, and indeed cannot actually be this way under monist materialism.

Quite. Because you have, yet again, utterly failed to understand the concepts in play.

Ask an incoherent question...

 

[Aridas]

Well, what actually exists in a monist universe is a neural representation. This representation is engineered through evolution to appear in such a way as to suggest that an observer exists within it. However this cannot actually be validated empirically, and indeed cannot actually be this way under monist materialism.

Well, what actually exists is a series of packets of data being transmitted electronically from one place to another in a monist universe. The representation is engineered by man to appear in such a way as to suggest that the internet exists. However, this cannot actually be validated empirically, and indeed cannot actually be this way under monist materialism.

The logic is ridiculous in either form.

 

[Aridas]

Well, I think Cartesian dualism hypothesises some sort of "point of witnessing" via the pineal. Not sure if this answers your q. Don't know that I can otherwise!

It doesn't. There's no reason here that at all addresses how the observer you propose is viable under dualism would be any less subject to the logic that you're employing to say that there's no possible observer under a monistic system.

 

[abaddon]

OK. In a dualistic universe I would be unable to tell the difference. In a monist universe I would know the first was lying or deluded.

How?

And that is where Nick's argument falls to bits. Either way, he must be an observer of the universe. If, as he claims he is not, then he is not capable of making the observations that he claims he does not make yet he tries to force those same observations down everyone's throat.

 

[Roger Ramjets]

And that is where Nick's argument falls to bits. Either way, he must be an observer of the universe. If, as he claims he is not, then he is not capable of making the observations that he claims he does not make

You don't understand.

Definition of observer:
noun
1 A person who watches or notices something:​

In a monist universe nobody can observe anything, because people don't exist!