Materialism - Devastator of Scientific Method! / Observer Delusion

[Nick227]

You have yet to coherently explain how.

Well, I have been trying. You may not agree that it's coherent but I am trying.

For a start whole areas of science may be in reality just branches of neuroscience. Particle physics for example. Are we just inadvertently investigating the dynamics of neural representation? And this could be applied to plenty more fields.

I take it that you can see no cause for concern here?

 

[theprestige]

I'm not making an anti-real argument, though. I'm saying we need to investigate because this shift towards perception being neural representation could have a considerable knock-on effect.

Why do you expect it to have *any* knock-on effect?

 

[Nonpareil]

For a start whole areas of science may be in reality just branches of neuroscience. Particle physics for example. Are we just inadvertently investigating the dynamics of neural representation? And this could be applied to plenty more fields.

I take it that you can see no cause for concern here?

No, because your idea is still entirely incoherent.

What you have here, so far as I can make out, is a poorly-worded attempt at saying "our brains may be feeding us entirely inaccurate information, so how do we know anything is really true?", which has already been addressed in this thread - see the previous discussion on the brain-in-a-vat idea. It is nothing but incoherent semantic games.

 

[marplots]

What "real" events and processes have been discovered and genuinely explained by either religion or philosophy? After all, religion has had perhaps 5000 years trying it, and philosophy perhaps 3000.

That's a loaded question. The only things that will count as sufficient answers are things that fit the notion of what science and useful knowledge consist of. I could just as well ask what musical genre science has discovered. Science is not concerned with creating music, so I've front-loaded the question by eliminating what science does.

Science has discovered and accurately explained, at a very rough guess, many trillions of important if not absolutely vital things that we need and use every day in this universe. What is the score so far for philosophy or religion?

Do you realize you are making a philosophical argument in this thread? It strikes me as odd that anyone who doesn't think philosophy has merit would do so.

Every human who has lived a life of any depth has grappled with philosophical and religious questions. Whether they have been resolved or not isn't the point. The very rejection of religion is based on philosophical grounds. Atheism is a philosophical stance.

As to religion, many millions find the answers they seek in it every day. They find structure and meaning for their lives that science is unable to give them. If the response is going to be, "Well, those aren't real answers to real things," then again, I have to point out just how loaded the original question was.

Science is to philosophy as engineering is to science. The engineer takes what he finds useful and dismisses the rest, rightly claiming that basic research is not a marketable commodity and only those "answers" adopted by the engineering community have value.

As to religion, have you missed the current geopolitical landscape? If you want to know why ISIS is a "thing," you would want to understand the religious compulsion behind it as a start.

 

[Aridas]

Aridas - you are just presenting a False Dilemma.

What I'm saying is that you have to assess the impact of these revelations emerging from neuroscience. It is not black and white. It is not that all science is necessarily meaningless, or necessarily valuable. We need to assess the situation.

False dilemma? Heh. That fallacy isn't actually in play. After all, I wasn't saying that it's necessarily valuable or meaningless. Rather, all available methods are affected equally in such a case, which leaves the relative value largely unchanged. The implications that you were trying to assign, in particular, would not really be challenged until such time as science was meaningless, which makes your quibble here rather pointless. Separately, that we should assess the impact of new information is, frankly, a truly obvious thing. That doesn't mean that there's free rein to try to claim whatever suits oneself.

I watched Don Hoffman present his Interface Theory of Perception a couple of times online. On both occasions he demonstrated that fitness would always win over accuracy, in terms of how the brain evolved to create neural representations. And then immediately jumped from this point to asserting, essentially, that we have no clue what reality looks like. But it's not black and white like this. You can't just jump to this conclusion.

It's true, it's not black and white like that. That, at least, we can agree upon.

Traditional science is hammered by these revelations. It means that Plato's Cave is essentially correct (though there's no one actually in the cave!). Scientists and skeptics who actually understand the issue (seemingly not many on this thread) are in shock. But the truth is that it is not black and white. I'm saying we need to put a lot of research into neuroscience at this juncture because that's the only intelligent way forward.

How is it actually hammered by these "revelations?" It's usefulness and methodology is not at all based on the direct accuracy of human perception. Consistency of recognizing particular stilmuli, yes, but not necessarily that the stimuli have the same representation. Nor should it actually be much of a surprise to most that we only perceive a potentially flawed, fitness-rooted representation of reality rather than reality itself.

 

[Nonpareil]

How is it actually hammered by these "revelations?" It's usefulness and methodology is not at all based on the direct accuracy of human perception. Consistency of recognizing particular stilmuli, yes, but not necessarily that the stimuli have the same representation. Nor should it actually be much of a surprise to most that we only perceive a potentially flawed, fitness-rooted representation of reality rather than reality itself.

Precisely. This is what I was talking about earlier when I said that scientific methodology already has this taken into account. In fact, that's rather why it exists to begin with.

Nick's argument is essentially that we should discard science because its founding principles are demonstrably true.

 

[Nick227]

No, because your idea is still entirely incoherent.

What you have here, so far as I can make out, is a poorly-worded attempt at saying "our brains may be feeding us entirely inaccurate information, so how do we know anything is really true?", which has already been addressed in this thread - see the previous discussion on the brain-in-a-vat idea. It is nothing but incoherent semantic games.

I am not saying that.

As far as I can tell your brain is representing this as the argument either because it's an easy position to refute, or because it does not like the look of the alternative! Or most likely both.

 

[Nick227]

False dilemma? Heh. That fallacy isn't actually in play. After all, I wasn't saying that it's necessarily valuable or meaningless. Rather, all available methods are affected equally in such a case, which leaves the relative value largely unchanged.

That's the false positioning again. You start with a false dilemma and then back it up by falsely claiming that everything must be equally affected. A "false equivalence" perhaps?

We don't know the truth of the matter. We don't know the degree to which scientific method is affected.

Nor should it actually be much of a surprise to most that we only perceive a potentially flawed, fitness-rooted representation of reality rather than reality itself.

Yes, agreed... a potentially flawed, fitness-based, predictively-coded representation of reality... that no one is perceiving!

I mean, how could anyone find fault with that? The very idea! Really, what can I have been thinking?

 

[Nick227]

Precisely. This is what I was talking about earlier when I said that scientific methodology already has this taken into account. In fact, that's rather why it exists to begin with.

Well, I would certainly agree that the English empiricists were likely more aware than today's scientists of the problems of a selfless reality. I actually agree with you here. And they formulated their "method" accordingly. But they wouldn't have known the depth of the emerging issues with neural representation.

Nick's argument is essentially that we should discard science because its founding principles are demonstrably true.

Ah, another representation based on ease of rebuttal rather than accuracy!

Though I would certainly agree that materialism finally creates more problems for science than it solves.

 

[Nick227]

However, precisely neither of these things in any way indicate that there is no such thing as an observer or that science does not work.

You are still making completely nonsensical leaps.

I have never stated that the increasing acceptance of perception as neural representation means there's no observer.

I've presented both these issues separately.

I've said once that they're linked, but not that one leads to the other.

They're linked in that it is harder to wriggle an observer in if the representation model is correct. It is easier to believe that, on opening my eyes, all that's there is neural representation. If the veridical model were correct then there's more space for incredulity.

But I've never said one led to the other. I have of course repeatedly said that both potentially undermine scientific method... which is pretty much self evident if you ask me.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

Hi Hlafordlaes,

Hello

What I'm saying is that the ongoing discussion as to whether perception is veridical or representation is shifting as research data accrues. And it's moving to the latter.

Define veridical for the purposes of statements about representation, and you get dumped straight into the anti-real conundrum, but of course can then take either side. Veridical, down the line, implies a non-controversial fixed external standard for comparison, immune to the effects human interpretation.

And that as this happens so there needs to be an updated evaluation of the implications for science. I'm being pragmatic essentially.

See below.

You mean "conscious" if the non-existing observer sees it, and "unconscious" if the non-existing observer doesn't?

This is indicative of the crux of the issue: these definitions, like 'observer,' are derived from thinking about thinking, about the nature of experience, but remain undefined for the purposes of science. If the question is how do agents accomplish what they do, science can help. Today, little to say about how the physical becomes the functional, it is simply known to work and so needs to be teased out.

For example, there is a recent report that it is possible to predict the word about to be spoken before the subject becomes aware of it just from monitoring wave patterns. Now, although you can imagine a good deal of tech that might utilize such a discovery, essentially this is still at the level of stimulating a frog's leg: we've found a deterministic key to allow something, but not explained in theory what is going on. I exaggerate certainly in that there is much more detail known, but it remains true that how things are precisely done physically to achieve functional behavior is unknown; we cannot read the code.

I'm not making an anti-real argument, though. I'm saying we need to investigate because this shift towards perception being neural representation could have a considerable knock-on effect.

But what has really happened is that you have discovered that neurology does not use the terms or describe the concepts you expected to be there. If you are looking for 'the spark,' so to speak, I'll try to dig up a TED talk link (this one, in spite of the source, is OK) to brain scans involving being conscious in medical terms. The range is from fully conscious to brain dead, but has many intermediates. At any rate, this global state of being awake, aware, and attentive can be detected on an fMRI (as can a coma). If you want to call this medical consciousness 'the observer,' that's a valid choice to make.

Oh no! You're falling at the last hurdle!

Who? Didn't you say there's nobody here, on either side of the conversation?

 

[Nick227]

Who? Didn't you say there's nobody here, on either side of the conversation?

Ha ha. There's always someone there when you're wrong. And that's a deeper truth than anything materialism will ever come up with! Thank you for the rest of your post

 

[Nonpareil]

I am not saying that.

As far as I can tell your brain is representing this as the argument either because it's an easy position to refute, or because it does not like the look of the alternative! Or most likely both.

Or perhaps, as has been pointed out multiple times already, you have just utterly failed to present your argument in any sort of coherent form.

Well, I would certainly agree that the English empiricists were likely more aware than today's scientists of the problems of a selfless reality. I actually agree with you here. And they formulated their "method" accordingly. But they wouldn't have known the depth of the emerging issues with neural representation.

Which is irrelevant, since you have yet to present any sort of coherent issue that it presents.

Though I would certainly agree that materialism finally creates more problems for science than it solves.

I'm sure you would. But no one was saying that, because it is wrong.

They're linked in that it is harder to wriggle an observer in if the representation model is correct.

And you have utterly failed to justify this.

I have of course repeatedly said that both potentially undermine scientific method... which is pretty much self evident if you ask me.

No.

 

[Aridas]

That's the false positioning again. You start with a false dilemma and then back it up by falsely claiming that everything must be equally affected. A "false equivalence" perhaps?

When you're poking at an underlying commonality that must be shared equally by all viable methods? Yes, that will affect all viable methods, in a relatively equal way. No false equivalence to that. I suppose the argument could be made that science relies a bit less on such than other methods tend to, though, and so should be considered stronger or more valuable if your claims had value. Not much grounds for claiming weakening, though, until there's pretty much nothing left.

We don't know the truth of the matter. We don't know the degree to which scientific method is affected.

That is not the same as saying that we know nothing or the same as saying that how it's already being addressed, philosophically, is wrong. As it stands, what you refer to appears to have been taken into account as much as can reasonably be done since around the time that the modern version of science/methodological naturalism began being used seriously. You may happen to recall that there's no such thing as 100% certainty in science, after all, no matter how strongly supported something is. That lack of 100% certainty is there because of the inherent limitations of any and all methods of trying to understand reality. Incidentally, science certainly can and has adopted methods to make more and more accurate representations of reality and if you have specific suggestions, they will generally be listened to and adopted if scientists agree that they have value. A generalized "we don't know how much the scientific method is affected" is best considered to be useless and tossed in with the rest of the currently empty speculation that only prevents 100% certainty, rather than anything of real note.

Yes, agreed... a potentially flawed, fitness-based, predictively-coded representation of reality... that no one is perceiving!

I mean, how could anyone find fault with that? The very idea! Really, what can I have been thinking?

The "that no one is seeing" is pretty much nothing other than a red herring at this point, it sounds like. Your version of "someone" has been worthless through and through. When it comes to predictively-coded, you've got quite a bit of backing up to do for it if you want to pass that claim off in any way that even could actually help your stance in any way. You can, of course, easily pass it off in ways that are entirely trivial compared to your claims, and would not at all affect whether it's reasonable to accept that observers, in the actual meaning of the term, exist.

Though I would certainly agree that materialism finally creates more problems for science than it solves.

I'm curious. What problems do you think that materialism actually solves for science? Other than just matching with the observed phenomena sufficiently well for there to be predictive value and thus providing a useful model for understanding reality within?

 

[David Mo]

All that needs to be said was said long time ago:

By all that has been said the reader will easily perceive that the philosophy contained in this book is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and the belief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit. Nor is this all; when we believe anything of external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment of the same kind. Our author insists upon several other sceptical topics; and upon the whole concludes that we assent to our faculties, and employ our reason, only because we cannot help it. Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it. (David Hume: An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature).
​

Underlining is mine.
Italics by Hume.

Materialism is not a scientific method. Only a habit of our mind.

 

[Nick227]

When you're poking at an underlying commonality that must be shared equally by all viable methods?

But you're not doing this, Aridas. The simple truth is that we don't know the degree to which science and scientific method is affected by what's being discovered in neuroscience. We don't know because the neuroscience isn't sufficiently complete yet. That's why I'm saying a lot more scientific attention needs to be focussed on understanding more fully the process of neural representation in the brain.

That is not the same as saying that we know nothing or the same as saying that how it's already being addressed, philosophically, is wrong.

Sure. That's why I'm not taking this position.

As it stands, what you refer to appears to have been taken into account as much as can reasonably be done since around the time that the modern version of science/methodological naturalism began being used seriously.

Fiddlesticks! We didn't have the tech before so we just proceeded as though everything was OK. That's human nature, no problem. But the situation is changing. The reality of a problem is emerging.

A generalized "we don't know how much the scientific method is affected" is best considered to be useless and tossed in with the rest of the currently empty speculation that only prevents 100% certainty, rather than anything of real note.

But that is an honest appraisal of the situation. An issue is emerging. It needs to be recognised and then some intelligence can be brought to bear upon it.

The "that no one is seeing" is pretty much nothing other than a red herring at this point, it sounds like. Your version of "someone" has been worthless through and through. When it comes to predictively-coded, you've got quite a bit of backing up to do for it if you want to pass that claim off in any way that even could actually help your stance in any way. You can, of course, easily pass it off in ways that are entirely trivial compared to your claims, and would not at all affect whether it's reasonable to accept that observers, in the actual meaning of the term, exist.

I agree. I'm not trying to claim that predictive coding reduces the likely existence of an observer. I'm pointing out that, in the list of reasons why we urgently need more brain research, both of these stand out.

What we have is this...

* the need to create a neural basis for optical illusions
* the discovery of bayesian predictive coding
* the discovery that we can trigger locus-shifting experiences (such as oobes) by electrical stimulation to parts of the brain

These 3 reinforce the notion of non-veridical reality.

* the reality that an observer can't exist

This undermines the notion of objectivity being real.

I'm curious. What problems do you think that materialism actually solves for science? Other than just matching with the observed phenomena sufficiently well for there to be predictive value and thus providing a useful model for understanding reality within?

i think materialism creates a useful theoretical framework from which to develop an understanding of consciousness, along with plenty of other phenomena.

What's problematic is that some people are attracted to it because they feel it will reinforce an inherently commen-sensical view of reality. That it will provide them with a platform to from which to denounce other perspectives. To a degree it does do this. But the problem is that materialism, at its core, is far far more challenging a perspective to understand than anything else the human mind has ever conjured.

 

[marplots]

All that needs to be said was said long time ago:

By all that has been said the reader will easily perceive that the philosophy contained in this book is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and the belief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit. Nor is this all; when we believe anything of external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment of the same kind. Our author insists upon several other sceptical topics; and upon the whole concludes that we assent to our faculties, and employ our reason, only because we cannot help it. Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it. (David Hume: An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature).
​

Underlining is mine.
Italics by Hume.

Materialism is not a scientific method. Only a habit of our mind.

That doesn't count. Because philosophy can't explain anything and Hume didn't invent the Internet.

 

[Nick227]

Or perhaps, as has been pointed out multiple times already, you have just utterly failed to present your argument in any sort of coherent form.

That is possible, of course. But for me the apparent ease and speed with which you misrepresent or mis-sum up what I'm saying is more indicative of defence. To me you seem to be a very intelligent character with a good understanding of much of the background here. So I'm left assuming that there is something in this dialogue that a part of you really doesn't like the look of. I assume it's to do with the observer, and would be happy to be proven wrong.

Which is irrelevant, since you have yet to present any sort of coherent issue that it presents.

You're saying that mounting evidence from multiple branches of neuroscience that visual perception is non-veridical can have no possible ramifications for science? That's your position?

 

[Nick227]

If you look back at the last thousand or so posts you will discover that the ONLY objection anyone has ever been able to generate to counter Nick227’s constant assertions that an observer does not exist are exclusively anecdotal (the arguments you yourself have made are entirely anecdotal...but I think they don't teach that until college so you're excused). Nobody, anywhere, has ever produced an empirical definition for ‘observer’ (including Nick227) and nobody, anywhere, has come anywhere close to anything remotely resembling the ability to empirically adjudicate the existence of this observer ‘thing’ either biologically or cognitively. That is the whole point. The ENTIRE basis for the argument for the observer is EXCLUSIVELY anecdotal. There is no definitive science to support it

Yes. What I find fascinating personally is the way that the mind of the skeptic seems to absolutely NEED an observer. Otherwise perfectly intelligent people suddenly descend into all sorts of mis-representation, meaningless challenging, and related defence when this core belief is challenged.

Thus I can only conclude that the Observer is the skeptics version of God - an utterly unsubstantiable belief that they seem to need to be true in order to continue existing.

 

[tsig]

That is possible, of course. But for me the apparent ease and speed with which you misrepresent or mis-sum up what I'm saying is more indicative of defence. To me you seem to be a very intelligent character with a good understanding of much of the background here. So I'm left assuming that there is something in this dialogue that a part of you really doesn't like the look of. I assume it's to do with the observer, and would be happy to be proven wrong.



You're saying that mounting evidence from multiple branches of neuroscience that visual perception is non-veridical can have no possible ramifications for science? That's your position?

Again why is neuroscience exempt from the problems you say all the rest of science is suffering from, if all science is wrong then so must neuroscience be wrong.

Your automatic assumption that those who do not agree with you must do so because they are afraid of the idea is very insulting.

Have you ever considered that you may be wrong?