So basically "I'm right because I word things in the most obtuse way possible."
Gonna let you in on a little secret here and this might blow your mind... but the English language ain't exactly the most precise thing ever created. It's has some quirks.
We're not just talking about quirks. Language is important because it's an agreed upon view of reality.
When we talk about our minds, we're talking about things: "My mind is made up". When we refer to our minds, we're also referring to places where thoughts occur, where we relive memories, experience emotions, etc. "That just popped into my mind".
If our minds are simply brain functionings, then you're going to end up where Nick is at: there is no you, no observer (no
thing that observes)- only a bunch of brain functions that we (erroneously) have been categorizing as a
thing that physically exists. When someone says "I'm afraid I'm losing my mind" we know what they mean. You would never say "I'm afraid I'm losing my running". If you had concerns about how fast you can run, you would talk about your legs, not "your running". And it's not like we're primitives talking about things we have no clue about. Even with all the knowledge we've accumulated, we still differentiate between mind and brain.
This goes back to the simulation argument. Does a simulated tornado exist? Only so long as someone is around to observe it. If no one is around to observe the simulation, there's no simulated tornado. A program is just a particular sequence of switching operations. Do programs exist? Only so long as someone is around to assign meaning to the various combinations of switching operations that the program dictates. If we're just a bunch of neural processes, then the same problem arises: what exists to give the particular brain states meaning?