What is the appeal of "objective morality"

Here we go again. The same as above as per highlighted and bolded, evidence for that fact that are rational persons?

Look, if you are willing to insist that enslavement for the purposes of sex with young girls is not a moral issue, I honestly don't have much to say.

If morality has any domain at all, it is about how we treat one another. And forcing a young girl into "marriage" so that your fighter can have sex with her is fundamentally an issue of interpersonal relations. If you think that this issue is somehow divorced from moral considerations, then you and I are evidently using the word "morality" in such fundamentally different ways as to make conversation rather difficult.

In this context, I'm not even presuming moral realism. I'm simply saying that, should literally anything at all be a part of one's conception of morality, then surely kidnapping and raping young girls is something that is within that domain.
 
Yes, I doubt that it is a condition of rationality to prefer true beliefs over false ones; e.g. in regards to the debate about verification versus falsification. It is very easy to delude oneself if you only look for the truth.

Your response suggests that you misunderstand my claim, so let me make it more explicit.

"I would prefer that I believe things which are true rather than believe things which are false, ceteris paribus[1]."

Do you doubt that the above sentiment is a fundamental condition of rationality? Do you believe that a rational being could be indifferent to truth, or even prefer falsity over truth, though falsity comes with no extrinsic advantages?

[1] "Ceteris paribus" means all things being equal. I may concede that sometimes believing something false can come with such advantages as to outweigh the intrinsic value of truth. I'm not talking about those times.
 
Look, if you are willing to insist that enslavement for the purposes of sex with young girls is not a moral issue, I honestly don't have much to say.

If morality has any domain at all, it is about how we treat one another. And forcing a young girl into "marriage" so that your fighter can have sex with her is fundamentally an issue of interpersonal relations. If you think that this issue is somehow divorced from moral considerations, then you and I are evidently using the word "morality" in such fundamentally different ways as to make conversation rather difficult.

In this context, I'm not even presuming moral realism. I'm simply saying that, should literally anything at all be a part of one's conception of morality, then surely kidnapping and raping young girls is something that is within that domain.

Look, you can believe all you want in objective morality and rational persons, but if you can't given any evidence it remains subjective and a belief.

So do I believe that what IS does is wrong? Yes, but I don't have to be rational to believe that. I just have to admit that I feel it is wrong.
 
Look, you can believe all you want in objective morality and rational persons, but if you can't given any evidence it remains subjective and a belief.

So do I believe that what IS does is wrong? Yes, but I don't have to be rational to believe that. I just have to admit that I feel it is wrong.

Right, but what I said is this: if anything at all is a proper object of moral judgment, then so is the question of enslaved child brides. Now, maybe some people think that moral judgments are all meaningless and say nothing. I can imagine that. But I cannot imagine any individual who says, "I have a concept of right and wrong, but enslavement of child brides is simply not within the domain of morality, no more right or wrong than chewing gum."

Tell you what: find me a person who believes that there is right and there is wrong but that raping little girls and calling it marriage is outside the domain of right and wrong and I will admit my error. But, as it is, all I've said is that David Mo's claim that all this is merely a political, and not moral, issue is plain nonsense.

And this particular comment about Mo's bizarre statement is not about moral realism and does not presuppose realism, but rather is a matter of how actual people like you and me use terms like "morality".
 
Tell you what: find me a person who believes that there is right and there is wrong but that raping little girls and calling it marriage is outside the domain of right and wrong and I will admit my error. But, as it is, all I've said is that David Mo's claim that all this is merely a political, and not moral, issue is plain nonsense.

How do you answer the simple reply, "That's not rape."
 
Yes, yes, very cute.

Demand that I give evidence for that which I've admitted repeatedly that I cannot demonstrate.

There is no doubt in any rational person that, if the word "morality" applies to any actions at all, it applies to the enslavement of young girls for the purposes of rape. It is fundamentally stupid to pretend that these actions are merely political and not also a matter of morality, unless one is prepared to say that literally nothing is a matter of morality.

Allow me to turn the tables. Do you think that some things are the domain of moral judgments? If so, do you doubt that the abduction of so-called brides is somehow merely political and not a proper object of moral judgments?

Why are moral judgements any different that just plain judgements? You seem to believe in an objective morality in spite of disclaiming such belief.


The Romans abducted the Sabine women and thought it a great victory.
 
There was a recent BBC documentary in which an historian lamented the loss of the antiquities being destroyed by ISIS and, to his credit, talked as civilly as he could manage to someone who shared their beliefs. To this Muslim it was quite simple: any temple or idol to any god other than Allah was blasphemous and must be destroyed. It didn't matter that these antiquities were part of his own cultural heritage, it didn't matter that these gods had no modern followers, blasphemy was blasphemy. For someone who genuinely believes that Islam is the One True Religion this is perfectly rational.

I was reminded of Jacob Bronowski, standing by the pool in Auschwitz at the end of the "Knowledge or Certainty" episode of The Ascent of Man.

Jacob Bronowski said:
Into this pond were flushed the ashes of some four million people. And that was not done by gas. It was done by arrogance, it was done by dogma, it was done by ignorance. When people believe that they have absolute knowledge, with no test in reality, this is how they behave. This is what men do when they aspire to the knowledge of gods.

Science is a very human form of knowledge. We are always at the brink of the known; we always feel forward for what is to be hoped. Every judgment in science stands on the edge of error and is personal. Science is a tribute to what we can know although we are fallible. In the end, the words were said by Oliver Cromwell: "I beseech you in the bowels of Christ: Think it possible you may be mistaken."

That quote came back to me again today when I heard the news from Paris.
 
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How do you answer the simple reply, "That's not rape."

If we will recall the point of contention, it is not that raping little girls is wrong. It is that this kind of action is in the domain of morality. So, your question is simply beside the point.

That said, when I use the term rape, I mean sexual acts performed without consent of the other partner, and clearly forcing a girl at gunpoint to "marry" and then have sex with an ISIS soldier is done without consent. That doing such things without consent is objectively wrong is another matter, and certainly not one that I claim to be capable of settling.
 
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Why are moral judgements any different that just plain judgements? You seem to believe in an objective morality in spite of disclaiming such belief.

Moral judgments are a kind of judgment, just as aesthetic judgments are a kind of judgment.

I don't know why you keep suggesting that I "disclaim" a belief in moral realism.

Here's what I deny: I deny that there is a decisive argument in favor of realism, at least to my knowledge. I also deny that there is a decisive argument against it, at least to my knowledge.

Here's what I proclaim: I tend to think, albeit without a decisive argument, that realism is correct. I cannot prove (obviously) that it is correct and I don't think that the anti-realist position is irrational, but I think that it is wrong.

ETA: Honestly, tsig, my position has been quite explicitly stated in very, very many posts. Why don't you read carefully before trying to guess what I think?

The Romans abducted the Sabine women and thought it a great victory.

Yes. So?

For one last time: David Mo said terrorism isn't a moral issue at all. What David Mo said is simply, plainly, obviously wrong, no matter your view of realism, unless you happen to think that nothing at all in this world is a moral issue.
 
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If we will recall the point of contention, it is not that raping little girls is wrong. It is that this kind of action is in the domain of morality. So, your question is simply beside the point.

That said, when I use the term rape, I mean sexual acts performed without consent of the other partner, and clearly forcing a girl at gunpoint to "marry" and then have sex with an ISIS soldier is done without consent. That doing such things without consent is objectively wrong is another matter, and certainly not one that I claim to be capable of settling.

The same trick can, and I think has, been used to take it out of the domain of morality. Such arguments might take their heft from a kind of "evolutionary determinism" as an example.

One could assert there are moral grounds for eating (or not eating) different types of foods - a la vegetarianism - while others may say there is no moral element involved, using the "that's the way I'm built" argument to reshape the context.

I don't however, think it follows that someone could be entirely bereft of moral instincts, except perhaps for some odd pathology. Still, the idea that the moral realm exists for us all, in the same fashion, may not be justified.
 
I don't however, think it follows that someone could be entirely bereft of moral instincts, except perhaps for some odd pathology. Still, the idea that the moral realm exists for us all, in the same fashion, may not be justified.

Right. Realism could be false. I've not once said otherwise.
 
The same trick can, and I think has, been used to take it out of the domain of morality. Such arguments might take their heft from a kind of "evolutionary determinism" as an example.

Just as soon as you can point to someone claiming that the forced marriages of little girls has no moral component, then I will concede the point. But from where I sit, no matter how we draw the moral line or whether we regard morality is objective or not, it seems that rape is generally considered something within the moral realm -- and the same goes for terrorism generally speaking.

David Mo's claim was that terrorism is not a moral issue but (merely) a political one. This is simply not so. It is clearly both.
 
Just as soon as you can point to someone claiming that the forced marriages of little girls has no moral component, then I will concede the point. But from where I sit, no matter how we draw the moral line or whether we regard morality is objective or not, it seems that rape is generally considered something within the moral realm -- and the same goes for terrorism generally speaking.

David Mo's claim was that terrorism is not a moral issue but (merely) a political one. This is simply not so. It is clearly both.

It is a biological and psychological issue; and political, but that is also biology and psychology.
 
It is a biological and psychological issue; and political, but that is also biology and psychology.


...so then everything is just psychology...which is just biology...which is just chemistry...which is just physics...which is just mathematics.

...but where does mathematics come from? Oh look...it comes from the same place as...morality!
 
...so then everything is just psychology...which is just biology...which is just chemistry...which is just physics...which is just mathematics.

...but where does mathematics come from? Oh look...it comes from the same place as...morality!

I don't know what everything is. Do you know what everything is?
 
...so then everything is just psychology...which is just biology...which is just chemistry...which is just physics...which is just mathematics.

...but where does mathematics come from? Oh look...it comes from the same place as...morality!

Does it share other properties then, since it "comes from the same place?"

In other words, I can easily imagine someone being innumerate, should I then as easily imagine someone can be a-moral?

I tend to think of morality as a bit more entrenched in what it means to be human than mathematics, although I admit I haven't really thought about it much.
 
It is a biological and psychological issue; and political, but that is also biology and psychology.

Before I am satisfied with this answer, may I ask: is there any such thing as a moral issue? If so, what do you regard as a moral issue?

Thanks.
 
Moral judgments are a kind of judgment, just as aesthetic judgments are a kind of judgment.

I don't know why you keep suggesting that I "disclaim" a belief in moral realism.

Here's what I deny: I deny that there is a decisive argument in favor of realism, at least to my knowledge. I also deny that there is a decisive argument against it, at least to my knowledge.

Here's what I proclaim: I tend to think, albeit without a decisive argument, that realism is correct. I cannot prove (obviously) that it is correct and I don't think that the anti-realist position is irrational, but I think that it is wrong.

ETA: Honestly, tsig, my position has been quite explicitly stated in very, very many posts. Why don't you read carefully before trying to guess what I think?



Yes. So?

For one last time: David Mo said terrorism isn't a moral issue at all. What David Mo said is simply, plainly, obviously wrong, no matter your view of realism, unless you happen to think that nothing at all in this world is a moral issue.

OK, you think there are objective moral standards but you also think you cannot prove it.

Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which propositions may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately. This makes moral realism a non-nihilist form of ethical cognitivism with an ontological orientation, standing in opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism and moral skepticism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true); and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all). Within moral realism, the two main subdivisions are ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism.


I feel frustrated by this conversation as well, I ask a question and get a lecture on philosophy which may be related to what I asked.
 
OK, you think there are objective moral standards but you also think you cannot prove it.

Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which propositions may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately. This makes moral realism a non-nihilist form of ethical cognitivism with an ontological orientation, standing in opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism and moral skepticism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true); and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all). Within moral realism, the two main subdivisions are ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism.


I feel frustrated by this conversation as well, I ask a question and get a lecture on philosophy which may be related to what I asked.

Sorry, but these are philosophical issues, and it's hard to discuss philosophical issues without introducing some philosophy.

In any case, there is no contradiction evident in saying (1) moral norms are objective and (2) I have no decisive (objective) argument establishing (1).
 
Sorry, but these are philosophical issues, and it's hard to discuss philosophical issues without introducing some philosophy.

In any case, there is no contradiction evident in saying (1) moral norms are objective and (2) I have no decisive (objective) argument establishing (1).

I never said there is a contradiction I just wanted to be sure of your position.

If moral norms are objective then where do they come from?

Please note, I am not asking you to prove moral norms are objective since you said you can't do that but if morals do not originate in humans then where do they originate?


objective
adjective ob·jec·tive \əb-ˈjek-tiv, äb-\

: based on facts rather than feelings or opinions : not influenced by feelings

philosophy : existing outside of the mind : existing in the real world
 

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