What is the appeal of "objective morality"

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Yes if the "thought" is an informed, experienced, rational, logical and intelligent one formed with practical reasoning.

In other words... if it is a thought that is based upon scientific knowledge and critical reasoning that has been learned and gleaned from scientific experience and scientific skills and a scientific education.

Thoughts are not at all very useful and most emphatically not insightful if they are based upon woo and supernatural wishful thinking and spiritual delusions and metaphysical poppycock and transcendental sky daddies.

What is logic?

 

[David Mo]

Can we focus on this item for a moment. It consists of two statements. Am I right in thinking that the second statement is intended as a premise which entails the first statement? That is,

"Wrong" or "right" are not subject of experience.
Therefore, “Wrong” or “right” are not factual (objective) properties or attributes of external things.​

If so, I presume that you think that being a subject of experience is a necessary condition for being a "factual property or attribute of external things." Is this correct?

Not exactly. To be subject of the experience (or derived from) is a necessary condition to know that something is a fact.

I'm also puzzled about the part "of external things". I'm not sure that right and wrong are regarded as attributes of external things, but rather attributes of certain actions (perhaps in conjunction with certain mental features of the actor). Are you regarding such actions as "external things"?

Thanks.

Yes. External to subjective states of mind. If the value of an activity or relation between things were objective it would be something observable (in wide sense) and quantifiable (in wide sense). The value is usually attributed to the result of the action. (Pain, love, death, etc.)

You're welcome.

 

[IanS]

Er, yes, this is why I asked you to tell me what the conclusion of your argument is. Look, am I right in presuming that the following two statements are premises in an argument?

(Premise) The only known opinion ever expressed about any such notion as "morality", objective or otherwise, is an opinion voiced only by humans.
(Premise) No other known living things, have ever expressed any such notion.​

I took a guess at what the conclusion was, based on your post. You told me I was wrong, so either tell me what the conclusion of this argument is, perhaps by adding implicit premises, or tell me that I was wrong to think that these were premises in any argument at all. Don't you agree that this is a sensible solution to avoid further misinterpretations?

Thanks much.



I don't think I can give a clear and precise definition, but perhaps I can list some essential features of morality. Part of the reason, incidentally, that a clear and precise definition is not possible is that the answer to the question, "What is morality?" depends on certain meta-ethical considerations. A realist will not answer the question in the same manner as an emotivist[1], for instance.

So, let me answer as a realist would. A fundamental feature of moral norms is that they are about the appropriateness of an act, not to fulfill this or that subjective end of the actor, but in order to attain some objective good[2]. The heart of a moral claim is an "ought" that is intended to express some objective good.

Now, we can actually drop the "objective" part for now, and just observe that moral theories consist of normative claims, that is, "ought" statements. Science does not deal in such normative claims. Scientific theories are purely descriptive in nature. The only way in which we can derive "ought" claims[3] from scientific theories is if we add some value judgment -- If I desire a fire, then (thanks to certain scientific facts) I ought to be sure there is enough oxygen in the area, but that I do indeed desire a fire is not something that I learn from science.

Insofar, then, as the currency of morality is normative claims and science deals in descriptions instead, the fundamental questions of morality are not scientific questions. Science can tell me what people believe they ought to do, but it can't tell me what they ought to do.

[1] Emotivism states that so-called moral claims are not claims at all,
convey no proposition at all, but rather are mere expressions of emotional reactions. If, for instance, I say, "Murder is wrong," I am saying nothing more than, "Murder! Yuck!"

[2] Even some moral realists may balk at this much. For Kantians, the moral status of an act is independent of its fitness to attain any end.

[3] Sometimes, "ought" statements aren't literally normative, as when one says, "It ought to rain today." I'm talking about normative "ought" statements.

In post #132 I replied to you saying that I had already explained the situation as I see it, at least three times by then; and that I was not going to keep explaining the same thing to you over & over again.

So instead of you trying to construct some philosophical argumenst of language using what you call "Premises", and introducing -

"meta-ethical considerations"
"realist worlds"
"moral norms"
"moral ought claims"
"moral theories of normative claims in ought statements"
"emotivisms and Kantian belief"


Instead of such childish unscientific mumbo-jumbo semantics of philosophy, please just read carefully the explanation I have already given to you at least three times before.

 

[IanS]

I don't get it??? Why do you project a need for certainty onto me. I don't need 100% certainty.
Further why do you assume that I find the concept of truth important. If I am studying philosophy it could be that I accept the redundancy theory of truth. I.e. I don't what to know about truth, I want to know how you understand and explain yourself and the rest of the universe. There is no universe around us, we are in the universe and a part of the universe. I understand why the idea of the model/map and landscape makes sense, but it has its limit. Right now I am a part of the landscape, sitting in front of a computer writing an answer to you.

So as real scientists have a theory of gravity with all of the above of what you posted in mind, do they have a theory of being wrong?
In short and again with the above in mind if gravity is a fact, is it the same kind of fact, that a human is wrong?

Well the main thing about that above reply is that, as you yourself admit, "you do not get understand it things (very clearly)".

And as far as you saying "Why do you project a need for certainty onto me. I don't need 100% certainty " ... I already pointed out to you that you had just done precisely that twice with your own comments on gravity as a "fact".

From all your posts, it appears to me that you are far less interested in understanding why science has been able to discover and explain things (in fact almost everything that is physically open to human investigation), and instead interested only in the trivia of completely redundant philosophical arguments in the use of words to "win" semantic "debates" about anything.

If you only want to "win" word arguments by talking other people to death in mumbo-jumbo language, then philosophy is probably a pretty safe bet.

On the other hand if you want to understand how "real" events and processes exist and work in this universe, everything from the Big Bang to your first cup of tea in the morning, then science has shown repeatedly and unassailably why it is the only credible method ... and it's been able to do that with success far, far beyond anyone's wildest dreams.

 

[Pup]

I think that what you've said so far no one could deny. On the instrumentalist view of practical deliberation, we reason about means to our various ends. Science is a very reliable source for causal relations, and such relations provide the means for means-end reasoning.

But, of course, they don't provide the end[1]. Science doesn't tell one what he desires, though it provides very useful information regarding how to achieve what one desires.

All of this is consistent with what I said: science aims at description, not prescription. This fact is perfectly consistent with the utility of scientific discoveries in practical deliberation.

[1] Except in the case that the end currently pursued is itself instrumental, but the final end is not itself instrumental.

The only exception I'd propose is if one classifies the end goal as part of an organism's biological make-up.

For example: Scientific experiments can make one conclude that a person needs to eat to live. But no experiment can say that any particular person needs to have the goal of living. A person can choose to eat or not, and the most science can do is inform them what will happen if they don't. If they die it will leave their children feeling abandoned without a parent? Yes, science can address that, but it can't show that hurting children should be avoided. Living, caring about children, etc., are goals we assume that science is helping us with, and it is, but we're only assuming that those are worthwhile goals.

Unless... One proposes that each species has evolved certain typical goals that help it survive, because without such goals it would have died out. Thank you, Darwin. One can then address, scientifically, what behaviors and emotions would contribute to a species' survival, and come up with the answers to why we have a desire to eat and care for children.

In that case, the "ought" problem of morals comes under scientific investigation, but morals are then considered as biological urges that have contributed to survival, or at least not detracted from it too much, and the urge of a beaver to build a dam is on the same level as the urge of a human to contribute to his community. A lot of people don't like that and want humans to be special, even though our only specialness is introspection about our morality.

 

[David Mo]

Not exactly. To be subject of the experience (or derived from) is a necessary condition to know that something is a fact.



Yes. External to subjective states of mind. If the value of an activity or relation between things were objective it would be something observable (in wide sense) and quantifiable (in wide sense). The value is usually attributed to the result of the action. (Pain, love, death, etc.)

You're welcome.

I add:
If a moral dispute is objective it will present a discord on facts. In my (Craig’s) example about ablation (comment #138) both parts agree on facts: ablation is very painful; sex is pleasant (when well done); the clitoris is the main source of sexual pleasure for women.
Our disagreement is not about facts. Therefore it is not objective.

We can argue that moral values are another kind of entities. Perhaps they are metaphysical entities. Or a special kind of entity called “moral value”. Then we have a new problem: How do you know this special kind of entities?

We can argue that moral values are a different way to name some natural features of our acts or the things. For example, “X is good” is the same than “X is useful” or “X increases our well-being”. But this poses a problem: there is not a universal agreeing about what is the meaning of “useful” or another natural feature that we can propose as “moral good”. Furthermore, we will find in any case some people that call “good” something without this particular feature.

At last there will be a hard problem for any theory of the objective natural moral: how to pass from “my personal” good to a collective good.

Therefore I think we have to agree with a part of Mr. Craig’s discourse: we cannot postulate an objective good on the bases of natural properties of things/acts.

I postulate an intersubjective moral.

 

[Belz...]

I suggest you have a look at this post.

Constructive discussion is always a pleasure to watch.

 

[phiwum]

Not exactly. To be subject of the experience (or derived from) is a necessary condition to know that something is a fact.



Yes. External to subjective states of mind. If the value of an activity or relation between things were objective it would be something observable (in wide sense) and quantifiable (in wide sense). The value is usually attributed to the result of the action. (Pain, love, death, etc.)

You're welcome.

Tell me, if you would, how abstract mathematical theories are observable or quantifiable (in a wide sense). I'm thinking of things like ZFC (set theory), which includes the hierarchies of transfinite ordinals and cardinals, or (better, but less well known) category theory. The objects of these theories are not obviously interpretable as stuff around us, but surely the arguments that occur in these theories are as objective as anything in the natural world.

Thanks again.

 

[phiwum]

In post #132 I replied to you saying that I had already explained the situation as I see it, at least three times by then; and that I was not going to keep explaining the same thing to you over & over again.

Right. Let it drop then.

So instead of you trying to construct some philosophical argumenst of language using what you call "Premises", and introducing -

"meta-ethical considerations"
"realist worlds""moral norms"
"moral ought claims"
"moral theories of normative claims in ought statements""emotivisms and Kantian belief"


Instead of such childish unscientific mumbo-jumbo semantics of philosophy, please just read carefully the explanation I have already given to you at least three times before.

I'm sorry, but when you asked for a definition of morality, did you not expect some philosophical terms?

And is there any reason you made up those highlighted terms? They sure don't sound like my writing. (Not sure whether I've used the term "Kantian belief" either, but at least it's understandable.)

Each discipline has its jargon, used because technical terms enhance precision. I understand that not everyone knows philosophical terms, and so I try to explain them as I use them, but the terms are shorter than the explanation, so I tend to stick to the terms themselves.

But the conversation between us seems to have fizzled, to the point that you're accusing me of digression when I try to answer your request for a definition of morality as best I can and of trying to obfuscate by using the terminology that is standard in the study of ethics. Let's let it end here.

 

[phiwum]

What is logic?

I don't see this as a particularly useful question so far. I've studied my fair share of logic, and I don't think I could come up with a satisfactory answer.

 

[Cl1mh4224rd]

(I haven't read all six pages, so apologies if this has already been stated...)

I think when most religious folks refer to "objective morality", they actually mean "dictated morality". They don't believe humans (individually or as a species) are capable of coming up with a good, useful moral code on their own. Therefore, we need an external authority to tell what's good and right.

 

[phiwum]

The only exception I'd propose is if one classifies the end goal as part of an organism's biological make-up.

For example: Scientific experiments can make one conclude that a person needs to eat to live. But no experiment can say that any particular person needs to have the goal of living. A person can choose to eat or not, and the most science can do is inform them what will happen if they don't. If they die it will leave their children feeling abandoned without a parent? Yes, science can address that, but it can't show that hurting children should be avoided. Living, caring about children, etc., are goals we assume that science is helping us with, and it is, but we're only assuming that those are worthwhile goals.

Unless... One proposes that each species has evolved certain typical goals that help it survive, because without such goals it would have died out. Thank you, Darwin. One can then address, scientifically, what behaviors and emotions would contribute to a species' survival, and come up with the answers to why we have a desire to eat and care for children.

In that case, the "ought" problem of morals comes under scientific investigation, but morals are then considered as biological urges that have contributed to survival, or at least not detracted from it too much, and the urge of a beaver to build a dam is on the same level as the urge of a human to contribute to his community. A lot of people don't like that and want humans to be special, even though our only specialness is introspection about our morality.

You raise a good point, and it relates to some topics in philosophy of science dealing with evolution.

Beginning, I think, with Descartes, the notion of purpose and function was more or less banished from science. We can talk about the beneficial effects of the sun, but we cannot talk about the function of the sun, because natural objects have no function[1].

With natural selection, it is natural to talk about the function of biological organs, behaviors, etc. This re-introduction of functional talk into science was puzzling, since functions and purposes seem tied to someone who intends the function or purpose, and of course there is no intelligent agent making biological stuff to fulfill his goals. There are a number of papers in philosophy of science devoted to the problem of how to define "function" so that it doesn't seem to presume intention.

Obviously, functions and goals are related, and that is why your post made me think of this. I'm not sure that I agree with you that whole species have anything like goals. I don't think that it is the goal of the human race to reproduce and survive, but merely that the effect of natural selection is that species that didn't do that well are no longer with us, so the species that are with us tend to reproduce and survive, at least in their niches.

One final thought: with functional language comes some normative terminology (just like with goals, which was your point). If the function of a heart is to pump blood, then a heart is working well, i.e. doing what it ought to do, just in case it pumps blood well. A heart that does not pump enough blood, for instance, is malfunctioning, not doing what it ought. In this respect, there is indeed some normative language in evolutionary theory.

I think that such language is eliminable, not essential. It may be natural and tempting to use such language to describe the workings of biological stuff, but I don't think it's necessary. That said, I am not sure whether this is consensus or not, so my opinion may not matter much.

If I'm wrong, then evolutionary theory is one area where science draws some apparently normative conclusions, contrary to what I said before.

You made a very good point.

[1] Of course, Descartes believed the universe was created by God and it's possible that God had a purpose in mind when he created the sun, but speculation about such purposes were nonetheless out-of-bounds for science.

 

[phiwum]

I add:
If a moral dispute is objective it will present a discord on facts. In my (Craig’s) example about ablation (comment #138) both parts agree on facts: ablation is very painful; sex is pleasant (when well done); the clitoris is the main source of sexual pleasure for women.
Our disagreement is not about facts. Therefore it is not objective.

We can argue that moral values are another kind of entities. Perhaps they are metaphysical entities. Or a special kind of entity called “moral value”. Then we have a new problem: How do you know this special kind of entities?

We can argue that moral values are a different way to name some natural features of our acts or the things. For example, “X is good” is the same than “X is useful” or “X increases our well-being”. But this poses a problem: there is not a universal agreeing about what is the meaning of “useful” or another natural feature that we can propose as “moral good”. Furthermore, we will find in any case some people that call “good” something without this particular feature.

At last there will be a hard problem for any theory of the objective natural moral: how to pass from “my personal” good to a collective good.

Therefore I think we have to agree with a part of Mr. Craig’s discourse: we cannot postulate an objective good on the bases of natural properties of things/acts.

I postulate an intersubjective moral.

I wonder if some of your argument is informed by G.E. Moore's "naturalistic fallacy". I think there's some similarity there, but I am not too familiar with Moore.

 

[Pup]

Obviously, functions and goals are related, and that is why your post made me think of this. I'm not sure that I agree with you that whole species have anything like goals. I don't think that it is the goal of the human race to reproduce and survive, but merely that the effect of natural selection is that species that didn't do that well are no longer with us, so the species that are with us tend to reproduce and survive, at least in their niches.

To clarify, I don't think that species have goals in the sense that they have some metaphysical purpose. I mean, internally, it feels like a goal. But it's really just a property of the brain that makes some actions seem pleasurable and some not.

 

[Leumas]

(I haven't read all six pages, so apologies if this has already been stated...)

I think when most religious folks refer to "objective morality", they actually mean "dictated morality". They don't believe humans (individually or as a species) are capable of coming up with a good, useful moral code on their own. Therefore, we need an external authority to tell what's good and right.

EXACTLY!!!

See post #3 in this thread... also see post #6.

And the whole purpose of the obfuscation about "objective" and "normative" and "ought" sophistry-speak is of course a very obvious one of

Utter rubbish and poppycock!!

Only people who want to create trapdoors through which to shove imaginary friends and sky daddies would say stuff like the above statement.

Everything in nature is scientifically researchable and investigable.

People who claim that there are things that do not come under the purview of science want to confound and confuse with linguistic legerdemain and puffs of semantic smoke under which to materialize their wishful thinking and illusions.

All their sleights of pen and tongue are of course in order to furtively sneak in their religious and supernatural insults to reason and sanity and establish them as the magical denizens of those fissures and cracks they cunningly created and shrewdly declared off limits for investigation except by their claptrap sophistry and apologetic casuistry.

 

[phiwum]

To clarify, I don't think that species have goals in the sense that they have some metaphysical purpose. I mean, internally, it feels like a goal. But it's really just a property of the brain that makes some actions seem pleasurable and some not.

That is certainly plausible.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

I don't see this as a particularly useful question so far. I've studied my fair share of logic, and I don't think I could come up with a satisfactory answer.

I was not asking you I was asking Leumas and you do know that Leumas knows this, right!!! So I want to learn what logic is.

 

[phiwum]

EXACTLY!!!

See post #3 in this thread... also see post #6.

And the whole purpose of the obfuscation about "objective" and "normative" and "ought" sophistry-speak is of course a very obvious one of

I really hate to interrupt your victory lap, since you seem to be having a grand old time, but you are a bit premature.

Here's what I've conceded: In evolutionary theory, it is natural to talk about the functions of biological organs, and so on, and talk about functions is associated with normative terms like malfunction. (It seems to me that such normative concepts are eliminable, to be substituted by purely descriptive concepts.)

Here's what I've not conceded: The fact that we have evolved as social creatures is sufficient to infer that there are certain moral norms, which it would be bad, morally speaking, not to abide by.

 

[tsig]

I really hate to interrupt your victory lap, since you seem to be having a grand old time, but you are a bit premature.

Here's what I've conceded: In evolutionary theory, it is natural to talk about the functions of biological organs, and so on, and talk about functions is associated with normative terms like malfunction. (It seems to me that such normative concepts are eliminable, to be substituted by purely descriptive concepts.)

Here's what I've not conceded: The fact that we have evolved as social creatures is sufficient to infer that there are certain moral norms, which it would be bad, morally speaking, not to abide by.

You seem to be using the hilited as some sort of 'get out of meaning free' card. The word 'morals' comes to mean some sort of wibbly, wobbly, nebulous thing that cannot be defined.

 

[phiwum]

You seem to be using the hilited as some sort of 'get out of meaning free' card. The word 'morals' comes to mean some sort of wibbly, wobbly, nebulous thing that cannot be defined.

That's not my intention.

Moral norms apply to individual organisms, especially persons
As long as we agree to that, and we see that all I've conceded, at most, is that natural selection warrants certain functional norms, we can ask whether persons have evolutionary functions of the appropriate sort. It seems to me that they do not.

But even if persons have functions (reproduction, say), then a person who fails to perform his function is malfunctioning, not bad.

I'm not sure that this is as clear a response to your objection as I'd like, but I do tend to think that the difference between malfunction and guilt is intuitively clear.