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A different war in 1861

For the combined army, I'm inclined to pick out the top officers of the Confed and Union armies as existed at the start of the war. Winfield Scott was 3 stars but could not take the field. Robert E Lee was asked to head the US Army in the field. Based on my idea I have to make space for McClellan, 1 star. There were old guys like Wool and Twiggs who could not take a real field command. Samuel Cooper was another oldster who wound up in a non field command in the CSA.
If I were picking out based on post war knowledge of events I would have a high position for George H. Thomas, John Hood, jeb Stuart, John Reynolds, Oliver Howard, George Meade, W.T. Sherman, US Grant, PH Sheridan, Forrest, Jubal Early. AP Hill, Longstreet, etc.
But it wouldn't have worked that way. In the alternate setting first proposed, there would be the seniority factor and then Stonewall, Albert S Johnston, James McPherson are alive. There were the political generals like Beast Butler, Banks etc and they would have precedence over better officers.
 
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The rate of production of war materials by the North should have been a warning to countries like Japan and Germany, but I suspect that even if they were aware of the facts of the matter they would have decided US "splendid isolation" attitudes would work in their favor.
If they could perceive that in 1865, all the more could they assume the potential for increased US war materials production in 1940, but for some reason they drew no valid conclusions from such assumptions, if indeed they made them.
 
If they could perceive that in 1865, all the more could they assume the potential for increased US war materials production in 1940, but for some reason they drew no valid conclusions from such assumptions, if indeed they made them.

True. This is where learning from history bites some folks on the butt. The productivity history of the US should have been a red flag for Japan and Germany in 1940, but they ignored that, and regretted doing so in the end.
 
Victory had been stuck in dock for 50 years by the time of the ACW, so a US navy would have had to steam into Portsmouth to sink her. By which point I suspect her sinking would have been the least of the Admiralty's worries.

:)
The Americans might have been more interested in, and respectful of, HMS Warrior.
 
Possibly, but if we're speculating we could speculate that "Peacemaker" was not falsely libeled in the Princeton explosion and full charges were allowed for those guns. If that happened Warrior wouldn't have had her plating for long.
I seem to remember that we have discussed the usefulness of giant cannons before now.

I think that if a gun explodes while being shown off to dignitaries and blows to atoms

The father of the President's fiancée
The Secretary of the Navy, and its Chief of Construction
The Ambassador to Belgium
The Secretary of State

And misses the President himself only because he wisely stayed below decks for another drink; but his slave took the hit in his master's place. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Princeton_disaster_of_1844

In these extreme circumstances one might reasonably require the miscreant weapon, once repaired, to make amends by knocking the armour plating off a foreign vessel.
 
True. This is where learning from history bites some folks on the butt. The productivity history of the US should have been a red flag for Japan and Germany in 1940, but they ignored that, and regretted doing so in the end.

Probably because the US in ww1 had not shown a great ability to produce their own tanks, planes & artillery. (Iirc, no US designed tanks or planes saw action in ww1, the AEF was dependent on Anglo french material).

In 1940, WW1 was probably a lot fresher in folks minds than the ACW.
 
Probably because the US in ww1 had not shown a great ability to produce their own tanks, planes & artillery. (Iirc, no US designed tanks or planes saw action in ww1, the AEF was dependent on Anglo french material).

In 1940, WW1 was probably a lot fresher in folks minds than the ACW.
By 1940 they had all of these things in designs of their own. Some of them not very good, be it said. But everyone knew that the USA could produce things like steel, foodstuffs and fuel in superabundance; and that alone made the optimistic Axis assumptions about the dangers of having the USA as an enemy completely unjustified.
 
By 1940 they had all of these things in designs of their own. Some of them not very good, be it said. But everyone knew that the USA could produce things like steel, foodstuffs and fuel in superabundance; and that alone made the optimistic Axis assumptions about the dangers of having the USA as an enemy completely unjustified.

Oh quite. But I'm just trying to point out why the axis thought that the USA was only good at mass producing "refrigerators and razor blades" (I beleive that's Goring's quote). They thought, based on ww1, that the USA could not transition quickly and effectively to a wartime economy. Oh boy, was that a bad call.
 
The Peacemaker cannon design was tested later in the war and found acceptable.
A flaw in the Princeton product was corrected.
Ericsson had red-hot iron hoops around the breech-end of the weapon. This technique reduced the amount of stress that the breech would be subjected to when the huge powder charge was fired.
Apparently wanting to save money, the Stockton family supervised the manufacture of a second 12-inch gun for the Princeton in New York City. Not fully understanding the importance of Ericsson's hoop technology, Capt. Stockton ordered the breech of this second gun to be merely thickened. As a result, the second gun – named "Peacemaker" ... had an inherent weakness, that the breech was almost certain to burst after an unknown number of firings.
That is, the reinforcing hoops were not shrunk on to the gun to compensate for internal stress, but were merely welded on to add thickness of metal. Once this absurd error was corrected, these guns worked well.

Thank you for providing me with the motive to read up on this interesting incident.
 
The British were never going to fight us; at least on land. The logistics of moving the huge number of troops necessary to protect Canada (this wasn't 1812, the Federal forces were massive). And in general Great Britain did not maintain a large standing army, and many troops were stationed in India and were at the time engaged (or just returning) from the Second Opium War (1856-1860) with China.

As long as the US left their commerce alone (which except for the incidents mentioned above we generally did), there was no chance England would do more that watch from the sidelines (and occasionally build a ship or two for the Confederacy or smuggle a load of rifles through the blockade.

But even without re-uniting the country, no way in hell does England get enough troops deployed to Canada.

As for leadership, from the lists Hans provided, Albert Sidney Johnston commanded a Confederate Army and died at the Battle of Shiloh; Joseph E. Johnston held a variety of Confederate Army commands through the war, finally surrendering to Sherman; Twiggs, IIRC, served as a Division commander early in the war and Sumner was a Corps commander in the Army of the Potomac in 1861-62. The rest, to the best of my knowledge, did not exercise any major field command (Winfield Scott was in charge of the Union effort in 1861, but never exercised direct field command).

Probably Lee or Albert S. Johnson would have been the primary leaders of a United States vs. Europe war. Grant was a failed businessman who had a 'reputation', Jackson was an instructor (by all accounts a terrible one) at a military school, Sherman was a businessman, and the rest were either of low rank or not in line to command armies.
 
Oh quite. But I'm just trying to point out why the axis thought that the USA was only good at mass producing "refrigerators and razor blades" (I beleive that's Goring's quote). They thought, based on ww1, that the USA could not transition quickly and effectively to a wartime economy. Oh boy, was that a bad call.

The main reason the US only sent troops was because the British and French specifically asked for troops above all else.

What it does neglect is the state of US production by the end of the war.
There were some 3000 US produced aircraft awaiting shipping to Europe. Production was approaching 1000 aircraft a month.

The program was dogged by problems coming up with a coherent plan that worked with mass production (which was a key goal). This really only came together late in the war.

You will also see the same with artillery, which reached some 500 a month by the end of the war, for a tenth of that at the start of 1918.

Tanks only really started being produced right at the end.

Of course one of the key shifts was that France (for example) could shift a load of men out of steel and coal production and into the army, because they could now import all they needed from the US.
 
Its a little later in time but here's a fairly unknown fact. I'm a member of the continental wars society (we study wars in Europe between 1815-1914)and have a lot of books on the Prussian army of that timespan,the Prussians were involved in a fair few wars in that period.
In the late 1890s series plans were laid down for a invasion of the us mainland. The first plans involved hitting Hampton roads but this was later changed for new york and Boston. The idea was to land as many as 100,000 troops. This only came to light about twenty(I think)years ago when the plans were found. Interesting postscript-schleiffen thought it would be impossible to work.
I do have a few books etc with more detailed information in my room but can't be bothered getting up to check right now. If anyone's interested in finding out more though just ask.
 

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