Findings of the {ECHR} Court
36. The Court first recalls that, while the Convention provides in Article 6 the right to a fair hearing, it does not regulate on the admissibility of evidence as such, which is primarily a matter of domestic law . It must examine whether the procedure, including how evidence was obtained, was fair as a whole (Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], No. 22978/05, §§ 162-163, ECHR 2010).
37. The Court further recalls that the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are generally recognized international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of fair trial (Saunders v. The United Kingdom, 17 December 1996, § 68, Reports 1996-VI, Allan v. the United Kingdom, No. 48539/99, § 44, ECHR 2002-IX, and Jalloh v. Germany [GC], No. 54810/00, § 100, ECHR 2006 -IX). The right for the accused to remain silent and not to contribute to incriminating himself can not reasonably be confined to confessions of wrongdoing or to remarks which are directly incriminating (Saunders, cited above, § 71). Just as his statements are likely to substantially affect the position of the accused (Chabelnik v. Ukraine, No. 16404/03, § 57, 19 February 2009), statements made when the accused is not informed of his rights to remain silent and not to incriminate himself are to be treated with extreme caution (Lutsenko v. Ukraine, No. 30663/04, § 51, 18 December 2008).
38. The Court also notes that the right not to contribute to incriminating himself and the right to remain silent are intended to protect the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities and thus to avoid miscarriages of justice and achieve the aims of Article 6. In examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the right not to contribute to incriminating a person, the Court must consider the nature and degree of the compulsion, the existence of relevant safeguards in the procedure and the use made of any material so obtained (Bykov v. Russia [GC], no 4378/02, § 92, 10 March 2009).
39. In the section on the admissibility of this complaint, the Court found that the questioning of 1 August 2001 was, as such, capable of adversely affecting the fairness of the criminal trial against the applicant subsequently conducted (paragraph 31 above). The Court concludes that, in the circumstances of this case, it was up to the police to inform the applicant of her right not to incriminate herself and to remain silent during questioning (Aleksandr Zaichenko v. Russia, No. 39660/02, § 52, 18 February 2010). On the other hand, the Court fully agrees with the domestic authorities that the interrogation was only one piece of evidence of minor importance (see, conversely, Aleksandr Zaichenko, cited above, § 58). It considers that the Federal Court has substantiated in detail and convincingly that the courts {?} and the appellant relied in particular on the testimony of MS, regarded as credible by the domestic authorities. The said statements were corroborated by the testimony of many others (see paragraph 21 above). In other words, the conviction was not made solely on the basis of information obtained during the interrogation of 1 August 2001 (see in this sense O'Halloran and Francis v. The United Kingdom [GC], 15809/02 and 25624/02 our, § 60, ECHR 2007-III). Moreover, the applicant, duly represented by a lawyer before the domestic courts and before the Court, does not specify exactly what statements made during the interrogation of 1 August 2001 have subsequently been used by the Swiss authorities for her conviction. It should also be noted, reading the minutes of that examination (see paragraph 10 above), that the applicant had not complained on that occasion and had been left at liberty at its conclusion.
40. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the trial, seen in its entirety, was not unfair. Consequently, there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1.
