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We can argue what this thread meant pre-March 27th, 2015 - but this thread is meaningless post that date.
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I think there are still things to learn about this case, but as a whodunit, there really are no mysteries. ....
I agree that there are things to learn about this case. It is mostly over, but not really over. There is, for example, Amanda's calunnia conviction to be judged by the ECHR as a claim of violation of her Convention rights by Italy.
(Grinder, you may wish to stop reading at this point.)
I have done some library research at HUDOC to find decisions that would somehow contradict my understanding (and perhaps that of others on ISF) about the implications of Salduz v. Turkey and related case-law to Amanda's application.
My search produced two decisions of inadmissibility.
One is Simons v Belgium 71407/10. This application was inadmissible IIUC because it was unknown at the time when it was filed and judged whether the lack of a lawyer during the applicant's interrogation or questioning would materially affect the trial result; the trial had not begun and of course there had been no conviction. The applicant was in remand custody and claimed a violation under Convention Article 5.1 (right to liberty), not Article 6.1 (fair trial). Summarizing paragraphs 32 through 34, the ECHR decided that failure to provide a lawyer during interrogation or questioning did not itself, at least in this case, render the custody unlawful and thus a violation of Article 5.1. It should be noted that apparently the applicant in this case did not claim to have made statements under pressure and apparently did not retract her confession. The applicant had also been warned during her interview that her statements could be used against her. These three items are among the differences between Simons v Belgium and the Knox case. For Knox, the calunnia charge did result in a conviction, and it was based solely on statements she had made without benefit of a lawyer during an allegedly coercive interrogation with an interpreter serving as a "mediator" or subsequently while in custody.
The second ECHR decision is Diallo v Sweden 13205/07. In this application, Diallo, a French national, claimed that Sweden violated her Convention rights under Articles 6.3e (right to a fair interpreter) and 6.1 (right to a fair trial). Diallo had been found on entry to Sweden by Customs to have two packages of heroin in her suitcase. The first interpreter provided by Swedish Customs was a French-speak Customs agent who was not a certified or authorized interpreter. The applicant in particular claimed that one of her statements was misinterpreted and led to her conviction. The ECHR, however, observed that the disputed statement was far from the only evidence in the criminal proceedings against her and that there was nothing to indicate that it was decisive to the outcome of the case.
31. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant received sufficient linguistic assistance during the first interview with the Swedish Customs. Subsequently, an authorised interpreter was involved each time the applicant was heard, both during the pre-trial stage and the trial. Accordingly, the Court is unable to discern any violation of the right to a fair trial.
32. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
Again, there are major differences between the Diallo case and the Knox case with respect to the allegations about the role of the interpreter. In Knox's case, the involvement of the interpreter as "mediator" was significant in generating Knox's false statements in the interrogation. And these false statements, and perhaps the two Memoriales written while Knox was in custody without a lawyer as an attempt to withdraw or cast doubt on the false statements, are the sole basis for the calunnia conviction.
In conclusion, IMO, there is no indication from either Simons v Belgium or Diallo v Sweden that the ECHR would find Knox's application inadmissible.
