I keep hearing people on TV and everywhere talking about M[eredith] not having received justice - I agree with Mercuzio's points [here] -- and about somebody being convicted of a conspiracy in which the conspirators haven't been found, so that the solution to this case has been "crippled" -- and I don't know if you've already discussed it; if so, I apologize.
Given that that's not the case, and how fed up I am with all the talk I've been hearing from people in the information business who are or ought to be well informed about the law, but [instead] prefer to try squeezing a bit more out of this case that's already been squeezed to death, I'd like to shed some light on the fundamentals of criminal procedural law without which a non-existent problem might appear to exist: Rudy Guede is legally the only one responsible for the K[ercher] murder, without any conspiracy with anyone whatsover; he was the only one with unquestionable substantive evidence against him and SURE ENOUGH chose the path of a reduction in sentence; the other two, who were SUSPECTED of participating in the murder have been acquitted following three (and more) levels of trial. ERGO the process has demonstrated -- as it is supposed to -- that the charges were partially wrong: there was one killer and it was -- as has been definitively established -- R[udy] G[uede] without any participation by K[nox] and S[ollecito] -- as has been definitively established.
So why does G[uede]'s record include a conviction of "murder in conspiracy"? The answer is obvious: because he was tried (like the other two) and then convicted in a fast-track process of that charge, i.e. the charge written in the "decree of citation at the preliminary hearing" that was served to the three suspects, G[uede], K[nox], and S[ollecito] ("... for the crime p.p. of C.P. Articles 110, 575 etc.". which in legalese means conspiracy (C.P. 110) in voluntary homicide (C.P. 575 + any aggravating circumstances, concurrent crimes, etc)..
At the preliminary hearing, every defendant who has received that decree with that charge arrives for themselves and each one makes the procedural choices that suit them the best: so you have defendant G[uede] who, in view of the evidence against him chooses the fast track; then you have defendant K[nox] who decides to confront the preliminary hearing and thus, in the event of referral to judgement, a trial; and defendant S[ollecito] does the same thing.
So G[uede]'s position gets taken out, which effectively means that a new file gets made, into which is inserted the charge served in the summons to appear at the preliminary hearing, his registry and criminal certificates, and the public minister's file given that he chose to be judged on the state of the record (note: on the other hand, when the GUP sends the record to the trial judge after referral to judgement, they send it empty, with only the decrees served with the charge, the certificates of the accused, any documents such as [the results of] special evidentiary hearings [incidenti probatori]); then they fix a later date for the hearing in which, normally (i.e. in the absence of any investigative initiatives by the judge deemed indispensable for deciding the case), arguments are made for the defendant who chose the fast track and the judge issues the ruling. OK, Mr. G[uede] and corresponding attorneys, you may leave the room, we'll see you at the scheduled hearing date, have a nice day. Now we take up the remaining file, still based on the charge served to the three suspects, i.e. that which concerns defendants K[nox] and S[ollecito] who decided to go through the standard routine. They get referred to judgement and will follow their own path. Best wishes, we won't be seeing you any more here at the GUP.
We will however see defendant G[uede] again before the GUP, at the appropriately scheduled hearing; we argue about his position in the PM's investigation papers, and we convict him, with a discount: R[udy] G[uede] is guilty of the murder of M[eredith] K[ercher]. Bye, and happy sentence-serving.
Before the Corte d'Assise, meanwhile (but more easily afterward), the trial to assess the position of the PRESUMED co-conspirators of R[udy] G[uede] begins. We go through 47 levels of trial and torture all the torturable evidence, and end up with nothing: there wasn't any conspiracy, K[nox] and S[ollecito] don't have anything to do with the crime.
So let's understand, legally, why there's no contradiction in the conviction of R[udy] G[uede]: he was convicted of the murder, for sure. Those who were suspected of also being present and participating have been acquitted, so they weren't there. The legal history of the murder of M[eredith] K[ercher] is therefore closed in a wholly PHYSIOLOGICAL manner: the prosecution had hypothesized the co-culpabilty of three persons; the trials have established the culpability of one and the non-culpability of the other two. BUT since this happened via two different paths by choice of the defendants (long for two, very short for one), this FALSE contradiction has arisen: G[uede] could neither substantively nor legally be convicted of a charge other than the one that was served to him, and nor could a single word be pronounced on the position of the other two defendants: THE DECISION ON THE HYPOTHESIS OF A CONSPIRACY OF MORE THAN ONE PERSON WAS ENTRUSTED TO THE TRIAL OF THE PRESUMED CO-CONSPIRATORS OF THE INDISPUTABLE CULPRIT, AND THE DECISION WAS: NO CONSPIRACY. FROM WHICH IT OBVIOUSLY FOLLOWS: ONLY ONE CULPRIT. If, at this point, the prosecution is really convinced that he had co-conspirators, they can put together an investigation of other presumed co-conspirators.....but something tells me they will pocket the embarrassment of having prosecuted a case based on nothing (personal opinion).
