MichaelB
Muse
- Joined
- May 27, 2013
- Messages
- 555
Re Rudy Guede in part 4:
Analysis and Evaluation – the forbidden reasoning The holding of a separate fast-track trial for Guede was to facilitate precisely what the Micheli Sentencing Report alluded to during the Court’s written judgment. It provided Guede with a golden opportunity to minimize his part in the attack upon and murder of Meredith Kercher; loading the blame on to Knox and Sollecito who, by this time were suspected to be the chief architects of the attack. It is submitted that the combined circumstances, including the illicit interviews of Knox and Sollecito by the State Police had already contributed to a conscious or unconscious bias against Knox and Sollecito, which blinded the public, press and organs of the State to potential shortcomings in the motivations for the crime and/or the prosecution evidence which for convenience has been dubbed “the forbidden reasoning”.
Was Guede acting alone? – the Lone Wolf theory Early on in the investigation, the prosecution rejected the notion that Guede was unaccompanied by others (described as the “Lone Wolf theory”). The Micheli Report also rejected the same theory overlooking that its primary function was to decide whether Guede was guilty or not guilty. Instead, the Court was sucked into the question of Guede’s participation and culpability thereby examining in detail the evidence levelled against Knox and Sollecito leading ultimately to a flawed hypothesis. This supports the writer’s contention made earlier, that the holding of separate trials for co-accused was wrong in principle and in law because the prosecution were alleging that all three defendants committed the crime acting in concert.
Re Curatolo in Part 5:
At no stage after making a statement to the authorities was Curatolo asked to identify/recognize the accused by way of some form of identification parade. It is significant that the first time Curatolo was asked formally to pick-out the accused was in court. Dock identifications are notoriously unreliable per se and in the case of Knox and Sollecito it was a near certainty that Curatolo would point to the two accused – bearing in mind their pictures had featured in the local and national press for some considerable time. English law generally disapproves of dock identifications and the reader is referred to case law beginning with R. v. Cartwright (1914) 10 Cr App R 219.
Although Sollecito had resided in Perugia on and off for several years, Knox had only resided there for the best part of six to eight weeks and had only been going out with Sollecito for eight days. Curatolo’s claim that he had seen the two accused together previously appears suspect. He certainly could not have seen them frequently in each other’s company. As will be established later, they were not in the piazzetta the previous day ie, October 31. The evidence also disclosed that many students frequented Piazza Grimana in the relevant time period and the chances of a convincing witness such as Curatolo being mistaken were all too apparent. These dangers have been highlighted time and again by English jurisprudential practice culminating in R. v. Turnbull [1976] 3 All ER 549. This explains why in England and Wales, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 together with the Codes of Practice, place fairly strict obligations on the police regarding eg, the recognition and identification of suspects; even where some form of identification procedure, at first blush, appears to serve no useful purpose (such as where the witness declares he knows the person concerned): see R. v. Forbes [2001] 1 AC 473, HL. The trial Court also neglected to examine more closely the date on which Curatolo purported to see Knox and Sollecito in the piazzetta. It is significant that in his statement he said there were “…a lot of masks, young people that were joking about, it was a holiday period…” Even if Curatolo had become confused as to the date, with so many young people being present in that location the chances of a mistaken identification was high. It is also noteworthy that when asked to describe hat the two defendants were wearing the best description Curatolo could muster was that both were wearing “dark clothes”.
Analysis and Evaluation – the forbidden reasoning The holding of a separate fast-track trial for Guede was to facilitate precisely what the Micheli Sentencing Report alluded to during the Court’s written judgment. It provided Guede with a golden opportunity to minimize his part in the attack upon and murder of Meredith Kercher; loading the blame on to Knox and Sollecito who, by this time were suspected to be the chief architects of the attack. It is submitted that the combined circumstances, including the illicit interviews of Knox and Sollecito by the State Police had already contributed to a conscious or unconscious bias against Knox and Sollecito, which blinded the public, press and organs of the State to potential shortcomings in the motivations for the crime and/or the prosecution evidence which for convenience has been dubbed “the forbidden reasoning”.
Was Guede acting alone? – the Lone Wolf theory Early on in the investigation, the prosecution rejected the notion that Guede was unaccompanied by others (described as the “Lone Wolf theory”). The Micheli Report also rejected the same theory overlooking that its primary function was to decide whether Guede was guilty or not guilty. Instead, the Court was sucked into the question of Guede’s participation and culpability thereby examining in detail the evidence levelled against Knox and Sollecito leading ultimately to a flawed hypothesis. This supports the writer’s contention made earlier, that the holding of separate trials for co-accused was wrong in principle and in law because the prosecution were alleging that all three defendants committed the crime acting in concert.
Re Curatolo in Part 5:
At no stage after making a statement to the authorities was Curatolo asked to identify/recognize the accused by way of some form of identification parade. It is significant that the first time Curatolo was asked formally to pick-out the accused was in court. Dock identifications are notoriously unreliable per se and in the case of Knox and Sollecito it was a near certainty that Curatolo would point to the two accused – bearing in mind their pictures had featured in the local and national press for some considerable time. English law generally disapproves of dock identifications and the reader is referred to case law beginning with R. v. Cartwright (1914) 10 Cr App R 219.
Although Sollecito had resided in Perugia on and off for several years, Knox had only resided there for the best part of six to eight weeks and had only been going out with Sollecito for eight days. Curatolo’s claim that he had seen the two accused together previously appears suspect. He certainly could not have seen them frequently in each other’s company. As will be established later, they were not in the piazzetta the previous day ie, October 31. The evidence also disclosed that many students frequented Piazza Grimana in the relevant time period and the chances of a convincing witness such as Curatolo being mistaken were all too apparent. These dangers have been highlighted time and again by English jurisprudential practice culminating in R. v. Turnbull [1976] 3 All ER 549. This explains why in England and Wales, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 together with the Codes of Practice, place fairly strict obligations on the police regarding eg, the recognition and identification of suspects; even where some form of identification procedure, at first blush, appears to serve no useful purpose (such as where the witness declares he knows the person concerned): see R. v. Forbes [2001] 1 AC 473, HL. The trial Court also neglected to examine more closely the date on which Curatolo purported to see Knox and Sollecito in the piazzetta. It is significant that in his statement he said there were “…a lot of masks, young people that were joking about, it was a holiday period…” Even if Curatolo had become confused as to the date, with so many young people being present in that location the chances of a mistaken identification was high. It is also noteworthy that when asked to describe hat the two defendants were wearing the best description Curatolo could muster was that both were wearing “dark clothes”.
