Is ESP More Probable Than Advanced Alien Life?

[Aridas]

Trivial, yes. Irrelevant, no.

Irrelevant, yes. That trivial truth was already inherently accounted for and had nothing even potentially relevant to do with the point actually being made.

Edited by Agatha: 

Edited to remove moderated content and response to same.

Not intended as an insult, for the record, merely as part of an explanation for why what happened, happened.

This is not actually a separate way from the first. It is, rather, a follow-up to it.

The electron must have both position and velocity. If that position and-slash-or velocity cannot be known, ever, no matter how fine the measurements taken, then by definition it does not have them

*sigh* This is you doing it again, despite it already being explicitly explained to you. OF COURSE it has a position and velocity. The trouble comes when we try to obtain that information, because the very act of measuring with the methods that we even can use changes them.

(because, if we can't detect the electron in any way, there is no electron).

Your only options for backing that up are by invoking reality breaking magic to get around the potential reasons why an electron couldn't be detected or by saying that the objective is dependent on the subjective. You really can't win going either route. This is a worthless distraction, though, as I made no attempt to claim that electrons are undetectable, taking in account the tools at our disposal.

And no, the observer effect (by which you probably meant the uncertainty principle, but whatever)

I meant the observer effect. I could have used the uncertainty principle, yes, but I deemed that the point being made was served a little better with the observer effect.

does not actually change this. Position and velocity are difficult to measure simultaneously at such small scales because one is a measure of a change in the other over time. It is not that such values do not exist; it is that their means of measurement are incompatible, as one relies on taking a measurement at one instant and another over time.

...Not quite. The very act of measuring, given the actual tools that we can use, alters the velocity, which makes the position less certain. Otherwise, all we would need to do is find the velocity and we could calculate the position from there, provided interference could be removed, or at least made negligible, which we pretty much can do.

Demonstrable (or, again, at least demonstrable in theory) is very much part of the requirements for existing, at the trivial level and every other.

Empty assertion, but let's look at the rest for more on that. Also, demonstrable in what theory? The kind of theory where you invoke impossible magic to hand wave away all the problems with it?

All things that are demonstrable exist;

This is a trivial truth, given that the existence of whatever is being demonstrated is an inherent requirement for it to actually be demonstrated.

all things that exist are demonstrable.

This, on the other hand, is false assertion. Existence is indeed required for something to be demonstrable, but that in no way implies that for something to exist, it must be demonstrable. As it stands, for something to be demonstrable, there are a number of other conditions that must be met beyond merely "existing" for it to reasonably be able to be demonstrated.

If they are not demonstrable, then they have no effect on the rest of the universe

And no. Lack of demonstrability does not, in fact, equate with no effect. You're really trying to conflate distinct qualities here, yet again.

It really isn't.

There is no meaningful definition of the word "real" which allows things with no actual effect on the universe to exist. As a result of this, things which exist are necessarily detectable. If they are not, there is no difference between saying that they exist and that they don't - which means they don't.

This goes right back to you claiming to have knowledge that you cannot have, even in principle. Also, you're doing a disservice to science by trying to reinterpret its nature to something quite trivial in comparison.

If it can't be shown to be true, it is false.

That is what false means.

Hardly. True and false are a dichotomy, yes. A dichotomy of states of being. Showing that one is the case is an action, though, not a state of being, and a very good reason why that action might not be able to be done has been pointed out to you repeatedly. Beyond that, you're trying to make a dichotomy out of an action and a state of being, which would never be acceptable, anyways.

 

[Nonpareil]

*sigh* This is you doing it again, despite it already being explicitly explained to you. OF COURSE it has a position and velocity. The trouble comes when we try to obtain that information, because the very act of measuring with the methods that we even can use changes them.

Which doesn't actually change anything. They are still demonstrable, detectable, and measurable. It's just difficult.

Your only options for backing that up are by invoking reality breaking magic to get around the potential reasons why an electron couldn't be detected

You have not shown even one.

Because there aren't any. If it exists, it must by definition be detectable.

Also, demonstrable in what theory? The kind of theory where you invoke impossible magic to hand wave away all the problems with it?

If you like. Or, more accurately, any theory in which the necessary instruments for detecting it is available.

This, on the other hand, is false assertion. Existence is indeed required for something to be demonstrable, but that in no way implies that for something to exist, it must be demonstrable.

Nothing that is not demonstrable in some manner can be said to exist in any meaningful fashion.

If it can, you can answer Daylightstar's question.

As it stands, for something to be demonstrable, there are a number of other conditions that must be met beyond merely "existing" for it to reasonably be able to be demonstrated.

You're still confusing practical and theoretical limits.

And no. Lack of demonstrability does not, in fact, equate with no effect.

Yes, it does. If there is an effect, then the universe is necessarily different from how it would be if that effect were not present. These differences can, by definition, be detected. If they can't, then there is no meaningful way to say "there is a difference", which means that there is no effect.

 

[Daylightstar]

...
Which leads me back to my question in response to the above quoted statement:
Aridas,

Can you give an example of something that exists but is not demonstrable (not: demonstrated to exist)?

..... keeping in mind the following:

...
E.T.A.:
Perhaps the bracketed part could be clearer, it means that "not demonstrable" does not equate with "not demonstrated to exist".
Thanks for putting me on to it

Would you be so kind as to answer my question in the context of your claim in which it was presented to you, please. Thanks.

 

[Fudbucker]

If it can't be shown to be true, it's false, yes. Because, if it is true, you have to be able to show it.



Really not.



Yes, you can.

LOL, no. Other universes may exist. It may also be true that we will never be able to prove they exist. Our lack of "being able to show it" (nevermind how vague that phrase is) certainly doesn't make multiverse theory false.

 

[tsig]

LOL, no. Other universes may exist. It may also be true that we will never be able to prove they exist. Our lack of "being able to show it" (nevermind how vague that phrase is) certainly doesn't make multiverse theory false.

It makes them the same as cloud cuckoo land.

 

[Nonpareil]

LOL, no. Other universes may exist. It may also be true that we will never be able to prove they exist. Our lack of "being able to show it" (nevermind how vague that phrase is) certainly doesn't make multiverse theory false.

If there is no effect on our own universe, ever, then no. They do not exist, any more than the Death Star does.

If multiverse theory is ever shown to be true, it will be by identifying the effects of these other universes on our own.

 

[Daylightstar]

... Other universes ... Our lack of "being able to show it" ... certainly doesn't make multiverse theory false.

^{Hilite by Daylightstar}
It however does not enter (an)other universe(s) into existence.

E.T.A.: Same with ESP.

 

[Fudbucker]

If there is no effect on our own universe, ever, then no. They do not exist, any more than the Death Star does.

If multiverse theory is ever shown to be true, it will be by identifying the effects of these other universes on our own.

I thought you might just be being stubborn, but I now I think you're just not getting this.

In any case, the bolded part is about wrong as you can get.

Your second claim is also incorrrect. Multiverse theory can be indirectly proven in different ways besides other universes directly effecting our universe. For example, if inflation theory entails other universes exist (or makes the existence of other universes highly probable), and inflation theory is confirmed to a high degree, then "identifying the effects of those other universes on our own" won't be necessary to rationally conclude other universes exist. Evidence of inflation theory alone could be sufficient.

Also, if every interpretation of QM is eventually discredited, and MWI is the only one left standing, then that would be sufficient grounds to believe in the existence of other universes, even without having any direct evidence that these other universes exist.

 

[Fudbucker]

^{Hilite by Daylightstar}
It however does not enter (an)other universe(s) into existence.

E.T.A.: Same with ESP.

Sure, that goes without saying.

But Nonpareil is not only claiming that other universes might not exist (a weak claim ), but that absent any direct evidence of other universes, other universes don't exist (strong claim). This is, of course, wrong on many levels, and would surprise many cosmologists that are multiverse proponents.

 

[Daylightstar]

Sure, that goes without saying.

But Nonpareil is not only claiming that other universes might not exist (a weak claim ), but that absent any direct evidence of other universes, other universes don't exist (strong claim). This is, of course, wrong on many levels, and would surprise many cosmologists that are multiverse proponents.

Absent any direct evidence for other universes also does not enter these into the realm of the possible.
This is central to the problem with your op, where you appear to think ESP may be 'possible', although there is no valid data to suggest such.

All in all, the 'possibilities argument' you employ effectively amounts to a deflection or reversal of the burden of proof.

If you think other universes exist or that ESP exists, you are welcome to provide demonstration of such.
Without that, your belief in possibilities is completely inert.

 

[jsfisher]

If it can't be shown to be true, it's false, yes. Because, if it is true, you have to be able to show it.

Someone should tell Gödel.

 

[Nonpareil]

I thought you might just be being stubborn, but I now I think you're just not getting this.

I really am. You are not.

If there is no difference between an entity existing and not existing, then there is no meaningful definition of the word "real" which can be said to apply to it.

Your second claim is also incorrrect. Multiverse theory can be indirectly proven in different ways besides other universes directly effecting our universe. For example, if inflation theory entails other universes exist (or makes the existence of other universes highly probable), and inflation theory is confirmed to a high degree, then "identifying the effects of those other universes on our own" won't be necessary to rationally conclude other universes exist. Evidence of inflation theory alone could be sufficient.

If inflationary theory implies the existence of other universes, then - guess what? - it is because something about inflationary theory would not work (would be different) if those universes did not exist.

In other words, there is a detectable difference.

Also, if every interpretation of QM is eventually discredited, and MWI is the only one left standing, then that would be sufficient grounds to believe in the existence of other universes, even without having any direct evidence that these other universes exist.

Again: something detectable. If everything falls in line with MWI, that's evidence.

This is not hard.

 

[jaydeehess]

Move back from multiverse then. If other dimensions exist we cannot prove the theory to be true. Yes, the math indicates they exist, perhaps even experiments can imply they exist. However, at least at this time (irony intended) it cannot be proven. That does not make the theory false.

In the same way, when Einstein first proposed relativity there was no way to measure anything with enough precision to prove him correct. Was his theory false then because it could not be proven, and yet now correct because predictions arising from it have been shown to be true?

Back to multiverse, if a multiverse theory is developed that can make predictions as to effects observed in our universe will it still be false if those predictions cannot be possibly be determined and magically move into the realm of true if at a later date they can?

ETA: not that this has great relevance to the question in the OP which asks about relative probabilities, not possible/impossible, not true/false, not provable/unprovable.

 

[jaydeehess]

,,, and back to the OP, I thought of another analogy, since this thread is so big on them.
Two horses about to race. The pale one has been seen running private tracks and looks fast. The other however has never been in a race. Its been rumoured to have been run on a few private tracks though and said to be capable of running.

Vegas bookies give the pale horse 100:1 odds in favour of winning. What do they give the dark horse?

 

[John Jones]

…y’know I can’t help but find this absolutely hilarious. Here you are, an accredited scientist, insisting that hundreds of millions of data points specifically relating to a very narrow issue represent absolutely nothing!

…quite obviously they do not, and cannot, represent ‘no data’.

How do we know this?

The very evidence YOU presented unconditionally confirms it.

These very same statistics represent the ‘data’ that those very studies use to come to the conclusions they come to. It either means something, or it means nothing. If it all means nothing…as you and the rest keep insisting then those papers you presented would have had ‘no data’ to work with (why go to all the trouble of writing a scientific paper about...nothing????).

Those studies you presented (and the one Pixel42 presented) explicitly refer to the data (the personal observations / reports / experiences / anecdotes) that all of you keep arguing has absolutely no value or validity.

Thus…there IS data and it DOES have some evidentiary value.

The only question to be answered now is…what is that evidentiary value. If you read my previous post, the results that Pixel42 foolishly presented will give you some idea of what you can expect.

Studies that do absolutely no more than (and CAN do absolutely no more than) SUGGEST that SOME of the reports MAY (or may not) be explained by your vague conclusions.

I mean…could you get a more feeble scientific conclusion than ‘suggest some may’? It’s not even ‘established some may’…or ‘suggest all may’…or ‘ suggest some are’…. but it’s enough for all of you to insist the matter is conclusively resolved. So much for scientific rigor!

Expect to have this position unconditionally confirmed by all the other authors shortly.

Thus…all of your CLAIMS …will have been established to be nothing more than conditional explanations. Very…conditional…explanations (“suggest some may’…as opposed to ‘establish all are’….there’s a very big difference).

Since it is indisputable that personal subjective experience takes evidentiary priority (I’m going to assume you at least know what that means)…
…and since the anecdotal / personal observation / whatever-you-want-to-call-them reports (by the admission of your own studies) DO have evidentiary value (or your studies would not use them as data points)…
…and since the studies you presented can offer nothing but very conditional explanations (as Pixel42’s post very clearly establishes and as upcoming quotes from the authors of those same studies will conclusively establish)…

…we are now within spitting distance of finally establishing that psi phenomenon may very well have a probability above that of alien life.

NOTE TO THOSE WHO ARE GOING TO INSIST THAT I HAVEN’T PROOVED ANYTHING!

I…DON’T …NEED….TO….PROVE….ANYTHING!

I have hundreds of millions of data points that your own studies confirm as representing some form of valid data.

I have the indisputable fact that subjective experience takes evidentiary priority.

What you need to remind yourself of is that science does not represent the primary epistemology in this world. The vast majority of the worlds population (and even most scientists) get by quite successfully without it (which is why, IRL, everyone [including you] unconditionally depends on anecdotal evidence).

These points by themselves add up to sufficient data to establish some manner of quantifiable probability for psi.

Your own explanations explain nothing. They are guesses. Nothing more. You are the ones who are claiming to be able to resolve the issue with these explanations. I can establish that your explanations resolve nothing. The authors of the studies will confirm this…

…and the submission by Pixel42 already has.

That's quite a lengthy rejoinder!

Can you give us the Readers Digest version? If not, please don't try our fading patience with tedious and increasingly verbose logical fallacies.

 

[jaydeehess]

That's quite a lengthy rejoinder!

Can you give us the Readers Digest version? If not, please don't try our fading patience with tedious and increasingly verbose logical fallacies.

Lies, damn lies, and statistics

 

[Fudbucker]

,,, and back to the OP, I thought of another analogy, since this thread is so big on them.
Two horses about to race. The pale one has been seen running private tracks and looks fast. The other however has never been in a race. Its been rumoured to have been run on a few private tracks though and said to be capable of running.

Vegas bookies give the pale horse 100:1 odds in favour of winning. What do they give the dark horse?

1. You'll have to explain how it's analogous.

2. It doesn't sound like there's enough information to calculate the odds on the black horse. If a bookmaker can't figure out the odds, they're not going to take any bets. I wouldn't consider the black horse being a longshot because it might be a championship thoroughbred. I wouldn't consider it to be a sure thing (as far as sure things go in racing) because it might be one of the slowest horses to ever run. I wouldn't give it average odds because it might be a championship thoroughbred OR the slowest horse to ever run.

In the analogy you gave, I wouldn't be comfortable taking any bets. There's too much risk because so little information is known.

So let me ask myself the more straight-up question that you're hinting at.
We suspect there may be life on Europa (I think we might have a probe on the way, I'm not sure). Let's also say that as the probe is travelling to Jupiter, Princeton is going to start PEAR2, which will run for 10 years, and will be orders of magnitude better at determining whether random trails of HUGE numbers of events can be influenced by humans or not (I'm not explaining that very well, but you can read about the first PEAR study and get a general idea of how they were running their experiments).

Would I take a bet on which endeavor is more likely to be successful? Probably not, but if you forced me to, I would give even odds. I think it's as likely that we'll find life on Europa as it is that humans can influence random trials by almost infinitesimally small amounts. Neither discovery would be terribly surprising to me. The first PEAR experiments had some interesting (although ultimately inconclusive IMO) results. A second, more refined, set of experiments might lead to statistically conclusive results. I think there's enough wiggle-room in science to allow for extremely low-grade ESP abilities.

Of course, to be intellectually honest, the bet wouldn't simply be about Europa. It would be about sending probes to every seemingly habitable planet in the universe vs confirmation of ESP. Would I give even odds on that?

That's an awful lot of planets, and we would all be very surprised if every probe turned up a sterile planet. Now, whether this surprise is warranted or not is a good question. Is it just wishful-thinking or a knee-jerk reaction to seeing life around us all the time? I don't know. The smart money would seem to be on finding alien life. I've been kicking this around in my mind for awhile. I'm not as sure about this as I was. I think the huge amount of planets in the universe, might give alien life a distinct edge over ESP.

 

[Nonpareil]

Move back from multiverse then. If other dimensions exist we cannot prove the theory to be true. Yes, the math indicates they exist, perhaps even experiments can imply they exist. However, at least at this time (irony intended) it cannot be proven. That does not make the theory false.

If the math and experiments show evidence, then of course.

In the same way, when Einstein first proposed relativity there was no way to measure anything with enough precision to prove him correct. Was his theory false then because it could not be proven, and yet now correct because predictions arising from it have been shown to be true?

Of course not, and I have never said otherwise. Again, I am talking about theoretical impossibilities here, not practical ones.

Back to multiverse, if a multiverse theory is developed that can make predictions as to effects observed in our universe will it still be false if those predictions cannot be possibly be determined

I don't know what this means.

Regardless. This is not a particularly earth-shattering thing, as several posters seem to be asserting it to be. As Aridas has said, it is actually incredibly trivial.

Allow me to attempt clarification through rephrasing: if an entity is defined in such a way that it can never be shown to exist, it does not exist. If there is no difference between a world in which this entity exists and one where it does not, it does not; no meaningful definition of the word "real" applies to it.

That is what I am talking about when I say "even in theory". It's an answer to garage dragons, invisible pink unicorns, gravity leprechauns, and the like. These things don't exist because they define themselves out of existence; the universe with them is indistinguishable from the universe without.

Within the bounds of this specific thread, it applies to an earlier poster (I believe it was Fudbucker) suggesting that ESP might exist but be indistinguishable from chance, and annnnoid suggesting that it might not be detectable in any way as well. In both cases, it defines itself out of existence. It is a garage dragon.

Everything else I have said is follow-on to that. Multiverse theory and all the rest don't enter into it; they can be proven (or suggested by the evidence; the end result is the same, but with qualifications on exactly what you can say has been shown to exist). If they can't (again, meaning ever, not with current practical limits), then they aren't true. They're garage dragons.

 

[Fudbucker]

I really am. You are not.

If there is no difference between an entity existing and not existing, then there is no meaningful definition of the word "real" which can be said to apply to it.

This isn't clear. What do you mean by "no difference"? This is a different claim than what you were saying before: that what can't be proven to be true is therefore false. Are you backtracking from that?

If inflationary theory implies the existence of other universes, then - guess what? - it is because something about inflationary theory would not work (would be different) if those universes did not exist.

Inflationary theory doesn't entail the existence of other universes. It makes their existence more probable.

But more to the point, this is more goalpost moving. You said

If there is no effect on our own universe, ever, then no. They [other universes] do not exist, any more than the Death Star does.

It's completely plausible that other universes might, in principle, be incapable of affecting us. That does not mean they don't exist. There are galaxies we can see that we can never reach due to the acceleration of the expansion of the universe. They will eventually be beyond the observable universe. Since they cannot affect us, at that point, your claim means we should conclude they have ceased to exist.

In other words, there is a detectable difference.

This is also not clear.

Again: something detectable. If everything falls in line with MWI, that's evidence.

This is not hard.

It's evidence that MWI is correct, but again, you claimed that universes that can't affect us have to be considered as not existing. If the universes in the MWI interpretation of QM cannot affect us, then, according to you, we have to conclude they don't exist.

And since those universes can't be proven to exist, at this point in time, and might never be proven to exist, does that mean all the physicists who believe in the MWI of QM are dolts?

Or take simulation theory. Is it possible we exist in a simulation, designed in such a way that we will never be able to prove we live in a simulation? Of course. The existence of a simulation is not dependent on our attempts to prove it. And suppose the creator of the simulation never interacts with our simulated universe. Does that make it "not real"?

You keep conflating epistemology with ontology.

 

[Nonpareil]

This isn't clear. What do you mean by "no difference"? This is a different claim than what you were saying before: that what can't be proven to be true is therefore false. Are you backtracking from that?

No. They are naturally tied to one another, but they are not the same claim.

If there is no difference between the universe where a thing is true and a universe where a thing is not, then it is not true.

If there is a difference between those two universes, then there must be a way to show that difference. We do not necessarily have to have the capability at this point in time, but there must be some way to do it. There must be something that you can look at and say "if X was untrue, this would be different". Otherwise you can't actually say that there is a difference.

Because of this, everything that exists can be shown to exist. Again, we can't necessarily do this right now. But if something does exist, there must be some way to show it. If there is no way to show it, there is no difference - which takes us back to the first paragraph.

Everything that is true must be provable. Otherwise it is not true. I am not a mathematician - I have done some extremely high-level calculus as a part of my education in computer science, but theoretical mathematics is not my field - but I do not believe that Gödel's incompleteness theorems go against this, either. It states that, within formal systems that meet certain conditions (I will not pretend to understand what these conditions are), there must be at least one axiomatic statement - that is, a statement which is assumed to be true, but cannot be proven within the system. That does not preclude these axiomatic principles from being proven within other systems. But, really, I have no idea whether or not this applies to anything outside abstract mathematics and wouldn't be able to discuss it coherently if it did.

But more to the point, this is more goalpost moving. You said

If there is no effect on our own universe, ever, then no. They [other universes] do not exist, any more than the Death Star does.

It's completely plausible that other universes might, in principle, be incapable of affecting us. That does not mean they don't exist.

Yes, it does. If they never affect us in any way, ever, there is no difference between a world where they exist and a world where they don't, and thus there is no meaningful definition of the word "real" which applies to them. Saying that there is is special pleading; why shouldn't we give the same consideration to gravity leprechauns?

There are galaxies we can see that we can never reach due to the acceleration of the expansion of the universe. They will eventually be beyond the observable universe. Since they cannot affect us, at that point, your claim means we should conclude they have ceased to exist.

No, it doesn't. You could follow that galaxy and find it again, or observe the effects that it has on other, nearer galaxies.

You are still confusing practical with theoretical limitations.

It's evidence that MWI is correct, but again, you claimed that universes that can't affect us have to be considered as not existing. If the universes in the MWI interpretation of QM cannot affect us, then, according to you, we have to conclude they don't exist.

But the universes in the MWI interpretation do affect us. That is why they are part of the interpretation.

Or take simulation theory. Is it possible we exist in a simulation, designed in such a way that we will never be able to prove we live in a simulation? Of course.

Not by any functional definition of the word "simulation". A perfect mimic is the thing it is mimicking. If the universe behaves in all situations exactly as though it is real, the phrase "but it's actually a simulation" is meaningless.

It's the p-zombie problem all over again.