The problem you seem to have is being able to identify by citation from the case law, support for your contention that the ECHR is going to recognise "compelling reasons" for the denial of counsel in the present case. I cannot confirm an exhaustive search of all the 115 or so post Salduz judgements handed down by the ECHR, but between us here we have considered a good many.
There really is "no point of balance", no "conflicting rights" - not in this case.
But that's not your major problem. Your major problem is finding any exception relevant to the present case where statements used from interrogations without the benefit of counsel have been permitted to support convictions. Or perhaps you think the ECHR will anyway conclude that the 5:45 statement was the product of a "not an interrogation" kind of interrogation and congratulate Mignini for his most proper work?
...and you do realise don't you, unlike Popper, that one Article 6 violation and this conviction and this sentence is history, toast, never happened, doesn't count...etc etc. Have you explained that to all your boys and girls? CSC decision no. 2800? You have seen it right?
The ECHR is quite clear. The "compelling reasons" must be very strong, amounting to the equivalent of mass casualties due to, for example, terrorism. And since terrorist conspiracies may involve many people, there can legitimately be a concern about leaks hampering the investigation. This cannot be true for the Meredith Kercher murder, in which the police invented a theory of a conspiracy involving three persons: Amanda Knox, Raffaele Sollecito, and Patrick Lumumba, all of whom were at hand (either in the police station or at a known location in Perugia).
Another difference between Ibrahim and the current case is that the UK police had real evidence against at least the first three arrested persons prior to the start of the interviews. There was no such evidence before the "interviews" of Knox and Sollecito. In fact, there ever any reliable or credible evidence against Knox and Sollecito.
And the Italian judicial system eventually decided not to charge Lumumba, in part because he had a solid alibi, which a competent (should one write: non-Italian) police force would have investigated before going to the trouble and extreme violation of human rights in this judicial fiasco the police brought upon themselves and innocent persons.
From Ibrahim and others v the UK 50541/08 {emphasis added}:
198.
The first question to be examined is whether there were compelling reasons to restrict the applicants’ access to legal advice in their early police interviews. The Court has no doubt that there were (compare and contrast Salduz, cited above, § 56; and, more generally, Panovits, cited above).
199. It is important to note, first, that the present case is different from the case of Salduz as
the absence of a lawyer during the applicants’ initial police questioning did not result from the systemic application of a legal provision (see Şedal v. Turkey (dec.), no. 38802/08, § 33, 13 May 2014; compare Dayanan v. Turkey, no. 7377/03, § 33, 13 October 2009; and Çimen v. Turkey, no. 19582/02, § 26, 3 February 2009). Under the law in force in England, all of the applicants had the right to legal assistance upon arrest and the legal framework required that individual decisions be taken in each case as to when an arrest was to be made and whether, having regard to all of the circumstances,
legal assistance was, exceptionally, to be delayed in order to enable “safety” interviews (see paragraph 17 above) to be carried out.
200. As the Government explained, the pressures and responsibilities of the police in the days after 21 July 2005 were substantial (see paragraph 162 above).
Two weeks earlier, suicide bombers had detonated their bombs on the London transport system to devastating effect. The attacks had killed fifty-two people and injured countless more, and had temporarily disabled the entire London public transport system. When the first three applicants and Mr Osman detonated their devices two weeks later, the police had to work on the assumption that their conspiracy was an attempt to replicate the events of 7 July. At that stage, the police could not know why the bombs on 21 July had failed to explode and they had to assume that those responsible might attempt to detonate other bombs.
The possibility of further loss of life on a large scale was no doubt foremost in their minds. The need to obtain, as a matter of critical urgency, information on any further planned attacks and the identities of those potentially involved in the plot, while ensuring that the integrity of the investigation was not compromised by leaks, was clearly of the most compelling nature.
