Uh, I call shenanigans. Revelation is not a standard of evidence and any documented evidence has the same validity as Uri Geller's spoon bending; it's bullpies. And if you want to call the physiology irrelevant you would need to demonstrate that there is a monad interacting in that experience, and since your objections above have to merit welcome back to Sucktown, population: your argument.
Yes the evidence is what is referred to as "anecdotal". I don't need to demonstrate that the monad is there, or that it is interacting. There is sufficient "anecdotal" evidence to give it serious philosophical consideration as an alternative to materialism. Yes I know that science has provided a weight of evidence that existence is material. However I don't see sufficient cause to dismiss the philosophical and cultural historical record on existence, in favour of some scientist derived cosmogeny. Because as I have pointed out repeatedly, all science is doing is describing and theorising the form and action of matter. It is not addressing in any shape or form our existence, it is only describing the world we find ourselves in.
Surely under discussion is the origin of the world we find ourselves in, not its appearance?
I completely reject the existence of the mind in any fashion if it attempts to separate its dependency in physiology. There is more evidence to suggest the mind (as in: mental consciousness) being the product of brain activity.
All humans have relatively the same brains. It is not remarkable in an uncanny means that all humans would therefore feel the same sensation in regards to cognitive identity of the self.
The propagation for the sensation of the soul in humans is about on par with the propagation of humans creating pancake-like foods independent of each other.
When the same physical constructs are extent, it is reasonable to expect the same relative consequence in the absence of a new variable.
For most of human evolution, the variable of neuroscience (the ability to observe and catalog the function of the human brain) was not available so the sensation of a soul was left to deduction and discernment only through thinking (for instance, Descartes struggles to grasp the nature of impermanent physical form and persistent conception of identity in spite of such; something we can more easily explain today than he could then).
Again, subjective capgras patients readily match exactly the description you provided above regarding that sensation, but in their case, they are lacking that sensation implicitly and it absolutely destroys their sense of self-identity.
It's not a soul; it's your emotional recognition of you...it's your emotional you; the part of your self-identity in your brain which does not critically analyse and create a label and therefore remains implicit and seemingly elusive in description - like all things relating to emotion.
Give a computer a digital version of our fusiform gyrus, amgydala and mirror neurons (et. al.) and it would very likely tell you that it feels itself inside of itself.
Perhaps one day we'll do just that (see Blue Brain Project).
Yes, good points. Presumably(I am no expert) the thoughts of Descartes and others developed into philosophical positions like idealism and their lack of understanding of the physical world explains that. However I am taking as my justification for consideration of idealism, the experience of revelation, not the philosophical derivation of idealism.
You refer to emotions etc, this is not what I'm referring to as the soul/monad. Rather I would label that as the ego.
Yes the developments in AI are interesting, there is a philosophical conundrum to tackle there though. Would it simply be a mechanical device mimicking sentience?
Absolutely not.
If subjective capgras shows us anything it is that the emotional recognition of our self - the feeling of us being inside of ourselves - is absolutely critical to our functional level of sanity.
Removing it, the sensation from which a people interpret as being a soul, absolutely cripples an individual's perspective on reality and in most cases causes the individual to absolutely reject all of reality entirely - not just their own self.
When humans don't feel inside of their own body, then the brain will reject all of reality instead of rejecting the signal telling it that it does not feel inside of itself.
That is the opposite of not needing - that is critically and fundamentally requiring.
That people call it a soul and create metaphysical constructs around the sensation is a cognitive byproduct of this fundamental requirement of self-identity.
What we don't require is the metaphysical description of the emotional identity of one's own self identity, but we very much need the emotional identity of one's own self identity.
On the other hand; if you meant that the person can physically still be alive without feeling like they have a soul (as explicitly claimed by some individuals with subject capgras), then yes - we can physically function without the emotional recognition of our own self identity.
However, it is not a functional existence and requires assisted living.
It is like claiming that one doesn't need the prefrontal lobe to exist.
No, the human being as a thing doesn't need it to physically continue pumping blood through the body and firing neurons around the brain.
However, if what we mean by "exist" is AS the identity the individual PREVIOUSLY understood themselves to be, then no; an identity cannot "exist" as it DID without the components which permitted the formation of THAT identity...which is why they all claim to NO LONGER exist as THEM.
No; you can't deny the physical phenomena as an existence, but it does not therefore follow that this "soul" (a physical phenomena of the brain) is itself a separate object, even metaphysically, from our brain and that it is therefore clear that this sensation of our self emotionally perpetuates after the brain which supplies that sensation stops functioning.
In fact, again, subjective capgras quite fundamentally indicates that the sensation does not continue without the brain.
The extrapolation of the fact that one can imagine or conceive of an ontological thought paradox, or metaphysical construct, as conceptual independence of a physical product to support the construct in pondering does not then suggest that such is evident or valid in consideration of sustainment in value of holding as extant in any form other than a pondering thought.
I create the following, not as a false representation of your argument so to defeat, but to create a different argument of like form to yours but removed from your position on this subject so that perhaps you can see more easily how your proposition appears to me.
One might as well ask if a body were created in every physical manner as a human, but not given sentient awareness, would it still be considered human?
The problem here is the same as I have with your argument in your last series of responses; it proposes that the first half of the proposition is so and then therefore requests consideration of the latter half.
However, just as in this argument, there is an invalidity in the proposition that one could make a human in every physical manner without sentient awareness, your proposition has issue with me in assuming there is an involved constituent in any manner to any experience of a human relative to your description of a 'monad' as a metaphysical construct of any form.
Again; simply because one can extrapolate the constituents of an instance into categorical constructs which are conceptually removed from physical dependence in the pondering does not then produce such as the condition of the human subject in reality in any more meaningful manner than one creates a human without sentient awareness by postulating the sentiment.
I have seen in alternatives to materialism where people try to make arguments based on information. When were are talking about ordinary information, as opposed to subatomic information, there is a definite relationship between information and reality.
Information + energy -> reality
Reality + energy -> information
What this means is that given the material environment, you can expend energy to find out about it. Or given a sufficiently precise set of information, you can expend energy to create a material copy of that information. An example that comes to mind is that during WWII, Ford wanted to second-source an aircraft. The problem was that there was no precise set of blueprints that defined this aircraft. It was actually defined based on the tooling used to produce it and, of course, the manufacturer couldn't give away its tooling. So, they assembled two copies of the aircraft using Clecos instead of rivets. Clecos are spring-loaded fasteners that you can put into rivet holes to hold pieces together. You just compress the Cleco to put it in or take it out. Clecos are typically used during construction. For example, once you've drilled a couple of aligning holes, you can hold the pieces together with Clecos while you drill the rest of the rivet holes. However, you can then take it apart so that you can deburr the holes before you rivet it together permanently. Ford was able to take precise measurements of these two copies, inside and out, to create a set of blueprints that they then used to set up their own assembly line. They created information based on real aircraft and then used that information to create more aircraft.
This relationship is common. You create a movie or play based on a script and storyboards. You can make things from sketches. You can manufacture based on CAD information. You can also scan things to create information. The reason I mention this fundamental relationship is because I've seen people try to claim that information is reality. I certainly understand the temptation when arguing against materialism to make a claim like this; after all, if information is reality then that would take away a lot of obstacles. However, such an assertion is false; information and material examples are separated by energy expenditures.
The second temptation is to knowingly or unknowingly confuse subatomic information with ordinary information. These are not the same. You can't create or destroy subatomic information whereas ordinary information can be both created and destroyed. Likewise, while matter itself cannot be destroyed, material examples of information can be. For example, I can take a photograph and burn it which destroys the graphic depiction. However, the material itself still exists as carbon dioxide, water, ash, and some other trace gases.
The extrapolation of the fact that one can imagine or conceive of an ontological thought paradox, or metaphysical construct, as conceptual independence of a physical product to support the construct in pondering does not then suggest that such is evident or valid in consideration of sustainment in value of holding as extant in any form other than a pondering thought.
Yes, However I am taking my lead from revelation, not plucking the ideas out of the air.
I create the following, not as a false representation of your argument so to defeat, but to create a different argument of like form to yours but removed from your position on this subject so that perhaps you can see more easily how your proposition appears to me.
One might as well ask if a body were created in every physical manner as a human, but not given sentient awareness, would it still be considered human?
The problem here is the same as I have with your argument in your last series of responses; it proposes that the first half of the proposition is so and then therefore requests consideration of the latter half.
Yes, this is philosophical consideration, I consider the latter half. My point here is that if an AI were not identical to a human, how would we know it is sentient? And what quality of a human is critical for sentience.
However, just as in this argument, there is an invalidity in the proposition that one could make a human in every physical manner without sentient awareness, your proposition has issue with me in assuming there is an involved constituent in any manner to any experience of a human relative to your description of a 'monad' as a metaphysical construct of any form.
Yes, and yet the entire system of existence as we know it may either have been formed in the way we find it in order for such living sentience to emerge, or such an existence cannot in some unknown way be formed without such emergent sentience being a consequence. You see as we have no idea of the origin of our existence, we cannot dismiss the entire list of logical philosophical possibilities, any one of them may well be the case.
Again; simply because one can extrapolate the constituents of an instance into categorical constructs which are conceptually removed from physical dependence in the pondering does not then produce such as the condition of the human subject in reality in any more meaningful manner than one creates a human without sentient awareness by postulating the sentiment.
Yes, as I say I am following the lead of revelation, in this instance.
I am quite happy to accept your description of a human being, with a sentience emerging as a result of the chemical action of the body*, but I see no reason to dismiss other explanations, especially if they are philosophically consistent.
*note, I am not referring to sentience as a consequence of computation, but rather chemical metabolism.
Yes, However I am taking my lead from revelation, not plucking the ideas out of the air.Yes, this is philosophical consideration, I consider the latter half. My point here is that if an AI were not identical to a human, how would we know it is sentient? And what quality of a human is critical for sentience.
Yes, and yet the entire system of existence as we know it may either have been formed in the way we find it in order for such living sentience to emerge, or such an existence cannot in some unknown way be formed without such emergent sentience being a consequence. You see as we have no idea of the origin of our existence, we cannot dismiss the entire list of logical philosophical possibilities, any one of them may well be the case.
Yes, as I say I am following the lead of revelation, in this instance.
I am quite happy to accept your description of a human being, with a sentience emerging as a result of the chemical action of the body*, but I see no reason to dismiss other explanations, especially if they are philosophically consistent.
*note, I am not referring to sentience as a consequence of computation, but rather chemical metabolism.
Yes the evidence is what is referred to as "anecdotal". I don't need to demonstrate that the monad is there, or that it is interacting. There is sufficient "anecdotal" evidence to give it serious philosophical consideration as an alternative to materialism. Yes I know that science has provided a weight of evidence that existence is material. However I don't see sufficient cause to dismiss the philosophical and cultural historical record on existence, in favour of some scientist derived cosmogeny. Because as I have pointed out repeatedly, all science is doing is describing and theorising the form and action of matter. It is not addressing in any shape or form our existence, it is only describing the world we find ourselves in.
Surely under discussion is the origin of the world we find ourselves in, not its appearance?
You're calling your Zippo a flamethrower here. Your weak evidence is competing against some strong evidence (first things first: Materialism as a philosophy is ambitious but it is the only game in town for modeling so I have to subscribe to it if I want to discuss physical models.) You need to keep this in mind and never forget this. If I abolished ALL records, anecdotes, cultural, and scientific descriptions right now; if I nuked the entire Earth to a glass marble, YOUR evidence would be gone and never come back. Scientific models would endure. That's why we can dismiss your anecdotes.
As for existence, are you seeking a "how" or a "why"?
Yes the evidence is what is referred to as "anecdotal". I don't need to demonstrate that the monad is there, or that it is interacting. There is sufficient "anecdotal" evidence to give it serious philosophical consideration as an alternative to materialism. Yes I know that science has provided a weight of evidence that existence is material. However I don't see sufficient cause to dismiss the philosophical and cultural historical record on existence, in favour of some scientist derived cosmogeny. Because as I have pointed out repeatedly, all science is doing is describing and theorising the form and action of matter. It is not addressing in any shape or form our existence, it is only describing the world we find ourselves in.
Surely under discussion is the origin of the world we find ourselves in, not its appearance?
Is it possible to establish or extrapolate the existence of a monad through any mundane experience, or does it take the extraordinary experience, as PSI or NDE, in order to have a glimpse of the monad?
For example, I am sitting here now enjoying my morning cup of coffee. If it feels like I, the person living in my body is enjoying the coffee, would this be a misdiagnosis? Is it really a monad enjoying the coffee?
Is it possible to establish or extrapolate the existence of a monad through any mundane experience, or does it take the extraordinary experience, as PSI or NDE, in order to have a glimpse of the monad? ...snip...
I am not making the claim that PSI or NDE exist - I'm trying to get a handle on his notion of a monad . . . if a monad(s) exist, then it should be dectable in some form in everyday mundane experiences.
I am not making the claim that PSI or NDE exist - I'm trying to get a handle on his notion of a monad . . . if a monad(s) exist, then it should be dectable in some form in everyday mundane experiences.
"Revelation" and "out of the air" (the idiom referring to the action of picking a final product without verifying its accuracy, or referring to making something up) are functionally the same variable.
Yes, this is philosophical consideration, I consider the latter half.
It is out-dated in information to consider the sentient self aware identity of the human to be one only reserved for philosophical solution.
It is no longer left to the pondering of "maybe" or "if" and has arrived into the engineering age where it is a matter of "how" in regards to building.
Further; considering the "latter half" is exactly what I was highlighting as erroneous considering the axiom is merely an axiom and not rooted in reality.
We might as well write, "if a Teleparthon were whellning, but not pourneth, would it still be considered human?
My point here is that if an AI were not identical to a human, how would we know it is sentient?
Again, a false question.
It is first being presented, as if it were fact, that human level sentient self aware identity is possible in a physical build differing from the human brain's means of networking.
This would firstly have to be shown as evident - so far; there is nothing anywhere to suggest such is possible and instead all information suggests just the opposite of this; that if you want a specific given sentience, then you need that specific physical design and not another.
Meaning - if you want the device you are in theory building to be like an Iguana's sentience, then you will need to build it like an Iguana's brain network for processing.
If you want it to have a human's form of sentience then you will need to build the network like the human brain's network for processing.
It is an error to assume that sentient self aware identity is something which stands upon itself and is not emergent in dependence upon the entire physical construct of the brain from which it emerges and not one tiny object which can be emulated by a digital automaton.
No; the only way to accomplish human style sentience in a computer will be to build a computer that has a network processing system which is identical to the human brain's network.
I invite you to learn more by learning more details specifically regarding the Blue Brain Project; watch a few lectures and talks by Dr. Henry Markram.
This is a good starting point:
And what quality of a human is critical for sentience.
This is also a false question. There is no singular quality of a human which is critical for sentience.
Human sentient self aware identity is a complex emergence comprised of multiple networks in tandem and simultaneous processing.
It is like asking what quality of a human is critical for dancing.
Aside from the overly simplistic answer of "a brain" or "legs" (neither of which are specific answers) the question is invalid for it assumes the action involved is one in which a singular quality is required; it also creates the error in considering that sentient self aware identity is an object.
It is not a tangible singular object in any more fashion than "dancing" is an object.
If I place an automaton in front of you which can draw and write 200 different productions by the use of over a thousand cams, then the question as to what "quality" is required for it to "draw" (a specific action) is an invalid question due to the physical complexity of the object in question (the automaton) and the inapplicable standing of "drawing" to be considered an object requiring "quality".
Perhaps an even better comparison would be if you were to ask which quality was required for the internet to be monitoring itself, then we would be asking much the same question as your question about the human and in much the same way we would be making the same error.
In the same manner as the internet is not a singular object in which has a singular quality to monitor itself, but instead has mass arrays of NOC(C)'s and a variety of redundant relays and Bandwidth allocations and traffic-flow monitors, amplifiers, SNR regulators, Fiber, Coax, etc... spread throughout, variously, the planet physically; so too follows the human brain in like form.
It is an improper and incorrect question to the object in consideration.
One might as well walk up to a Foreman on a Skyscraper construction and ask them where the quality of "stable" is on the Skyscraper.
It's not that the question is wrong; it is simply inapplicable.
Yes, and yet the entire system of existence as we know it may either have been formed in the way we find it in order for such living sentience to emerge, or such an existence cannot in some unknown way be formed without such emergent sentience being a consequence. You see as we have no idea of the origin of our existence, we cannot dismiss the entire list of logical philosophical possibilities, any one of them may well be the case.
Irrelevant.
If Blue Brain is crafted by human hands or accidentally somehow happened changes absolutely nothing about the nature of how it accomplishes sentient self aware identity.
Deferring to an argument from ignorance regarding the origin of all that exists is simply irrelevant to the question of whether or not the human brain satisfies the full description of sentient self aware identity with its physical construct - it does.
Again, your comment here is like proposing that since one does not know how New York came to arrive specifically, that one cannot dismiss an entire list of philosophical possibilities for how the Skyscraper achieved a quality of "stability".
In much the same way as the origin of New York is not required to explain the stability of a Skyscraper, we do not require the origin of existence to explain the sentient self aware identity of a human brain.
I am quite happy to accept your description of a human being, with a sentience emerging as a result of the chemical action of the body*, but I see no reason to dismiss other explanations, especially if they are philosophically consistent.
I am quite happy to accept your description of a Skyscraper, with stability emerging as a result of the physical constituents in the construction, but I see no reason to dismiss other explanations (for its stability), especially if they are philosophically consistent.
You may want to learn for a while before you begin to offer propositions and you may want to consider shifting fields from PHILOSOPHY to NEUROSCIENCE if your question is in regards to human sentient self aware identity and the perception of the "soul" or "spirit".
Just because you can think it, does not make it.
You still need to show it - not in argument - in reality.
This isn't an argument over the quality of beauty, or some other philosophical topic.
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