Is there any update on how Amanda's doing Charlie?
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Continuation Part 11: Amanda Knox/Raffaele Sollecito
- Thread starter Magister
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Machiavelli
Philosopher
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- Sep 19, 2010
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- 5,844
It seems I may be misinterpreted. By noting that the child was actually a teenager, you perceive as if I were putting a subtext making excuses for the suspects, but there was no such subtext. I actually think it is necessary to have full details as possible before attempting to have a rough picture of events. The detail about the grown up child is to be noted, my opinion, not because makes actions look less bad, but because actually adds another "adult" person to the development of events which is something that the investigative judge would be interested into from an evidentiary point if view.
Now, frankly I disagree with your "interpretation" of my thought, like "attributing to absolute dishonest criminality", this is not my way of thinking. I don't even have these "absolute" categories.
I think that Knox's ticket and some of her behavioral records are an element compatible with both guilt or innocence, but they undermine some of the themes of the pro-Knox advocates, the bar a certain advocate strategy that basically hinges on portraying a false characterization of her personality.
There is also plain independant evidence that Ms. Knox was a manipulative character. Millions of people with such personalities exist who are basically all innocent of murder, so there isn't a direct causative bound that implies guilt from this. But there is not even room for a "good character" and "no motive" defensive line, for example to try to bolster the false claim that she was a "virtual stranger" with Rudy Guede.
Let's also point out that the presumption of innocence or unprejudiced attitude method should also apply to Rudy Guede, in terms of crimes there I no evidence he committed, such as a break in in Via della Pergola.
As for the social worker affair, the law says he is entitled to a mitigation. Which is not the same of saying what he did was legal.
Bill Williams
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2011
- Messages
- 15,713
There is no one who agrees with you, except for the pro-guilt lobby - those who believe the caricature of Foxy Knoxy exists. There simply is no evidence of being a "manipulative character", otherwise you would have provided it. Once again, you make statements. No evidence, just statements.
Desert Fox
Philosopher
- Joined
- Feb 4, 2014
- Messages
- 6,147
She has been writing articles for a local Seattle Newspaper
A compelling article and video in NYTimes on Lindy Chamberlain with many close parallels to the Kercher case
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/17/u...an-scorned-by-australias-news-media.html?_r=0
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/17/u...an-scorned-by-australias-news-media.html?_r=0
Charlie Wilkes
Illuminator
- Joined
- Dec 8, 2009
- Messages
- 4,177
I saw her about a month ago, and I stay in touch with her. She is doing well.
It is no picnic to have thugs in Italy persecuting her and a mob of ignorant strangers on the Internet hating on her. But she is living a good and productive life. She is heartened by the many people who understand the truth about her case and will continue to support her until the day she is exonerated.
She is a strong and resilient person, in her quiet way. The haters will not make her hate them back. They will not sow bitterness in her heart.
The effect of gamma rays on Knox, Amanda Marie...
Here is yet another informative case from the ECtHR:
CASE OF SCOPPOLA v. ITALY (No. 2) 10249/03 17/09/2009
In brief (excerpts from the Grand Chamber judgment):
On 2 September 1999, after a fight with his two sons, the applicant killed his wife and injured one of his sons. He was arrested on 3 September.
At a hearing on 18 February 2000 before the Rome preliminary hearings judge (giudice dell'udienza preliminare – “the GUP”) the applicant asked to be tried under the summary procedure, a simplified process which entailed a reduction of sentence in the event of conviction. In the version in force at that time Article 442 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) provided that, if the crime committed by the defendant was punishable by life imprisonment, the appropriate sentence should be thirty years.
The GUP agreed to follow the summary procedure.
On 24 November 2000 the GUP found the applicant guilty and noted that he was liable to a sentence of life imprisonment; however, as the applicant had elected to stand trial under the summary procedure, the judge sentenced him to a term of 30 years.
On 12 January 2001 the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Rome Court of Appeal appealed on points of law against the Rome GUP's judgment of 24 November 2000. The prosecution argued that the GUP should have applied Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 341 of 24 November 2000, which entered into force on the very day when the applicant was convicted. After being amended by parliament, Legislative Decree no. 341 was converted into Law no. 4 of 19 January 2001.
The prosecution contended in particular that Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 341 had amended Article 442 of the CCP and now provided that, in the event of trial under the summary procedure, life imprisonment was to be substituted for life imprisonment with daytime isolation if there were “cumulative offences” (concorso di reati) or a “continuous offence” (reato continuato). The GUP's failure to apply Legislative Decree no. 341 amounted to “a manifest error of law”.
On 18 July 2003 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal on the ground of a factual error (Article 625a of the CCP)....The applicant further alleged that the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him following the changes made by Legislative Decree no. 341 of 2000, and thus through a retrospective criminal-law provision, had breached Article 7 of the Convention and the principles of fair trial. He submitted that his waiver of procedural safeguards as a result of electing to stand trial under the summary procedure had not been compensated for by the reduction of his sentence promised by the State at the time when he made that choice. Lastly, he maintained that life imprisonment was an inhuman and degrading punishment and as such contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.
In a judgment of 14 May 2004, deposited with its registry on 28 October 2004, the Court of Cassation declared the applicant's extraordinary appeal inadmissible. It observed that he was not complaining of factual errors committed by the domestic courts but essentially attempting to challenge the Court of Cassation's assessment on points of law.
{Key aspects of the ECtHR judgment, critical for understanding its role, follow.}
147. By Article 46 of the Convention the High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case to which they are parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. It follows, inter alia, that a judgment in which the Court finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction under Article 41, but also to choose the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted. As the Court's judgments are essentially declaratory, the respondent State remains free, subject to the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court's judgment (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000-VIII; Sejdovic, cited above, § 119; and Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468/06, § 238, 22 December 2008).
148. However, exceptionally, with a view to helping the respondent State to fulfil its obligations under Article 46, the Court will seek to indicate the type of measure that might be taken in order to put an end to a situation it has found to exist (see, for example, Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 194, ECHR 2004-V). In other exceptional cases, where the very nature of the violation found is such as to leave no real choice between measures capable of remedying it, the Court may decide to indicate only one such measure (see Aleksanyan, cited above, § 239, and Abbasov v. Azerbaijan, no. 24271/05, § 37, 17 January 2008).
149. In the present case, the Court does not consider it necessary to indicate general measures required at national level for the execution of its judgment.
150. As regards individual measures, the Court observes that in many cases in which it found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention because an applicant had not been tried by an independent and impartial tribunal (see, among other judgments, Gençel v. Turkey, no. 53431/99, § 27, 23 October 2003, and Tahir Duran v. Turkey, no. 40997/98, § 23, 29 January 2004), or because of an interference with the right to participate in the trial (see Somogyi v. Italy, no. 67972/01, § 86, ECHR 2004-IV, and R.R. v. Italy, no. 42191/02, § 76, 9 June 2005) or with the right to examine prosecution witnesses (see Bracci v. Italy, no. 36822/02, § 75, 13 October 2005) the Court indicated in Chamber judgments that in principle the most appropriate remedy would be for the applicant to be given a retrial without delay if he or she so requested. The Grand Chamber has endorsed the general approach taken in the cases cited above (see Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 210, ECHR 2005-IV, and Sejdovic, cited above, §§ 126-127).
151. Nevertheless, the aim of individual measures should be to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position he would have been in had the requirements of the Convention not been disregarded (see Piersack v. Belgium (Article 50), 26 October 1984, § 12, Series A no. 85). A judgment in which the Court finds a violation imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention to put an end to the violation found and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (see Menteş and Others v. Turkey (just satisfaction), 24 July 1998, § 24, Reports 1998-IV; Scozzari and Giunta, cited above, § 249; Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 47, ECHR 2004-I; and Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 198, ECHR 2004-II).
152. The State preserves discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment, provided that it discharges its primary obligation under the Convention, which is to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed (see Assanidze, cited above, § 202). At the same time, in ratifying the Convention the Contracting States undertake to ensure that their domestic legislation is compatible with it, so that it is for the respondent State to remove any obstacles in its domestic legal system that might prevent the applicant's situation from being adequately redressed (see Maestri, cited above, § 47, and Assanidze, cited above, § 198).
153. The Court has found in the present case that the retrospective application to the applicant's detriment of the provisions of Legislative Decree no. 341 of 2000 infringed the rights guaranteed by Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention. In particular, after a trial that the Court has found to have been unfair, the applicant received a sentence (life imprisonment) heavier than the maximum sentence to which he was liable at the time when he requested and was granted the right to be tried under the summary procedure (thirty years' imprisonment).
154. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and the urgent need to put an end to the breach of Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention, the Court therefore considers that the respondent State is responsible for ensuring that the applicant's sentence of life imprisonment is replaced by a penalty consistent with the principles set out in the present judgment, which is a sentence not exceeding thirty years' imprisonment.
--------------------------------------------
A summary of key concepts (and contrary to what those without citations [aka guilters] may claim):
1. The ECtHR generally leaves individual and general measures to be decided by the CoM with the respondent state.
2. When it sees the need, the ECtHR will specify any individual and/or general measures the respondent state should take it believes important from a human rights perspective, for example, apparently when there may be a need for urgency or a need for explicit direction.
3. This case to an extent addresses the calculation of the 30 year sentence that replaces a life sentence in the fast-track trial in Italy.
CASE OF SCOPPOLA v. ITALY (No. 2) 10249/03 17/09/2009
In brief (excerpts from the Grand Chamber judgment):
On 2 September 1999, after a fight with his two sons, the applicant killed his wife and injured one of his sons. He was arrested on 3 September.
At a hearing on 18 February 2000 before the Rome preliminary hearings judge (giudice dell'udienza preliminare – “the GUP”) the applicant asked to be tried under the summary procedure, a simplified process which entailed a reduction of sentence in the event of conviction. In the version in force at that time Article 442 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) provided that, if the crime committed by the defendant was punishable by life imprisonment, the appropriate sentence should be thirty years.
The GUP agreed to follow the summary procedure.
On 24 November 2000 the GUP found the applicant guilty and noted that he was liable to a sentence of life imprisonment; however, as the applicant had elected to stand trial under the summary procedure, the judge sentenced him to a term of 30 years.
On 12 January 2001 the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Rome Court of Appeal appealed on points of law against the Rome GUP's judgment of 24 November 2000. The prosecution argued that the GUP should have applied Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 341 of 24 November 2000, which entered into force on the very day when the applicant was convicted. After being amended by parliament, Legislative Decree no. 341 was converted into Law no. 4 of 19 January 2001.
The prosecution contended in particular that Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 341 had amended Article 442 of the CCP and now provided that, in the event of trial under the summary procedure, life imprisonment was to be substituted for life imprisonment with daytime isolation if there were “cumulative offences” (concorso di reati) or a “continuous offence” (reato continuato). The GUP's failure to apply Legislative Decree no. 341 amounted to “a manifest error of law”.
On 18 July 2003 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal on the ground of a factual error (Article 625a of the CCP)....The applicant further alleged that the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him following the changes made by Legislative Decree no. 341 of 2000, and thus through a retrospective criminal-law provision, had breached Article 7 of the Convention and the principles of fair trial. He submitted that his waiver of procedural safeguards as a result of electing to stand trial under the summary procedure had not been compensated for by the reduction of his sentence promised by the State at the time when he made that choice. Lastly, he maintained that life imprisonment was an inhuman and degrading punishment and as such contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.
In a judgment of 14 May 2004, deposited with its registry on 28 October 2004, the Court of Cassation declared the applicant's extraordinary appeal inadmissible. It observed that he was not complaining of factual errors committed by the domestic courts but essentially attempting to challenge the Court of Cassation's assessment on points of law.
{Key aspects of the ECtHR judgment, critical for understanding its role, follow.}
147. By Article 46 of the Convention the High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case to which they are parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. It follows, inter alia, that a judgment in which the Court finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction under Article 41, but also to choose the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted. As the Court's judgments are essentially declaratory, the respondent State remains free, subject to the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court's judgment (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000-VIII; Sejdovic, cited above, § 119; and Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468/06, § 238, 22 December 2008).
148. However, exceptionally, with a view to helping the respondent State to fulfil its obligations under Article 46, the Court will seek to indicate the type of measure that might be taken in order to put an end to a situation it has found to exist (see, for example, Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 194, ECHR 2004-V). In other exceptional cases, where the very nature of the violation found is such as to leave no real choice between measures capable of remedying it, the Court may decide to indicate only one such measure (see Aleksanyan, cited above, § 239, and Abbasov v. Azerbaijan, no. 24271/05, § 37, 17 January 2008).
149. In the present case, the Court does not consider it necessary to indicate general measures required at national level for the execution of its judgment.
150. As regards individual measures, the Court observes that in many cases in which it found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention because an applicant had not been tried by an independent and impartial tribunal (see, among other judgments, Gençel v. Turkey, no. 53431/99, § 27, 23 October 2003, and Tahir Duran v. Turkey, no. 40997/98, § 23, 29 January 2004), or because of an interference with the right to participate in the trial (see Somogyi v. Italy, no. 67972/01, § 86, ECHR 2004-IV, and R.R. v. Italy, no. 42191/02, § 76, 9 June 2005) or with the right to examine prosecution witnesses (see Bracci v. Italy, no. 36822/02, § 75, 13 October 2005) the Court indicated in Chamber judgments that in principle the most appropriate remedy would be for the applicant to be given a retrial without delay if he or she so requested. The Grand Chamber has endorsed the general approach taken in the cases cited above (see Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 210, ECHR 2005-IV, and Sejdovic, cited above, §§ 126-127).
151. Nevertheless, the aim of individual measures should be to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position he would have been in had the requirements of the Convention not been disregarded (see Piersack v. Belgium (Article 50), 26 October 1984, § 12, Series A no. 85). A judgment in which the Court finds a violation imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention to put an end to the violation found and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (see Menteş and Others v. Turkey (just satisfaction), 24 July 1998, § 24, Reports 1998-IV; Scozzari and Giunta, cited above, § 249; Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 47, ECHR 2004-I; and Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 198, ECHR 2004-II).
152. The State preserves discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment, provided that it discharges its primary obligation under the Convention, which is to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed (see Assanidze, cited above, § 202). At the same time, in ratifying the Convention the Contracting States undertake to ensure that their domestic legislation is compatible with it, so that it is for the respondent State to remove any obstacles in its domestic legal system that might prevent the applicant's situation from being adequately redressed (see Maestri, cited above, § 47, and Assanidze, cited above, § 198).
153. The Court has found in the present case that the retrospective application to the applicant's detriment of the provisions of Legislative Decree no. 341 of 2000 infringed the rights guaranteed by Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention. In particular, after a trial that the Court has found to have been unfair, the applicant received a sentence (life imprisonment) heavier than the maximum sentence to which he was liable at the time when he requested and was granted the right to be tried under the summary procedure (thirty years' imprisonment).
154. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and the urgent need to put an end to the breach of Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention, the Court therefore considers that the respondent State is responsible for ensuring that the applicant's sentence of life imprisonment is replaced by a penalty consistent with the principles set out in the present judgment, which is a sentence not exceeding thirty years' imprisonment.
--------------------------------------------
A summary of key concepts (and contrary to what those without citations [aka guilters] may claim):
1. The ECtHR generally leaves individual and general measures to be decided by the CoM with the respondent state.
2. When it sees the need, the ECtHR will specify any individual and/or general measures the respondent state should take it believes important from a human rights perspective, for example, apparently when there may be a need for urgency or a need for explicit direction.
3. This case to an extent addresses the calculation of the 30 year sentence that replaces a life sentence in the fast-track trial in Italy.
Regarding a few of your statements, which I have highlighted:
1. Statement #1 is false. Amanda Knox lived in Italy, in the college town of Perugia, less than two months. You and other guilters have no basis to make this statement; people in the US who have known Ms. Knox for many years regard her as a person to be respected.
2. Statement #2 is false. Rudy Guede was a resident of the town of Perugia. He apparently was known to the Perugia police, at least because he was apprehended after illegally entering a children's nursery in Milan, armed with a knife. The Perugian police allowed him to return to Perugia rather than be detained for the armed burglary in Milan. Guede was also a basketball-playing friend of the boys in the downstairs apartment of the cottage. He had visited them several times. Amanda and Meredith only knew him because of his visit(s) with the downstairs boys.
ETA 3. It is reasonable to suppose the Rudy Guede entered the cottage through the broken window of Filomena's room. This entry would be similar to the method he used to enter the lawyer's office in Perugia, where he stole a computer and other items; when he was apprehended in Milan, he had those items. In the US, a person carrying items stolen from a location is assumed to have been the thief, unless that person can produce solid evidence that they received them otherwise.
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Although the Italian scientific police are now members of ENSFI they were not at the time. The standards require such things as written SOPs for the labs, records of contamination, environmental controls, personnel development processes. That hey were not members at the time implies they failed to meet these standards. If Italy has freedom of information legislation I have suggested an Italian ask for correspondence concerning the application for membership. Individuals can not be members of ENFSI as the name implies, so neither Stefanoni nor Conti nor Vechiotti could be members.
Mach believes that it's his absolute right to slander Amanda Knox. He doesn't need to have a reason why.
Charlie's recent comments about the lab tech Ms. Stefanoni's whorish behavior seem to be an ironic counterpoint to this kind of attack.
Ask Mach, for example, if he believes that Amanda Knox could fairly be characterized as an honor student at a top American university. He will say no, and nothing that is offered (like her academic records, the difficulty of being accepted at her school, her performance while there, the quality of the school itself, etc.) will convince him otherwise.
What will happen instead is that he'll say this doesn't matter anyway, and that it's only secondary to his argument that she took a knife to Meredith Kercher for no apparent reason . . . and then in a month or two, he'll slip it in again, the idea that she could never have been an honor student because she was really a party girl who came to Perugia only for the wild and dissolute lifestyle she could find there.
Ha ha ha, it just occurred to me that this really is pretty funny, given that Amanda Knox's home town (which also happens to be mine) is exactly the sort of city where a young person wanting to party and live a wild life could do so with a lot less effort than it takes to get into the University of Washington, excel in classes for a couple of years, find a good study abroad program, work part time jobs to pay for getting to Europe, all for the extravagant reward of what?
Partying in Perugia! Woo ****** hoo.
But Mach will never, ever give up on the party girl theme . . . oddly, it seems very important to him.
Copied from the IIP forum.
From: Glossary of Statistical Terms
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats ... ry_ENG.pdf
{Note that the communication to the respondent state of an application not deemed immediately inadmissible comes before the final Court decision on admissibility.}
Processing applications - major procedural steps
•
An application may be declared inadmissible or struck out of the Court’s list of cases by a Single-Judge formation, Committee or a Chamber, without any further procedural steps.
•
Otherwise the Section President or the competent Chamber generally decides to give notice of the application to the respondent government (“communication”).
•
At the communication stage the Section Registrar may encourage the Parties to reach a friendly settlement. If the parties accept the Registrar’s proposal, reach a settlement on their own initiative or if the Court is otherwise satisfied that the case has been settled, it will be struck out of the list of cases.
•
If the application has not been settled, the Chamber or Committee will resume, on the basis of the material received, the examination of the admissibility and merits. Unless the Chamber or Committee decides at this stage to declare the application inadmissible, the decision on admissibility is usually incorporated in the
judgment on the merits.
This judgment becomes final after expiry of a three-month period for submitting a request for referral to by the Grand Chamber.
From: Glossary of Statistical Terms
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats ... ry_ENG.pdf
{Note that the communication to the respondent state of an application not deemed immediately inadmissible comes before the final Court decision on admissibility.}
Processing applications - major procedural steps
•
An application may be declared inadmissible or struck out of the Court’s list of cases by a Single-Judge formation, Committee or a Chamber, without any further procedural steps.
•
Otherwise the Section President or the competent Chamber generally decides to give notice of the application to the respondent government (“communication”).
•
At the communication stage the Section Registrar may encourage the Parties to reach a friendly settlement. If the parties accept the Registrar’s proposal, reach a settlement on their own initiative or if the Court is otherwise satisfied that the case has been settled, it will be struck out of the list of cases.
•
If the application has not been settled, the Chamber or Committee will resume, on the basis of the material received, the examination of the admissibility and merits. Unless the Chamber or Committee decides at this stage to declare the application inadmissible, the decision on admissibility is usually incorporated in the
judgment on the merits.
This judgment becomes final after expiry of a three-month period for submitting a request for referral to by the Grand Chamber.
Back to the future.
For starters, even before the family had set up camp at Uluru — formerly known as Ayers Rock, in Australia’s Northern Territory — the chief park ranger there had warned his superiors that dingoes were a growing threat to humans and that their numbers needed to be thinned. He was ignored
Imagine this.
For starters, a Perugian policeman warned there was a serial black offender who liked burgling, brandishing and stealing knives.
He was ignored.
Unfortunately this mythical but prescient Italian did not exist.
For starters, even before the family had set up camp at Uluru — formerly known as Ayers Rock, in Australia’s Northern Territory — the chief park ranger there had warned his superiors that dingoes were a growing threat to humans and that their numbers needed to be thinned. He was ignored
Imagine this.
For starters, a Perugian policeman warned there was a serial black offender who liked burgling, brandishing and stealing knives.
He was ignored.
Unfortunately this mythical but prescient Italian did not exist.
Ampulla of Vater
Illuminator
I would have to accept this except it doesn't explain the remark about the bad relationship with the father. That statement can only be an attempt to make the abuse of office appear to be for a good reason, thereby excusing the breaking of the law.
This cannot be so, on many points. If you saw it as comparable with both guilt and innocence, it would then be of no importance whatsoever, yet it is continuously mentioned. It is never brought up by the pro-innocence people, only by the pro-guilt people as a character flaw of some sort. Just like you state a manipulative personality can be present in both innocent and guilty people, then it cannot be solely indicative of guilt. It must be a non-issue and people must stop attempting to use it as an element of guilt because it is not (and I am not agreeing with Knox having a manipulative personality).
None of it has any bearing on whether or not she met Rudy once or six times.
What I am saying is you --you Machiavelli -- view every minute detail of Knox and Sollecito through guilt-colored glasses and everything everyone else does through virtuous glasses, the exact same thing innocenters are accused of doing in reverse.
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Kauffer
Master Poster
- Joined
- Oct 17, 2014
- Messages
- 2,382
Bias
There is no "independent evidence" that Ms Knox is a manipulative character and, you cite nothing. Similarly, there is no evidence that she was anything other than a virtual stranger to Guede, with two or three instances of her finding herself in his company, randomly and not by design. There are no telephone contacts - you could believe Kokomani of course, but that wouldn't be very bright.
Furthermore you can provide no evidence in the form of actual documentation proving that Ms Knox had any contact whatsoever with any drug dealers and repeat no more than tittle tattle and rumour.
Additionally, you have cast aspersions with no evidence that Ms Knox's scholastic record was not excellent and that the circumstances of her attendance at her course in Perugia were of an unplanned and hurried nature.
Here you are scrabbling around on the margins, looking for something, anything, to impugn Ms Knox's character, because you have no hard evidence at all of her involvement in Ms Kercher's murder, despite your attempts to re-write scientific method and contradict the entire scientific community.
Your evidence lite approach to this case is predicated on your guilt filtering the smallest piece of irrelevance. Perhaps you are, after all, representative of the post inquisitional, post facistic nature of Italian society - a debt ridden failed state oiled by corruption and riddled by the rot of a superannuated, medieval judiciary, which has proven itself incapable of adjudicating criminal cases according to Italy's own laws and in ignorance of its constitution - in short, a dietrologian nightmare permeated by collective thought disorder.
There is no "independent evidence" that Ms Knox is a manipulative character and, you cite nothing. Similarly, there is no evidence that she was anything other than a virtual stranger to Guede, with two or three instances of her finding herself in his company, randomly and not by design. There are no telephone contacts - you could believe Kokomani of course, but that wouldn't be very bright.
Furthermore you can provide no evidence in the form of actual documentation proving that Ms Knox had any contact whatsoever with any drug dealers and repeat no more than tittle tattle and rumour.
Additionally, you have cast aspersions with no evidence that Ms Knox's scholastic record was not excellent and that the circumstances of her attendance at her course in Perugia were of an unplanned and hurried nature.
Here you are scrabbling around on the margins, looking for something, anything, to impugn Ms Knox's character, because you have no hard evidence at all of her involvement in Ms Kercher's murder, despite your attempts to re-write scientific method and contradict the entire scientific community.
Your evidence lite approach to this case is predicated on your guilt filtering the smallest piece of irrelevance. Perhaps you are, after all, representative of the post inquisitional, post facistic nature of Italian society - a debt ridden failed state oiled by corruption and riddled by the rot of a superannuated, medieval judiciary, which has proven itself incapable of adjudicating criminal cases according to Italy's own laws and in ignorance of its constitution - in short, a dietrologian nightmare permeated by collective thought disorder.
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anglolawyer
Banned
What about all the other evidence?
Kauffer
When you probe far enough, the evidence always turns out to be all the other evidence. It's like arguing with a lump of blancmange.
Kauffer
When you probe far enough, the evidence always turns out to be all the other evidence. It's like arguing with a lump of blancmange.
Desert Fox
Philosopher
- Joined
- Feb 4, 2014
- Messages
- 6,147
I have not heard the pink dildo argued recently. . . .Has to have some pro guilt meaning
Kauffer
Master Poster
- Joined
- Oct 17, 2014
- Messages
- 2,382
Double standards
Yes, obviously. The whole thing stemmed from the licentious Ms Knox's bathroom bag, sex toys and prophylactics. And we must remember that Ms Kercher hated Ms Knox and angrily disapproved of her countless men friends and the contents of her bathroom bag. But of course she needed to borrow Ms Knox's condoms for sex with Silenzi. And then there are all those sweet text messages between these female arch enemies signed off with kisses and shopping trips and the chocolate festival and the concert. Gosh, didn't Ms Kercher have a strange way of showing anger and hatred! But, I suppose since Ms Knox had Ms Kercher raped, murdered her and stole her money, then Ms Kercher must have been angry and filled with hate. Yes, that must be it.
I have not heard the pink dildo argued recently. . . .Has to have some pro guilt meaning
Yes, obviously. The whole thing stemmed from the licentious Ms Knox's bathroom bag, sex toys and prophylactics. And we must remember that Ms Kercher hated Ms Knox and angrily disapproved of her countless men friends and the contents of her bathroom bag. But of course she needed to borrow Ms Knox's condoms for sex with Silenzi. And then there are all those sweet text messages between these female arch enemies signed off with kisses and shopping trips and the chocolate festival and the concert. Gosh, didn't Ms Kercher have a strange way of showing anger and hatred! But, I suppose since Ms Knox had Ms Kercher raped, murdered her and stole her money, then Ms Kercher must have been angry and filled with hate. Yes, that must be it.
anglolawyer
Banned
No what happened was, Knox hired Guede to come over and **** in the pan to piss Meredith off but he stupidly used the wrong one. An argument erupted anyway but because of Guede's error they framed him. This is more or less the Crini theory.
carbonjam72
Master Poster
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- Apr 24, 2014
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I'm not a fan of Stafanoni. I think she has well earned for herself a jail cell for her to sit in and reflect on her criminal conduct and how many lives she's damaged with her foolish lies and deceit.
But I'm troubled by the 'whore' angle slurs that have come up. It's sickening to see these kinds of ignorant attacks against Amanda, but it's uncomfortable to watch such baseless claims against Stef.
Being an actual whore has consequences, both to the person, and how others judge them. If Stefanoni were an actual street walker, it would indeed add one more layer of hypocrisy to a case where the Italians have done nothing but project all of the worst most familiar stereotypical slurs made against Italians, and projected those slurs onto Amanda. (filthy, libidinous, violent, manipulative, clannish etc).
The character assassination, which Mach so casually repeats above, has been one of the most egregious and lingering malicious assaults of this unjustified persecution, and its not just wrong, its mean.
So while it would have been fascinating if Stef actually were a whore in the real sense, unless its true I'd hope reasonable people could cut the crap. Lets not confuse Stef as a whore, with Stef whoring out her lab services, professional work, and expert opinion, to any customers.
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