Continuation Part 10: Amanda Knox/Raffaele Sollecito

Status
Not open for further replies.
Yes, apparently nothing has been done for at least six years since the Italian Constitutional Court asked the Italian legislature to take action.

So this shows how consistent a political and judicial system can be.

IIUC, Italy released Dorigo from prison (more than SEVEN years after his trial was judged unfair by the EConventionHR Commission) in Dec. 2006. It's not clear if he was declared "innocent" or "non-guilty" at release; the prosecutor and CSC decided that keeping him in prison was incompatible with Italy's obligations under the EConventionHR.

Here is the final report (2007) of the Committee of Ministers:
{Source: http://caselaw.echr.globe24h.com/0/0/italy/2007/06/20/case-of-dorigo-against-italy-81277-33286-96.shtml}

Final Resolution CM/ResDH(2007)83[1]

Execution of the decisions of the Committee of Ministers

Case of Dorigo against Italy



(Application No. 33286/96, Interim Resolution DH(99)258 of 15/04/99 (violation),

Interim Resolutions ResDH(2002)30 of 19/02/02, ResDH(2004)13 of 10/02/04 and ResDH(2005)85)



The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of former Article 32 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter “the Convention”),



Having regard to Interim Resolution DH(99)258, adopted on 15 April 1999 in the case of Dorigo against Italy case, in which it concluded, in agreement with the report of the European Commission of Human Rights, that Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention had been violated by the unfairness of criminal proceedings brought against the applicant, who had been unable to question hostile witnesses, or have them questioned, and authorised publication of the report of the European Commission of Human Rights;



Whereas the Committee of Ministers has examined the proposals on just satisfaction in the Commission's report, which were supplemented by a letter from the President of the Commission of 30 March 1999;



Whereas, in a decision adopted under the former Article 32, paragraph 2, of the Convention, on 3 December 1999 at the Deputies' 688th meeting, the Committee of Ministers ruled that the respondent government should, as proposed by the Commission, pay the applicant 5 000 000 million Italian lire within three months as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage, plus 7 000 000 million Italian lire to cover costs and expenses, i.e., a total of 12 000 000 million Italian lire, and that interest assessed on each full month's delay, at the legal rate applying on the date of the decision, should be payable on any sums unpaid, from expiry of the deadline until full payment had been made;



Having asked the government of the respondent state to inform it of action taken on its decisions in this case, having regard to Italy's duty of compliance, under the former Article 32, paragraph 4 of the Convention;



Recalling that Committee of Ministers' decisions finding a breach of the Convention, taken under former Article 32 require the respondent state, in addition to paying just satisfaction, to take, if necessary:



- individual measures putting an end to the violations and remedying their consequences, if possible through restitutio in integrum; and



- general measures to prevent similar violations;



Just satisfaction



Having verified that the respondent state had paid the applicant the just satisfaction awarded within the time-limit laid down (see details in appendix);



General measures



Taking note of the general measures taken by the authorities to prevent violations of the Convention similar to those found in the present case (see details in appendix);



Noting in particular that certain requirements of Article 6 of the Convention were incorporated into the Italian Constitution in 1999, and that other changes in the law and subsequent case-law rulings have reinforced the direct effect of the Convention;



Individual measures



Having examined the information submitted by the government on problems encountered in executing the Committee's decisions in this case (see details in appendix), and having regard to the various interim resolutions adopted to encourage the Italian authorities to solve them, i.e.:



- ResDH(2002)30, noting that the absence of means of reopening the proceedings at issue had made it impossible fully to rectify the serious and continuing consequences of the violation found, and encouraging the Italian authorities to ensure the rapid adoption of new legislation in conformity with the principles laid down in its Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 on the reopening of domestic proceedings;



- ResDH(2004)13, noting that the legislative process had not yet borne fruit and strongly urging the Italian authorities to ensure that measures making it possible to erase the consequences of the violation for the applicant in this case be adopted quickly;



- ResDH(2005)85, firmly recalling the obligation on all the authorities concerned to ensure the adoption of appropriate measures in favour of the applicant, and calling for prompt adoption of legislation authorising re-examination of the Dorigo case at domestic level in conditions consistent with the Convention;



Deploring, first, the considerable delays noted in implementing its decisions and resolutions in this case, notwithstanding the importance and urgency of the measures required to remedy the consequences of the violation for the applicant, and, secondly, the fact that the applicant has thus been obliged to serve nearly all the prison sentence passed on him in the unfair trial;



Considering, however, that the Italian authorities' recent decisions respond positively to the requirements stated in its own decisions in this case, i.e. remedy, as far as possible, the serious consequences of the violation for the applicant;



Taking note with satisfaction, more specifically, of the firm action taken by the public prosecutor in Udine, who applied first to the Assize Court and then to the Court of Cassation to release the applicant, arguing that his detention was rendered unlawful by the violation of the Convention found in this case;



Welcoming the judgment given, in response to this action, on 1 December 2006 by the Court of Cassation, which declared the applicant's detention unlawful, and ordered his final release, referring to the direct effects of the Convention in Italian law, noted Italy's prolonged failure to take action, in persistent violation of the Convention – in spite of the various interim resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers;



Noting moreover with satisfaction the conclusion of the Court of Cassation concerning the urgent need for legislative intervention to introduce into Italian Law the possibility to reopen criminal proceedings following judgments of the European Court;



Believing that it is for the competent Italian authorities to draw all the necessary consequences from the decision of the court of Cassation and the requirements of the Convention, both generally and in the present case, particularly with regard to the erasure of the negative effects for the applicant of mentioning the conviction in his criminal record, as well as any other redress which may be due to him;



Strongly urging the Italian authorities to complete, as rapidly as possible, the legislative action needed to make it possible, in Italian law, to reopen proceedings following judgments given by the Court,



Declares, having examined the measures taken by the respondent state (see details in appendix), and noting that the applicant now has effective means of securing, as far as this is possible, erasure of the consequences of the violation, that it has fulfilled its obligations under the former Article 32 of the Convention in the present case, and



Decides to close the examination of this case.
 
Here is the appendix to the report of the Committee of Ministers on the Dorigo case.
It has some important information about the methods of relief considered by the CoM and Italian authorities. For example, presidential pardon was one method considered, but rejected. The appendix mentions the 1999 changes to Article 111 of the Italian Constitution. There is also some additional detail about the unfairness of the trial, and the need for Italy to avoid repetition of such unfairness, which the changes to Article 111 were meant to prevent. However, Italy did not avoid such unfairness in the case of Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito. {Source:
http://caselaw.echr.globe24h.com/0/...-of-dorigo-against-italy-81277-33286-96.shtml
Highlighting and bolding my emphasis.}

Appendix to Resolution CM/ResDH(2007)83



Information about the measures to comply with the decisions

of the Committee of Ministers in the case of Dorigo against Italy





Introductory summary of the case



The case concerns the unfair nature of criminal proceedings which resulted in the applicant's being sentenced in 1994 to over 13 years and 6 months in prison, and also fined, for his involvement in a terrorist attack on a NATO military base in 1993. His conviction was solely based on statements made before the trial by three co-accused, without his being able to question them, or have them questioned, in accordance with the law applying at the material time (violation of Article 6§1 in conjunction with Article 6§3).


I. Payment of just satisfaction and individual measures



A. Details of just satisfaction





Name and No. of application


Pecuniary damage


Non-pecuniary damage


Costs and expenses


Total

Dorigo

33286/96


-


5 000 000 ITL


7 000 000 ITL


12 000 000 ITL

Paid on 21/03/2000





B. Individual measures



1) Measures expected: Italy's obligation to take individual measures was emphasised by the Committee of Ministers from the time the violation was found, in 1999. Specifically, it noted that the violation had had very serious negative consequences for the applicant. The payment of just satisfaction, covering only the non-pecuniary damage suffered up to 1999, was not in itself sufficient to erase these consequences, since the violation of the rights of the defence raised serious doubts concerning the validity of the conviction itself. Since no adequate execution measures had been taken, the Committee was obliged to adopt a series of measures to encourage the Italian authorities to respect their obligations under the Convention.



2) Various initiatives taken by the Council of Europe:



• The Committee of Ministers: To accelerate execution in this case, the Committee adopted several interim resolutions between 2002 and 2005 (see in particular ResDH(2002)30 of 19/02/2002, ResDH(2004)13 of 10/02/2004 and ResDH(2005)85 of 12/10/2005). In the last of those resolutions, it firmly reminded all the authorities concerned of their obligation to ensure the adoption of adequate execution measures benefiting the applicant, and called, in particular, for the adoption of legislation making it possible to reopen judicial proceedings when this was necessary to repair, as far as possible, the consequences of violations of the Convention (see, on this question, Committee of Ministers Recommendation (2000)2.)



This resolution was adopted in response to the unsatisfactory reply received from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Fini, to a letter of 18/01/2005 from the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Rotfeld, requesting rapid practical action to benefit the applicant.



• The Parliamentary Assembly also reacted on several occasions to Italy's failure to take action, particularly in Recommendation 1684(2004) and Resolution 1411(2004), both of 23/11/2004, and Resolution 1516(2006) of 2 October 2006, and also in several parliamentary questions: by Mr Jurgens, No. 13 of 05/10/2004, Ms Bemelmans-Videc, No. 15 of 26/01/2005, and Mr Lloyd, No. 13 of 22/06/2005).



3) Principal measures examined by the Committee of Ministers:



Over the years, the Committee specifically considered the following solutions in this case.



- Presidential pardon: this possibility was referred to in the Committee in July 2004 (see Addendum 4 to the annotated agenda for the 948th meeting, 29-30 November 2005). The Italian delegation said, however, that a pardon was unlikely to be obtained rapidly. The Deputies concluded that this was an ineffective remedy, even if coupled with adequate complementary measures (see CM/Inf/DH(2005)13), and so did not discuss it further.

- Reopening of the unfair proceedings: The Interim Resolutions, ResDH(2002)30 of 19/02/2002, ResDH(2004)13 of 10/02/2004 and ResDH(2005)85 of 12/10/2005 emphasised that reopening the proceedings complained of was still the best way of securing restitutio in integrum in this case. Several bills providing for reopening of the proceedings were tabled in Parliament. One was approved by one chamber, but not by the other.


At its 960th (March 2006) and 966th (July 2006) meetings, in view of the difficulties encountered with the adoption of effective measures, the Committee again called on the Italian authorities to remedy the consequences of the violation without delay, either by changing the law or developing the case-law.



4) Measures adopted in 2006: Notwithstanding the lack of progress on reopening the proceedings or securing a pardon, recent proceedings in two courts have produced practical results, i.e.:



• The proceedings for review of sentence, brought by the applicant in the Bologna Appeal Court. In March 2006, the Bologna Appeal Court questioned the constitutional legitimacy of domestic law, insofar as it did not allow the reopening of proceedings on the basis of a finding of a violation by the European Court. Pending the Constitutional Court's decision, the Appeal Court decided to suspend execution of Mr Dorigo's sentence, and he was provisionally released in March 2006.



• The proceedings brought in the Assize Court by the public prosecutor in Udine: the public prosecutor in Udine referred the case to the Assize Court, arguing that the applicant's detention was rendered unlawful by the European Court's finding that the Convention had been violated. In January 2006, the Assize Court rejected his application, whereupon he appealed. On 1 January 2006, the Court of Cassation set the Assize Court's decision aside, without referring it back, and ordered Mr Dorigo's unconditional release.
In this judgment, the Court of Cassation confirmed that the direct effect of the Convention was an established principle in the Italian judicial system. It insisted that machinery for the reopening of domestic proceedings was urgently needed, and noted that this was already possible in the case of in absentia judgments.


The Court of Cassation also emphasised that the Constitutional Court had not yet answered the question put to it by the Bologna Appeal Court, and that this created a legal vacuum. In these circumstances, and in view of Italy's prolonged inaction – despite the interim resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers and the persistent violations of Article 46 of the Convention – it ruled that the detention of the applicant, who had been convicted in unfair judicial proceedings, was unlawful.



Subsequent action: In view of the Court of Cassation's decision, the applicant now has several new remedies which he can use to obtain compensation for his unlawful detention, and secure deletion of the conviction from his criminal record.



II. General measures



Adopted (See Resolution ResDH(2005)86 in the Lucà v. Italy case). Article 111 of the Italian Constitution, as amended in November 1999, gave constitutional status to certain requirements laid down in Article 6 of the Convention. This new constitutional provision was implemented by Act No. 63 of 1 March 2001, which amended Article 513 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the law as it stands, statements made by other accused persons in a non-adversarial context outside the court may be used in court against an accused person only with his consent (unless the judge finds that the other accused persons' refusal to be questioned at the trial results from corruption or intimidation). This rule applies not only to statements made in the same, but also in different proceedings. In current proceedings, Act No. 35 of 25 February 2000 provides that statements made by witnesses who have not been exposed to questioning may be used against an accused person in court only if corroborated by other evidence.



III. Conclusions of the respondent state



The government considers that the action taken is such as to remedy, as far as possible, the effects of the violation for the applicant and prevent similar violations in future, and that Italy has therefore fulfilled its obligations under the former Article 32 of the Convention.

[1] Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 June 2007 at the 997th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
 
Weight of evidence

I think I agree with sept79 on this. I am a scientific layperson, who can perhaps blurt out three science-like sentences on just about anything, but if asked for a fourth sentence, I'd rather change the subject.

If I was on a 12 person jury, though, and was told by a judge that I was 1/12th of a trier of fact......

...... wildly differing "expert" opinions would look like reasonable doubt to me.

True, there will always be opposing views. It's why I offered up John Oliver's demonstration upthread about global warming. In the case of the Massei/Hellmann/Nencini trials and the veracity of the DNA evidence that prosecutors want to use to send two people away for almost 30 years.....

..... I'd say that the weight of the DNA evidence does not support doing that. And that's even before considering that one police office, and one only, supports a guilt version of the DNA. Everyone else who has looked at it (not just those allowed to address a jury) says the DNA evidence against the two is bogus.

That looks like (at least) reasonable doubt to me!

I think it's all about weight of evidence. Doubt must be reasonable. You can always make a case; you can make a case for Guede - his lawyer did - just not a convincing one. The PLE and PG people claim there is no reasonable doubt in the convictions of Ms Knox and Mr Sollecito. Yet here on this very forum you have good scientists like Chris Halkides thundering away at the evidence. It's weighty; it's extraordinarily impressive and it IS, demonstrably, at least reasonable doubt.
 
The following paragraph from the appendix of the 2007 report of the Committee of Ministers deserves close attention, IMO, especially in regard to statements made by some of the guilters:

Adopted (See Resolution ResDH(2005)86 in the Lucà v. Italy case). Article 111 of the Italian Constitution, as amended in November 1999, gave constitutional status to certain requirements laid down in Article 6 of the Convention. This new constitutional provision was implemented by Act No. 63 of 1 March 2001, which amended Article 513 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the law as it stands, statements made by other accused persons in a non-adversarial context outside the court may be used in court against an accused person only with his consent (unless the judge finds that the other accused persons' refusal to be questioned at the trial results from corruption or intimidation). This rule applies not only to statements made in the same, but also in different proceedings. In current proceedings, Act No. 35 of 25 February 2000 provides that statements made by witnesses who have not been exposed to questioning may be used against an accused person in court only if corroborated by other evidence.
 
Bacteria do the darndest things

...... wildly differing "expert" opinions would look like reasonable doubt to me.
I would agree, as long as both are experts and both put forth reasonable ideas. However, sometimes one side or the other puts forward unalloyed junk science. I have been doing a little bit of reading about cases where the ABO antigen from the evidence does not match the antigen of the suspect. You can guess what happens next. Garrett and Neufeld wrote,

{start quote}
In the case of Paul Kordonowy, Julie Long of the Montana State Forensic Laboratory performed the testing on the victim’s underpants that revealed A antigens, which neither the victim nor Kordonowy possessed; both were Type O secretors.124 Rather than testify that the testing excluded Kordonowy, Long testified as follows: “n this case there was a large amount of bacteria, which I noted, and it has been reported that a large amount of bacteria can give you an A substance reading in your analysis because your ABO substances are sugars, and bacteria also produce sugars.”125 As Edward Blake concluded in his report examining the case, this “bacteria” testimony lacks any scientific foundation: [T]here is no evidence whatsoever that bacteria produce water soluble ABO antigens of any sort much less ABO antigens of type “A.” If this assertion were true, the ABO typing of sexual assault evidence would be inherently unreliable...
{end quote}

Or consider the case of Barry Laughman, who had type B secretions, when actual rapist-murderer had type A. Investigative journalist extraordinaire Pete Shellem wrote,

{start quote}
In Crawford's case, a copy of Roadcap's original lab notes -- which contradicted her testimony and that of other investigators -- surfaced in a discarded briefcase.

In Barry's case, Roadcap acknowledged at trial she probably amended her notes after Barry's blood was pegged as type B, writing in the margins of the report that swabs taken of the semen "were moist when placed in vials. Breakdown of B antigens could have occurred."

She offered various theories as to why the tests did not point to a different murderer.

She suggested that bacteria could have attacked the B antigens...
SNIP
Dr. Richard Saferstein, former head of the New Jersey State Police crime lab and the author of textbooks on forensic serology, said there is no basis in science or fact for Roadcap's conclusions.

He said that bacteria selectively destroying only B antigens might be theoretically possible, but is extremely unlikely to occur in all three samples -- in separate test tubes -- where Roadcap detected semen.

"She keeps saying it's possible. Well, anything's possible," Saferstein said. "We have to talk in terms of reasonable probability. These are outrageous statements."
{end quote}

When one reads science fiction like this, Stefanoni's shenanigans start to come into context. Of course in Italy the judge would praise Roadcap and chide Saferstein for saying, "Anything's possible."
 
Last edited:
I would agree, as long as both are experts and both put forth reasonable ideas. However, sometimes one side or the other puts forward unalloyed junk science.

<............ sinister deletia .............>

When one reads science fiction like this, Stefanoni's shenanigans start to come into context. Of course in Italy the judge would praise Roadcap and chide Saferstein for saying, "Anything's possible."

And then the judge would write a motivations report, and the Pro-guilt lobby would praise him for it, saying that the defence now has to prove it impossible.....

Anyway, thanks for your post.
 
And then the judge would write a motivations report, and the Pro-guilt lobby would praise him for it, saying that the defence now has to prove it impossible.....

Anyway, thanks for your post.

Speaking about the Pro Guild side of things, I don't know how many here pay attention to the other issues on the board. There is an issue being called "Gamers Gate." The hatred spewed at Amanda is reminiscent of the hatred to the women involved in that case. They also are trying a very deceptive PR campaign as well.
 
I would agree, as long as both are experts and both put forth reasonable ideas. However, sometimes one side or the other puts forward unalloyed junk science. I have been doing a little bit of reading about cases where the ABO antigen from the evidence does not match the antigen of the suspect. You can guess what happens next. Garrett and Neufeld wrote,

{start quote}
In the case of Paul Kordonowy, Julie Long of the Montana State Forensic Laboratory performed the testing on the victim’s underpants that revealed A antigens, which neither the victim nor Kordonowy possessed; both were Type O secretors.124 Rather than testify that the testing excluded Kordonowy, Long testified as follows: “n this case there was a large amount of bacteria, which I noted, and it has been reported that a large amount of bacteria can give you an A substance reading in your analysis because your ABO substances are sugars, and bacteria also produce sugars.”125 As Edward Blake concluded in his report examining the case, this “bacteria” testimony lacks any scientific foundation: [T]here is no evidence whatsoever that bacteria produce water soluble ABO antigens of any sort much less ABO antigens of type “A.” If this assertion were true, the ABO typing of sexual assault evidence would be inherently unreliable...
{end quote}

Or consider the case of Barry Laughman, who had type B secretions, when actual rapist-murderer had type A. Investigative journalist extraordinaire Pete Shellem wrote,

{start quote}
In Crawford's case, a copy of Roadcap's original lab notes -- which contradicted her testimony and that of other investigators -- surfaced in a discarded briefcase.

In Barry's case, Roadcap acknowledged at trial she probably amended her notes after Barry's blood was pegged as type B, writing in the margins of the report that swabs taken of the semen "were moist when placed in vials. Breakdown of B antigens could have occurred."

She offered various theories as to why the tests did not point to a different murderer.

She suggested that bacteria could have attacked the B antigens...
SNIP
Dr. Richard Saferstein, former head of the New Jersey State Police crime lab and the author of textbooks on forensic serology, said there is no basis in science or fact for Roadcap's conclusions.

He said that bacteria selectively destroying only B antigens might be theoretically possible, but is extremely unlikely to occur in all three samples -- in separate test tubes -- where Roadcap detected semen.

"She keeps saying it's possible. Well, anything's possible," Saferstein said. "We have to talk in terms of reasonable probability. These are outrageous statements."
{end quote}

When one reads science fiction like this, Stefanoni's shenanigans start to come into context. Of course in Italy the judge would praise Roadcap and chide Saferstein for saying, "Anything's possible."


Did these US lab techs graduate from schools in Italy?

On a serious note: Assuring that forensic evidence is reliable is critical to avoiding wrongful convictions.
 
They seem to have it backwards over there. You know, free press and all that jazz.



Consequently, nothing at all has been done.

Yes, apparently nothing was done for at least six years four years since the Italian Constitutional Court asked the Italian legislature to take action.

So this shows how consistent a political and judicial system can be.

On IAF, roteoctober wrote:

The Constitutional Court introduced the provision for a revision of trial after an ECHR ruling with the 113/2011 ruling. So now the remedy exists, at least in theory.
______________
Therefore, Italy did address the issue in 2011, but by means of the Constitutional Court rather than the legislature. Note the correction above based on roteoctober's information: 2011 - 2007 = 4 years.
 
Last edited:
I have been reading Nencini. I am at the part where he lists the numerous defence requests for further enquiry and testing and dismisses them all. I found this interesting:


That's an illuminating dichotomy, is it not? What happens when it's applied to Stefanoni? Should one not also disregard entirely the evidence of the incompetent professional who destroyed the evidence in the first place?

Stefanoni didn't destroy evidence. Never failed to accomplish judges' orders. As usual you ignore the landscape and the principle that rules are everything.
 
Stefanoni didn't destroy evidence. Never failed to accomplish judges' orders. As usual you ignore the landscape and the principle that rules are everything.

Then perhaps she knows where the bra-clasp is.

BTW you have not answered: is De Nunzio a criminal?
 
Stefanoni didn't destroy evidence. Never failed to accomplish judges' orders. As usual you ignore the landscape and the principle that rules are everything.
I can think of two pieces of evidence right off the top of my head: the incorrectly stored bra clasp hooks and the towels Guede used to mop up blood and which might have turned out to have his blood on them along with the victim's (it's a nice touch, of which I was reminded while reading Nencini, that the question whether he cut his fingers was settled on the testimony, or reports, of three friends who saw him the next day and didn't notice them, rather than by reference to those towels or a DNA analysis of the hand print on the pillow).

All three sentences in your short post above merit a separate essay in reply but as its 4.00 a.m. and I should be asleep I'll confine myself to saying the second must be an oblique and hypocritical criticism of Conti and Vechiotti and the third, especially the last five words, a perfect encapsulation of the extremity to which a fine intellect like yours may be driven by argument. In the context of this discussion, justice is everything.
 
Evidence

Stefanoni didn't destroy evidence. Never failed to accomplish judges' orders. As usual you ignore the landscape and the principle that rules are everything.

Talking about evidence, will we be hearing from you about the evidence for Amanda Knox actually being in Meredith Kercher's bedroom during the murder as opposed to what you regard to be evidence of blood from her footprints, made outside Ms Kercher's bedroom, shortly after the murder?

Or is this too difficult a challenge to respond to?
 
The following paragraph from the appendix of the 2007 report of the Committee of Ministers deserves close attention, IMO, especially in regard to statements made by some of the guilters:

Adopted (See Resolution ResDH(2005)86 in the Lucà v. Italy case). Article 111 of the Italian Constitution, as amended in November 1999, gave constitutional status to certain requirements laid down in Article 6 of the Convention. This new constitutional provision was implemented by Act No. 63 of 1 March 2001, which amended Article 513 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the law as it stands, statements made by other accused persons in a non-adversarial context outside the court may be used in court against an accused person only with his consent (unless the judge finds that the other accused persons' refusal to be questioned at the trial results from corruption or intimidation). This rule applies not only to statements made in the same, but also in different proceedings. In current proceedings, Act No. 35 of 25 February 2000 provides that statements made by witnesses who have not been exposed to questioning may be used against an accused person in court only if corroborated by other evidence.

Numbers, do you have a link for this please?
 
Then perhaps she knows where the bra-clasp is.

BTW you have not answered: is De Nunzio a criminal?

Bill, she didn't lose the clasp, she stored it in such a manner as to render the test she claims to have performed on it unrepeatable. Merely losing it would have been less egregious.
 
AngloLawyer wrote:

Numbers, do you have a link for this please?
______________

Source: http://caselaw.echr.globe24h.com/0/...-of-dorigo-against-italy-81277-33286-96.shtml

{Source also identified in posts #5301 & 5302 (Main Report & Appendix, respectively)}

The following paragraph from the appendix of the 2007 report of the Committee of Ministers deserves close attention, IMO, especially in regard to statements made by some of the guilters:

Adopted (See Resolution ResDH(2005)86 in the Lucà v. Italy case). Article 111 of the Italian Constitution, as amended in November 1999, gave constitutional status to certain requirements laid down in Article 6 of the Convention. This new constitutional provision was implemented by Act No. 63 of 1 March 2001, which amended Article 513 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the law as it stands, statements made by other accused persons in a non-adversarial context outside the court may be used in court against an accused person only with his consent (unless the judge finds that the other accused persons' refusal to be questioned at the trial results from corruption or intimidation). This rule applies not only to statements made in the same, but also in different proceedings. In current proceedings, Act No. 35 of 25 February 2000 provides that statements made by witnesses who have not been exposed to questioning may be used against an accused person in court only if corroborated by other evidence.
 
Last edited:
Bill, she didn't lose the clasp, she stored it in such a manner as to render the test she claims to have performed on it unrepeatable. Merely losing it would have been less egregious.

Specifically, she stored the bra clasps in an aqueous environment (inside a kind of test-tube) apparently at room temperature, which necessarily resulted in the degradation of the DNA allegedly on the clasps.

There is a photograph on IIP showing that previously to the storage in the wet environment, the clasps had been stored more properly, not in the presence of liquid.

Degradation means: breaking up the DNA strands into little chemical pieces no longer suitable for profiling.

It is very well-known that storage of DNA in an aqueous environment at room temperature leads to its degradation.

ETA: Apparently she did lose other evidence, including, as RW points out: the fibers or hair found in Meredith's hand and on her body.
 
Last edited:
The following is the 2005 Report of the Committee of Ministers for the Luca v. Italy case
{Highlighting is my emphasis; CoM apparently believed that reopening cases where there was an ECHR violation was now part of Italian law.}

Source:
http://caselaw.echr.globe24h.com/0/...se-of-luca-against-italy-71066-33354-96.shtml


Resolution ResDH(2005)86

concerning the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
of 27 February 2001 (final on 27 May 2001)
in the case of Lucà against Italy



(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 October 2005
at the 940th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)





The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”),



Having regard to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Lucà case delivered on 27 February 2001 and transmitted to the Committee of Ministers once it had become final under Articles 44 and 46 of the Convention;



Recalling that the case originated in an application (No. 33354/96) against Italy, lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 17 January 1994 under former Article 25 of the Convention by Mr Nicola Lucà, an Italian national, and that the Court, seised of the case under Article 5, paragraph 2, of Protocol No. 11, declared admissible the complaint concerning the unfairness of the criminal proceedings which had resulted in the applicant's conviction in 1994 to eight years and four month's imprisonment, given in particular that the conviction was based exclusively on pre-trial statements made by a co-accused person whom the applicant was not allowed to cross-examine;



Whereas in its judgment of 27 February 2001 the Court:



- held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 3 d), of the Convention;



- held, by six votes to one, that the government of the respondent state was to pay the applicant, within three months from the date at which the judgment became final, 15 000 000 Italian lire in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 3 000 000 Italian lire in respect of costs and expenses and that simple interest at an annual rate of 3.5% would be payable on those sums from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement;



- dismissed, unanimously, the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction;



Having regard to the Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers concerning the application of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention;



Having invited the government of the respondent state to inform it of the measures which had been taken in consequence of the judgment of 27 February 2001, having regard to Italy's obligation under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention to abide by it;



Having satisfied itself that on 14 September 2001, after the expiry of the time-limit set, the government of the respondent state had paid the applicant the sums provided for in the judgment of 27 February 2001, and that the default interest due was paid on 10 December 2003;



Noting, as regards individual measures, that Italian law does now allow the reopening or the reexamination of domestic judicial proceedings following the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights;

Considering, that this situation does not dispense the Committee from examining, from the point of view of the Convention, whether appropriate measures to ensure, as far as possible, restitutio in integrum would be nevertheless necessary (see mutatis mutandis, ResDH(2004)88 in the case of I.J.L. and others against the United Kingdom);



Considering however that the adoption of individual measures is not called for in this case taking account of its specific circumstances and, in particular, of the applicant's release from detention and of the absence of any claim on his part for reopening of the impugned domestic proceedings (cf. Recommendation R (2000) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and the abovementioned Resolution ResDH(2004)88);



Concluding accordingly that Italy was not in the present case called upon, under Article 46 of the Convention, to adopt any individual measure over and above the just satisfaction awarded by the Court, in order to erase the consequences for the applicant of the violations found;



Noting nevertheless with interest the ongoing reflection regarding the necessity of introducing into Italian law a clear possibility to reopen proceedings contrary to the Convention and the importance of ensuring that the legislative work in this respect is rapidly completed (see Interim Resolution ResDH(2005)85 in the case Dorigo against Italy) ;



Whereas, as regards the general measures, the government of the respondent state recalled that measures had already been taken to avoid new violations of the same kind as that found in this case, in particular through constitutional and legislative amendments to the relevant provisions between 1999 and 2001 (see for details Resolution ResDH(2005)28 adopted in the case of Craxi II against Italy), and indicated that the Court's judgment had been published in Revue internationale des droits de l'homme, vol. 2, May-August 2001 and in Il Sole 24Ore – Guida al Diritto, No. 14 of 14 April 2001 and sent out to the authorities directly concerned;



Declares, after having examined the information supplied by the Government of Italy, that it has exercised its functions under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention in this case.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Back
Top Bottom