I challenge you: your best argument for materialism

[Nonpareil]

Well, that is the crux of the problem, they aren't (functionally) mutually exclusive. Fundamental materialism excludes functional idealism but fundamental idealism does not exclude functional materialism. So the exclusion is not (at least functionally) mutual.

To be clear, I'm talking about the fundamental side of things exclusively. The functional side leads to the whole "under no circumstance would we expect a fundamentally idealistic universe to appear functionally materialistic" thing.

 

[PixyMisa]

Not strictly true. Turing machines, by definition, have infinite memory capacity, and so a true Turing Machine cannot exist in reality.

True. But a general-purpose physical computer can pretend to be infinite until it actually runs out of storage, remapping addresses (or their equivalent) to the available capacity.

 

[PixyMisa]

Plenty of very smart people have gotten line to argue that the Turing Equivalent model is not sufficient to explain the capacities of the human mind - even if we limit the human mind to mathematics

Not one of them has offered any evidence for this, though. So I'd argue that they weren't all that smart.

And a Turing-equivalent computer is sufficient to simulate all of reality, so really, they're talking about magic.

. . . much less qualia.

Qualia don't exist.

 

[The Man]

To be clear, I'm talking about the fundamental side of things exclusively. The functional side leads to the whole "under no circumstance would we expect a fundamentally idealistic universe to appear functionally materialistic" thing.

To be clear, I know what your were talking about which is why I made the fundamental/functional distinction, as I have before. Expectations are irrelevant (particularly where idealism is concerned), a fundamentally idealistic reality does not preclude functional materialism. As you note in the post I quoted before, functional materialism does tend to introduce explanatory problems for fundamental idealism. Particularly in terms of consistency, but that doesn't, in and of itself, preclude an apparently and consistently functional materialism. So "the whole "under no circumstance would we expect a fundamentally idealistic universe to appear functionally materialistic"" is technically incorrect.

As I have asked before, what couldn't you expect under fundamental idealism? Other than just 'no consciousness', I can't imagine anything. As we do find what we refer to as consciousness, that singular condition has been met. That one might expect to find material inconsistencies in a fundamentally idealistic universe doesn't mean that must be that case. So while fundamentally materialism is falsifiable fundamental idealism isn't. As long as there are conscious entities to consider it.

However, a lack of falsifiablility ain't my main problem with idealism. It is the reliance upon and extension of something so tenuous as consciousness.

In the dreams I related before, subjectively I thought I was conscious. However, certain of my higher level brain functions still weren't operating as they should during that subjective experience of consciousness. With those aspects functioning and looking back at the experience (even that day) there were clear indications that I wasn't in fact completely conscious. So even what we do experience as consciousness (extended as the basis of idealism) is often, in and of itself, just misleading.

 

[Nonpareil]

So "the whole "under no circumstance would we expect a fundamentally idealistic universe to appear functionally materialistic"" is technically incorrect.

Granted, given that the circumstance meant is that "it behaves exactly as if it isn't idealism".

Which I've mentioned before. We're just talking in circles here - not really disagreeing, just arguing semantics.

 

[punshhh]

To be clear, I know what your were talking about which is why I made the fundamental/functional distinction, as I have before. Expectations are irrelevant (particularly where idealism is concerned), a fundamentally idealistic reality does not preclude functional materialism. As you note in the post I quoted before, functional materialism does tend to introduce explanatory problems for fundamental idealism. Particularly in terms of consistency, but that doesn't, in and of itself, preclude an apparently and consistently functional materialism. So "the whole "under no circumstance would we expect a fundamentally idealistic universe to appear functionally materialistic"" is technically incorrect.

As I have asked before, what couldn't you expect under fundamental idealism? Other than just 'no consciousness', I can't imagine anything. As we do find what we refer to as consciousness, that singular condition has been met. That one might expect to find material inconsistencies in a fundamentally idealistic universe doesn't mean that must be that case. So while fundamentally materialism is falsifiable fundamental idealism isn't. As long as there are conscious entities to consider it.

However, a lack of falsifiablility ain't my main problem with idealism. It is the reliance upon and extension of something so tenuous as consciousness.

In the dreams I related before, subjectively I thought I was conscious. However, certain of my higher level brain functions still weren't operating as they should during that subjective experience of consciousness. With those aspects functioning and looking back at the experience (even that day) there were clear indications that I wasn't in fact completely conscious. So even what we do experience as consciousness (extended as the basis of idealism) is often, in and of itself, just misleading.

Agreed, I have been pointing out to PixyMisa that a fundamentally idealist universe may appear as a fully functional materialist universe and would be indistinguishable from it, if it did.

His argument is equally impotent when one realises that if we were in an idealist universe, we wouldn't have a clue what a materialist universe would be like, if it where even possible for it to exist.

On this realisation the issue is placed clearly within the field of philosophy and is not addressed by scientific considerations, or Scientism.

Regarding the tenuous consciousness, I agree, however this is a naivety of academic philosophy, as I see it. I would replace the word consciousness with monad(or being) and adopt the Hindu brand of idealism.

 

[punshhh]

The who to the what, now ?

Presumably, in an idealist universe, at some point an idea is conceived and in the expression of that idea a form of material is manifest to express it. Physical matter would be a rather dense form of this material.

But why would the world be this way at all ? Under materialism I can see how randomly-generated physics lead to atoms, molecules, stars, planets and video games, but under idealism, everything being mind, there is no physics, no rules, so how come reality's so damned consistent ?

Well, it makes sense to me that if any kind of material is manifest, it would always and only be following some physical or mathematical rules. You see I consider mind as a material, a subtle material with its own physical and mathematical rules.

If something as dense as physical matter were not so consistent, it would require some pretty drastic physics to achieve it, surely. Something as effervescent as mind would not require such drastic physics to be inconsistent in the same way. But this does not mean that it would not be equally consistent in other ways.

And where does the image come from ? I mean, I can't imagine things I've never had any sort of experience of, but somehow this consciousness can ?

This addresses the consistency of mind, I have just alluded to(in my last sentence). The image comes from some other, or previous, expression of ideas. A historical record, if you will. Mental images consistently consist of subjective and conceptual images of some form of expression or manifestation in material form.Which in turn follows physical laws and principles.

 

[Darat]

Presumably, in an idealist universe, at some point an idea is conceived and in the expression of that idea a form of material is manifest to express it. Physical matter would be a rather dense form of this material....snip...

Which would then mean our "consciousness", our "qualia" arise from interactions of this spontaneously created material.

ETA: And of course we've never seen any evidence that the material of our reality does arise apparently spontaneously -the evidence supports that it is a self-referential closed system.

 

[PixyMisa]

Agreed, I have been pointing out to PixyMisa that a fundamentally idealist universe may appear as a fully functional materialist universe and would be indistinguishable from it, if it did.

If your idealist universe is indistinguishable from a materialist one, that means that minds in that universe would arise from matter, and not the other way around. Which means that idealism would be demonstrably false.

This is not complicated. Our universe is material, and all you are doing is offering one self-defeating excuse after another for a failed philosophy.

 

[PixyMisa]

Presumably, in an idealist universe, at some point an idea is conceived and in the expression of that idea a form of material is manifest to express it. Physical matter would be a rather dense form of this material.

This does not happen. In fact, we can go so far as to say this is what does not happen.

Therefore idealism is false.

 

[Belz...]

Not strictly true. Turing machines, by definition, have infinite memory capacity, and so a true Turing Machine cannot exist in reality.

Yeah but that's not what Pixy said. He said Turing Equivalent.

 

[Belz...]

Presumably, in an idealist universe, at some point an idea is conceived and in the expression of that idea a form of material is manifest to express it. Physical matter would be a rather dense form of this material.

How do you distinguish such a universe from a material one ?

Well, it makes sense to me that if any kind of material is manifest, it would always and only be following some physical or mathematical rules.

Why would that make sense under idealism ?

If something as dense as physical matter were not so consistent, it would require some pretty drastic physics to achieve it, surely.

Or no physics at all.

Something as effervescent as mind would not require such drastic physics to be inconsistent in the same way. But this does not mean that it would not be equally consistent in other ways.

Yes, it does. The point is that we observe total consistency.

 

[tsig]

Presumably, in an idealist universe, at some point an idea is conceived and in the expression of that idea a form of material is manifest to express it. Physical matter would be a rather dense form of this material.


Well, it makes sense to me that if any kind of material is manifest, it would always and only be following some physical or mathematical rules. You see I consider mind as a material, a subtle material with its own physical and mathematical rules.

If something as dense as physical matter were not so consistent, it would require some pretty drastic physics to achieve it, surely. Something as effervescent as mind would not require such drastic physics to be inconsistent in the same way. But this does not mean that it would not be equally consistent in other ways.
This addresses the consistency of mind, I have just alluded to(in my last sentence). The image comes from some other, or previous, expression of ideas. A historical record, if you will. Mental images consistently consist of subjective and conceptual images of some form of expression or manifestation in material form.Which in turn follows physical laws and principles.

Thing is every thing that forms an idea is a physical thing we have never found an idea running loose all by itself so until you can produce one of those non materiel ideas you have nothing.

 

[dlorde]

Plenty of very smart people have gotten line to argue that the Turing Equivalent model is not sufficient to explain the capacities of the human mind - even if we limit the human mind to mathematics . . . much less qualia.

That doesn't contradict Pixy's claim that it is a at least a computer (i.e. at least Turing-equivalent).

Also, the number of smart people that argue a point may make us more inclined to take it more seriously, but doesn't, in itself, make the argument any more robust.

 

[punshhh]

Which would then mean our "consciousness", our "qualia" arise from interactions of this spontaneously created material.

Yes, because we are physical animals. Just because there is a physical pathway of manifestation does not negate the possibility of an underlying monad.

ETA: And of course we've never seen any evidence that the material of our reality does arise apparently spontaneously -the evidence supports that it is a self-referential closed system.

A self-referential closed system which arises spontaneously. Unfortunately, we have no idea of the origin.

 

[punshhh]

If your idealist universe is indistinguishable from a materialist one, that means that minds in that universe would arise from matter, and not the other way around. Which means that idealism would be demonstrably false.

Non sequitur.

This is not complicated. Our universe is material, and all you are doing is offering one self-defeating excuse after another for a failed philosophy.

Perhaps idealism fails in attempts to explain physical phenomena. I have already pointed this out, as we are limited animals and the reality of existence is likely beyond our feeble understanding.

 

[punshhh]

This does not happen. In fact, we can go so far as to say this is what does not happen.

It appears not to happen, but we are simple animals, it might be more profound than our basic understandings.

Therefore idealism is false.

Non sequitur.

 

[tsig]

Yes, because we are physical animals. Just because there is a physical pathway of manifestation does not negate the possibility of an underlying monad.
A self-referential closed system which arises spontaneously. Unfortunately, we have no idea of the origin.

Just because there is a physical pathway of manifestation does not negate the possibility of an underlying _________.


Fill in the blank fellow posters.

god

event horizon of the formless

or whatever delusion makes you feel all warm and cuddly.

 

[Belz...]

Yes, because we are physical animals. Just because there is a physical pathway of manifestation does not negate the possibility of an underlying monad.

Argument from ignorance.

I have already pointed this out, as we are limited animals and the reality of existence is likely beyond our feeble understanding.

Seriously, we said exactly that about volcanoes, lightning, stars, wind and other things, and all of them were explained. What makes you think that consciousness is any different ?

 

[Belz...]

It appears not to happen, but we are simple animals, it might be more profound than our basic understandings.

There's nothing "profound" about the universe. In fact it is extremely shallow. Things just happen mechanically.