I challenge you: your best argument for materialism

[JoeMorgue]

Nothing matters to people who deny reality, and therefore the very concept of evidence.

If you are resigned to not accept reality what you are doing is not thinking in any real sense of the term, it's just making stuff up at random.

 

[Belz...]

Nothing matters to people who deny reality, and therefore the very concept of evidence.

If you are resigned to not accept reality what you are doing is not thinking in any real sense of the term, it's just making stuff up at random.

Pfft. Why should I listen to a figment of my imagination ?

 

[Lowpro]

The problem with consciousness is that while it is contingent on the physical it is not actually physical itself. Least not by the standard definition of what physical is. Which is that which has property or dimension. Consciousness has neither. So one cannot just examine it under a microscope like one would with any type of observable matter. It is not something that can be referenced by the five senses. Being self conscious is not something that can be subject to the rigours of the scientific method because objectivity cannot be guaranteed since only the individual who is experiencing it knows that it actually exists. Which is why it is more appropriate a subject for philosophy than science. The problem here however is that philosophy deals in ideas not in evidence or proof so any conclusion cannot be demonstrated. The best theories so far with regard to it are either supervenience or materialism but neither of these can be scientifically tested. So it is then the hardest problem in all of science because it cannot be objectively investigated by it. Maybe the time will come when it will have to be accepted as simply an unanswerable question. Untestable hypotheses may be true but if they cannot be demonstrated then they are disregarded. And consciousness is at this point in time a prime candidate for such consideration. And there is also the other problem of objectivity being compromised as one cannot use the very same means of investigation as the methodology for the thing being investigated. The most objective means would be artificial intelligence. Though anything less than absolute proof one way or the other would be problematic for exactly the same reasons

To the highlighted, you're trying to beg the question here. I'll give you an example. Survival is a measure that is contingent on the physical. The transmission and selection of genes in an environment is a wholly physical process, but we call that process survival.

I posit (as others have for decades now, this is nothing new) that consciousness is the process of the physical activity (and lack thereof) in the brain along a continuum. That is materialistic in nature and does not suffer from the question begging. If anything consciousness is wholly misrepresented by any entity OTHER than physical because it assumes consciousness is a discrete event (or continuum of events) and from a metaphysical standpoint that is untenable. Metaphysics gets built from physics, and physics tells us that it's a process. The attempt to characterize the hard problem in such a way (yes surreptitious I know you did this on Ratskep and you want to do it here too) is not metaphysics anymore, it's a crank theory.

 

[Lowpro]

Idealism denies, presumably, an exclusively physical reality. I see no reason why, with an idealist ontology, there would not be any physical material.

Well we are all resigned to the reality that something with the appearance of physical reality exists. Surely with an idealist ontology, this would also be the case?

Idealism at its core asserts that reality is the experience. It has to be specific when we discuss consciousness and physiology because idealists cannot deny that experiences have physiological dependencies which is why idealists have resorted to characterizing consciousness as the "experience thingy" or the mind; they can call it a four course continental breakfast for all I care. It dodges physicalism by characterizing consciousness as (A) existing by necessity since we all experience it (your solipsistic mileage may vary...) and (B) the hard problem making a discrete separation between brain activity and qualia (the "redness of red" in our awareness of that color)

I know from Bernardo's previous ramblings that he supports monistic idealism almost purely because it doesn't have to answer for an ontological external reality, where our bodies are probes in an external environment. His monistic idealism asserts that reality is experience itself (it reeks of Chopra...). He calls that being more parsimonious, thus idealism fits better. Whether it's good or bad philosophy isn't even at issue with his position; it cannot even discriminate evidence for or against it. Even if you took the most contemporary neurological research to inform this position it can resort to nuking the playfield by asserting the experience defining reality.

So long story short, Idealism doesn't deny a physical reality, rather it defines reality as the product of experience.

 

[The Man]

Idealism denies, presumably, an exclusively physical reality. I see no reason why, with an idealist ontology, there would not be any physical material.

No, Idealism denies a physical reality in principle. A reality that combines physical and idealistic elements is dualism not idealism.

Well we are all resigned to the reality that something with the appearance of physical reality exists. Surely with an idealist ontology, this would also be the case?

Right "appearance of" being the operative phrase. You may note that I have remarked before in this thread that fundamental idealism is compatible with functional materialism while functional idealism is not compatible with fundamental materialism.

 

[punshhh]

It already has been.

All we can conclude is that we just appear in this world. We find ourselves here. Circumstances in this world cannot prove what or what did not occur prior to this occurrence. Unless of course you assume that this world is all there is and that you actually know what it is you are assuming in this act.

Or any reason why there would be. All you can do with idealism is provide post-hoc rationalisations.

The notion that there is any substantial difference between the stuff of idealism and the stuff of materialism is a false dichotomy. Duality is a nonsense, I can't speak for idealists as I am not one, but the material of mind is just as much a material, as the material of the body and the world. It's just a different form, or state of material.

Why?

To the idealist what they experience is the same, they just prefer a different origin for it.

 

[LarryS]

I'm not sure if I understood Bernardo's Idealism, but I think he holds the mind at large to NOT be conscious, but mind stuff none the less . . . maybe sort of a lively/squirrelly material substance. Who knows, maybe he'll be lucky and be right, matter is just itchin to rock and roll.

 

[Dancing David]

Idealism as an ontology reduces to materialism, it may be that the ultimate substrate is Mind (or butterfly dreams, dancing energy or tofu and seitan) but it all acts like it is matter.

So rather a moot point

 

[punshhh]

Idealism at its core asserts that reality is the experience. It has to be specific when we discuss consciousness and physiology because idealists cannot deny that experiences have physiological dependencies which is why idealists have resorted to characterizing consciousness as the "experience thingy" or the mind; they can call it a four course continental breakfast for all I care. It dodges physicalism by characterizing consciousness as (A) existing by necessity since we all experience it (your solipsistic mileage may vary...) and (B) the hard problem making a discrete separation between brain activity and qualia (the "redness of red" in our awareness of that color)

Thanks for explaining something about idealism, as I am not all that familiar with academic terminology. It seams they're missing a trick here, by simply considering that physiological dependencies are a complexity of a particular manifestation of experience, they would not need to mount some kind of defence against something else, ie an alternative materialistic ontology.

I know from Bernardo's previous ramblings that he supports monistic idealism almost purely because it doesn't have to answer for an ontological external reality, where our bodies are probes in an external environment. His monistic idealism asserts that reality is experience itself (it reeks of Chopra...). He calls that being more parsimonious, thus idealism fits better. Whether it's good or bad philosophy isn't even at issue with his position; it cannot even discriminate evidence for or against it. Even if you took the most contemporary neurological research to inform this position it can resort to nuking the playfield by asserting the experience defining reality.

Unfortunately or not, I cannot bring myself to read his material. Monistic idealism sounds great as a notion, why sully it by attempting to explain the world and things in the world with it?

So long story short, Idealism doesn't deny a physical reality, rather it defines reality as the product of experience.

Putting the chicken before the egg?

Sarcasm alert.

(You know, I once had this far out trip, man, you know what I realised? It all happens the other way around. Experience goes in not out).

Far out (in) maaan.

 

[punshhh]

Idealism as an ontology reduces to materialism, it may be that the ultimate substrate is Mind (or butterfly dreams, dancing energy or tofu and seitan) but it all acts like it is matter.

So rather a moot point

Quite.

 

[punshhh]

No, Idealism denies a physical reality in principle. A reality that combines physical and idealistic elements is dualism not idealism.

Please note what I wrote in response to PixyMisa a moment ago.

Right "appearance of" being the operative phrase. You may note that I have remarked before in this thread that fundamental idealism is compatible with functional materialism while functional idealism is not compatible with fundamental materialism.

Ok, I'm new to the thread. I think the problem with functional idealism is a lack of insight, rather than a misunderstanding.

 

[PixyMisa]

All we can conclude is that we just appear in this world.

Wrong.

The notion that there is any substantial difference between the stuff of idealism and the stuff of materialism is a false dichotomy.

Wrong.

To the idealist what they experience is the same, they just prefer a different origin for it.

Wrong.

 

[metacristi]

So can you come up with anything else? What's your best argument in defense of materialism? What's your best argument against monistic idealism? Apologies in advance for the fact that I will have to ignore trolls given my limited time. As for the rest of you, your input will be sincerely appreciated.

What about the fact that the interpretations of QM having consciousness as essential for the collapse of the wavefunction do not have any epistemological precedence at the moment? Consciousness does not appear that important from what we know.

Besides how do you make a clear difference between what you propose and Brahman (which is impersonal, we deal with neutral monism, consciousness appearing as an extension at a lower level) for example? Or from Berkeley's system (God absolutely necessary, more souls) or Kant's? I really doubt you can although I have no doubt your book is full of arguments.

Now I personally think that we miss something extremely important at the moment* but I understand also why many philosophers and scientists consider materialism (physicalism) as the first choice paradigm of today (thus a accept that physicalism is the main paradigm at the moment).

Still that does not mean that I reject idealist solutions** (at least some of them are still fully viable, even supernaturalism is not out of question; actively pursuing alternative research programmes should not be discouraged, the only condition is to avoid claims of having the truth, the only true path and so on) but unfortunately today they have no precedence over physicalist ones, the philosophical arguments pros physicalism, informed by Science, are much stronger today than those pros idealism. Finally a middle way is always a much better alternative than believing strongly that something is true and realizing later that it is not so.

In your place I would avoid a triumphalist tone, write your book and show your results to us all. I'm sure that critical thinkers will accept your results if your arguments are indeed so persuasive.


*at least consciousness may need something qualitatively new to be really understood, not necessarily amounting to idealism; in my view it is premature now to make claims equivalent with those of Lord Kelvin at the end of 19th century who thought that Physics was almost complete, very few new discoveries ahead

**being also a fallibilist in non rivial ways and a moderate philosophical skeptic I doubt we will ever find arguments which to strongly 'anchor' our knowledge so that we should always remain open to possible rational non trivial changes in ALL parts of what we accept today as knowledge

 

[PixyMisa]

Finally a middle way is always a much better alternative than believing strongly that something is true and realizing later that it is not so.

No; what is best is following the evidence. If the early evidence is misleading, then when you get better evidence you will find out that you were wrong, and change your mind. But if you steer to a middle way you will always be wrong.

Edit: If you mean that all scientific findings are tentative and subject to change if new evidence appears, then I have no problem with that. Of course, some findings are a lot less tentative than others.

*at least consciousness may need something qualitatively new to be really understood, not necessarily amounting to idealism; in my view it is premature now to make claims equivalent with those of Lord Kelvin at the end of 19th century who thought that Physics was almost complete, very few new discoveries ahead

Why? Also, how?

We know a lot more now than in Kelvin's day, and in particular, we have a very good idea of what we don't know. And we know that there's no unknown physics involved in consciousness.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vrs-Azp0i3k#t=2046

 

[JoeMorgue]

Putting the chicken before the egg?

No the egg is firmly before the chicken. We're just having to humor self important psuedotellecuals that want us to prove the egg exists before deciding whether or not to pluck and fry the chicken for dinner.

 

[punshhh]

Wrong.
Wrong.
Wrong.

Scientism masquerading as philosophy. It's time to take your blinkers of now.

 

[JoeMorgue]

I can't prove my Woo so I'm gonna argue nobody can really prove anything.

That only works out beyond the event horizon of the formless.

 

[PixyMisa]

Scientism masquerading as philosophy. It's time to take your blinkers of now.

You presented three statements that were entirely false. I pointed out that the three statements were entirely false.

What you do with that information is up to you.

 

[The Man]

Please note what I wrote in response to PixyMisa a moment ago.

What, where you claim you "can't speak for idealists" after asserting what distinguishes that ontology from materialism as "a false dichotomy."?

OK, I've noted that.

Ok, I'm new to the thread. I think the problem with functional idealism is a lack of insight, rather than a misunderstanding.

Sure, perhaps a lack of insight but I'm not sure what "misunderstanding" you might be referring to? Is it that "the problem with functional idealism" might not be "a lack of insight"?

 

[LarryS]

To the highlighted, you're trying to beg the question here. I'll give you an example. Survival is a measure that is contingent on the physical. The transmission and selection of genes in an environment is a wholly physical process, but we call that process survival.

I posit (as others have for decades now, this is nothing new) that consciousness is the process of the physical activity (and lack thereof) in the brain along a continuum. That is materialistic in nature and does not suffer from the question begging. If anything consciousness is wholly misrepresented by any entity OTHER than physical because it assumes consciousness is a discrete event (or continuum of events) and from a metaphysical standpoint that is untenable. Metaphysics gets built from physics, and physics tells us that it's a process. The attempt to characterize the hard problem in such a way (yes surreptitious I know you did this on Ratskep and you want to do it here too) is not metaphysics anymore, it's a crank theory.

To suggest that "consciousness is the process of the physical activity (and lack thereof) in the brain along a continuum" because "That is materialistic in nature" is a perfect example of begging the question.

You can state axiomatically that: the material world alone exists, so therefore, consciousness emerges from the material world.