Proof of Immortality II

[John Jones]

That's an interesting point. I'm surprised that Jabba hasn't already tried it.

He could claim he died last week, and is already back, therefore immortality.

Any comments, Jabba?

 

[Jabba]

- Just to make sure that you aren't including intelligent design as part of my claim. My claim is only that my current existence makes the current naturalistic worldview extremely improbable.

That's the claim I disagree with.

- Good.

 

[Porpoise of Life]

Any jokes about this thread being immortal and references to Douglas Adams' puddle quote have probably already been made. I'll b in the kitchen making some coffee.

 

[Toontown]

The sample size is the question. How many sides must there be on the dice before I determine that the number that comes up is specific and/or significant?

I like this. Easy answer: It is irrelevant how many sides the die has. Unless one of the sides does something specific for me personally, none of them are significant to me. If I don't have skin in the game, you can roll it all day long. I don't care what it does. It doesn't matter to me.

But if one of the sides potentially does something for me, then that specific side is significant if it comes up. If it doesn't come up, it doesn't achieve significance, because it hasn't done anything for me - once again demonstrating the falsity of your implication that an event cannot be significant after it happens. In this case it can only be significant if it does happen.

Which gets nicely back to my last post. All the significance you are ascribing is, by your own admission, after the fact.

Texas Sharp Shooter, regardless how often or strongly you deny it.

Your die analogy was completely unrelated to the point I've been trying to make all along. Therefore, I admit my hasty response in the context of your irrelevant die analogy is also irrelevant to the point I've been trying to make. I'll make my point once more, without the meaningless die, just to tie up a final loose end.

1. Either the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event can be statistically significant, simply because of the expected likelihood of the event's occurrence during a given number of observations or trials.

2. Statistical tests of hypotheses are based on acknowledging the implied significance of observed events, either after they happen or because they do not happen as expected. The question is "Should I believe hypothesis A, given what I have specifically observed?" If the likelihood of the observation is ludicrously small, then hypothesis A is proportionally devalued.

3. The reasoning behind (2.) is completely unrelated to any Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.

Every time I've tried to point out the above, my efforts have been met by a troop of tap-dancers who have then proceeded to go dancing off on some irrelevant tangent like your die analogy, inevitably ending in a Texas Sharpshooter accusation, no matter how convoluted and meaningless the path to the TS accusation had to be in order to get there.

Why? Why not simply meet 1, 2, and 3 above head on if you disagree with the entire concept of testing a hypothesis, by observation, in the above manner?

Making practical use of my unique conditional perspective, I see that Unique Brain Assumption implies, with a certainty converging on 1, that I, specifically, should never have any unique conditional perspective ( an implication completely unrelated to the inevitable existence of innumerable other nonspecific things). I see that only my specific nonexistence would support the UBA, in which case the absence of the questioner would be more than compensated by the absence of a cause to question the UBA. Yet here I am, observing my specific existence and all the other nonspecific things, being roundly scolded and admonished - by a small, persistent group of thread-bias-selected avowed "skeptics" who have taken up "skepticism" as an ideology rather than a selective tool - that I should swallow the Unique Brain Assumption whole - like a careless bass swallows a lure, without even thinking about what it might really be.

Edited by LashL: 

Edited to remove breach of Rule 0 and Rule 12.

 

[John Jones]

Any jokes about this thread being immortal and references to Douglas Adams' puddle quote have probably already been made. I'll b in the kitchen making some coffee.

Undead is probably more like it.

 

[jsfisher]

Why? Why not simply meet 1, 2, and 3 above head on if you disagree with the entire concept of testing a hypothesis, by observation, in the above manner?

Were that exactly what Jabba were doing, your question would have relevance. But Jabba isn't, now, is he? His observation about his existence is predicated on his existence.

Edited by LashL: 

Removed quote of moderated content and response to same.

 

[Jabba]

Anyway, Jabba, how would your formula look if "A" was defined as "the hypothesis that selves are immortal"?

Mojo,
- I'll double check my figures, but this should do.
- P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)* P(~A))
- P(A|me) = .5 *.01/ (.05 * .01 + 1/10⁸⁰! * .99)
- P(A|me) = .005/(.005+(a little less than1/10⁸⁰!))
- P(A|me) = (a very little less than 1.00)

 

[Slowvehicle]

What evidence of the "soul's" existence, or its "immortality", supports your contention?

 

[Nonpareil]

Making practical use of my unique conditional perspective, I see that Unique Brain Assumption implies, with a certainty converging on 1, that I, specifically, should never have any unique conditional perspective ( an implication completely unrelated to the inevitable existence of innumerable other nonspecific things). I see that only my specific nonexistence would support the UBA

No.

Once again, you fail to take into account that literally every specific brain has that same probability of existence.

I would mention the Texas sharpshooter fallacy again, but as we've already seen, you simply don't care.

 

[Humots]

Mojo,
- I'll double check my figures, but this should do.
- P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)* P(~A))
- P(A|me) = .5 *.01/ (.05 * .01 + 1/10⁸⁰! * .99)
- P(A|me) = .005/(.005+(a little less than1/10⁸⁰!))
- P(A|me) = (a very little less than 1.00)

If A is defined as "the hypothesis that selves are immortal", where do you get P(A) = .01 and P(~A) = .99?

How can you assign any probability to A at all?

If A is "the 1-6 sided die will come up 7" then what is P(A)?

Assigning a probability to A is just another way of begging the question.

 

[Giordano]

Mojo,
- I'll double check my figures, but this should do.
- P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)* P(~A))
- P(A|me) = .5 *.01/ (.05 * .01 + 1/10⁸⁰! * .99)
- P(A|me) = .005/(.005+(a little less than1/10⁸⁰!))
- P(A|me) = (a very little less than 1.00)

Do you intend to explain how you got those numbers? Perhaps in your next post?

 

[John Jones]

Do you intend to explain how you got those numbers? Perhaps in your next post?

He'll be back.

 

[jsfisher]

Mojo,
- I'll double check my figures, but this should do.
- P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)* P(~A))
- P(A|me) = .5 *.01/ (.05 * .01 + 1/10⁸⁰! * .99)
- P(A|me) = .005/(.005+(a little less than1/10⁸⁰!))
- P(A|me) = (a very little less than 1.00)

Still having trouble understanding complements, aren't you? ...or the Texas Sharp-shooter fallacy for that matter.

 

[Garrette]

Your die analogy was completely unrelated to the point I've been trying to make all along. Therefore, I admit my hasty response in the context of your irrelevant die analogy is also irrelevant to the point I've been trying to make. I'll make my point once more, without the meaningless die, just to tie up a final loose end.

1. Either the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event can be statistically significant, simply because of the expected likelihood of the event's occurrence during a given number of observations or trials.

2. Statistical tests of hypotheses are based on acknowledging the implied significance of observed events, either after they happen or because they do not happen as expected. The question is "Should I believe hypothesis A, given what I have specifically observed?" If the likelihood of the observation is ludicrously small, then hypothesis A is proportionally devalued.

3. The reasoning behind (2.) is completely unrelated to any Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.

Every time I've tried to point out the above, my efforts have been met by a troop of tap-dancers who have then proceeded to go dancing off on some irrelevant tangent like your die analogy, inevitably ending in a Texas Sharpshooter accusation, no matter how convoluted and meaningless the path to the TS accusation had to be in order to get there.

Why? Why not simply meet 1, 2, and 3 above head on if you disagree with the entire concept of testing a hypothesis, by observation, in the above manner?

Making practical use of my unique conditional perspective, I see that Unique Brain Assumption implies, with a certainty converging on 1, that I, specifically, should never have any unique conditional perspective ( an implication completely unrelated to the inevitable existence of innumerable other nonspecific things). I see that only my specific nonexistence would support the UBA, in which case the absence of the questioner would be more than compensated by the absence of a cause to question the UBA. Yet here I am, observing my specific existence and all the other nonspecific things, being roundly scolded and admonished - by a small, persistent group of thread-bias-selected avowed "skeptics" who have taken up "skepticism" as an ideology rather than a selective tool - that I should swallow the Unique Brain Assumption whole - like a careless bass swallows a lure, without even thinking about what it might really be.

...

Edited by LashL: 

Removed quote of moderated content.

Utter nonsense, even setting aside that the die analogy becomes irrelevant only when it is shown to demonstrate your error.

You may dance rhetorically around it all that you like, you may continue to assert and imply that we are simply too thick or too ideological to comprehend, and you may continue to conflate personal significance with statistical significance while proclaiming you are not. The clear and simple fact is that your argument is exactly the same as Jabba's with the same fatal flaw.

You are merely saying that because it is important to you that you exist then you were pre-designated. That's it. There is no insight, no analysis, and certainly no logic to your position, regardless how you dress it up.

 

[Jabba]

Anyway, Jabba, how would your formula look if "A" was defined as "the hypothesis that selves are immortal"?

Mojo,

- I'll double check my figures, but this should do.
- P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)* P(~A))
- P(A|me) = .5 *.01/ (.05 * .01 + 1/10⁸⁰! * .99)
- P(A|me) = .005/(.005+(a little less than1/10⁸⁰!))
- P(A|me) = (a very little less than 1.00)

If A is defined as "the hypothesis that selves are immortal", where do you get P(A) = .01 and P(~A) = .99?...

Humots,

- You're right -- I answered as if I were just reversing the current equation, in which case, what is currently A would become ~A, and what is currently ~A would become A.
- Using the most simple form of the current "A," the new "A" would be that "I will either exist multiple times, or I will exist infinitely." Unfortunately, this allows for the possibility of numerous -- but, finitely numerous -- finite lives. And IOW, this allows for ultimate mortality...
- Anyway, I think I had best put this request on a back-burner for now.

- Whatever, I will try to deal with the full immortality issue if I can ever fully express my arguments for the simple -- current -- version of "A" being wrong...

- I was away, and totally busy, over the weekend.

 

[Giordano]

Humots,

- You're right -- I answered as if I were just reversing the current equation, in which case, what is currently A would become ~A, and what is currently ~A would become A.
- Using the most simple form of the current "A," the new "A" would be that "I will either exist multiple times, or I will exist infinitely." Unfortunately, this allows for the possibility of numerous -- but, finitely numerous -- finite lives. And IOW, this allows for ultimate mortality...

I think that was the point: there are a lot of possibilities other than your reincarnation theory if the SM is wrong. Simply disproving the SM (which you haven"t done, by the way) doesn't provide evidence for your own theory. This has been brought up before, multiple times (sort of a multiple "reincarnation" of this idea) but you never remarked on it or indicated how this concept would change your "proof." Now that you clearly understand the problem, here is your chance to fix it!

 

[Giordano]

- Anyway, I think I had best put this request on a back-burner for now.

In fact, I think you should put your entire theory on a back-burner until, at least, you can state what exactly is reincarnated in your theory- appearance, likes, loves, preferences, viewpoints, etc. If these make up the "soul/metaphysical self" required for your theory, then you should prove that "soul/self" exists next.

It really helps to know what you are trying to prove when you try to prove it. Unless you get too caught up in the interaction here and lose site of the OP.

 

[Akhenaten]

Humots,

- You're right -- I answered as if I were just reversing the current equation, in which case, what is currently A would become ~A, and what is currently ~A would become A.

You're completely missing the point that since the values you're using are nothing better than random it doesn't really matter how you use them.

- Using the most simple form of the current "A," the new "A" would be that "I will either exist multiple times, or I will exist infinitely." Unfortunately, this allows for the possibility of numerous -- but, finitely numerous -- finite lives. And IOW, this allows for ultimate mortality...

You appear to have abandoned all pretence that "A" has anything to do with what might be referred to as a scientific model and replaced it with your own ridiculously unsubstantiated fantasy of eternal life.

- Anyway, I think I had best put this request on a back-burner for now.

Getting a bit crowded back there, isn't it?

- Whatever, I will try to deal with the full immortality issue if I can ever fully express my arguments for the simple -- current -- version of "A" being wrong...

You'll be doing well, considering that you appear to have completely lost sight of what "A" was supposed to represent in the first place..

- I was away, and totally busy, over the weekend.

For two years?

 

[Giordano]

- You're right -- I answered as if I were just reversing the current equation, in which case, what is currently A would become ~A, and what is currently ~A would become A.
- Using the most simple form of the current "A," the new "A" would be that "I will either exist multiple times, or I will exist infinitely." Unfortunately, this allows for the possibility of numerous -- but, finitely numerous -- finite lives. And IOW, this allows for ultimate mortality...

Seems an odd thing to do for a person certified in statistics. Perhaps you should review all of your statistical arguments using a book to be certain that the rest of your arguments are on solid ground?

 

[Akhenaten]

In fact, I think you should put your entire theory on a back-burner until, at least, you can state what exactly is reincarnated in your theory- appearance, likes, loves, preferences, viewpoints, etc. If these make up the "soul/metaphysical self" required for your theory, then you should prove that "soul/self" exists next.

It really helps to know what you are trying to prove when you try to prove it. Unless you get too caught up in the interaction here and lose site of the OP.

Exactly.

I still maintain that the value of "me" in Jabba's formula is the most problematic issue in this whole sad discussion.