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I challenge you: your best argument for materialism

Have you ever felt that horrible sensation when your pages in RAM have gotten totally fragmented, tangling your pending process threads all to hell, and your stack is nearly full and the interrupts are still coming in fast and furious, and you know if you don't reboot soon you're just going to crash?

Oh yes, about a millisecond ago. Thankfully, that's ancient history now.
 
You want someone to prove that the world is real??:eye-poppi

ETA: If you refuse to accept the evidence of your senses then I don't see how we can have any discussion.


If I understand correctly, neurologists claim that color, flavor, melody . . . these are not properties of matter, but are generated by brain wave activity. So the green of Summer, the sweet sticky meat of a ripe mango, the beauty of a Van Gogh, and experience of nausea - these are essentially hallucinations - because all that's really out there are various states of inert colorless, odorless, tasteless matter, in various quantities.

So those who accept materialism, that consciousness emerges from matter, they are the ones who don't accept the evidence of their own senses.
 
If I understand correctly, neurologists claim that color, flavor, melody . . . these are not properties of matter, but are generated by brain wave activity. So the green of Summer, the sweet sticky meat of a ripe mango, the beauty of a Van Gogh, and experience of nausea - these are essentially hallucinations - because all that's really out there are various states of inert colorless, odorless, tasteless matter, in various quantities.

Well sure... in Brooklyn.
 
If I understand correctly, neurologists claim that color, flavor, melody . . . these are not properties of matter, but are generated by brain wave activity. So the green of Summer, the sweet sticky meat of a ripe mango, the beauty of a Van Gogh, and experience of nausea - these are essentially hallucinations - because all that's really out there are various states of inert colorless, odorless, tasteless matter, in various quantities.

So those who accept materialism, that consciousness emerges from matter, they are the ones who don't accept the evidence of their own senses.


Sure. The same way we don't accept the evidence of the ocean having waves, currents, tides, storm surges, thermohaline systems, el nino cycles, or tsunami, because all that's really in there are water, salt, and a few trace minerals and biologics.

Since you feel differently, do you hold that the beauty of a Van Gogh results instead from some unknown-to-science property of the paint he used? Or from some spiritual parallel dimension of beauty that's magically invoked by the image? In short, where does the beauty of the Van Gogh painting exist, if not in the brain waves evoked when people look at it?
 
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...snip...

So those who accept materialism, that consciousness emerges from matter, they are the ones who don't accept the evidence of their own senses.

That seems a bit arse about tit to me, I don't think you've got a grip on how the word materialism is being used in this thread. To use your phrase "Brain waves" exist, we have evidence they exist, we can create and stop them at will, we can alter them by many ways by making material changes. Why would a materialist not think they are real?
 
If I understand correctly, neurologists claim that color, flavor, melody . . . these are not properties of matter, but are generated by brain wave activity. So the green of Summer, the sweet sticky meat of a ripe mango, the beauty of a Van Gogh, and experience of nausea - these are essentially hallucinations - because all that's really out there are various states of inert colorless, odorless, tasteless matter, in various quantities.

Yes.

So those who accept materialism, that consciousness emerges from matter, they are the ones who don't accept the evidence of their own senses

No, it's specifically because we accept evidence that we must conclude, despite our feelings in the matter, that sensation is an emergent property of the system, not some ineffable quality of the eternal human soul.
 
what's up with you and the soul . . . there's lots of wiggle room between physicality and an eternal soul.
 
what's up with you and the soul . . . there's lots of wiggle room between physicality and an eternal soul.

True. But anyone wishing to say that consciousness is not an emergent property of a given environment is immediately postulating something we have no evidence for, and that something has to somehow interact with the "material world" and yet not be part of it, in other words dualism.
 
Sure. The same way we don't accept the evidence of the ocean having waves, currents, tides, storm surges, thermohaline systems, el nino cycles, or tsunami, because all that's really in there are water, salt, and a few trace minerals and biologics.

Since you feel differently, do you hold that the beauty of a Van Gogh results instead from some unknown-to-science property of the paint he used? Or from some spiritual parallel dimension of beauty that's magically invoked by the image? In short, where does the beauty of the Van Gogh painting exist, if not in the brain waves evoked when people look at it?

I am not sure where the beauty, color, melody, etc comes from . . . but it sure would be nice if it came from the object - and not from an hallucination.
 
If I understand correctly, neurologists claim that color, flavor, melody . . . these are not properties of matter, but are generated by brain wave activity. So the green of Summer, the sweet sticky meat of a ripe mango, the beauty of a Van Gogh, and experience of nausea - these are essentially hallucinations - because all that's really out there are various states of inert colorless, odorless, tasteless matter, in various quantities.

So those who accept materialism, that consciousness emerges from matter, they are the ones who don't accept the evidence of their own senses.

Well of course. They're our reactions--created by our brainwaves--and not intrinsic properties of the objects. Otherwise people wouldn't have different subjective reactions and their reactions wouldn't change due to physical changes, such as losing one's sense of taste and smell and therefore no longer experiencing a mango the same way.

As others have said, brainwaves and brains and humans are real, so of course beauty, flavor, etc. are real to materialists. But they're the result of certain processing in the brain.

If you don't agree, what do you think they are? Are they attributed of objects? We can say, objectively, that an apple is red, if we define red as something that can be measured by light wavelengths. So an apple will remain labelled red even if viewed by a colorblind person. We could also define and then measure its sweetness, crunchiness, etc. Those are all real.

We could even define something subjective like "delicious" based on average attributes in things that humans rate as delicious, and predict on average what most people would classify as delicious. But unlike color or hardness, the word delicious implies subjectivity. If I think something is delicious, it is, to me, and there's no accounting for taste, although I could be classified as typical or an outlier.

What do you think subjective things like beauty, deliciousness, etc. are, if not subjective experiences caused by brainwaves? Are they intrinsic properties that are attached to things, like colors, and a person who can't see the beauty in something is beauty-blind, like a person who can't see the red in an apple is colorblind? But what criteria do you use to define beauty, that's not tied to subjective human experience?

Edited to add: I just saw you answered while I was typing. Sorry, I don't share your desire, so I don't have the same natural bias to believe a certain way.
 
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I am not sure where the beauty, color, melody, etc comes from . . . but it sure would be nice if it came from the object - and not from an hallucination.

That would give a whole new meaning to the idea of "I love burritos but they don't love me" *craps pants*
 
I am not sure where the beauty, color, melody, etc comes from . . . but it sure would be nice if it came from the object - and not from an hallucination.

Seriously, why would it matter what "would be nice" ? Things are what they are.

And you still owe me examples for your earlier claim.
 
Well of course. They're our reactions--created by our brainwaves--and not intrinsic properties of the objects. Otherwise people wouldn't have different subjective reactions and their reactions wouldn't change due to physical changes, such as losing one's sense of taste and smell and therefore no longer experiencing a mango the same way.

As others have said, brainwaves and brains and humans are real, so of course beauty, flavor, etc. are real to materialists. But they're the result of certain processing in the brain.

If you don't agree, what do you think they are? Are they attributed of objects? We can say, objectively, that an apple is red, if we define red as something that can be measured by light wavelengths. So an apple will remain labelled red even if viewed by a colorblind person. We could also define and then measure its sweetness, crunchiness, etc. Those are all real.

We could even define something subjective like "delicious" based on average attributes in things that humans rate as delicious, and predict on average what most people would classify as delicious. But unlike color or hardness, the word delicious implies subjectivity. If I think something is delicious, it is, to me, and there's no accounting for taste, although I could be classified as typical or an outlier.

What do you think subjective things like beauty, deliciousness, etc. are, if not subjective experiences caused by brainwaves? Are they intrinsic properties that are attached to things, like colors, and a person who can't see the beauty in something is beauty-blind, like a person who can't see the red in an apple is colorblind? But what criteria do you use to define beauty, that's not tied to subjective human experience?

Edited to add: I just saw you answered while I was typing. Sorry, I don't share your desire, so I don't have the same natural bias to believe a certain way.

and I don't share your certainty and remain skeptical
 
I am not sure where the beauty, color, melody, etc comes from . . . but it sure would be nice if it came from the object - and not from an hallucination.

The universe does not operate according to what you think would be "nice".
 
But you have to step back from an idea of pain as an output. You're dealing with physiological feedback right from the very beginning of the pain response which is why I suggest that a better model of most any sensation involving neurons would be a stochastic one and instead of pain as an output it would be within a space (probably spaces, and spaces within spaces with regards to epicritic and protopathic sensations of pain). When the brain processes the interactions within that space you'll feel pain. When it's out of that space you won't feel pain (ignoring that pain is dynamic and in degrees).

And it gets worse because all perceptions are models derived from the sensation and constructed by brains.
 
You are only demonstrating why the analogy is not apt.

In my example it does not matter what happened before or will happen after or who remembers it.

If nausea is a computation then there should be a sensation of nausea produced by nothing else than a series of steps such as I described.

Nausea is more complex that PixyMisa's computation model, first of all perceptions are generated events that appear to made by brains. They are partly learned through exposure to sensations and then manufactured (apparently) by brains.

The sensation of nausea if even more difficult than say visual perceptions, because it has a multi channel sensation pathway, including the very odd and complex vestibular sensations, which are partly cochlear based, partly kinesthetic, partly abdominal sensations and partly visual sensations.

And on top of that they are also idiomatic to individuals.

(Not all materialists are computational minded, I partly agree with PM and partly disagree)
 
Seriously, why would it matter what "would be nice" ? Things are what they are.

And you still owe me examples for your earlier claim.


I have no obligation to come up with alternative explanations to state that a given explanation is dubious. "I don't know" is a respectable answer. Perhaps you need to explain why an individual (like myself) who finds the mind is an emergent property of matter, must necessarily believe in an eternal soul. Of course you'd have to define what an eternal soul would be.
 
I have no obligation to come up with alternative explanations to state that a given explanation is dubious. "I don't know" is a respectable answer.

You said that there is a lot of wiggle room. I asked you for examples. Now you are saying that you don't know, thereby negating that claim. We can therefore conclude that, unless you come up with those answers, the soul is the alternative to physicality, no ?

Perhaps you need to explain why an individual (like myself) who finds the mind is an emergent property of matter, must necessarily believe in an eternal soul.

Given that this is the exact opposite of what I say, it would be odd for me to need to explain this.
 

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