I challenge you: your best argument for materialism

[Pup]

That's a very good argument, but not against idealism: it's against acting as if idealism is true even if it is.

It's an argument against acting as if a random illogical idealism is true. (I mean the kind of idealism that proposes "reality" must be as illogical as a dream world.) But I don't see that it's an argument against acting as if any form of idealism is true.

For what it's worth, I agree that materialism appears to be the obvious explanation, but I just don't think the arguments against idealism demolish it as much as people think, because it's so easy to frame idealism as unfalsifiable. In that case, one can't prove it wrong, but one can't prove it right either, so the best solution seems to be to just ignore it, same as god-hypotheses where a god (or fairies or unicorns) created a logical world and abandoned it. Can't disprove it, but it answers no question that can't be answered without it.

 

[The Man]

It's an argument against acting as if a random illogical idealism is true. (I mean the kind of idealism that proposes "reality" must be as illogical as a dream world.) But I don't see that it's an argument against acting as if any form of idealism is true.

Well, I don't think dreams are necessarily illogical or random they just aren’t bound by the same (often material) restrictions. For example I often have problems driving in my dreams, generally my breaks don't seem to work. I attribute this to a lack of inertia, my mind expects to feel a change in acceleration (G force) but doesn’t. Strange as I have felt other sensations in dreams not apparently related to external stimuli while I’m sleeping but for some reason this particular sensation (related to input from the Vestibular system) I don’t seem to dream very well.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vestibular_system

 

[Lowpro]

No, we shouldn't.

Well reign it in then. If programmers want to discuss physiology then you have to use biochemistry. Using deterministic intuition to describe it makes no sense and yet programmers of all types seem to ignore that.

I'm not sure we should even consider qualia.

Normally I don't, however as I said before, qualia is colloquially used to describe conscious sensations. I had a feeling that Robin may be trying to use a trojan horse argument regarding pain so I wanted to kill it early.

 

[JoeMorgue]

"Qualia" is Woo for "Senses but more mystical and woo-ey."

 

[dlorde]

To me, it's the most convincing one.
... Everything that you know for a fact is in your mind is inconsistent. No exception. Now, suddenly the thing you don't know for a fact is in your mind, but suppose it is, is totally consistent ? If mind affected reality directly, the idealists might have a point. As it stands it is the one piece of evidence they need, and don't have.

Ironically Bishop Berkeley made the same point in support of his idealism - he noted that his own imaginative ideas could be inconsistent and nonsensical, and that he had some control over what he imagined. On the other hand, ideas coming via his senses were involuntary, consistent, and systematic - therefore only some infinitely meticulous and systematic mind could be generating them - i.e. God.

Sometimes I think he was just making a point about the (lack of) utility of philosophical arguments.

 

[dlorde]

Well reign it in then. If programmers want to discuss physiology then you have to use biochemistry. Using deterministic intuition to describe it makes no sense and yet programmers of all types seem to ignore that.

Some of us were physiologists before becoming programmers, and reject your crude stereotype.

 

[Lowpro]

Some of us were physiologists before becoming programmers, and reject your crude stereotype.

That's fine. Use biochemistry.

 

[dlorde]

That's fine. Use biochemistry.

I'll use physiology if it's all the same to you; biochemistry was such a bore.

 

[Lowpro]

I'll use physiology if it's all the same to you; biochemistry was such a bore.

Funny enough it is all the same to me, but to call biochemistry a bore is blasphemy

 

[Belz...]

Well reign it in then. If programmers want to discuss physiology then you have to use biochemistry.

We're discussing consciousness, which is broader than just physiology.

 

[JoeMorgue]

I'm pretty sure figments of my imagination aren't allowed to order me to use specific frameworks in which to build an argument.

 

[Lowpro]

We're discussing consciousness, which is broader than just physiology.

Robin was pretty damn far in the realm of physiology. My complaint was firmly related to conflating physiological processes with programming routines. Not that Robin was trying to emulate physiological processes with programming but straight up accepting the comparison as true for his or her example.

That will not fly here. If you guys want to take shots from the peanut gallery and ignore that context that's up to you.

 

[Robin]

EXACTLY why programmers should shut the crap up about this kind of debate. A better model would be a stochastic one first of all, and second of all materialism doesn't even suppose a deterministic approach to qualia. Your example is a strawman because it doesn't describe materialism's predictions. This is why Bernardo sucks at his ideas. The only condition of materialism is that reality/nature is material. That does NOT translate to AND functions in programming. To try and conflate the two is lying.

Bear in mind I find the idea of qualia to be an undefined attribute and has no utility. However as an approximation of sensation it's a word that is often used.

It is PixyMisa who brought up computation (and one other I recall) so perhaps you had better take it up with him.

And a computation is a well defined thing.

I said "suppose the feeling of nausea was a computation", which was not my supposition.

If it is a computation then of course there will be an equivalent computation in a register machine language. And the substrate should make no difference.

I know from previous conversations with PixyMisa than when he says "computation" he actually means "computation" and not some vague swirly idea of computation.

So, no straw man in this case.

 

[Robin]

Robin was pretty damn far in the realm of physiology. My complaint was firmly related to conflating physiological processes with programming routines. Not that Robin was trying to emulate physiological processes with programming but straight up accepting the comparison as true for his or her example.

That will not fly here. If you guys want to take shots from the peanut gallery and ignore that context that's up to you.

Actually it is you who are ignoring the context. It was previously suggested that mind ,including sensation, is a computation.

 

[Robin]

Surely it would just be easier for you to say you have definition, rather than dancing around the issue. It seems quite common for those arguing brain is not mind not to be able to define what that not actually is.

I do have a definition. An ostensive definition. As I said.

But please, feel free to keep ignoring what I say.

 

[Robin]

Well reign it in then. If programmers want to discuss physiology then you have to use biochemistry.

If anyone wants to claim that mind is a computation then they have to accept the mathematics of computation. If the mind is a computation then the substrate is quite beside the point - any substrate will do. If mind is a computation then biochemistry is more or less beside the point.

If the feeling of nausea is a computation then there must be, as I said, an equivalent computation running on a register machine - just as I said.

If there is no equivalent computation that can run on a register machine then you are not talking about computation, full stop.

 

[Myriad]

I do have a definition. An ostensive definition. As I said.

Your ostenstive definition, as far as I can tell, suggests that consciousness is demonstrated by inflicting crippling injury upon oneself.

Is that right? If I built a robot and programmed it to bash itself to bits, that would be conscious? (At least, while the bashing continued?)

If I've got it wrong, you might consider clarifying your definition.

 

[Robin]

You say this as though it means something.

Seriously? You are saying that if a doctor asks "do you have any pain" you would have no idea what he was talking about unless you completely understood the brain and central nervous system.

Of course there is.

Well then, out with it.

The sensation IS the reaction. Your problem is that you assume without cause that they are different things.

Nope. I have no assumption. Basically you are saying that there is some chemical reaction which could not be explained in terms of chemistry alone. There is some chemical reaction that, even if you could completely observe the actions of the atoms and their associated forces, you could not see what is happening unless you could ask some person "does that hurt?"

This is what I am asking. What is that chemical reaction?

Obviously, if it didn't cause nausea, the reaction that causes it wouldn't be the same.

On what, exactly, are you basing that assumption. Is there some law of chemistry, or law of physics which says that a particular process will not complete unless there is an associated sensation. What is that law?

Again, it is your assumption that causes your error, here.

Again, it is you who are making the assumption. I am asking for the basis of your assumption.

Yes, because it matches our observations.

The claim is that this world is just like what a material world would be like. I asked for backing for this claim.

Now it appears that you are saying that this world is just what a material world would be like because this is a material world and this is what it is like.

Circular.

Your position isn't based on observation; it's based on a naive understanding of existential philosophy, one that can only lead to some boring form of solipsism.

Again, I haven't put a position, I am asking others to justify their position.

If you claim to know what a material world ought to be like then you can't base that on observation, without assuming your conclusion that this is, in fact, a material world.

So, without the assumption that this is a material world, and without the assumption that the physical process is a sensation, show the physics or chemistry that demonstrate that particular processes must produce a sensation like nausea or pain.

 

[Robin]

Your ostenstive definition, as far as I can tell, suggests that consciousness is demonstrated by inflicting crippling injury upon oneself.

Is that right? If I built a robot and programmed it to bash itself to bits, that would be conscious? (At least, while the bashing continued?)

If I've got it wrong, you might consider clarifying your definition.

I don't recall saying that it would work on a robot. If I have then please feel free to show me where I have.

Otherwise, the definition works fine as long as you don't add in extra words that I didn't say. You can also eat a peach and experience the taste. You can listen to music and hear what it sounds like. You can have somebody tickle your tummy and see what that feels like.

 

[Robin]

If it's pain from touching a hot stove:

nocireceptor response towards the thalamus which then enters the somatosensory cortex thus the "experience" of pain. This is is constant positive and negative regulation thus pain can be promoted or inhibited in this pathway

So, again, please show me the physics or chemistry which demonstrates that this must result in a sensation of pain. It is a simple question. Otherwise show me the contradiction that would ensue if this occurred without there being a sensation of pain.

I have a feeling that you're searching for a "gotcha" in nerve vs "experiences of pain without nerve involvement"

No, I am looking for an answer to my question. Getting lots of evasion and question begging in response.

(blah blah)..mindlessly masturbated..(blah blah)...It's like the black knight with no arms or legs claiming it's a flesh wound...

Or, avoid the question altogether and claim victory - that will work too.