Proof of Immortality II

[Toontown]

Well, Toontown! I was wondering if we would hear from you. Do you think there are an infinite number of possible human brains?

Like most cosmologists, I think the universe is probably infinite. Draw your own conclusions.

But what I really, really think is: every possible unique brain has one shot and one shot only; One unique organization, one unique place, one unique time, or bust. Therefore, it matters not how big the universe may be, if the question is how likely it was that a specific existing brain would have come to exist. That probability is greater than zero, but not significantly greater than zero for practical, hypothesis-testing purposes.

 

[Toontown]

Then Jabba has another problem. If he has an infinite universe for his "potential combinations" to play out in, he needs to put infinity into his numerator. He now has an infinite denominator and an infinite numerator. This is the sort of absurdity he ends up with when he tries to shoehorn "infinity" into a formula.

No. There is no infinity of organizations, places, and times for Jabba's unique brain. The numerator is still 1, if that's how you are all determined to go about calculating the probability of Jabba's unique brain.*

*An exercise in futility any way you go about it, and unnecessary as well. All that is required is enough plain, common sense to recognize that the odds are in the tillions or drillions.

 

[Jabba]

...No, that's just the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy again. As Giordano so aptly put it:

- At least in a sense, for me, that’s the main issue here -- and the one that I will now try to address. Which number replaces P(me|A)? Is it the likelihood of ME currently existing – or, is it the likelihood of someone/anyone currently existing?...

- (IOW, for the former to be the case, I had to be circled as the target before the shooting.)

Hold on. I thought you said P(me|A) wasn't the likelihood of you existing, it was the probability of A being correct given that you exist.

Dave,
- You have it backwards. Can you show me where I said that?

Right here:

Dave,
- I’ll give it a try now.
- First, you should probably look up Bayesian probability. Here’s a little bit from Wikipedia:
Bayesian probability belongs to the category of evidential probabilities; to evaluate the probability of a hypothesis, the Bayesian probabilist specifies some prior probability, which is then updated in the light of new, relevant data (evidence).[1] The Bayesian interpretation provides a standard set of procedures and formulae to perform this calculation.
In contrast to interpreting probability as the "frequency" or "propensity" of some phenomenon, Bayesian probability is a quantity that we assign for the purpose of representing a state of knowledge,[2] or a state of belief.[3] In the Bayesian view, a probability is assigned to a hypothesis, whereas under the frequentist view, a hypothesis is typically tested without being assigned a probability.
- Next, if you analyze the Bayesian formula I’m using, you see that there is no place to include all the factors that led to my existence.
- The formula: P(A|me) = P(me|A) P(A)/(P(me|A) P(A) + P(me|~A) P(~A))
- Here, we are NOT asking for the likelihood of my existence – we already know that I exist. What we’re really asking is, “What is the random likelihood that I would exist if the theory at issue is true?” Or better yet, “What is the random likelihood that all the events necessary for my existence to occur would, themselves, occur IF THE THEORY AT ISSUE IS TRUE?”
- I think I’ll leave it there for now.
- So once again, does that help…?

Dave,
- I don’t see such a claim in that passage. Please be more specific.

Here you go:

- (The highlighted line below.)

Dave,
- I’ll give it a try now.
- First, you should probably look up Bayesian probability. Here’s a little bit from Wikipedia:
Bayesian probability belongs to the category of evidential probabilities; to evaluate the probability of a hypothesis, the Bayesian probabilist specifies some prior probability, which is then updated in the light of new, relevant data (evidence).[1] The Bayesian interpretation provides a standard set of procedures and formulae to perform this calculation.
In contrast to interpreting probability as the "frequency" or "propensity" of some phenomenon, Bayesian probability is a quantity that we assign for the purpose of representing a state of knowledge,[2] or a state of belief.[3] In the Bayesian view, a probability is assigned to a hypothesis, whereas under the frequentist view, a hypothesis is typically tested without being assigned a probability.
- Next, if you analyze the Bayesian formula I’m using, you see that there is no place to include all the factors that led to my existence.
- The formula: P(A|me) = P(me|A) P(A)/(P(me|A) P(A) + P(me|~A) P(~A))
- Here, we are NOT asking for the likelihood of my existence – we already know that I exist. What we’re really asking is, “What is the random likelihood that I would exist if the theory at issue is true?” Or better yet, “What is the random likelihood that all the events necessary for my existence to occur would, themselves, occur IF THE THEORY AT ISSUE IS TRUE?”
- I think I’ll leave it there for now.
- So once again, does that help…?

Dave,
- You had said, "Hold on. I thought you said P(me|A) wasn't the likelihood of you existing, it was the probability of A being correct given that you exist." The backward part of what you said was the claim that I had said that P(me|A) "...was the probability of A being correct given that you exist." Instead, I had said that it is P(A|me)that is the probability of A being correct given that I exist.
- But also, we are not asking for the likelihood of my existence, we are really asking for the random likelihood that I would exist if the theory at issue is true.

 

[godless dave]

But also, we are not asking for the likelihood of my existence, we are really asking for the random likelihood that I would exist if the theory at issue is true.

What's the difference?

 

[Jabba]

…- But also, we are not asking for the likelihood of my existence, we are really asking for the random likelihood that I would exist if the theory at issue is true.

What's the difference?

- Well, the random likelihood that I would exist if the theory at issue is true is conditional probability – the likelihood of my existence is not. And, Bayesian statistics is about the conditional probability of something.
- I would add that if "the likelihood of my existence" is not ambiguous, the proper answer to it should be 1.00.

 

[Akhenaten]

- But, reproducing my particular sequence of base pairs would not bring me back to consciousness. The result would be somebody else.

What then is this immortality thing of which ye speake?

- And, if we kept reproducing my particular sequence of base pairs, we'd keep producing new, and different, particular consciounesses.

Yes. So what?

I'm saying that these all represent potential selves that will never exist .

What you're saying is that your wildly implausible hypothesis relies on an oxymoron.

And, in that sense of "potential," there are just as many potential selves as there are digits in the square root of 2.

What a shame that your "sense" of potential has nothing to do with the actual meaning of the word.

 

[Akhenaten]

Jabba, please, I'm begging you ... for the love of all that is decent and good on this planet ... for the love of Jamie Otis from Married at First Sight ... please understand just this one thing:

You Cannot Get To Infinity By Adding.

But what if you could?

 

[Akhenaten]

So what is it that you imagine is immortal? Do you imagine brains are immortal?

I have asked Jabba repeatedly what is immortal in his model (his own definition of "self" or "observer"): my sense of identity, my gender, my preferences in food, my way of interpreting what I see (observe), any aspects of my appearence, who I love, who I hate, etc. He has yet to reply in any fashion. So I am unclear how, by his own model, he will be Jabba again after he dies: what part of his "reincarnated" self will be Jabba? Why would it reassure him that he would live again? At least my kids have about 50% of my DNA and share some of their traits with me.

His lack of response to even very straightforward questions about his own model makes me doubt if he, himself, believes it.

I've also asked Jabba this question many times.

Lacking an answer, his OP has become as meaningless as claiming that he can use Bayes to essentially prove "tasty".

 

[Loss Leader]

But what if you could?

I don't know. There's a guy who got a Nobel prize for sterilizing developmentally disabled people without consent. So, I guess there's room in the history of science for people who are tragically, stupidly, insanely wrong.

 

[xtifr]

- (IOW, for the former to be the case, I had to be circled as the target before the shooting.)

No, the only reason we're interested in the prior probability of you, in particular, existing is because you did end up existing. That's a textbook case of drawing the circle after the shooting.

The fact that you do exist means that the only way to circle you as a target before the shooting at this point is to invent time travel. Which is definitely cheating, and rather subverts the whole concept of "before" and "after". (And if I invented time travel, I'd use it to beat the odds and win lotteries long before I wasted it in beating the odds and predicting you before you existed. )

- But also, we are not asking for the likelihood of my existence, we are really asking for the random likelihood that I would exist if the theory at issue is true.

Yes, we all understand this. It's just tedious to spell the whole thing out every time. Especially given that pretty much everyone but you in this discussion considers the theory at issue to be basically a given, based on all available evidence and logic. It's like remembering to say, "if water is wet" every time you're discussing the probability of someone drowning.

 

[godless dave]

- Well, the random likelihood that I would exist if the theory at issue is true is conditional probability – the likelihood of my existence is not. And, Bayesian statistics is about the conditional probability of something.
- I would add that if "the likelihood of my existence" is not ambiguous, the proper answer to it should be 1.00.

Wouldn't the likelihood that you would exist if the theory is true be the likelihood that that theory predicts? In the scientific model, the likelihood of your existence is based on the events that led to your existence, not on the total number of potential people that can ecist throughout history, including the future.

 

[jsfisher]

- I would add that if "the likelihood of my existence" is not ambiguous, the proper answer to it should be 1.00.

Well, that will certainly simplify things if you can ever manage to advance the discussion. Meanwhile, why is P(me) necessarily 1?

Once you've answered that, please note

P(me) = [ P(me|A)P(A) + P(me|~A)P(~A) ]​

and since you require P(me) = 1, of mathematical necessity, P(me|A) must be 1.

See how simple it gets?

 

[Loss Leader]

P(me) = [ P(me|A)P(A) + P(me|~A)P(~A) ]​

and since you require P(me) = 1, of mathematical necessity, P(me|A) must be 1.

Really? I don't follow that.

 

[jsfisher]

Really? I don't follow that.

If P(me) = 1, then Jabba's existence is 100% assured, independent of any scientific or non-scientific model of reality. As long as the scientific model is at least possible (e.g. P(A) > 0, and even Jabba hasn't asserted otherwise), then P(me|A) must = 1.

(If follows from the mathematics of the formula, too, but it gets a bit tangled. It all hinges on the fact the product of two numbers between 0 and 1 is less than either of the two numbers.)

 

[Toontown]

The fact that you do exist means that the only way to circle you as a target before the shooting at this point is to invent time travel.

You needn't go that far. You could simply acknowledge the fact that there was only one specific organization of atoms, occurring at specific spacetime coordinates, that could ever have been Jabba's brain.

From there it's only a short hop to the realization that no sentient being needed to be present at the big bang to certify said organization + coordinates. They require no certification.

 

[Toontown]

Well, that will certainly simplify things if you can ever manage to advance the discussion. Meanwhile, why is P(me) necessarily 1?

Once you've answered that, please note

P(me) = [ P(me|A)P(A) + P(me|~A)P(~A) ]​

and since you require P(me) = 1, of mathematical necessity, P(me|A) must be 1.

See how simple it gets?

Don't get your hopes up. Taken in context, it doesn't look like Jabba meant what you think he meant. You're probably doing all that speculating based on a misunderstanding of Jabba's intended meaning.

I'm betting Jabba is saying the likelihood that he does now exist is 1 (assuming his current existence is not ambiguous), but the Bayes formula does not use that as a variable. It is assumed that Jabba exists.

 

[jsfisher]

Don't get your hopes up. Taken in context, it doesn't look like Jabba meant what you think he meant.

Since you can be certain of neither what Jabba meant nor what I think he meant, how about we let Jabba himself clarify what he may have meant then move on from there?

 

[Jabba]

Wouldn't the likelihood that you would exist if the theory is true be the likelihood that that theory predicts?...

- Yes. But, probability is a complicated, confusing mess when viewed beneath the surface…
- The KIND of probability that you have in mind includes such conclusions as the odds that the Jets will beat the Raiders this Sunday, or the percent probability that it will rain in Baton Rouge tomorrow. In making such predictions, we try to take every existing factor, we can, into account. Our bankroll may depend upon it.
- But, that isn’t the KIND of probability we’re seeking in P(me|A). Here, we’re really asking about the likelihood of all the necessary events (for me to currently exist), actually occurring, given the scientific consensus that each potential self has but one, finite life to live (at most).

- (Actually, I haven't been able to find any scientists talking about potential selves (or, potential self processes) -- so, I'm just assuming that "each potential self has but one, finite life to live (at most)" is the unspoken consensus.)

 

[godless dave]

- Yes. But, probability is a complicated, confusing mess when viewed beneath the surface…
- The KIND of probability that you have in mind includes such conclusions as the odds that the Jets will beat the Raiders this Sunday, or the percent probability that it will rain in Baton Rouge tomorrow. In making such predictions, we try to take every existing factor, we can, into account. Our bankroll will depend upon it.
- But, that isn’t the KIND of probability we’re seeking in P(me|A). Here, we’re really asking about the likelihood of all the necessary events (for me to currently exist), actually occurring, given the scientific consensus that each potential self has but one, finite life to live (at most).

I've bolded the part that agrees with what I said earlier.

The scientific model doesn't allow for time travel, so matings between people who weren't alive at the same time - before the invention of frozen sperm and egg technology - aren't potential selves in the scientific model. The ability to precisely replicate a human being hasn't been invented yet, so such duplicates don't count as potential selves either. If you look at every possible human being from the beginning of the universe through now, you're not going to get an infinite number. Beyond that, each human being is a product of previous events; it is not a random collection of matter that can appear at any time.

- (Actually, I haven't been able to find any scientists talking about potential selves (or, potential self processes) -- so, I'm just assuming that "each potential self has but one, finite life to live (at most)" is the unspoken consensus.)

I don't see any reason why scientists would concern themselves with potential selves outside of a probability calculation. I think the scientific consensus is that each self has exactly one finite life to live.

 

[Jabba]

Debatable. At least in the (purely hypothetical) case of making a perfect copy of someone, you can say it's the same person or a different person, and both statements could reasonably be considered correct!…

- Fine. I’m just arguing that the sense (statement) in which the perfect copy would be a different person is the appropriate sense to use in this case.