Proof of Immortality II

[Giordano]

If at first you don't succeed- try, try again.

 

[godless dave]

Jabba, you seem to be saying that any entity capable of self-awareness is necessarily unique. In naturalism, this is not the case. In practice, every human "experiencer" is unique because every human brain is unique. Not only does each brain start off unique, but brains constantly change throughout their life, so no two human brains are ever identical.

 

[Akhenaten]

Actually, you're having this discussion again because the next step after disproving the scientific model would be to consider alternative hypotheses and you have no idea how to exclude all of them except reincarnation.

Indeed. I'm convinced that the only reason this discussion now finds itself perched tenuously on the outermost twiglets of its premise is that its progenitor realises that the trunk of the argument (that the only alternative to the current scientific thingy of a single life per organism is endless Jabbas) is rotten at its core.

You also have no idea how to get your theory to apply only to humans and not to decks of cards, volkswagens, runners or eggplants.

Or Tyrannosauruses.

So, you mercilessly stab away at the one and only point you think you can make - that an endless supply of souls is somewhere gestating in a metaphysical pool waiting for circumstances to be right to install themselves into a brain.

 

[JoeMorgue]

No Jabba is saying he's going to live forever because he has a soul. He's just coming up with more and more convoluted and dishonest ways of saying that.

 

[Giordano]

No Jabba is saying he's going to live forever because he has a soul. He's just coming up with more and more convoluted and dishonest ways of saying that.

I believe that soul music will live nearly forever. Is that the same thing?

 

[Akhenaten]

I believe that soul music will live nearly forever. Is that the same thing?

It certainly makes more sense.

 

[John Jones]

I believe that soul music will live nearly forever. Is that the same thing?

I met Isaac Hayes in person, and The Theme From Shaft was some great soul music.

 

[JoeMorgue]

You also have no idea how to get your theory to apply only to humans and not to decks of cards, volkswagens, runners or eggplants.

So, you mercilessly stab away at the one and only point you think you can make - that an endless supply of souls is somewhere gestating in a metaphysical pool waiting for circumstances to be right to install themselves into a brain.

Because Jabba has gotten trapped in the most insidious and illogical of all Woo mindsets... the dreaded Woo Loop of Perpetual Reinforcement.

You have to understand that Jabba is starting from a position that one key central fact, that the process of human consciousness is eternal and separate from the bio-electrical neurological process of the brain, is a given. He is literally mentally incapable for some reason of even entertaining the idea that this concept isn't fact despite obviously having zero evidence to back this up.

So via Jabba Logic:

1. The Human Mind is defined as something eternal and separate from its biological process.

2. Ergo the Human Mind has to separate and eternal because if it wasn't it wouldn't be the mind.

3. 1 proves 2.

4. 2 proves 1.

5. Repeat 1-4 again and again neither adding or accepting new information.

 

[pakeha]

[ . . . ]You have to understand that Jabba is starting from a position that one key central fact, that the process of human consciousness is eternal and separate from the bio-electrical neurological process of the brain, is a given. He is literally mentally incapable for some reason of even entertaining the idea that this concept isn't fact despite obviously having zero evidence to back this up. [ . . . ]

This. Or alternatively, Jabba's trolling.

Either way, I've learned a great deal from the thread. Thanks all!

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, you seem to be saying that any entity capable of self-awareness is necessarily unique. In naturalism, this is not the case. In practice, every human "experiencer" is unique because every human brain is unique. Not only does each brain start off unique, but brains constantly change throughout their life, so no two human brains are ever identical.

Dave,
- Still trying to find wording that we can agree upon.
1) A new, separate, distinct brain produces a new, separate, distinct experiencer.
2) Even if my brain were perfectly duplicated, it would not duplicate me -- it would not bring me back to life.
3) If we could, somehow, produce new brains forever, we could produce new, distinct, experiencers forever.
4) In such a universe, the number of distinct experiencers would be infinite.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- Still trying to find wording that we can agree upon.
1) A new, separate, distinct brain produces a new, separate, distinct experiencer.
2) Even if my brain were perfectly duplicated, it would not duplicate me -- it would not bring me back to life.

It would duplicate you. It wouldn't bring you back to life, it would create a new you that was exactly identical to the original you. That's what duplication means.

In the scientific model, every aspect of the experiencer is determined by the brain.

 

[Jabba]

It would duplicate you. It wouldn't bring you back to life, it would create a new you that was exactly identical to the original you. That's what duplication means.

In the scientific model, every aspect of the experiencer is determined by the brain.

- Could you agree that in some sense it would not duplicate me? I think you know what I mean by that -- is there a word I could use instead of "duplicate"?

 

[godless dave]

- Could you agree that in some sense it would not duplicate me?

No.

I think you know what I mean by that

I really don't.

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- Still trying to find wording that we can agree upon.
1) A new, separate, distinct brain produces a new, separate, distinct experiencer.
2) Even if my brain were perfectly duplicated, it would not duplicate me -- it would not bring me back to life.
3) If we could, somehow, produce new brains forever, we could produce new, distinct, experiencers forever.
4) In such a universe, the number of distinct experiencers would be infinite.

It would duplicate you. It wouldn't bring you back to life, it would create a new you that was exactly identical to the original you. That's what duplication means.

- How about in the sense that duplicating my brain would not duplicate my sense of continuing self?

 

[Slowvehicle]

Dave,
- Still trying to find wording that we can agree upon.
1) A new, separate, distinct brain produces a new, separate, distinct experiencer.

Um, no. A new, separate, distinct brain will manifest the emergent property of a A new, separate, distinct consciousness.

2) Even if my brain were perfectly duplicated, it would not duplicate me -- it would not bring me back to life.

Right. Your duplicated brain would give rise to the emergent property of a duplicated Rich Savage; as identical a copy to you, at the moment of duplication, as the duplicated brain were to yours. (Purely hypothetically, as such things are not possible.)

The instant the experiences of the duplicated brain's emergent consciousness diverged from your experiences, the duplicated emergent consciousness would diverge to the same degree. (Purely hypothetically, again, as such things are not possible.)

3) If we could, somehow, produce new brains forever, we could produce new, distinct, experiencers forever.

Sevral issues arise. First, the possibility of producing new brains forever seems to be obviated by all manner of evidence thet the universe is not unlimited. Second, you continue to pretend that the "experiencer" to which you refer is, somehow, different from the emergent property of consciousness manifested by a functioning neurosystem (nor am I the only one to point this out to you).

4) In such a universe, the number of distinct experiencers would be infinite.

In what way do you think your special pleading supports your belief in the "soul", and its "immortality"?

 

[godless dave]

- How about in the sense that duplicating my brain would not duplicate my sense of continuing self?

Nope, I don't agree with that at all.

 

[Jabba]

- How about in the sense that duplicating my brain would not duplicate my sense of continuing self?

Nope, I don't agree with that at all.

- How about, duplicating my brain would not retrieve my particular sense of continuing self?

 

[godless dave]

- How about, duplicating my brain would not retrieve my particular sense of continuing self?

Correct. It would result in a copy that was exactly like it.

 

[Jabba]

- Back to #3:
3) If we could, somehow, produce new brains forever, we could produce new, distinct, experiencers forever.

 

[JoeMorgue]

- Could you agree that in some sense it would not duplicate me?

- How about in the sense that duplicating my brain would not duplicate my sense of continuing self?

- How about, duplicating my brain would not retrieve my particular sense of continuing self?

Seriously Jabba could you be anymore obvious in your desperate reaching?