Proof of Immortality II

[Toontown]

Indeed, this is the second place you went wrong: assuming you could show you, or any of us, are somehow special. This is where you invoke the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.

No. The target was predetermined. One particular organization, one place, one time, or it is nothingness forever for the potential brain that missed the existence target.

It's not the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. It is simple conditional probability. That brains exist is to be expected. You should not expect to be among them, if eternal nothingness is the only alternative to your specific brain.

 

[Giordano]

No. The target was predetermined. One particular organization, one place, one time, or it is nothingness forever for the potential brain that missed the existence target.

It's not the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. It is simple conditional probability. That brains exist is to be expected. You should not expect to be among them, if eternal nothingness is the only alternative to your specific brain.

The target was post-determined: Jabba! Not just anyone, or me, or my sister, but Jabba and his particular personality. This is just like Texas Sharpshooting: the universe gets Jabba (and everyone else) first, then Jabba draws the circle around himself and asks what are the chances of this particular Jabba given the other possibilities. He could have inherited any of the many (but not infinite) possible physical brains that might have developed from his parent's mating (almost any bullet hole), but he makes the error of assuming his particular brain and associated personality (bullet hole) was the target of the shooting after it already took place. It was not. That is the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. Very much so.


I have compared this to fingerprints. Jabba likely has a unique set of fingerprints. What are the advance chances of that particular set of fingerprints developing? Very low. Yet, he had a very high probability of developing some set of fingerprints, and happened to develop that particular set. It only seems unusual after one draws the target. Same with inorganic things, like snowflakes: you might look at one and say it is unique and therefore rare, but I don't think anyone has proposed that snowflakes must therefore represent reincarnated souls.

 

[godless dave]

That brains exist is to be expected. You should not expect to be among them.

I can't expect anything until I already exist.

 

[Giordano]

No. The target was predetermined. One particular organization, one place, one time, or it is nothingness forever for the potential brain that missed the existence target.

It's not the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. It is simple conditional probability. That brains exist is to be expected. You should not expect to be among them, if eternal nothingness is the only alternative to your specific brain.

The organization (some sort of human brain) was determined by the genetics and early environment. Once some sort of heathy human brain was determined, then its particular consciousness was a required consequence. Eternal nothingness is very unlikely from the biology: we are strongly programmed to develop a functional human brain in utero. Mistakes occur, but not often enough to have interfered enough to prevent the evolution of the human population. In fact, eternal nothingness is not the only alternative to your specific brain, as you state, but rather some other specific human brain. I got one, my sister got another.

 

[Toontown]

The target was post-determined: Jabba! Not just anyone, or me, or my sister, but Jabba and his particular personality.

From the beginning of time, there was ever only one brain that could have produced that particular personality. Therefore the target was drawn at the beginning of time. Not by Jabba. Not by anyone. No specific Jabba-brain, no specific Jabba. That's the rule, that is the "prerequisite", and is probabilistically identical to your inexact "target" analogy.

This is just like Texas Sharpshooting: the universe gets Jabba (and everyone else) first, then Jabba draws the circle around himself and asks what are the chances of this particular Jabba given the other possibilities.

No. Noticing that a target was hit is not identical to drawing the target.

No Jabba-brain, no Jabba-personality. That's been the rule since the beginning of time. Jabba didn't make that rule.

He could have inherited any of the many (but not infinite) possible physical brains that might have developed from his parent's mating (almost any bullet hole)...

No. Any other bullet, hitting anywhere else, would not have produced the specific Jabba-brain.

but he makes the error of assuming his particular brain and associated personality (bullet hole) was the target of the shooting after it already took place. It was not. That is the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. Very much so.

You're right in one sense - there was no target, and no shooting. You are applying an incorrect fallacy analogy.

There was a singular prerequisite: 1 possible organization, occurring at one specific set of spacetime coordinates, or it's nothingness forever for that specific potential brain. And that's been the prerequisite since the beginning of time.

I have compared this to fingerprints. Jabba likely has a unique set of fingerprints. What are the advance chances of that particular set of fingerprints developing? Very low.

Equal to the advance chances of Jabba existing at all - as you understated, "Very low."

Jabba, Jabba fingerprints.

No Jabba, no Jabba fingerprints.

Yet, he had a very high probability of developing some set of fingerprints, and happened to develop that particular set.

No. Jabba's chances of developing any set of fingerprints were exactly equal to his chances of existing at all - again, as you said, "Very low." And there is only one set of fingerprints Jabba's specific body could have produced.

So you're wrong on all counts.

 

[Loss Leader]

From the beginning of time, there was ever only one brain that could have produced that particular personality. Therefore the target was drawn at the beginning of time. Not by Jabba. Not by anyone. No specific Jabba-brain, no specific Jabba. That's the rule, that is the "prerequisite", and is probabilistically identical to your inexact "target" analogy.

Why, at the beginning of time, would you bother to speculate on the chance that an exact Jabba would be formed? You know that staggeringly high numbers of entities will form, you know that they will take an astonishingly great number of shapes, you know that some portion of them will be able to ask questions about themselves? So, why would it be important back then to consider the chance of creating Jabba?

There are 7 billion other people alive right now who could pose the same questions Jabba does if they cared to think about it.

The only reason we're now talking about the likelihood of forming Jabba is because he was formed to talk about that likelihood. If he weren't here, somebody else would be doing it.

That's the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. That's exactly what Jabba is doing and it's exactly what you are trying and failing to argue away.

 

[Toontown]

The organization (some sort of human brain) was determined by the genetics and early environment.

I'm not talking about "some sort of human brain". If I choose to apply the [conditional] probability Jabba's formula relies on, then I am talking about [my] specific brain, and any reference to any other brain, existing or potential, is completely irrelevant.

Example of conditional probability:

A shell game is in progress, involving a pea hidden under one of two walnut halves. The player has no idea which shell the pea is under, but he knows it's under one of them, so his conditional probability distribution on the pea's location is ( 0.5, 0.5 ) A little girl standing next to the dealer is just the right height to spot the pea when the dealer raises the shell slightly, so her conditional probability distribution on the pea's location is ( 0, 1 ).

These two probability distributions are as dissimilar as they can get, yet both are equally valid. Both are correct assessments of the pea's location, given what each observer knows.

 

[AdMan]

That's the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. That's exactly what Jabba is doing and it's exactly what you are trying and failing to argue away.

Exactly. All this time and all these posts, and we are exactly at the point we started, and nowhere nearer to proving immortality.

 

[Giordano]

I'm not talking about "some sort of human brain". If I choose to apply the [conditional] probability Jabba's formula relies on, then I am talking about [my] specific brain, and any reference to any other brain, existing or potential, is completely irrelevant.

Example of conditional probability:

A shell game is in progress, involving a pea hidden under one of two walnut halves. The player has no idea which shell the pea is under, but he knows it's under one of them, so his conditional probability distribution on the pea's location is ( 0.5, 0.5 ) A little girl standing next to the dealer is just the right height to spot the pea when the dealer raises the shell slightly, so her conditional probability distribution on the pea's location is ( 0, 1 ).

These two probability distributions are as dissimilar as they can get, yet both are equally valid. Both are correct assessments of the pea's location, given what each observer knows.

It is exactly like the first case where the player waits until the shells are raised, picks the one under which the pea was and says that they won. Probability of finding the pea in advance is 50%, probability that a pea was under one of the two shells is 100% (if it is a fair game), probability of finding a pea after the reveal (if you are functioning okay) is 100%.

So in advance, the probability of any one person being Jabba is very small, but they had to be someone and happened to be (in retrospect) Jabba.

Perhaps you could address why fingerprints are any different?

 

[Toontown]

Why, at the beginning of time, would you bother to speculate on the chance that an exact Jabba would be formed?

It's not a calculation. It's a prerequisite, the prerequisite to the existence of an exact Jabba. Has been the prerequisite since the beginning of time. Didn't need to be calculated. However, it is possible to estimate that the odds against a particular brain coming into existence are giganogargantuan.

There are 7 billion other people alive right now who could pose the same questions Jabba does if they cared to think about it.

Yep. It's a repeatable thought experiment. As far as I know, the use of conditional probability in a repeatable thought experiment by any or all of those 7 billion is not currently a thought crime in most countries.

The only reason we're now talking about the likelihood of forming Jabba is because he was formed to talk about that likelihood. If he weren't here, somebody else would be doing it.

That's true of any empirical statistical data. It isn't empirical statistical data unless it actually exists. There never is anything to say about about empirical statistical data that does not exist.

That's the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. That's exactly what Jabba is doing and it's exactly what you are trying and failing to argue away.

From my conditional perspective, you're the one who is failing to understand what I'm explaining. Failing quite miserably, actually.

The Texas Sharpshooter shoots a random bullet and draws a target around the hole.

Jabba is the target, gets hit, then notices he's been hit.

You ridiculously counter that Jabba wouldn't have noticed he got hit unless he got hit, so it doesn't count that he got hit, plus he's a Texas Sharpshooter for noticing he got hit.

I say it doesn't make a rat's ass whether the target knows it got hit or not. If it got hit, it got hit. Look at it this way: You're in a combat zone, catching a few winks. A sniper targets you and shoots you in the ass, which wakes you up. After a few minutes of wakefulness, you discover you've been hit. To wit: discovering you got hit after you got hit does not mean you weren't a target.

BTW, you're all wrong. Jabba is wrong about his immortal soul conclusion, and I'm occasionally pointing out a small proportion of the numerous cases where Jabba's interlocutors are wrong. Which annoys them to no end.

 

[Loss Leader]

Look at it this way: You're in a combat zone, catching a few winks. A sniper targets you and shoots you in the ass, which wakes you up. After a few minutes of wakefulness, you discover you've been hit. To wit: discovering you got hit after you got hit does not mean you weren't a target.

Yes, but it doesn't mean you were the target. All it means is that it was possible to shoot you. Jabba is arguing that he is the target after he's been hit. That's where his Sharpshooter problems come into play. And it's where you've chosen to disagree, to no effect.

 

[Toontown]

It is exactly like the first case where the player waits until the shells are raised, picks the one under which the pea was and says that they won. Probability of finding the pea in advance is 50%, probability that a pea was under one of the two shells is 100% (if it is a fair game), probability of finding a pea after the reveal (if you are functioning okay) is 100%.

No, it's exactly like another false analogy.

You don't get to pick the pea unless you see it. You don't see it unless you exist. You don't exist unless your target gets hit, i.e., the prerequisite potential brain which has been the prerequisite since the beginning of time, becomes real.

 

[godless dave]

I'm not talking about "some sort of human brain". If I choose to apply the [conditional] probability Jabba's formula relies on, then I am talking about [my] specific brain, and any reference to any other brain, existing or potential, is completely irrelevant.

Example of conditional probability:

A shell game is in progress, involving a pea hidden under one of two walnut halves. The player has no idea which shell the pea is under, but he knows it's under one of them, so his conditional probability distribution on the pea's location is ( 0.5, 0.5 ) A little girl standing next to the dealer is just the right height to spot the pea when the dealer raises the shell slightly, so her conditional probability distribution on the pea's location is ( 0, 1 ).

These two probability distributions are as dissimilar as they can get, yet both are equally valid. Both are correct assessments of the pea's location, given what each observer knows.

Let's look at it from the point of view of another observer: the pea. No matter how many shells there are, the probability that the pea will be under the shell the pea is under is 1. If there are 2 shells, the probability that the pea will be under the shell the pea is under is 1. Same if there are 50 shells. Same if there are 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 shells. Even though 999,999,999,999,999,999 shells have nothingness underneath them, the pea will never be nothingness, it will always be a pea.

That's analogous to the situation we're talking about with human beings. We're observing from the point of view of the "targets" that have been hit. The targets that haven't been hit aren't here to tell us they vastly outnumber us.

 

[Giordano]

It's not a calculation. It's a prerequisite, the prerequisite to the existence of an exact Jabba. Has been the prerequisite since the beginning of time. Didn't need to be calculated. However, it is possible to estimate that the odds against a particular brain coming into existence are giganogargantuan.



Yep. It's a repeatable thought experiment. As far as I know, the use of conditional probability in a repeatable thought experiment by any or all of those 7 billion is not currently a thought crime in most countries.



That's true of any empirical statistical data. It isn't empirical statistical data unless it actually exists. There never is anything to say about about empirical statistical data that does not exist.



From my conditional perspective, you're the one who is failing to understand what I'm explaining. Failing quite miserably, actually.

The Texas Sharpshooter shoots a random bullet and draws a target around the hole.

Jabba is the target, gets hit, then notices he's been hit.

You ridiculously counter that Jabba wouldn't have noticed he got hit unless he got hit, so it doesn't count that he got hit, plus he's a Texas Sharpshooter for noticing he got hit.

I say it doesn't make a rat's ass whether the target knows it got hit or not. If it got hit, it got hit. Look at it this way: You're in a combat zone, catching a few winks. A sniper targets you and shoots you in the ass, which wakes you up. After a few minutes of wakefulness, you discover you've been hit. To wit: discovering you got hit after you got hit does not mean you weren't a target.

BTW, you're all wrong. Jabba is wrong about his immortal soul conclusion, and I'm occasionally pointing out a small proportion of the numerous cases where Jabba's interlocutors are wrong. Which annoys them to no end.

How is Jabba the target that is aimed at before he exists? Bullets are sent out at random until Jabba happens to be hit, becomes Jabba, and he thinks they were shooting specifically at him. Anyone could have been hit and would have become a particular person that is not Jabba. I think you have proven my point. Is the sniper in your 2nd scenario aiming at me specifically? Or does he happen to shoot at people at random and I wonder after I'm shoot what are the chances he would target specifically me, Giordano? Chances are high he would target someone among the thousand men in my group, chances are low he would target me in particular.

 

[Toontown]

Yes, but it doesn't mean you were the target. All it means is that it was possible to shoot you. Jabba is arguing that he is the target after he's been hit. That's where his Sharpshooter problems come into play. And it's where you've chosen to disagree, to no effect.

Are you disagreeing that your specific brain is the prerequisite to your specific existence?

prerequisite = target

 

[Loss Leader]

Chances are high he would target someone among the thousand men in my group, chances are low he would target me in particular.

What the heck kind of group do you hang out with?

 

[Giordano]

What the heck kind of group do you hang out with?

Actually I could not remember how many people are in a platoon, a battalion, etc. so a group sounded non-specific enough. But I hang out with the Borg, so there are a lot of us.

 

[Toontown]

Let's look at it from the point of view of another observer: the pea. No matter how many shells there are, the probability that the pea will be under the shell the pea is under is 1. If there are 2 shells, the probability that the pea will be under the shell the pea is under is 1. Same if there are 50 shells. Same if there are 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 shells. Even though 999,999,999,999,999,999 shells have nothingness underneath them, the pea will never be nothingness, it will always be a pea.

A more inappropriate POV is difficult to imagine.

If you wanted to know the probability of rolling a specific number on a die, would you calculate the probability of a coin flip coming up heads? Why would you do that? Because it's a simpler calculation? Because you get the answer you want that way?

That's essentially what you're doing by substituting the pea for me. I don't have the pea's conditional perspective, and the pea doesn't have mine.

That's analogous to the situation we're talking about with human beings. We're observing from the point of view of the "targets" that have been hit. The targets that haven't been hit aren't here to tell us they vastly outnumber us.

I don't need any information from the targets that haven't been hit. None of them are me. The probability of me being hit is what it is, irrespective of how many other targets have or have not been hit.

 

[Mojo]

From the beginning of time, there was ever only one brain that could have produced that particular personality. Therefore the target was drawn at the beginning of time.

Jabba must be much older than I thought he was.

 

[zooterkin]

Jabba must be much older than I thought he was.

Immortal, perhaps?