Proof of Immortality II

[Mojo]

xt,
- Not quite the complement -- but, if time is finite, and there is no limited pool of potential experiencers (which, I think we have agreed upon), a new brain simply produces a new experiencer -- even if the new brain perfectly replicates an old brain. And (here's the hard part), the new experiencer -- not being drawn from a limited pool of potential experiencers, and having no previous formulaic representation, is simply created on the spot. A new brain simply produces a new experiencer...

The "experiencer" doesn't actually exist. It's something that the brain does, not a thing that it produces. The idea that "a new brain simply produces a new experiencer" is nonsense.

You wouldn't talk about a new pair of legs producing a new running, would you?

 

[Hokulele]

A new brain simply produces a new experiencer...

The "experiencer" isn't a thing, it is a process. An existing brain is constantly producing new "experiencers" with every input and state change. Drinking a pint of rum will produce a new "experiencer", you do not need a new brain for that.

 

[Mojo]

Given an infinite amount of time, could we produce an infinite number of ways of telling Jabba the same thing?

 

[Akhenaten]

Drinking a pint of rum will produce a new "experiencer", you do not need a new brain for that.

Alas! Many are the times I've wished that the new brain thing was actually an option.

 

[Mojo]

Drinking a pint of rum will produce a new "experiencer", you do not need a new brain for that.

You might want a new one the next morning, though.

 

[Akhenaten]

You might want a new one the next morning, though.

We seem to be on the same page.

 

[Slowvehicle]

We seem to be on the same page.

"Our mistress' health will now begin, in spite of the Pope and the Spanish King..."

 

[jond]

The "experiencer" isn't a thing, it is a process. An existing brain is constantly producing new "experiencers" with every input and state change. Drinking a pint of rum will produce a new "experiencer", you do not need a new brain for that.

Jabba, please read and try to understand this post!

 

[Hokulele]

And (here's the hard part), the new experiencer -- not being drawn from a limited pool of potential experiencers, and having no previous formulaic representation, is simply created on the spot.

Thinking about this further, this is another example that demonstrates you still do not fully understand the nature of an emergent property. For example, what makes something blue? Atoms themselves aren't blue, nor are the molecules they combine to form. So where does the blue come from? Is it "created on the spot" from nothing at all?

 

[xtifr]

xt,
- Not quite the complement -- but, if time is finite, and there is no limited pool of potential experiencers (which, I think we have agreed upon), a new brain simply produces a new experiencer -- even if the new brain perfectly replicates an old brain. And (here's the hard part), the new experiencer -- not being drawn from a limited pool of potential experiencers, and having no previous formulaic representation, is simply created on the spot. A new brain simply produces a new experiencer...
- That ought to get us started.

If time is finite, and there is no limited pool of potential runners (which I think we have agreed upon), a new pair of legs simply produces a new runner -- even if the new pair of legs perfectly replicates the old pair of legs. And (here's the hard part), the new runner -- not being drawn from a limited pool of runners and having no previous formulaic representation, is simply created on the spot. A new pair of legs produces a new runner.

Therefore, I claim that every instance of running is eternal!

 

[Jabba]

776

No, but that's not relevant. The number of potential brains would only be one element in your probability calculation. The probability of a specific brain existing depends on all the events that led to its existence. Those would all have to be included in the calculation.

Dave,
- There are a few different points to make re your suggestion, but #1 is probably that the replicate brains would not (each) produce the same experiencer – they would each produce a different experiencer. Here, we’re looking for the likelihood of the current existence of a particular experiencer.

 

[Akhenaten]

776Dave,
- There are a few different points to make re your suggestion, but #1 is probably that the replicate brains would not (each) produce the same experiencer – they would each produce a different experiencer.

They would each produce identical experiencers and they'd be the same in that regard, but they'd be separate, and therefore not the same.

Please stop trying to trick people with semantics, Jabba. You're abysmally bad at it.

Furthermore, your so-called #1 point has nothing to do with the post you've quoted.

Here, we’re looking for the likelihood of the current existence of a particular experiencer.

The likelihood (and I assume you mean probability) of anything which currently exists is one.

You're welcome.

 

[Akhenaten]

...

 

[Akhenaten]

Here, we’re looking for the likelihood of the current existence of a particular experiencer.

How did you calculate the likelihood that your immortal self would be a human being rather than, say, a giant, tail-hopping dragonfly?

Surely there's an infinity of potential dragonflies? And rocks? And bacon?

How does the mathematics behind multiple infinities actually work?

 

[godless dave]

776Dave,
- There are a few different points to make re your suggestion, but #1 is probably that the replicate brains would not (each) produce the same experiencer – they would each produce a different experiencer. Here, we’re looking for the likelihood of the current existence of a particular experiencer.

I really don't see what that has to do with my point.

The likelihood of a particular experiencer existing is exactly the same as the likelihood of the brain that produces it existing. The number of potential experiencers that could exist throughout all of time isn't relevant.

 

[Mojo]

There are a few different points to make re your suggestion, but #1 is probably that the replicate brains would not (each) produce the same experiencer – they would each produce a different experiencer. Here, we’re looking for the likelihood of the current existence of a particular experiencer.

If they were completely identical the resulting "experiencers" would, at the time that the replicate brains were identical, be identical. Not different. Identical. The "experiencers" of a few seconds afterwards would be different, not only from each other, but from the "experiencers" at the time that the two brains were identical, because the "experiencer" is a process, not a thing.

ETA: and, re the "likelihood", what Dave just said. With the additional observation that since you exist, the probability that you exist is exactly 1.

 

[Butter!]

How did you calculate the likelihood that your immortal self would be a human being rather than, say, a giant, tail-hopping dragonfly?

Surely there's an infinity of potential dragonflies? And rocks? And bacon?

How does the mathematics behind multiple infinities actually work?

Good morning, Jabba! I was wondering about this question myself.

 

[Loss Leader]

776Dave,
- There are a few different points to make re your suggestion, but #1 is probably that the replicate brains would not (each) produce the same experiencer – they would each produce a different experiencer. Here, we’re looking for the likelihood of the current existence of a particular experiencer.

There's no such thing as an "experiencer." Nobody, least of all you, should be fooled into using yet another secret code word for "immortal soul."

Can you offer any evidence whatsoever that consciousness is any different from any other running process of a complex system?

 

[Monza]

Surely there's an infinity of potential dragonflies? And rocks? And bacon?

Mmmm... Tell me more.

 

[Monza]

776Dave,
- There are a few different points to make re your suggestion, but #1 is probably that the replicate brains would not (each) produce the same experiencer – they would each produce a different experiencer. Here, we’re looking for the likelihood of the current existence of a particular experiencer.

You still have this problem with the idea of an identical object. A replicate brain would have a replicate experiencer. Note that the experiencer is just a property of the brain, but still it is identical if the brains are identical. If you are "looking for the likelihood of the current existence of a particular experiencer" then how is this any different from looking for the likelihood of a particular widget out of a bucket full of identical widgets? It is a meaningless distinction.

You keep saying that an identical Jabba wouldn't be you. But understand he would be exactly like you in every way except that he would occupy a different location in space. His memories, thoughts, deepest secrets, etc. would all be exactly the same as yours. He would think exactly like you and would believe that he was you. And he would be correct in thinking so; no less correct correct than you would be. He would be every bit you as you are, just separate.

All you are doing is pointing to one of two identical objects and saying, "But that other one isn't this one." It is utterly meaningless. The fact that they are separate is part of the initial condition of saying there is a copy. You can't use this as a distinguishing feature to imply there is something inherently special about one of them.