- I claim that the value of P(me|A) is either one over infinity or one over a totally unimaginably large number.
And, while pretty much everyone has denied the former, absolutely
no one has disagreed with the latter. I freely state (not admit) here and now that the value of P(me|A) is one over a totally unimaginably large number. I fact, have loudly claimed this to be the fact numerous times. It is
not infinity, but it
is mind-bogglingly large. Large enough that the
exponent is probably a mildly boggling number itself. I put an
absolute bare minimum possible estimate on the value at 10 to the 80th power (1E80)
factorial (i.e., 1E80 x (1E80 - 1) x (1E80 - 2) x (1E80 - 3) ... 4 x 3 x 2). That's a number so large that there may not be enough particles in the universe to write out the
exponent in full, let alone the number itself. And I suspect it's bogglingly less than the actual value.
As I have said
numerous times over the last
year, if you can accept a finite number—
any finite number, no matter how large—
do so, and this debate can move forward!
A perfect replica of my brain would not produce the same me.
Only in the sense that there'd now be two, which wouldn't share the mathematical property of identity. It could
just as reasonably (or just as unreasonably) be said that the
copy was you and the original no longer was. You're getting stuck in semantics. English is not designed to cope with the existence of two yous, but that's what we would essentially have. Two yous, both you in every reasonable sense, but still distinct and separate individuals.
Most importantly, the copy would have
exactly the same sense of continuity and sense of self! Subjectively, both would be you! If you were teleported and copied at the same time, there would be no way of saying which had been teleported and which copied, subjectively
or objectively, because
teleportation is indistinguishable from destroying the original when creating a copy!
So yes, a perfect copy of your brain
would produce the same you. There would now be two same yous, and we could tell them apart from each other, but neither would be
THE same you. They would each be
A same you. They would both be
as much the same you as each other.
ETA: anyway, isn't all this arguing about whether it would be the "same you" just to try to get to infinity? When you
just admitted that you don't
need to get to infinity for your proof? Just
forget about infinity and
present your proof of immortality!