Proof of Immortality II

[jond]

Jabba - all you are saying is wrong.

Leg lifting is a process carried out by a material thing. The self is a process carried out by a material thing.

You want badly for the self to be a thing, but it isn't. It's just a process - like going 65 mph, running, becoming beer, or anything else.

For so long as you try to treat the self as a thing, rather than as a process, you will not be talking about the scientific model. You will also not be making an argument as to why science should see the self as a thing because you present no evidence. There is evidence that the self is a process. Without evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to abandon our default position.

So, either present evidence or accept that the logical outcome of the evidence we have is not consistent with your desires.

Yes, and re: beer (drool). No doubt Jabba pictures a nice can of Tetley's and says, "see it's a thing!" But the flavor of the beer is a process just like consciousness, as indeed is the process of getting to the canning stage, and the process of sitting in the can, the process of being opened, poured into a pint glass, aerating. Then as it is quaffed, the flavor tickles the palate, changes slightly, but perceptibly as it lingers. And then there's the second sip. Is it the same as the first sip? Scientific testing must be done, and I am just the person to undertake this experiment!

 

[JoeMorgue]

Jabba - all you are saying is wrong.

(Respectful snip)

You want badly for the self to be a thing, but it isn't. It's just a process - like going 65 mph, running, becoming beer, or anything else.

You have to understand Jabba doesn't want conciousness to be a thing and not a process. He deeply, strongly needs it to be thing not a process.

As long as conciousness is a thing then it needs a process and that process can be Woo. And that Woo allows Jabba to continue in his delusion that the thing can continue after its process ends.

If conciousness is the process then there is no place to put the Woo. There's no Gap to fill in with Woo. And he needs the Woo. Otherwise he'd have to face his own mortality and it's obvious he is simply incapable of doing so.

 

[pakeha]

[ . . .] All I’m saying is that while leg lifts are part of running, and SELVES are part of consciousness, they are not analogous to each other in this context. They are not “just as” each other re our discussion.

Indeed they are, Jabba.
Both are emergent properties, rather than things.

- And other than that, by accepting that there are two kinds of differences possible – features and identities – and that replica leg lifts and selves would differ in regard to their relationships with those, I think that you’re actually accepting that as parts of running and consciousness, leg lifting and selves are not alike – or, analogous. [ . . .]

Quite the contrary, Jabba, as you'll understand once you've grasped why the sense of self isn't a thing, bu rather an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem.

 

[Hokulele]

- No, you’re right, it is not a difficult concept. All I’m saying is that while leg lifts are part of running, and SELVES are part of consciousness, they are not analogous to each other in this context. They are not “just as” each other re our discussion.
- And other than that, by accepting that there are two kinds of differences possible – features and identities – and that replica leg lifts and selves would differ in regard to their relationships with those, I think that you’re actually accepting that as parts of running and consciousness, leg lifting and selves are not alike – or, analogous.
- So, it seems to me that you are actually being inconsistent when you assert

No.

 

[xtifr]

- No, you’re right, it is not a difficult concept. All I’m saying is that while leg lifts are part of running, and SELVES are part of consciousness, they are not analogous to each other in this context. They are not “just as” each other re our discussion.

You need evidence to support this assertion. That's not what I believe, and I know of no evidence to support the assertion. As far as I can tell, they are "just as" each other.

- And other than that, by accepting that there are two kinds of differences possible – features and identities – and that replica leg lifts and selves would differ in regard to their relationships with those, I think that you’re actually accepting that as parts of running and consciousness, leg lifting and selves are not alike – or, analogous.

Highlighted the part I don't accept. The second self has a different identity (it is a distinct and discrete process), but no differing features (it is isomorphic), just as the leg lift has a different identity, but no differing features. They are perfectly analogous as far as I can see.

If you want me to accept that there's a third type of difference, other than a lack of identity or a lack of isomophism, which only applies to a sense of self, you're going to have to prove it. Because it sounds like utter nonsense to me. And you need a third type, because the two types we've identified already (identity and features) both work the same way with respect to leg-lifting and the self.

Remember (again), teleportation is indistinguishable from destroying the original when you create the copy. That's because there is nothing unique about the original. Nothing at all. It's almost meaningless to talk about the difference between the copy and the original, because they're both you. If they were swapped at the moment of copying, the results would be no different. The one that was found at the original location can be considered the original, but that's more-or-less an arbitrary labeling. Each has a sense of self, each feels like and appears to be the original (if we ignore location), both objectively and subjectively. The only difference, between body, brain, consciousness and self, is that they're distinct, discrete, and don't share physical/mathematical identity. There's two.

- So, it seems to me that you are actually being inconsistent when you assert

No, I'm being perfectly consistent. The only inconsistency I see here is your claim that selves have a different kind of difference from leg-lifting. If I accepted your claim that self has a special property that makes it not work the same way leg-lifting does, then I would be being inconsistent, but I don't accept that.

One more time: teleportation is indistinguishable from destroying the original when creating the copy. Seriously think about that, Jabba!

 

[Slowvehicle]

Yes, and re: beer (drool). No doubt Jabba pictures a nice can of Tetley's and says, "see it's a thing!" But the flavor of the beer is a process just like consciousness, as indeed is the process of getting to the canning stage, and the process of sitting in the can, the process of being opened, poured into a pint glass, aerating. Then as it is quaffed, the flavor tickles the palate, changes slightly, but perceptibly as it lingers. And then there's the second sip. Is it the same as the first sip? Scientific testing must be done, and I am just the person to undertake this experiment!

Get in line...

 

[Filippo Lippi]

You lost me at "can"

 

[jond]

You lost me at "can"

At the risk of a derail, here in these parts Tetley's is packaged in the Guiness designed lined cans with a nitro widget. And he saw that it was good...

 

[Akhenaten]

Though,

- Anyway,

- As would the leg lifts.

No.

- No, you’re right, it is not a difficult concept. All I’m saying is that while leg lifts are part of running, and SELVES are part of consciousness, they are not analogous to each other in this context. They are not “just as” each other re our discussion.

What discussion?

- And other than that, by accepting that there are two kinds of differences possible – features and identities – and that replica leg lifts and selves would differ in regard to their relationships with those, I think that you’re actually accepting that as parts of running and consciousness, leg lifting and selves are not alike – or, analogous.

Gibberish.

- So, it seems to me that you are actually being inconsistent when you assert

 

[John Jones]

Jabba Let me give you an example of emergent process.

Here is conway game of life : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway's_Game_of_Life

[...]

This is fascinating. Thanks for the link.

 

[SusanB-M1]

May I just pop in here, please, to ask if anyone knows whether 'An Atheist Afterlife' by David Storm has been discussed anywhere? Thanks.

 

[John Jones]

May I just pop in here, please, to ask if anyone knows whether 'An Atheist Afterlife' by David Storm has been discussed anywhere? Thanks.

Not that I recall, and I've been watching for nearly 2 years.

 

[Akhenaten]

May I just pop in here, please, to ask if anyone knows whether 'An Atheist Afterlife' by David Storm has been discussed anywhere? Thanks.

Hopefully it will be now. If ever a breath of fresh air was needed, this is the place for it.

 

[Jabba]

- I'm going to leave the numbering in, as it's helpful to me. Please just ignore the numbers.

363

- Try this for the scientific model.
1. There is a general physical situation (formula/recipe/prescription) that, somehow, results in what we call consciousness.
2. Each new consciousness brings with it – or, takes on -- a new, particular, sense of self (hereafter, referred to as simply a new, particular "self)".

391

…Not "brings with it" or "takes on". The self is a part of consciousness. Just as leg-lifting is part of running…

401

- I don't think that I have a problem with that. I would include being a part of consciousness under "Each new consciousness brings with it."
- I'll try to get to "Just as leg-lifting is part of running." in my next dispatch to you. I need further thought on that.

509

…Two identical things are different from each other because they're not the same thing. Two is different from one.
Not being the same is always and invariably the only direct cause of two different things being different.
Yes there is, and it's a simple one: the brains are different. They're not the same brain, so they're different brains, so they produce different SELVES.
This is really not a difficult concept.

554

- No, you’re right, it is not a difficult concept. All I’m saying is that while leg lifts are part of running, and SELVES are part of consciousness, they are not analogous to each other in this context. They are not “just as” each other re our discussion.
- And other than that, by accepting that there are two kinds of differences possible – features and identities – and that replica leg lifts and selves would differ in regard to their relationships with those, I think that you’re actually accepting that as parts of running and consciousness, leg lifting and selves are not alike – or, analogous.
- So, it seems to me that you are actually being inconsistent when you assert

565

You need evidence to support this assertion. That's not what I believe, and I know of no evidence to support the assertion. As far as I can tell, they are "just as" each other.

xt,
- Going back a few pages, I thought that you were accepting that there is a way in which SELVES and leg lifts relate differently to consciousness and to running (respectively). See hi-lighted below.

D317-335

- The observers (selves) would have different SELVES. They could be identical except for their SELVES. The batches of brown ale would be totally identical.

335-338

You're confusing two different meanings of "different" here. Different as in not sharing identity vs. different as in not having the same features.The SELVES are distinct, but have the same features. The beers are distinct, but have the same features. There is no difference in the way they're different from each other. Each is distinct, but isomorphic (to throw in some random technical jargon). The SELF is just as much "totally identical" as the beer, and just as much not "totally identical", depending on whether you're referring to identity or form.

- Now, I see that I had misread (misunderstood) your point. I was thinking that you were being inconsistent even in that one paragraph...
- I was thinking that in that one sentence you were admitting that the beer's relationship with "identity" was different than consciousness' relationship with identity.- Now, I see that I had misread (misunderstood) your point. I was thinking that you were being inconsistent both within and between each of the two paragraphs...
- I was thinking that in those two sentences you were admitting that the beer's relationship to "identity" was different than consciousness' relationship to "identity," rather than both beer and consciousness had different relationships to "features" than they did with "identity." (Though, I'm still not sure that we're talking about the same "identity"...)

- I think I'll leave it at that rather than try to explain my misunderstanding. (That could take another two weeks...)
- For now, I'm thinking that we just disagree about the relationships that beer and consciousness have to identity. I think that they're different; you think that they're the same.
- I'll be back.

 

[Akhenaten]

- I'm going to leave the numbering in, as it's helpful to me.

Judging by the results it seems to be about as helpful as a cow upstairs.

Since you have nothing else to add to the discussion, why don't you share with us the way in which this numbering is more helpful to you than the Forum's built-in post linking function?

Please just ignore the numbers.

Yes, perhaps that would be for the best.

Let's concentrate instead on the evidence in support of your claim of the existence of immortal souls.

- I'll be back.

Why?

Srsly. What in the name of Isis are you hoping to achieve?

 

[Akhenaten]

D317-335

335-338
- Now, I see that I had misread (misunderstood) your point. I was thinking that you were being inconsistent even in that one paragraph...
- I was thinking that in that one sentence you were admitting that the beer's relationship with "identity" was different than consciousness' relationship with identity.- Now, I see that I had misread (misunderstood) your point. I was thinking that you were being inconsistent both within and between each of the two paragraphs...
- I was thinking that in those two sentences you were admitting that the beer's relationship to "identity" was different than consciousness' relationship to "identity," rather than both beer and consciousness had different relationships to "features" than they did with "identity." (Though, I'm still not sure that we're talking about the same "identity"...)

You actually think this gibberish makes sense, don't you?

How tragic (comical).

- I think I'll leave it at that rather than try to explain my misunderstanding. (That could take another two weeks...)

You'll never (not ever) be able to explain your misunderstanding (discombobulation) because you can't (won't) deal with its ramifications (implications).

- For now, I'm thinking that we just disagree about the relationships that beer and consciousness have to identity. I think that they're different; you think that they're the same.

If that's what you're thinking then all hope is lost.

". . . the relationships that beer and consciousness have to identity . . ."


Really??? (Srsly???)

 

[Loss Leader]

- For now, I'm thinking that we just disagree about the relationships that beer and consciousness have to identity. I think that they're different; you think that they're the same.
- I'll be back.

We could grant you all o our disagreements and it wouldn't matter one bit. None of your nattering about consciousness and identity has anything whatsoever to do with infinity. You can't get there from here.

 

[Agatha]

Jabba, are you reading any posts other than those by xtifr and godless dave?

It's simply not worth anyone else responding unless you are prepared to widen the discussion to at least a few more people participating in this thread, and it's really uncivil of you to ignore so many people/posts.

Some things are really hard to understand, but the fact that two identical things are separate but identical should not be one of them.

However, given that it is not possible to create an identical copy of a person, and given that this thought experiment has been picked over and discussed for weeks while getting absolutely nowhere, do you think you could get on with showing some evidence for immortality?

 

[godless dave]

Some things are really hard to understand, but the fact that two identical things are separate but identical should not be one of them.

Worth repeating, in a separate but identical post.

 

[John Jones]

-

Did you have something to say that hasn't been said after two years?