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Proof of Immortality II

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- The observers (selves) would have different SELVES. They could be identical except for their SELVES. The batches of brown ale would be totally identical.

You're confusing two different meanings of "different" here. Different as in not sharing identity vs. different as in not having the same features.
The SELVES are distinct, but have the same features. The beers are distinct, but have the same features. There is no difference in the way they're different from each other. Each is distinct, but isomorphic (to throw in some random technical jargon). The SELF is just as much "totally identical" as the beer, and just as much not "totally identical", depending on whether you're referring to identity or form.

- (This is still the leg-lifting issue -- I just needed to back up a space or two.)

- But science requires a cause for any difference -- whether the difference is in what you're calling identity or in what you're calling form.
- Unfortunately, I'm not sure of what it is that you're calling "identity," and what it is that you're calling "form."
 
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- But science requires a cause for any difference -- whether the difference is in what you're calling identity or in what you're calling form.

Yes.

For example, if you have two identical brains, what is the cause for the difference in their locations?
 
Yes.

For example, if you have two identical brains, what is the cause for the difference in their locations?
Dave,
- I don't think you said what you meant to say. My response to what you did say is that any causes for the different locations are irrelevant.
- I think that you mean to say that a difference in location is the causal difference for different SELVES (in our replica 'experiment').
 
Dave,
- I don't think you said what you meant to say. My response to what you did say is that any causes for the different locations are irrelevant.

The question I asked is what I meant to ask.

If the causes for different locations of brains are irrelevant, then why are the causes of different locations of SELVES relevant? Remember, in the scientific model, SELVES come from brains, and the only difference between two identical SELVES would be location.
 
- (This is still the leg-lifting issue -- I just needed to back up a space or two.)

- But science requires a cause for any difference -- whether the difference is in what you're calling identity or in what you're calling form.
- Unfortunately, I'm not sure of what it is that you're calling "identity," and what it is that you're calling "form."

Strange statement of the need for a cause for a difference for someone claiming to to be trained in statistics... Why does one coin land on Heads when flipped and on Tails the next time?

Anyway: fortunately the "difference" we are discussing here does has a cause: one brain/consciousness/sense of self is in one spatial location and the other brain/consciousness/sense of self is in another spatial location. (Also, they are made of of different, although indistinguishable atoms and molecules;but you don't have to worry about the second point). Exactly physically duplicated people have exactly duplicated brains/consciousnesses/senses of self. They identify themselves the same way (if we duplicated Jabba, each would correctly identify themselves as Jabba). If we lost track of which Jabba was in which location, we could not tell them apart.

But this has been explained to you many times here better than I can. Read it! But if you chose to ignore these posts, then why are you asking question? If you read them, you might understand them and make a statement that is correct. But for now, you are wrong.
 
Dave,
- I don't think you said what you meant to say. My response to what you did say is that any causes for the different locations are irrelevant.
- I think that you mean to say that a difference in location is the causal difference for different SELVES (in our replica 'experiment').

Still at it, huh? Not only do we not understand you, but if we state something you disagree with, we must of said it wrong. Maybe you should ignore everyone on this thread except your own posts; at least you have a better chance of them agreeing with you. But from what I've read, I doubt even that.
 
The question I asked is what I meant to ask.

If the causes for different locations of brains are irrelevant, then why are the causes of different locations of SELVES relevant?
- We aren't looking for the causes of the locations. I would assume that it doesn't matter how the original and the replica got to where they were upon inception -- what matters is that where they were were different (in your model).
Remember, in the scientific model, SELVES come from brains, and the only difference between two identical SELVES would be location.
- I think that is what you should have said the first time.
 
- (This is still the leg-lifting issue -- I just needed to back up a space or two.)

- But science requires a cause for any difference -- whether the difference is in what you're calling identity or in what you're calling form.
- Unfortunately, I'm not sure of what it is that you're calling "identity," and what it is that you're calling "form."

Dave,
- I don't think you said what you meant to say. My response to what you did say is that any causes for the different locations are irrelevant.
- I think that you mean to say that a difference in location is the causal difference for different SELVES (in our replica 'experiment').

Jabba, have you lost track of how self, or more correctly, a sense of self is defined?
Hint: emergent property
 
- We aren't looking for the causes of the locations. I would assume that it doesn't matter how the original and the replica got to where they were upon inception -- what matters is that where they were were different (in your model).

That's what my question was addressing. You said every difference has a cause.

- I think that is what you should have said the first time.

I've been saying it for as long as we've been discussing this "duplicate human" thought experiment.

That's the scientific model, after all.
 
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- (This is still the leg-lifting issue -- I just needed to back up a space or two.)


You'll still have to do the leg lifting thing. Just try to remember that the lifted leg has to be moved rearwards before putting it back on the ground and the muscles of the other leg need to be flexed such as to shift your weight in the same direction.



- But science requires a cause for any difference -- whether the difference is in what you're calling identity or in what you're calling form.


Science does. Jabbanetics™ not so much.

Are you really so ignorant of your own claims as to not realise that the difference YOU are claiming is based on nothing more than a personal belief in immortal souls?



- Unfortunately, I'm not sure of what it is that you're calling "identity," and what it is that you're calling "form."


Does it inform you in any way at all that YOU are the only one suffering from this lack of comprehension?
 
- We aren't looking for the causes of the locations. I would assume that it doesn't matter how the original and the replica got to where they were upon inception


Of course it matters. How they got there is part of the "recipe" that you say cannot be individualized. In fact, every single moment before now is part of the recipe that got me to this point. Ignoring the cause is ignoring the difference.
 
Loss Leader is right. The events that led to something existing are essential to calculating the likelihood of that thing existing.
 
- We aren't looking for the causes of the locations. I would assume that it doesn't matter how the original and the replica got to where they were upon inception -- what matters is that where they were were different (in your model).
- I think that is what you should have said the first time.

That is how they are different.

What do you think I should have said, having said what I didn't mean?
 
The question I asked is what I meant to ask.

If the causes for different locations of brains are irrelevant, then why are the causes of different locations of SELVES relevant?


- We aren't looking for the causes of the locations.


That's probably because this whole stupid sidebar argument is based upon the impossibly silly hypothetical that identical brains are a thing.



I would assume that it doesn't matter how the original and the replica got to where they were upon inception -


And I assume that your assertion that this doesn't matter is a product of nothing more than your complete lack of an ability to explain where these hypothetical replicas come from.



- what matters is that where they were were different (in your model).


It's not Dave's model, Jabba. It's observable reality.



Remember, in the scientific model, SELVES come from brains, and the only difference between two identical SELVES would be location.


- I think that is what you should have said the first time.


He did.

Further, given that YOU are the only one here who hasn't bothered to follow most of the discussion that's taken place in this misbegotten thread, your effrontery in telling the LCP what he should have said is nothing short of breathtaking.
 
Dave,
- I don't think you said what you meant to say.


Srsly? This is Truly Effective Debate™ in action, is it?


Giggles.jpg
Giggles.jpg
 
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- (This is still the leg-lifting issue -- I just needed to back up a space or two.)

- But science requires a cause for any difference -- whether the difference is in what you're calling identity or in what you're calling form.

Everything needs a cause, but I think it's a bit of a stretch to call a difference a thing. Elephants and squid need causes, but the difference between them just is. A difference isn't even an action!

(Also, as John Jones pointed out, it's somewhat ambiguous to refer to nuclear decay or certain quantum effects as having a cause. But I don't think any physicists would say that quantum randomness is a causality violation.)

- Unfortunately, I'm not sure of what it is that you're calling "identity," and what it is that you're calling "form."

Identity in the mathematical sense (not the psychological). Two atoms of carbon 12 with all electrons in the ground state are identical and indistinguishable, but distinct. They have the same form, but do not share identity. They're separate atoms.
 
[...]
- I think that is what you should have said the first time.

What I think you should have said the first time is that you have no valid evidence of immortality or souls, and just really, really, want to believe in an afterlife.

I think that is what you should have said the first time.
 
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