Proof of Immortality II

[pakeha]

[ . . . ]- I should have just said that there is no complete bio-chemical recipe (formula, prescription) for a particular SELF. [ . . . ]

Jabba, why do you think a self is a product, when we all know the sense of self is a process, that of a functioning neurosystem?

 

[Filippo Lippi]

Because it is necessary to Jabba's agument that they can't.

Yes, an "aguement" is precisely what Jabba is presenting

 

[Jabba]

The two selves would have different observers (SELVES). In that sense, they would not be identical. Each self would have its own SELF.

And the two batches of ale would have different bottles. In that sense, each batch would not be identical.
And each batch would have its own set of bottles.

xt,
- I think the answer is that each new batch of consciousness automatically, intrinsically, inherently takes on, or brings with it, a particular SELF. Such is not the case for batches of ale. The two identical batches of ale would be independent of their containers (and the containers independent of their particular batches), and totally identical.

 

[John Jones]

Got any essential proof of immortality yet?

 

[jond]

Obviously I don't agree, but that's not quite his argument. It's a little more nuanced than that.

1. The scientific model should include* a non-physical component of consciousness, but suggests that that non-physical component goes away at death.
2. A non-physical component that goes away at death is infinitely improbable.
3. Therefore the scientific model is wrong and immortality is the only conceivable alternative.

He's trying to get us to agree to 1, which does not include life after death, so that he can then triumphantly point out the supposed contradiction. The problem he's having is that we don't agree with 1.

(At least, I don't.)

* "should include" is the exact claim he made at one point, though I'm too lazy to hunt it down.



Which central issue?

There's so many weak links in his chain of reasoning that it's really hard to point to just one and say "there's the flaw." All three of the points I mentioned above are required elements of his argument, so all three could be described as central.

So far, we're stuck on 1, but 3 may be a bigger problem overall. And he doesn't even seem to recognize that 2 doesn't necessarily follow from 1, which is another pretty major problem.

Sorry, meant to type "THIS" central issue. Thought it was clear that I was talking about the self not being a thing and that this was something I and many others have been trying to get him to address. Anyway, I'm traveling and short snippets on iPads don't make for great communication.

 

[Aepervius]

Got any essential proof of immortality yet?

No. Actually IMHO it is now worst : we used to be the second of February at a random time, but now we are stuck at the scene where the clock switch from 05:59 to 06:00.

"Then put your little hand in mine
There ain't no hill or mountain we can't climb

Babe
got you babe
I got you babe"

 

[Mojo]

I think the answer is that each new batch of consciousness automatically, intrinsically, inherently takes on, or brings with it, a particular SELF.

If that is the case, then far from the SELF surviving death, it doesn't even survive unconsciousness or sleep, since the new batch of consciousness you produce when you wake up would automatically, intrinsically, inherently bring with it a new SELF.

 

[Giordano]

xt,
- I think the answer is that each new batch of consciousness automatically, intrinsically, inherently takes on, or brings with it, a particular SELF. Such is not the case for batches of ale. The two identical batches of ale would be independent of their containers (and the containers independent of their particular batches), and totally identical.

Wrong. Just read the other posts here if you want to know why.

By the way: since you have argued there is no "pool" of "selfs" in your model of reincarnation, is the "self" you postulate transferred from someone who dies at exactly the same moment someone else is born? Or at the moment of conception? Is there any "slop" in time? How is your previously stated cosmic consciousness different from such a pool? Does your model even address such questions?

 

[abaddon]

Wrong. Just read the other posts here if you want to know why.

By the way: since you have argued there is no "pool" of "selfs" in your model of reincarnation, is the "self" you postulate transferred from someone who dies at exactly the same moment someone else is born? Or at the moment of conception? Is there any "slop" in time? How is your previously stated cosmic consciousness different from such a pool? Does your model even address such questions?

At this point, I cannot tell if Jabba is arguing for or against a "pool of selves".

 

[John Jones]

At this point, I cannot tell if Jabba is arguing for or against a "pool of selves".

I'm not convinced he can tell either.

I'm just here to see how this plays out, and perhaps to help edify Jabba's invisible audience of lurking supporters -- if any such creatures exist.

 

[tsig]

I could probably explain well enough that someone who already understands the implication would be able to follow the explanation. However, doing so would only give rise to false Texas sharpshooter charges. So I'll pass on the wonderful opportunity.

However, if at any time I should think of an empirical experiment which would demonstrate the principle using something simple like dice, I'll be sure to describe the experiment. But I'm not going to give myself a headache trying to design one.

I'm sure the experiment would involve a bull eating lots of hay then coming back later to see what happened to the hay.

 

[Loss Leader]

xt,
- I think the answer is that each new batch of consciousness automatically, intrinsically, inherently takes on, or brings with it, a particular SELF. Such is not the case for batches of ale. The two identical batches of ale would be independent of their containers (and the containers independent of their particular batches), and totally identical.

And yet here is a link that says a beer's container is very important to the finished product. So, not only are you wrong about metaphysics, you're wrong about how beer is made.

In any case, the "container" isn't the analog of the physical body here, it's the ingredients that are being compared to the body. The ingredients, when put together,are beer. The body, when correctly assembled, is sentient.

And I don't even drink.

 

[John Jones]

I could probably explain well enough [...but...] I'll pass on the wonderful opportunity.[...]

That's really the only argument or position I have seen you post here, but I don't put your posts at the top of my must-read list.

Have a nice long, pleasant weekend if you're in the USA.

 

[xtifr]

xt,
- I think the answer is that each new batch of consciousness automatically, intrinsically, inherently takes on, or brings with it, a particular SELF. Such is not the case for batches of ale. The two identical batches of ale would be independent of their containers (and the containers independent of their particular batches), and totally identical.

Yes, it's true that bottles aren't an ongoing process like the SELF. Which is why I used running for my analogy. Cases of ale was Dave's. But it really doesn't matter. The only difference between the SELVES is that they're separate instances. There's no magical element of a SELF that makes it not a property of a specific, individual brain. Cases with bottles is a perfectly reasonable analogy, even if running is better.

(And don't think I didn't notice how you leapt on cases of ale because you thought you could distinguish it, and completely ignored running.)

You keep trying to retreat to biochemical "recipe" and ignore physics. I thought we'd covered that already. One SELF per brain. One running per legs. One heartbeat per heart. The copy has a separate heartbeat--does that mean the heartbeat is non-physical?

Consciousness is a process. SELF is a part of that process, not something separate on its own. You experience things because neurons fire in your brain. Self-awareness is a truly amazing piece of software--speaking as a software developer, I'm in awe of it--but it's just software, and needs hardware to run on. It can't exist separate from a medium any more than words can.

 

[Jabba]

What sense is that? Why can't two observers be identical?

- The observers (selves) would have different SELVES. They could be identical except for their SELVES. The batches of brown ale would be totally identical.

 

[Akhenaten]

What sense is that? Why can't two observers be identical?

- The observers (selves) would have different SELVES.

Do YOU really think you're explaining anything here? If I look up SELF in the dictionary am I going to find a completely different definition from the one that's given for self?

They could be identical except for their SELVES.

And this could make sense if only it made SENSE.

The batches of brown ale would be totally identical.

Not if one batch was brown and the other batch was BROWN.

 

[Akhenaten]

Dave,

- Unfortunately, you're right...

Therefore you will ignore what he's said and proceed as though he'd actually SAID something else.

- But at the same time, I think you've revealed just where it is that we've been passing in the night. Per usual, the particular wording is crucial...

More particularly, your use of YOUR own personal definitions for words is crucial.

- I probably never should have used the term “exclusive.”

Or selves, observers, identitities, same, replica, immortal, prior representation, recipe or entity.

- I should have just said that there is no complete bio-chemical recipe (formula, prescription) for a particular SELF.

The only thing that enables you to say such a thing is that when you use SELF in this way, what you really mean is SOUL and in saying that there's no recipe for such a thing you are, for once, entirely correct.

- A perfect biochemical replica of a particular "batch of brown ale" would be totally identical to its predecessor.

The only thing that enables you to say this is lack of belief that beer has a soul. Many (including myself) would argue this point, but for the purpose of the discussion I'll cede that you've probably got this right as well.

We're on a roll here.

Such, however, would not be the case with a perfect biochemical replica of a "self."

That didn't last long.

The two selves would have different observers (SELVES).

That's pretty much gibberish. Instead of trying to claim that selves are different to SELVES why don't you just write SOULS.

You'd still be wrong, but at least you'd get a point for being honest.

In that sense, they would not be identical.

Except that it doesn't make sense.

Each self would have its own SELF.

And while no one could tell -- from watching them -- which entity was which, anyone watching them could tell that they were not just one SELF, observing through both sets of senses and controlling both bodies.

Whether you could tell them apart is irrelevant. The important thing is that you could most definitely tell that there are two of them.

- IOW, there would be an aspect of the new self that is not identical to that aspect in the old self.

This is merely a repetition of your original (albeit surreptitious) claim that people have souls. It remains, as always, a bare assertion.

There would be no such aspect in the two batches of brown ale.

How do you know this?

How do you know that it's only people that have SELVES souls? What about frogs? Marigolds? Bacteria? Fossils?

That’s how they differ.

The only reason they differ, according to the evidence that you've presented, is that you assert that they do.

 

[xtifr]

- The observers (selves) would have different SELVES. They could be identical except for their SELVES. The batches of brown ale would be totally identical.

You're confusing two different meanings of "different" here. Different as in not sharing identity vs. different as in not having the same features.

The SELVES are distinct, but have the same features. The beers are distinct, but have the same features. There is no difference in the way they're different from each other. Each is distinct, but isomorphic (to throw in some random technical jargon). The SELF is just as much "totally identical" as the beer, and just as much not "totally identical", depending on whether you're referring to identity or form.

 

[Giordano]

- The observers (selves) would have different SELVES. They could be identical except for their SELVES. The batches of brown ale would be totally identical.

I honestly thought you got this point, but apparently not. Two perfectly duplicated batches of brown ale, would be different even if they were somehow perfectly duplicated, because they would not be the same object; they would be two objects. One can drink the first and still have the second batch. Duplicates, but not identical. No metaphysical self involved.

Same idea for observers. Two perfectly duplicated observers would be different, even if they were somehow perfectly duplicated, because they are would not be the same object; they would be two objects. One might die and the other could live, Duplicates, but not identical. No metaphysical self involved.

Maybe xtifr's explanation might help...

 

[godless dave]

- The observers (selves) would have different SELVES. They could be identical except for their SELVES. The batches of brown ale would be totally identical.

I thought observer was a synonym for SELF.

Why can't two SELVES be identical?