[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Giordano]

Replicating my brain chemistry would not bring the same me back to life.

Please at least get this much right: replicating your brain chemistry will not bring you back to life because, as your question implies, you would be dead at the time. Replicating your brain chemistry at that moment would only make a duplicate dead person that looks like Jabba.

Replicating your brain chemistry when you were alive would make a duplicate live person named Jabba who is indistinguishably you (except for location or clothes or unique marks, like a "Duplicate" scrawled across your forehead in Magicmarker by the experimenter to help keep track). The duplicate would have your sense of self, your memories, and think like you, completely.

 

[Monza]

Jabba, a copy of anything is just that, a copy; a distinct, separate, identical object. This can be done with anything, so what is so special about applying it to you (or your PSoS, consciousness, self, whatever)?

If you, or any distinct object, is destroyed then that particular object can never be brought back. Copies can exist such that no one can tell the difference. I am currently sitting at my desk and staring at a pad of Post-It^TM notes. If I tear off the top note and burn it, it is gone forever. Look, there are copies. But that distinct original object is no more. It didn't exist prior to its existence and it will never exist again. Does that make it immortal or special?

 

[godless dave]

Jabba, it seems like the thing that has a 1/∞ chance of coming into existence is something the scientific model doesn't include.

In the scientific model, the likelihood of someone's consciousness existing is identical to the likelihood of their body existing.

 

[pakeha]

Originally Posted by Jabba
- This raises a possibly ineffable question… The specialness that I’m claiming, and to which I’m alluding, is (that) consciousness provides an “identity” for the specific object that produces it; an identity that would distinguish that object from any other -- otherwise chemically identical -- object. [ . . . ].

No, Jabba.
Remember how consciousness is defined?
There is no identity, only a sense of self, which in turn is an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem.

 

[doronshadmi]

The duplicate would have your sense of self, your memories, and think like you, completely.

Only if space\time changes completely stop immediately after the duplication.

As space\time changes continue, each clone has its own unique development, unique history, unique points of view etc., which happen inside\outside each clone, such that they can't be considered anymore as completely the same thing.

 

[Garrette]

Only if space\time changes completely stop immediately after the duplication.

As space\time changes continue, each clone has its own unique development, unique history, unique points of view etc., which happen inside\outside each clone, such that they can't be considered anymore as completely the same thing.

Very true, but repeatedly pointed out. Whether Jabba has read such pointing out or understood them is anybody's guess.

 

[Humots]

Derail removed to AAH. doronshadmi, you already have at least one thread in which to discuss your claims, this thread is for discussion of Jabba's claims.

Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic  Posted By: Cuddles

Dodged a bullet. Whew!

 

[Giordano]

Only if space\time changes completely stop immediately after the duplication.

As space\time changes continue, each clone has its own unique development, unique history, unique points of view etc., which happen inside\outside each clone, such that they can't be considered anymore as completely the same thing.

Have you bothered to read this thread? I have repeatedly noted in this thread that changes in experience would change the "sense of self" or whatever word Jabba has chosen to use that day. I have also mentioned in this thread that random choices in development would also diverge the two brains after time zero. I am not the only poster who has pointed that out. So clearly the duplicate and the original will only be exactly identical at time zero, the time of replication. But thanks for emphasizing those points for any who might have forgot them.

 

[abaddon]

Only if space\time changes completely stop immediately after the duplication.

As space\time changes continue, each clone has its own unique development, unique history, unique points of view etc., which happen inside\outside each clone, such that they can't be considered anymore as completely the same thing.

Super. In 186 pages, Jabba has failed to even read such posts. He will not reply to you any more than he replies to anyone else who has posted the very same.

Good luck.

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- I think that we have agreed that the sci model would accept the possibility of creating identical MEs but not the same MEs. That’s the issue I was trying to deal with above.
- If I’m correct about that, then there is no chemical definition exclusive to the “same me” – and, replicating my brain chemistry would produce an identical me, but not a (the) same me. Replicating my brain chemistry would not bring the same me back to life.
- I assume that the above will not clear things up, but one can always hope.

That doesn't clear anything up. It is trivially obvious that if you duplicate something, you are not recreating the original. I can make multiple identical loaves of banana bread but I can't make the same loaf twice.
Do you have any evidence to support the claim that:

- OK. It appears that part of my problem is that I’ve been trying to ‘prove’ a fact that you guys have been accepting as trivially obvious all along…
- What I need to prove instead is what I perceive to be the elementary deduction stemming from that fact.
- But first, I need to come up with a couple of better terms for an identical me versus the same me. How about a “me” versus the “ME.” You guys claim that it is space/time coordinates that complete the “definition” for ME – or at least, that’s one way of putting it…
- How’s that?

 

[godless dave]

How about just using "identical me" and "same me".

 

[Akhenaten]

- OK. It appears that part of my problem is that I’ve been trying to ‘prove’ a fact that you guys have been accepting as trivially obvious all along…

No, you've been trying to prove immortality.

- What I NEED to prove instead is what I perceive to be the elementary deduction stemming from that fact.

At this stage it would be a boon if you could just prove that you have some idea of the topic.

- But first, I need to come up with a couple of better terms for an IDENTICAL ME versus THE SAME ME. How about a “me” versus the “ME.”

How about "identical me" and "same me".

KISS

You guys claim that it is space/time coordinates that complete the “definition” for ME – or at least, that’s one way of putting it…
- How’s that?

As meaningless as ever.

 

[Filippo Lippi]

How about some evidence?

 

[Slowvehicle]

- OK. It appears that part of my problem is that I’ve been trying to ‘prove’ a fact that you guys have been accepting as trivially obvious all along…
- What I need to prove instead is what I perceive to be the elementary deduction stemming from that fact.
- But first, I need to come up with a couple of better terms for an identical me versus the same me. How about a “me” versus the “ME.” You guys claim that it is space/time coordinates that complete the “definition” for ME – or at least, that’s one way of putting it…
- How’s that?

Good Morning, Mr. Savage!

"That" is pointlessly abtruse and baroque.

It also misses the point that, IF you_ב and you_א were, in fact, actually identical, there would be no way to distinguish them, making any set of labels arbitrary. IF some marker or distinguishant were added to the mix, the two would no longer be identical.

How is this getting us any closer to "essentially" "proving" "immortality"?

 

[Jabba]

How about just using "identical me" and "same me".

- OK.

 

[Akhenaten]

- OK.

Excellent. Now that we've got that cleared up you can finally get on with posting your evidence of immortal souls.

 

[Jabba]

- OK. If an identical brain would not result in ME (or, the same me), there is no chemical definition exclusive to ME (or, the same me).

 

[jond]

- OK. If an identical brain would not result in ME (or, the same me), there is no chemical definition exclusive to ME (or, the same me).

Why do you keep ignoring the fact that ME is not an actual thing?

 

[jsfisher]

- OK. If an identical brain would not result in ME (or, the same me), there is no chemical definition exclusive to ME (or, the same me).

I think this needs to be challenged, since it is all vague and unclear what "me" means as the term is being used.

You and an identical replica of you: How do we distinguish which is which?

 

[godless dave]

- OK. If an identical brain would not result in ME (or, the same me), there is no chemical definition exclusive to ME (or, the same me).

Technically correct, but irrelevant. The very nature of an identical copy is that it is physically, chemically, and biologically identical to the original. That's why the duplicate you would start out exactly the same as the original you, the same personality, same fears, same hopes, same thought patterns. There would be nothing about the original you that is in any way different from the duplicate you.

And I'll repeat just for clarficiation: this thought experiment is not possible in reality. In reality, every human is unique.