[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Mojo]

As we've agreed...

Jabba, you do realise that the duplicate Jabbas that have been discussed in this thread are only hypothetical, don't you?

 

[Garrette]

Jabba, you do realise that the duplicate Jabbas that have been discussed in this thread are only hypothetical, don't you?

 

[Aepervius]

- We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.

No that is YOUR ASSUMPTION. We have been telling you over and (over and over and over)^∞ that the identity/self/personality/memory/whatever attribute and synonym would be the SAME. Putting the copy and you side by side they would get the SAME answer. But if you throw a punch at one, the other one would not feel the pain. And if you cut the throat of one the other would live and not feel anything, but the dying one would DIE.

No, you have been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. Everyone else has been telling you that this assumption is wrong.

That would imply he would need to read the psot we write.

ETA: I think Jabba is using "we" as plural Majestis : he might think he is the god of rethoric or something.

 

[Aepervius]

Jabba, you do realise that the duplicate Jabbas that have been discussed in this thread are only hypothetical, don't you?

I read that after my own ETA. Can we nominate post which have another psoter name in them ?

 

[Akhenaten]

Jabba, you do realise that the duplicate Jabbas that have been discussed in this thread are only hypothetical, don't you?

Mwahahahahahahaha!

Let's see you keep that image out of your nightmares.

 

[Giordano]

Dave,

- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain. For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.
- We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.
- But again -- that doesn’t seem to jive with your claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. My identity must be an aspect of my sense of self, and we both assume that my identity would not return if we were able to perfectly replicate my brain…

Oh too bad, you are back to being very wrong. Apparently you refuse to read the many other posts here that would explain why. Please do.

Well, as pointed out elsewhere, I don't remember other people agreeing with you either that loafs of banana bread are not analogs for brains in the way cited, or that a perfect replica of your brain would not replicate your sense of identity/self. It should be easy for you to cite the posts that acknowledged this agreement: please do so I can refresh my memory.

 

[Slowvehicle]

[qimg]http://www.yvonneclaireadams.com/HostedStuff/PoolOfJabbas.jpg[/qimg]​

Mwahahahahahahaha!

Let's see you keep that image out of your nightmares.

Cruel is the Pharaoh (may he post forever!).

In the absence of Brain Bleach, I shall have to resort to Gin.

 

[Giordano]

If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.

If you read the other posts here, you might have noticed that more than once, people have pointed out that perfectly replicating a dead brain would produce an exact copy, a dead brain. So I assure you that your identity would not return to life if this was done, no matter your philosophy. So you probably would want to duplicate the brain while you are still alive.

But you are really stuck on this duplicating brain story, so you must think it proves that part of you is not physical. A metaphysical, non-physical "self" (or whatever you are flaying around, trying to call it today), But no one here agrees with you. The SM does not agree with you. You are only proving yourself wrong. You probably will just want to move on from this at best hypothetical argument. Explain again, just what is reincarnated?

 

[Agatha]

Cruel is the Pharaoh (may he post forever!).

In the absence of Brain Bleach, I shall have to resort to Gin.

It's a little early, but it's five o'clock somewhere* (h/t Alan Jackson) so I'll join you.

Jabba, despite your claimed agreement, absolutely nobody has agreed with you. What you describe is not the scientific model and this hypothetical discussion about replicating brains or people will go nowhere even if you do address the many rebuttals of your assertions. It's all hypothetical and isn't helping you to explain your views in any case.

Skip to the evidence for souls, or that consciousness can survive the death of the neurosystem. Please.

* as I type this, it's five o'clock in the CEST zone, so France, Belgium, Germany etc.

 

[carlitos]

Mmm, gin.

Also,

Dave,

- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain.

NO! No one else has agreed to this. You are a liar. Stop lying.

 

[Loss Leader]

a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain.

Well, not most brains, in any case.

 

[Monza]

Dave,

- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain. For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.

A loaf of banana bread is analogous to a brain. That's what an analogy is. Dave was using this analogy to make a point which you have clearly missed. Also, I don't see anywhere that Dave or anyone else agreed that this analogy is invalid.

- We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.

What?! Who is we? Everyone here has been saying the exact opposite. You really need to read the replies on this forum. All of the answers are there. A perfect replica of a brain will replicate that identity. This is the definition of replicate. After you die, your brain with your identity will never return to life. But a perfect replica of your brain will have a perfect replica of your identity. This is because consciousness/self/PSoS/identity is an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem. I'm sure someone has mentioned this before.

- But again -- that doesn’t seem to jive with your claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. My identity must be an aspect of my sense of self, and we both assume that my identity would not return if we were able to perfectly replicate my brain…

You are assuming agreement where none exists. Please read the replies carefully as you seem to be putting words into Dave's mouth (keyboard?).

Once again, you are having difficulty with the concept of replication. The thought experiment here involves perfect replicas; identical objects. Two identical objects are identical but separate. There is a difference between a particular object and its separate identical replica. A particular object may be destroyed with the identical object remaining to exist.

 

[godless dave]

I think Jabba is saying that there is some property of his consciousness that identifies it as that particular consciousness, like a VIN on a car. That's just not how it works in the scientific model. The reason my consciousness is "me" is because it is in my body. The reason Jabba's consciousness is "Jabba" is because it is in Jabba's body.

 

[Giordano]

I think Jabba is saying that there is some property of his consciousness that identifies it as that particular consciousness, like a VIN on a car. That's just not how it works in the scientific model. The reason my consciousness is "me" is because it is in my body. The reason Jabba's consciousness is "Jabba" is because it is in Jabba's body.

Hi dave! How are you? You have an awesome responsibility as not-LC-P. It is sort of like being a priest: God talks to you, and you talk to the rest of us. I know you did not seek the position, but like it or not, you appear to have been ordained into it. Do you do intercessory prayers too?

 

[godless dave]

Hi dave! How are you? You have an awesome responsibility as not-LC-P. It is sort of like being a priest: God talks to you, and you talk to the rest of us. I know you did not seek the position, but like it or not, you appear to have been ordained into it. Do you do intercessory prayers too?

Yes, in exchange for a tax-deductible donation of cash or single malt Scotch.

 

[pakeha]

Dave,

- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain. For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.
- We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.
- But again -- that doesn’t seem to jive with your claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. My identity must be an aspect of my sense of self, and we both assume that my identity would not return if we were able to perfectly replicate my brain…

No, Jabba.
"For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” "

Not for some reason, Jabba.
Consciousness is an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem.
A sense of self is part of that emergent property.

 

[Slowvehicle]

No, Jabba.
"For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” "

Not for some reason, Jabba.
Consciousness is an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem.
A sense of self is part of that emergent property.

Are you reading any of this, Mr. Savage?

I implore you--quit this tack, and start with the evidence, eh?

 

[xtifr]

Dave,

- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain. For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference.

Dave doesn't agree:

I haven't agreed to that at all.

And for the record, neither do I. Nor has anyone else that I've noticed.

You seem to have some peculiar notion of what "emergent property" is. It is not some sort of mystical or magical property. It's a perfectly ordinary property that happens to be surprisingly complex. Snowflakes and clouds have emergent properties. So even if I agreed that a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain for the purposes of this discussion, I would still say that a cloud or snowflake is analogous.

Here's a picture of an emergent property (from Wikipedia, created by Craig Lindsay, licensed CC-BY-SA):

Nothing inherent in air or water vapor defines those nice rows, or the sequence of odd bumps that make up the rows. That's an emergent property for ya. A relatively simple one, but an emergent property nonetheless. Now, are you going to claim that that cloud is immortal too?

(And for the record, banana bread probably does have some emergent properties. I can't think of any of the top of my head, but emergent properties are not rare or unusual.)

- We’ve been assuming that a perfect replica of the brain would not replicate that identity. If my brain is perfectly replicated after I die, my identity will not return to life – or, so we assume.

It will and it won't. It's a question of semantics, not a physical difference. The copy is you; it just isn't the same you. There is no mystical inherent property known to science that distinguishes the original from the copy. You're still dead and you're alive again.

And all this still doesn't help you get to infinity, so why are you going on about it? I thought we'd moved past this? Is this the famous "reset" that people have been talking about? Are you going to forget everything that Dave and I have said for the last few months, and pretend we've learned nothing? Or are we having an actual dialog?

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- As we've agreed, a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain. For some reason, the brain has an emergent property of consciousness, and consciousness naturally involves what we call an “identity” – or at least, the illusion of an identity, the illusion of a continuous “self.” A loaf of banana bread does not involve this emergent property. This is what makes the difference…

I haven't agreed to that at all.
Your identity isn't an aspect of your sense of self.

Dave doesn't agree:

And for the record, neither do I. Nor has anyone else that I've noticed.

You seem to have some peculiar notion of what "emergent property" is. It is not some sort of mystical or magical property. It's a perfectly ordinary property that happens to be surprisingly complex. Snowflakes and clouds have emergent properties. So even if I agreed that a loaf of banana bread is not analogous to a brain for the purposes of this discussion, I would still say that a cloud or snowflake is analogous…

xtifr,
- I’m still trying to figure out where we agree, and where we disagree. In this case, you didn’t quite catch what I said.
- I didn’t say that a loaf of banana bread doesn’t involve ANY emergent properties – I said that a loaf of banana bread doesn’t involve THIS emergent property. I said that a loaf of banana bread doesn’t involve consciousness.
- Then, I went on to say that there is something about consciousness that is special. Do you have any objections or reservations so far?

 

[godless dave]

I'm not xtifr, but I have an objection, and it's one I raised before:

- Then, I went on to say that there is something about consciousness that is special. Do you have any objections or reservations so far?

I disagree that consciousness has any special property of identity. The consciousness in my body is me because it's in my body. The consciousness in your body is you because it's in your body.

In nature, each consciousness is unique because it is practically impossible to precisely duplicate every single factor that goes into producing and changing a human brain. That's where the uniqueness comes from.

The identity just comes from existing.