• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

Wesley Clark made case for Iraq war before Congress

To be fair, I didn't see anything in the transcript or the London article that specifically said he was in favor of the war.

He acknowledges that certain actions by Bush and Blair are justifiable, and he agrees with Perle that Saddam is (was) a threat, but I couldn't find anything in the passage that is contradictory to his current stand on the war in Iraq.
 
Phil said:
To be fair, I didn't see anything in the transcript or the London article that specifically said he was in favor of the war.

He acknowledges that certain actions by Bush and Blair are justifiable, and he agrees with Perle that Saddam is (was) a threat, but I couldn't find anything in the passage that is contradictory to his current stand on the war in Iraq.

I'd have to disagree with you, Phil. Clark stated that "I've been very consistent... I've been against this war from the beginning". But if he was always against it, then why did he testify for it? While he doesn't just come out and say that going to war would be a good idea, he strongly implies it in these statements:

"...this is a problem that's longstanding. It's been a decade in the making. It needs to be dealt with and the clock is ticking on this."

"There's no requirement to have any doctrine here. I mean this is simply a longstanding right of the United States and other nations to take the actions they deem necessary in their self defense," Clark told Congress on September 26, 2002.

"Every president has deployed forces as necessary to take action. He's done so without multilateral support if necessary."

It seems as if he is advising Congress to go to war unilaterally.
 
clk said:


I'd have to disagree with you, Phil. Clark stated that "I've been very consistent... I've been against this war from the beginning". But if he was always against it, then why did he testify for it? While he doesn't just come out and say that going to war would be a good idea, he strongly implies it in these statements:

"...this is a problem that's longstanding. It's been a decade in the making. It needs to be dealt with and the clock is ticking on this."

"There's no requirement to have any doctrine here. I mean this is simply a longstanding right of the United States and other nations to take the actions they deem necessary in their self defense," Clark told Congress on September 26, 2002.

"Every president has deployed forces as necessary to take action. He's done so without multilateral support if necessary."

It seems as if he is advising Congress to go to war unilaterally.
You're right. The implications are there. And I suppose I'm splitting hairs a bit, but the words, "I think commitment to deploying 150,000 troops to engage in a full ground war, to secure the skies and all borders, and to oust Saddam Hussein is the answer to this problem," never come from his mouth.

I just get fed up with both politicians and media types who use quotes out of context to rake the muck.
 
It seems to me that the only Democratic candidates who are consistent on the war are Kucinich and Lieberman.

The others are all flopping their flips.
 
Phil said:
I just get fed up with both politicians and media types who use quotes out of context to rake the muck.


Those that want context can find it here. I've linked to his statement, you can find a link to his testimony at the top of the page.
 
As I read the whole testimony, I start to agree with Phil. Clark has been more consistent than the Drudge excerpts give him credit for.
 
Thanks for the link, aerocontrols. Now I agree with Phil, as well. Drudge simply took a few statements out of that transcript and they were taken out of context. I should have known that was the case, seeing as how Drudge was the one that made the report :mad:
 
I see that someone has already posted a link to the transcript.....

Josh Marshall also did a good job of highlighting one of the main quotes Drudge takes and showing the full context of it in the transcript at:

http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/week_2004_01_11.html#002415

When I first saw the Drudge story I got nervous (especially from just the headline) because I am a Clark supporter, but once I compared the excerpts Drudge took to the full transcript, I wasn't as worried.

I am still concerned though because I think the tendency is for people to read the headline, maybe read the excerpts and draw the conclusion based on that. I don't think many people will actually take the time to question Drudge's motivations or the nature of his selective quoting.

In Drudge's case I think he is just desperate to break some big story, and still hoping for his glory years from all the attention he got with the Lewinsky story.

-Elektrix
 
Oh, I don;t know... he makes a pretty compelling case for the war, and advocates the US taking action if the UN is unwilling to...

"the President’s clear determination to act if the United Nations can’t provides strong leverage undergirding further diplomatic efforts."

I don;t think it;s much of a stretch to say that his position has changed here... in this testimony he's clearly not saying that a preemptive attack would be wrong - in fact, he says that any attack on Saddam couldn;t be classified as preemption.
 
crackmonkey said:
Oh, I don;t know... he makes a pretty compelling case for the war, and advocates the US taking action if the UN is unwilling to...

"the President’s clear determination to act if the United Nations can’t provides strong leverage undergirding further diplomatic efforts."

I don;t think it;s much of a stretch to say that his position has changed here... in this testimony he's clearly not saying that a preemptive attack would be wrong - in fact, he says that any attack on Saddam couldn;t be classified as preemption.

I disagree.

He makes a case that it could be valid as a last resort (which is not different from what he currently says), but his main point then and now was that it was not right to do it at that time:

The yellow light is flashing. We have a problem. We've got to muster the best judgment in this country. We've got to muster the will of the American people and we've got to be prepared to deal with this problem, but time is on our side in the near term and we should use it. Thank you.

And regarding what he said about preemption, it is clear when you look at the paragraph as a whole:

So, all that having been said, the option to use force must remain on the table. It should be used as the last resort after all diplomatic means have been exhausted unless there's information that indicates that a further delay would represent an immediate risk to the assembled forces and organizations. And, I want to underscore that I think the United States should not categorize this action as preemptive. Preemptive and that doctrine has nothing whatsoever to do with this problem.

As you can see, this is in the context of describing this option to use force but he makes it clear he thought even then it should have only been used as the last resort after all diplomatic means (unless there was specific information that would make delay a risk).

I think it is pretty clear, and what he said then was right on the money, and it is still true today.

And finally:

We have to work this problem in a way to gain worldwide legitimacy and understanding for the concerns that we rightly feel and for our leadership. This is what U.S. leadership in the world must be. We must bring others to share our views, not be too quick to rush to try to impose them even if we have the power to do so. I agree that there's a risk that the inspections would fail to provide evidence of the weapons program. They might fail, but I think we can deal with this problem as we move along, and I think the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by the opportunities to gain allies, support and legitimacy in the campaign against Saddam Hussein.

His point here really was that we should have followed the path of working with the International community, and his criticism of the administration is for NOT following that path.

The places where he makes a case for war make sense, when taken in context for when he said force should be used, and more specifically his point that the threat of force would be one of the best ways to get Iraq to follow those resolutions.

You can of course continue to read the entire transcript of his testimony........ or choose to pick individual quotes out and make them reflect what you would like to think about his positions having changed.

But my personal opinion from reading through the entire transcript is that he was generally right on many of these things (and the points he was wrong on, such as the issue of Saddam having chemical and biological weapons, were based on him trusting at the time things like the presentations by Powell, and taking them at their word......... he's certainly not the only one that had believed some of this intelligence).

Either way, I think he had the right ideas back then in his testimony, and the things he cautioned against (the dangers of not using the time the US had wisely and not rushing in and ignoring the International community) have proven to be pretty much right on the money.

And finally, note that he was recommending back then in his testimony that IF the inspections process failed, that if force was going to be used it would HAVE to involve the broadest possible coalition:

If the efforts to resolve the problem by using the United Nations fail, either initially or ultimately, then we need to form the broadest possible coalition including our NATO allies and the North Atlantic Council if we're going to have to bring forces to bear. We should not be using force until the personnel, the organizations, the plans that will be required for post conflict Iraq, are prepared and ready. This includes dealing with requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance, and preparations for a transitional governing body and eventual elections, perhaps even including a new constitution.

Ideally, the international/multinational organizations will participate in the readying of such post-conflict operations -- the United Nations, NATO, other regional organizations, Islamic organizations -- but we have no idea how long this campaign could last, and if it were to go like the campaign against the Afghans, against the Taliban, in which suddenly the Taliban collapsed and there we were.

I see nothing in that that contradicts what he says now, and it frankly only reinforces his criticism of how the war was handled, and also how he thought a postwar process should have been handled.

His point here and the point he still makes today is that it was wrong to just go in full bore, to not exhaust diplomatic opportunities, to not

Nowhere in here does he support the notion that attacking Saddam by ourselves and without exhausting other opportunties was right, and the preemption he talks about is in reference to the general notion of dealing with Saddam before he acted...... he is not saying that means any preemptive attack on Saddam is OK, and reading the testimony in full especially shows that he had laid out what would have been a reasonable thing for the US to do, and his criticism then and now is that the US did NOT act that way, and the points he made about the consequences of not working with the UN process and our allies has been shown to be valid.

-Elektrix
 
Knight Ridder newspapers has an excellent analysis of this and makes some interesting points:

http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/news/nation/7720762.htm

Particularly interesting is this tidbit:

Clark's congressional testimony was further distorted Thursday by cyber-gossip columnist Matt Drudge, who quoted selected portions of Clark's testimony and added sentences that don't appear in the transcript on his Web site Thursday. Drudge didn't respond to an e-mail request for comment.

If you scroll down a bit at http://www.campaigndesk.com there's also a good analysis of the nature of how things were picked apart, re-arranged, etc. and the use of ellipses, etc.

As a general point I think it's pretty funny that RNC chair Ed Gillepsie just happened to be giving a speech the same day making the same accusations....... says a lot in general that the RNC seems to be trying to focus so much attention on smearing Clark, the truth be damned.

-Elektrix
 
Btw, just one other thing from this........ one thing I think some people aren't noticing is that the way this testimony was given, he was actually debating against Richard Perle, who was the other guy on the panel that day.

Perle's replies to Clark show that at the very least he understood what Clark was saying:

He [Clark] seems to be preoccupied, and I'm quoting now, with building legitimacy, with exhausting all diplomatic remedies as though we hadn't been through diplomacy for the last decade, and relegating the use of force to a last resort, to building the broadest possible coalition, in short a variety of very amorphous, ephemeral concerns alongside which there's a stark reality and that is that every day that goes by, Saddam Hussein is busy perfecting those weapons of mass destruction that he already has, improving their capabilities, improving the means with which to deliver them and readying himself for a future conflict.

So I don't believe that time is on our side and I don't believe that this fuzzy notion that the most important thing is building legitimacy, as if we lack legitimacy now, after all the U.N. resolutions that he's in blatant violation of, I don't believe that that should be the decisive consideration. So I think General Clark simply doesn't want to see us use military force and he has thrown out as many reasons as he can develop to that but the bottom line is he just doesn't want to take action. He wants to wait.

-Elektrix
 
But Clark never said that the use of military force was wrong, even if used unilaterally. He said he preferred to wait until diplomacy had run its course, and he preferred the broadest possible coalition, but he always said taht war was an option and Saddam was clearly a threat.
 
crackmonkey said:
But Clark never said that the use of military force was wrong, even if used unilaterally. He said he preferred to wait until diplomacy had run its course, and he preferred the broadest possible coalition, but he always said taht war was an option and Saddam was clearly a threat.

Right, and that is consistent. He never said he thought war should never be an option, just that it should be the last option, and the way that this war was handled was not the right way to do it.

And he did say that Saddam was clearly a threat (a position he shared and shares with many people, including Bill Clinton who signed the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998), although his testimony shows him disagreeing with Perle and the administration on the difference between him being a threat and being an IMMINENT threat (which is the important distinction).

His point there was that clearly Saddam was a potential threat based on the intelligence we have had and his history....... but that Saddam was not an imminent threat that warranted doing and end-run around going through the UN, etc. His general position was that Saddam shouldn't have these weapons, but I think a lot of people agree with this.

He states quite clearly what his specific position on Saddam was then:

Saddam has been pursuing nuclear weapons for over twenty years._ According to all estimates made available he does not now have these weapons._ The best public assessment is that if he were to acquire fissionable material he might field some type of weapon within two years._

And his major point then and now was that the focus should have remained on Al Quaeda, and he was consistent on this back then:

We have an unfinished, world-wide war against Al Qaeda, a war that has to be won in conjunction with friends and allies, and that ultimately be won by persuasion as much as by force, when we turn off the Al Qaeda recruiting machine._Some three thousand deaths on September 11th testify to the real danger from Al Qaeda, and as all acknowledge, Al Qaeda has not yet been defeated. Thus far, substantial evidence has not been made available to link Saddam’s regime to the Al Qaeda network._ And while such linkages may emerge, winning the war against Al Qaeda may well require different actions than ending the weapons programs in Iraq._

Especially note how he points out there isn't substantial evidence to link Saddam and Al Qaeda, and that even if it emerged it would be a separate issue than ending the weapons programs in Iraq.

You are right that he doesn't just say using force is "wrong", but he doesn't need to do there. His point was in testifying and debating Richard Perle on what the US should have done....... he wasn't there to just say using force was wrong, but to point out what should be done:

The United States diplomacy in the United Nations will be further strengthened if the Congress can adopt a resolution expressing US determination to act if the United Nations will_ not._ The use of force must remain a US option under active consideration. The resolution need not at this point authorize the use of force, but simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force, if other measures fail.

Note in particular there he says that the resolution doesn't need to authorize the use of force, which is a critical point.

Throughout this testimony he makes the point again and again that these measures should have been taken, and argues forcefully for the importance of going through this process and building up a strong coalition and letting the process work.

He does not argue for unilateral action here and makes a point that every possible measure should be used to have the strongest coalition possible and to use all diplomatic means BEFORE any use of force.

I don't see anywhere in the testimony where he explicitly states that it would be OK to just go in unilaterally and take out Saddam by ourselves.

So again, he said Saddam was a threat, and force should be AN option. His criticism then and his criticism now is that the rest of what he said should be done wasn't done.

I don't see a big point to disagree with him on these areas. I think the things he said were right. Force should have remained an option because the threat of force (his point that all that was needed was an agreement to authorize force if other processes failed) can get things moving.... and the notion that Saddam was a threat, but not an imminent threat (note how Clark points out we had time and should have used that time.... if Clark had been arguing Saddam was an imminent threat he wouldn't have said this).

Perle's response to Clark also makes it pretty clear I think how they perceived Clark's testimony, as urging them to wait and hold off and let the process work and give it legitimacy if it had to happen.

-Elektrix
 
If you haven't read it yet, I'd definitely recommend reading the entire testimony (i.e. at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has269000.000/has269000_0f.htm)

I think it becomes a lot clearer what points he was getting at.

I guess the sticking point for you is that you find a problem in him not flat out saying "we should never use force" and "Saddam is not a threat", but that would not really be a reasonable statement to make, as he does point out situations where it might be necessary.

The fundamental point he made then and that he makes now is that it was not planned properly and it didn't need to happen at that time.

Aside from his testimony, he also made this same point in a USA Today editorial:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2002-09-09-oplede_x.htm

"Our strategic priorities need to be kept in order: We can best face a possible fight against Iraq if we have strong allies and a weakened al-Qaeda. While we eventually may have to use force against Iraq, we should use our resolve first to empower diplomacy, with war as the last resort."

-Elektrix
 

Back
Top Bottom