The Illusion of 'Managing' China

[CBL4]

By Robert Kagan in the Washington Post

There has been much disc ussion recently about how to "manage the rise of China." The phrase itself is soothing, implying gradualism, predictability and time. Time enough to think and prepare, to take measurements of China's trajectory and adjust as necessary. If China eventually emerges as a clear threat, there will be time to react. But meanwhile there is time enough not to overreact, to be watchful but patient and not to create self-fulfilling prophecies. If we prematurely treat China as an enemy, it is said, it will become an enemy.

The idea that we can manage China's rise is comforting because it gives us a sense of control and mastery, and of paternalistic superiority. With proper piloting and steady nerves on our part, the massive Chinese ship can be brought safely into harbor and put at anchor. It can be "integrated" into the international system and thereby tamed and made safe for civilized existence in the postmodern world. Wisely "managed," China can be a friend. Badly managed, it can become a very dangerous power indeed. But at least the choice seems to be ours.

The history of rising powers, however, and their attempted "management" by established powers provides little reason for confidence or comfort. Rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war that reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power. [CBL - Examples: Germany and Japan in 19th century and the Soviet Union]
...
[W]e need to understand that the nature of China's rise will be determined largely by the Chinese and not by us. The Chinese leadership may already believe the United States is its enemy, for instance, and there is nothing we can do to change that. Partly this is due to our actions -- such as the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, which began during the Clinton administration, and our recent efforts to enhance strategic ties with India. Partly it is due to our different forms of government, since autocratic rulers naturally feel threatened by a democratic superpower and its democratic allies around their periphery. Partly it is due to the nature of the situation in East Asia. It used to be an article of faith among Sinologists that the Chinese did not want to drive the United States out of the region. Today many are not so sure. It would not be unusual if an increasingly powerful China wanted to become the dominant power in its own region, and dominant not just economically but in all other respects, as well.

When one contemplates how to "manage" that, however, comforting notions of gradualness, predictability and time begin to fade. The obvious choices would seem to lie between ceding American predominance in the region and taking steps to contain China's understandable ambitions. Not many Americans favor the former course, and for sound political, moral and strategic reasons. But let's not kid ourselves. It will be hard to pursue the latter course without treating China as at least a prospective enemy, and not just 20 years from now, but now. Nor, if that is the choice, can Chinese leaders be expected to wait patiently while the web of containment is strengthened around them. More likely, they will periodically want to challenge both the United States and its allies in the region to back off. Crises could come sooner than expected, and without much warning, requiring difficult judgments about the risks and rewards of both action and inaction.

Good commentary but it leaves out the Sharansky idea of linkage between human rights and trade.

CBL

 

[CapelDodger]

Good commentary but it leaves out the Sharansky idea of linkage between human rights and trade.CBL

Seems a good idea given how complicated the real world is.

It is good commentary, and not just because the usual servings are such pap. He doesn't make it explicit, but he gets across the idea that it's the Sino-US relationship that needs to be, and can be, managed. The US, sole super-power though it be, does not bestride the world (and does not need to).

The history of rising powers, however, and their attempted "management" by established powers provides little reason for confidence or comfort.

Established powers became established in an environment they exploited best. The environment changes - technology, philosophy and demography have their own trajectories - and established powers always end up trying to keep their world the way it was rather than adapt. What is worse, they tend to deny that anything has changed. Tension mounts, rupture ensues, and from the rubble new powers establish themselves because they best exploit the existing environment.

The emphasis given to military power is a reflection of the old environment, not the current. Short of nuclear annihilation the US cannot take on China militarily. It has fought three wars across the Pacific : the Philippine War, which took longer and cost more (possibly the source of Murphy's 2nd Law), the Pacific War which was horrendously expensive, and the Vietnam War which was not only 2nd Law but was eventually abandoned as worthless. Given that record, taking on China would be criminally ridiculous.

The better option is a partnership. Domination of the Pacific by two powers that no more need to argue than two kids let loose in a candy-store. Both have problems with Muslims : ka-ching! Indonesia gets a make-over as a whole bunch of new places. Japanese get whiney? Slap 'em around, you know you want to. Taiwan : nobody rocks the boat, status remains undefined. Australians : biddable. South America a US sphere of interest, Indo-China a Chinese one. Thailand a buffer-zone, Malaysia, Burma and Sri Lanka an Indian sphere. Africa a free-fire zone - nothing new there, then - and the Middle East subject to negotiation by outside powers - again, no change.

Now that's what I call Management.

 

[zakur]

Read the latest Atlantic Monthly to skip right over that 'managing China' nonsense:

How We Would Fight China

 

[CapelDodger]

Read the latest Atlantic Monthly to skip right over that 'managing China' nonsense:

How We Would Fight China

The Middle East is just a blip.

The established power still fixated on the old environment, to my mind.

Good link. The Chinese involvement with Africa - the game-board of the near future, in my opinion - is not remarked on as often as it warrants.

 

[Kerberos]

Re: Re: The Illusion of 'Managing' China

The emphasis given to military power is a reflection of the old environment, not the current. Short of nuclear annihilation the US cannot take on China militarily.

I'm not sure that's true, certainly you can't stage an invasion of the Chinese mainland, but I should think you could take out their navy and, unless they hid it in underground bunkers, their air force. You could then blockade their coastline and, depending on the alignment of other countries, in particular China's neighbours, stage an embargo. Couple that with air strikes, naval bombardment and Cruise missiles against military and economic targets, and I'd think you could make life very unpleasant for the Chinese. The biggest problem would probably be the Chinese ICBMs.

 

[a_unique_person]

By Robert Kagan in the Washington Post

Good commentary but it leaves out the Sharansky idea of linkage between human rights and trade.

CBL

Sharansky is only useful for platitudes, I'm afraid.

 

[Magyar]

Re: Re: Re: The Illusion of 'Managing' China

I'm not sure that's true, certainly you can't stage an invasion of the Chinese mainland, but I should think you could take out their navy and, unless they hid it in underground bunkers, their air force. You could then blockade their coastline and, depending on the alignment of other countries, in particular China's neighbours, stage an embargo. Couple that with air strikes, naval bombardment and Cruise missiles against military and economic targets, and I'd think you could make life very unpleasant for the Chinese. The biggest problem would probably be the Chinese ICBMs.

and from the title of the article
The Middle East is just a blip. The American military contest with China in the Pacific will define the twenty-first century. And China will be a more formidable adversary than Russia ever was.
___________________________________________________

What indications do you have that we (as in the govt.) has even contemplated the idea of opposing china?

The admin (and this includes both sides of the isle) are bending over, and not even asking to be kissed, to insure the success and prosperity of the Chinese economy because the FULL force of the
US corp. world demands it! And they always get what they pay for from our govt despite the cost to its average citizen.

China's biggest problem in gaining economic world dominance is
middle and upper management. The US corp world sees this as
an opportunity where they can "gain control" or "manage China". This may work in the short run, but not for long.

The military schenario is not vaild because we won't be fighting China alone and the ICBM option will never happen. The rest of the world will at best turn their backs on us and DEMAND a settlement and worse actively support China because we will have nothing to offer the world. The power is shifting and everyone will go with the "winner" because shift always offers opportunity to improve your own statis in the world far more than the status quo. The US will not die, but just as England lost it's world dominance in the 19th century we will lose ours in the 21st.

And the fact that christo-fascist taliban wants us to revert to the
16th century when it comes to things like ID/science in school will not help us compete in the fields that matter.

 

[CapelDodger]

Re: Re: Re: The Illusion of 'Managing' China

I'm not sure that's true, certainly you can't stage an invasion of the Chinese mainland, but I should think you could take out their navy and, unless they hid it in underground bunkers, their air force. You could then blockade their coastline and, depending on the alignment of other countries, in particular China's neighbours, stage an embargo. Couple that with air strikes, naval bombardment and Cruise missiles against military and economic targets, and I'd think you could make life very unpleasant for the Chinese. The biggest problem would probably be the Chinese ICBMs.

The alignment of Siberia and Central Asia is going to be determined by China, which is, you'll agree, an awful lot closer to China than the US. China is a land-power, oriented towards the interior of the continent, by tradition. Strategically, China used to know one thing but it was a very big thing - the Great Wall. They were entirely unprepared for the age of ocean-borne empire. That age may have ended.

The US has no more chance of conquering China than China does of conquering the US. China is more self-sufficient than the US, more easily mobilised, and it doesn't need the oceans. The US would be dependent on local allies who would need a lot of persuading to irritate the big gorilla next door for the sake of the big gorilla the other side of the Pacific. And all this assumes that Walmart would allow it in the first place.

 

[CapelDodger]

Re: Re: Re: Re: The Illusion of 'Managing' China

China's biggest problem in gaining economic world dominance is middle and upper management.

I think we're returning to a Balance of Powers world, so dominance is moot. I see their major problem as being the banking system, which is just awful. If the banking expertise of the Overseas Chinese (including Taiwan) can be brought back into the fold China could make some serious strides over the next few decades.

The US will not die, but just as England lost it's world dominance in the 19th century we will lose ours in the 21st.

Britain is still managing the decline, although the job's mostly done. How the US manages it is going to be the big story of the next few decades. It is, as a nation, rather more fragile than Britain was.

 

[CapelDodger]

China had world dominance - as far as they knew, which is all that matters - for a very long time. I don't think the Chinese have ever accepted that they still don't.

The French have some very peculiar notions as well. At least the Germans are properly chastened.

(eta)
The Arabs had their century in the sun and still have a chip on their shoulders about it. This dominance thing probably isn't worth having in the long-run. (Or persuading yourself you've had, in the French case.)