Ignatius
Critical Thinker
- Joined
- Nov 21, 2001
- Messages
- 373
Interesting read. Download the .pdf here
Interesting passages so far (feel free to add your own).
Interesting passages so far (feel free to add your own).
Tensions among the Iraqi communities were therefore
severe, but were also viewed as controllable by a strong
central government supported by the British.66 The first
Iraqi government was led by the Hashemite King Faisal
who was installed by the British from the Hajaz based on his
wartime alliance with them. As an Arab nationalist leader,
Faisal had some popularity and his position as King was
confirmed by an Iraqi referendum. Nevertheless, Faisal
began his reign as a client of the United Kingdom, and
British troops helped him consolidate power and establish
authority. Such tasks were often difficult. Tribal uprisings
and isolated acts of terrorism against British troops were a
problem from early in the occupation. Moreover, Shi’ite
clerics proclaimed a jihad against British forces from the
Shi’ite holy city of Karbala in southern Iraq. The situation
stabilized in February 1921 after the British had suffered
around 2,000 casualties. Britain remained involved in Iraq
despite the bloodshed because of that country’s oil wealth.67
Should democracy or even pluralistic political stability
be established in Iraq, this would be a tremendous
achievement of which all could be proud. Nevertheless, U.S.
policymakers sometimes assume that a democratic
government will also be friendly to U.S. policies in the
Middle East. This cannot be assumed in the case of Iraq. At
the present time, the only Arab leader who has been elected
in a fair election is Palestinian President Yassir Arafat, who
is clearly not the favored U.S. choice. Likewise, in the Gulf,
Islamists have done extremely well in recent legislative
elections in Bahrain. The Kuwaiti parliament has a strong
Islamist grouping, and free elections in other states could
duplicate this situation. Free elections in the Arab world
seldom produce pro-Western governments.
When calling upon members of the Shi’ite community to
serve in the regime, Saddam exhibits a predictable bias in
favor of well-educated secular elites. Secular regime
officials are held up as important models for emulation in
Iraq since secularism helps to lessen tensions between
Shi’ites and Sunnis. Consequently, secular Shi’ite leaders,
in some contrast to the clergy, have a more clearcut record of
collaboration with the regime. This background of
collaboration by individuals with Ph.D.s rather than
Islamic education may be held against them by ordinary
Shi’ites in a post-Saddam regime. Secular elites have been
willing to participate in the structure of repression. This is
less so with clerics.
A Force for Unity: Dealing with the Iraqi Military.
While a struggle for power between civilian and military
elites would contribute to Iraqi fragmentation, the military
can also serve as a unifying force under certain conditions.
In a highly diverse and fragmented society like Iraq, the
military (primarily the ground forces) is one of the few
national institutions that stresses national unity as an
important principle. Conscripts are at least publicly
encouraged to rise above parochial loyalties and may be
stationed in parts of the country far from their ethnic
kinsmen. To tear apart the Army in the war’s aftermath
could lead to the destruction of one of the only forces for
unity within the society. Breaking up large elements of the
army also raises the possibility that demobilized soldiers
could affiliate with ethnic or tribal militias.
The Potential for Terrorism against U.S.
Occupation Forces.
The longer a U.S. occupation of Iraq continues, the more
danger exists that elements of the Iraqi population will
become impatient and take violent measures to hasten the
departure of U.S. forces. At the same time, a premature
withdrawal from Iraq could lead to instability and perhaps
even civil war. By ousting the Saddam Hussein regime, the
United States will have placed itself in the position where it
will be held responsible by the world should anarchy and
civil war develop in a post-Saddam era. Having entered into
Iraq, the United States will find itself unable to leave
rapidly, despite the many pressures to do so.
If the campaign to eliminate Saddam is short and
involves few civilian casualties, it is likely that U.S. troops
will be greeted with enthusiasm by Iraqi citizens who have
had the burden of Saddam’s tyranny lifted from their
shoulders. Nevertheless, the United States should not
expect that occupation forces will be protected by a
bottomless well of gratitude. Most Iraqis will assume that
the United States has intervened in their country for its own
political purposes and not to liberate them from oppression,
an argument that is not terribly difficult to make. Indeed
some sources, such as the London-based Economist, suggest
that the Iraqi population already appears to distrust U.S.
motives for an invasion, assuming such an act would be
initiated primarily to help Israel’s strategic situation and to
dominate Iraqi oil.88 Major postwar improvements in the
quality of daily life of the population may soften such
concerns, but they are unlikely to eliminate them.
Although Iraq is one of the most repressive countries in
the world, it is not a disarmed society. Unlike a variety of
other dictatorships, many Iraqi citizens have access to
firearms. One of Saddam’s most common ways of rewarding
loyal tribal sheikhs is to allow them to arm their followers.
Moreover, a variety of militias in Iraq have been equipped
with weapons as part of a regime defense strategy. These
weapons can become a problem following the war.
It is likely that in a post-Saddam era both the United
States and the new Iraqi government will seek a less
militarized civil society. Disarming the population will
nevertheless be a difficult task. Arab chieftains who have
been permitted to arm their followers would view efforts to
disarm them as the actions of an enemy. Additionally, in the
aftermath of a war, many individuals may feel the need to
maintain personal weapons for self-defense in case there is
a breakdown in public order. Yet, to leave weapons in
private hands invites the possibility of terrorism. A
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potential compromise is to allow some individual weapons
to remain in public hands, while larger crew-served
weapons are removed to government control.
In the past, Shi’ite Arabs in other countries have shown
themselves to be particularly dangerous when they turned
to terrorism, due to the special religious sanction given to
the concept of martyrdom in Shi’ite Islam. Shi’ites in
Lebanon developed and perfected the technique of suicide
car bombing which they applied to Israeli occupation forces
during the 1980s and 1990s with considerable effect. This
tactic is now popular in the Palestinian territories, but was
utilized only after careful attention to the Lebanese Shi’ite
example.
Following Saddam’s defeat, the United States will
further need to seek indigenous forces to aid in law and
order functions and help prepare for a post-occupation Iraq.
This approach is an inevitable part of rehabilitating Iraq to
govern itself without U.S. military forces. Nevertheless, by
developing local allies, the United States makes itself at
least partially responsible for the behavior of those allies.
Hence a pro-U.S. force that attacks any other Iraqi force for
private reasons threatens to involve the United States in
the complex web of sectarian, tribal, or clan warfare.
The Israeli example in Lebanon is also instructive here.
While occupying Lebanon, Israeli forces supported and
strengthened pro-Israel militias which they viewed as
useful for reducing their own manpower requirements and
casualties. Unfortunately for the Israelis, many of the
militia members brought their own political and factional
priorities to their tasks as militiamen. In one case, Druze
members of the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) militia
randomly murdered thirteen Shi’ite villagers in response to
an ambush of their troops. While both the SLA leadership
and the Israelis denounced this crime, the tension between
Israeli occupation forces and Shi’ite Lebanese was pushed
to a new level.
Another danger of occupation is that terrorists might
generate strategies to alienate Iraqis who are initially
neutral toward a U.S. occupation. In Lebanon, for example,
militants would occasionally hide weapons in mosques to
tempt Israeli occupation troops into conducting searches of
these sites. The sight of a mosque being ransacked by
foreign, non-Muslim soldiers is offensive to many believers,
no matter how good the reasons for such a response might
be. As a result, the Israelis further alienated the population.
Such actions are particularly problematic when no weapons
are found. Moreover, damage created by a search remains
to be viewed by devout believers after the troops depart.
Also, any expansion of terrorism or guerrilla activity
against U.S. troops in Iraq will undoubtedly require a
forceful American response. Such U.S actions could involve
a dramatic escalation in the numbers of arrests, interrogations,
and detentions of local Iraqis. While such actions do
improve security and force protection, they seldom win
friends among the local citizenry. Individuals alienated
from the U.S. occupation could well have their hostility
deepened and increased by these acts. Thus, a small number
of terrorists could reasonably choose to attack U.S. forces in
the hope that they can incite an action- reaction cycle that
will enhance their cause and increase their numbers.
The Potential for a Popular Uprising
against U.S. Troops.
A mass uprising against occupation forces is unlikely in
the early stages of any U.S. occupation of Iraq, probably up
to at least the first year. Gratitude for the removal of
Saddam Hussein and an uncertainty over the degree to
which U.S. troops can be pushed are virtual guarantees of
the limits to which even a restive population can reasonably
be expected to adhere. After the first year, the possibility of
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a serious uprising may increase should severe disillusionment
set in and Iraqis begin to draw parallels between U.S.
actions and historical examples of Western imperialism.
Mass uprisings have occurred in that part of the world in
several key historical instances and therefore are known to
the local population. In the final death agonies of the last
Iranian shah’s regime, millions of individuals took to the
streets to protest and resist Imperial authority. Shi’ites and
Kurds in Iraq also rose up against Saddam Hussein in 1991
but were then crushed in a ruthless campaign by the Iraqi
regime. While it is hoped that nothing that the United
States could do would provoke the same kind of reaction as
Saddam’s actions, the potential for an uprising against U.S.
authority cannot be wholly dismissed, especially if it is
encouraged by false and escalating rumors of U.S. anti-
Muslim activity.
The Iraqi population is, as noted, diverse, and many
internal grievances exist among the various factions, tribes,
ethnicities and religious sects. Any occupation authority
will assume the responsibility for mediating among
opposing groups and attempting to resolve differences in a
nonviolent way. Some of these differences are centuries old
and cannot be resolved by any third party. Thus even the
most scrupulous effort at fairness can nevertheless alienate
various tribes and ethnicities from the occupation forces
and cause them to respond to occupation policies as a group.
This discontent could fuel mass action or even an uprising.
The Requirement for Large-Scale Economic
Assistance to Iraq.
Iraq is a country with important natural resources
which is, nevertheless, stricken by poverty as a result of
recent historical events. Ten years of sanctions followed
upon the heels of the Gulf War in 1991. Earlier, from
1980-88, Iraqis were absorbed in an extremely bloody war
with Iran. While Saddam initially attempted to fund both
war requirements and social spending during the conflict
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with Iran, circumstances forced him to shift to a total war
economy by 1981. If the United States assumes control of
Iraq, it will therefore assume control of a badly battered
economy.
Upon ousting Saddam, the United States will then have
responsibility for providing some level of comfort and
subsistence to Iraq’s impoverished population. Based on
the people’s current plight, these tasks will be exceptionally
challenging. Moreover, regional or international public
opinion will have little tolerance for a lethargic aid program
under which people starve while waiting for relevant
bureaucracies to work out their problems. Any incidents of
suffering, neglect, or U.S. indifference can be expected to
come to the prompt attention of the regional and
international media.
Some of the economic burden of rebuilding the country
may be borne by reliance on the Iraqi oil industry. It is
doubtful, however, that oil wealth will pay for all of Iraq’s
reconstruction needs, even if the oil infrastructure survives
the war relatively intact. Estimates of the cost of rebuilding
range from $30 to $100 billion and do not include the cost of
occupation troops.92 Such troops will be maintained as a
separate expense from that of reconstruction and are not
expected to be maintained through Iraqi revenues.
Moreover, Iraq also has an exceptionally heavy burden of
debt, the management of which was one of Saddam’s major
reasons for invading Kuwait in 1990. On the plus side, Iraq
does have a well-educated population that could participate
in reconstruction efforts.
