The Abolition of Man

[FireGarden]

In the POM thread, Stamenflicker suggested a discusion on CS Lewis' "The Abolition of Man"

In that work there are three lectures, "Men without Chests" "The Way" and "The Abolition of Man"

This is something I wrote up while reading the above during the past week. It's mostly a summary of what grabbed my attention, and my first thoughts regarding Lewis' arguments. It's still long, but believe me - it's been edited!


First a little eccentricity:
He has notes that tell you which pages of "The Green Book" he was quoting from. But what is the "The Green Book"? He made a point of not telling us!

Lewis says that there is a "Tao, which others may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality". And there is a need to be educated in the ways of theTao:

Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought. [...] Plato before him had said the same. The little human animal will not at first have the right responses. It must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust, and hatred at those things which really are pleasant, likeable, disgusting and hateful.

In the Republic, the well-nurtured youth is one 'who would see most clearly whatever was amiss in ill-made works of man or ill-grown works of nature, and with a just distaste would blame and hate the ugly even from his earliest years and would give delighted praise to beauty, receiving it into his soul and being nourished by it, so that he becomes a man of gentle heart. All this before he is of an age to reason; so that when Reason at length comes to him, then, bred as he has been, he will hold out his hands in welcome and recognize her because of the affinity he bears to her

He says we learn the Tao, through culture or at our mother's knee, etc. He admits that the Tao is not provable, and says that all other innovations in ethics will suffer the same defect.

This seems well and good.
If his point were merely that we have to base reason on something unproved, then fine. But he seems to go further and to say that this Tao is the same for all, though he admits that, if we were to mix all faiths together, then we would need to remove contradictions from the result. He says the corrections can be done from within the Tao, like a poet would modernize language, in contrast to how a theorist of languages would change it to improve accuracy.

The example he gives is Christ improving upon the Confusian 'Do not do to others what you would not like them to do to you'. Nietzsche, on the other hand strays too far, because you have to abandon what you start with.

How does that hold water?
Do we mix religions and remove the contradictions by working within the spirit of the mixture? Or do we change Islam from within the spirit of Islam, whilst changing Buddhism from within the spirit of Buddhism. Do we then end up with the same thing?


I agree that our opinions have to be based on something. Where I disagree is on Lewis' claim that there is only one Tao. Or, if there is only one, then I think that the Tao must admit to varieties of Ethics. Just like Gauss' algebraic geometry admits to varieties of geometries - each equally consistent though they contradict each other.

Lewis can have consistent and logical ethics, just as Euclid had a consistent and logical geometry. But, today we know that there are plenty of alternative geometries that (on paper) are just as consistent as Euclid's, though they contradict Euclid. To decide which of these is the one that most accurately models the real world, we have to rely on experiment. That is never going to be 100% objective. Even in something as measurable as geometry.

Lewis moves on to how "the innovators" have to keep moving the goal posts when explaining what is good from first principles. I won't belabour that, since I agree with his claim that there needs to be an unproven assumption at the beginning of every argument.

'This will cost you your life' cannot lead directly to 'do not do this': it can lead to it only through a felt desire or an acknowledged duty of self-preservation. [...] We must therefore either extend the word Reason to include what our ancestors called Practical Reason and confess that judgements such as 'society ought to be preserved' [...] are not mere sentiments but are rationality itself; or else we must give up at once, and for ever, the attempt to find a core of 'rational' value behind all the sentiments we have debunked.

I think that in 'debunking sentiment', the aim is not to show that all sentiment is irrational. Instead, it is to explain why we have a particular set of feelings rather than a different set. I'm not sure if Lewis covers that adequately.

The example he gives is the easiest to explain.
Self-preservation and an adventurous spirit both have their pros and cons. Not enough self-preservation will mean less chance of a next generation to continue the trait. But, now and then, "he who dares wins, Rodney". So the willingness to take risks is beneficial.

So is it a surprise that all cultures contain a mix of people ranging from the extremely timid to the reckless. Which characteristic is the most noble? Well, excuse the PCness, but 'It takes every kind of people to make the world go round.'


#####################################
The third lecture, is all about the dangers of allowing men to choose their own morality. Lewis says that would give men power over men, since the powerful would mould others into what they wanted men to be.

In the older systems both the kind of man the teachers wished to produce and their motives for producing him were prescribed by the Tao - a norm to which the teachers themselves were subject and from which they claimed no liberty to depart. They did not cut men to some pattern they had chosen. They handed on what they had received: they initiated the young neophyte into the mystery of humanity which over-arched him and them alike. It was but old birds teaching young birds to fly.

This will be changed. Values are now mere natural phenomena. Judgements of value are to be produced in the pupil as part of the conditioning. Whatever Tao there is will be the product, not the motive, of education. The conditioners have been emancipated from all that. It is one more part of Nature which they have conquered. The ultimate springs of human action are no longer, for them, something given. They have surrendered - like electricity: it is the function of the Conditioners to control, not to obey them. They know how to produce conscience and decide what kind of conscience they will produce. They themselves are outside, above. For we are assuming the last stage of Man's struggle with Nature. The final victory has been won. Human nature has been conquered - and, of course, has conquered, in whatever sense those words may now bear.

I can agree that some will be more influential than others. But influential people will not be of one mind. So we will still have a variety of opinions and characters, both amongst the influential and those they influence. How is that different to any "Golden Age" of humanity?

Lewis isn't worried that bad men will take charge, but rather that those in charge will not be men at all. Because he believes adherence to the Tao is an essential part of humanity. He thinks that real men are "birds that teach other birds how to fly".

I think his main fear is that we might end up with children who don't agree with the values of their parents, but instead believe in the values of the "conditioners". He doesn't seem to address the fact that these "conditioners" would have been children themselves at some point. Or is his fear that, since there has been one break in the Tao, values will no longer be passed complete from generation to generation?

The source of this worry seems to be Lewis' belief that there can be only one workable, useable morality.

Yet the Conditioners will act. When I said just now that all motives fail them, I should have said all motives except one. All motives that claim any validity other than that of their felt emotional weight at a given moment have failed them. Everything except the sic volo, sic jubeo has been explained away. [From notes: sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas: "Thus I will, thus I command, my pleasure stands for law."]

[...] I am inclined to think that the Conditioners will hate the conditioned. Though regarding as an illusion the artificial conscience which they produce in us their subjects, they will yet perceive that it creates in us an illusion of meaning for our lives which compares favourably with the futility of their own: and they will envy us as eunuchs envy men. But I do not insist on this, for it is a mere conjecture. What is not conjecture is that our hope even of a `conditioned' happiness rests on what is ordinarily called `chance' - the chance that benevolent impulses may on the whole predominate in our Conditioners. For without the judgement `Benevolence is good' - that is, without re-entering the Tao - they can have no ground for promoting or stabilizing these impulses rather than any others.

But he doesn't make clear that the element of chance means that the conditioners will not all agree, there will be variety. See above.

Lewis doesn't consider the danger in the alternative. That we choose the wrong interpretation of the Tao, and never change our minds. At least not in a radical way. We can change from within the spirit of the Tao, but we cannot innovate. This begs the question of how we know what the spirit of the Tao is, even if it exists. If we learn it from our parents, then where did they learn it? What made them so sure they had it right?


This summarizes, not Lewis' argument, but simply man being abolished.

The stars do not become Nature till we can weigh and measure them: the soul does not become Nature till we can psychoanalyse her. The wresting of powers from Nature is also the surrendering of things to Nature. As long as this process stops short of the final stage we may well hold that the gain outweighs the loss. But as soon as we take the final step of reducing our own species to the level of mere Nature, the whole process is stultified, for this time the being who stood to gain and the being who has been sacrificed are one and the same.

[...] It is the magician's bargain: give up our soul, get power in return. But once our souls, that is, ourselves, have been given up, the power thus conferred will not belong to us. We shall in fact be the slaves and puppets of that to which we have given our souls.

Summary of my response in general,
I'm thinking about sci-fi cyborgs, but I can't quite make the anology I want.

In a war between cyborgs and humans, Humanity doesn't get my automatic support. There is something of the "parent feeling jealous regarding its own child" about Lewis' argument, which may as well amount to "Man is abolished in every generation."

The best antidote I can think of is this from Kahlil Gibran
Your children are not your children. They are the sons and daughters of life's longing for itself. They come through you but not from you. And though they are with you yet they belong not to you.

"You may give them your love but not your thoughts. For they have their own thoughts. You may house their bodies but not their souls. For their souls dwell in the house of tomorrow, which you cannot visit, not even in your dreams. You may strive to be like them, but seek not to make them like you. For life goes not backward nor tarries with yesterday."

 

[Dr Adequate]

I agree with much of what he says, but I'm not sure about this bit:

Now the emotion, thus considered by itself, cannot be either in agreement or disagreement with Reason. It is irrational not as a paralogism is irrational, but as a physical event is irrational...

This, please note, is part of a summary of the view that he's rejecting. But I should have said that this observation is part of the solution, not part of the problem. The very first thing to be said to someone who says "your feelings are irrational" is that he's making a howling great category error. It is true that they are not rational. It is also true that they are not soluble in water, but to describe them as "insoluble in water" would be odd.

Part 3 seems rather weak. Scientific investigation does seem to show that stars don't have anthropomorphic personalities: actually, this is rather a shame. But we needn't worry that further investigation will reveal that humans don't have anthropomorphic personalities, 'cos they do. Lewis never really understood science. I don't think we really have cause to worry.

 

[stamenflicker]

Thanks FG, for the thread and the kick off contribution. I'm going to keep my post on Part I for a bit before moving on if that's ok. Part I and Part III are his strongest, but really without part I, we won't really glean the rest anyway.

As to the "Green Book," I have doubts as to its authencity even if it is a fictional name for a book he claims he read; and found myself looking around for it. What I don't doubt is that such books exist, in fact I've so much as read them before: intentional or happenstance works designed to subjective-ize all of humanity's descriptive adjectives.

His assumption that things carry their own intrinsic values or characteristics (values of the Tao) is a big one, but it appears as though its an assumption he makes only after weighing it against the alternative, which makes his essay more appealing to me personally.

While he doesn't explore the consequences of his own assumption (FG raised some good points), he does a pretty decent job explaining why he objects to a whole-hearted sellout of values which are defined as eternally subjective. The most convincing of these is the lack of true education.

Another, though not as convincing, is of utmost importance to me and found here:

From this passage the schoolboy will learn about literature precisely nothing. What he will learn quickly enough, and perhaps indelibly, is the belief that all emotions aroused by local association are in themselves contrary to reason and contemptible. He will have no notion that there are two ways of being immune to such an advertisement—that it falls equally flat on those who are above it and those who are below it, on the man of real sensibility and on the mere trousered ape who has never been able to conceive the Atlantic as anything more than so many million tons of cold salt water....

Much less do they learn of the two classes of men who are, respectively, above and below the danger of such writing—the man who really knows horses and really loves them, not with anthropomorphic illusions, but with ordinate love, and the irredeemable urban blockhead to whom a horse is merely an old-fashioned means of transport. Some pleasure in their own ponies and dogs they will have lost; some incentive to cruelty or neglect they will have received; some pleasure in their own knowingness will have entered their minds. That is their day's lesson in English, though of English they have learned nothing.

Later Lewis makes a great argument that I hear from many people of science:

When the age for reflective thought comes, the pupil who has been thus trained in 'ordinate affections' or 'just sentiments' will easily find the first principles in Ethics; but to the corrupt man they will never be visible at all and he can make no progress in that science.

I think it was MLK, Jr. who said "We have guided missles, but misguided men." And the familiar words of science can tell us how to build a nuclear weapon, but it fails to answer if one should be built at all, or when it's technology should be used.

The "first" question of ethics (Lewis' term) seems to apply to the latter questions, which renders a nearly complete answer for us. If objects are themselves not inherently carrying any moral properties (the Tao) at all, then we are left to use such a device as our collective self-subjectivity allows.

I'll try to pen more on Part I later, but only after working with other posts above.

Peace,

Flick

 

[Dr Adequate]

As to the "Green Book," I have doubts as to its authencity...

As you point out, such books exist; he takes care to assure us that it is not a fictional example: he was an honest man. I'm guessing it existed.

His assumption that things carry their own intrinsic values or characteristics (values of the Tao) is a big one, but it appears as though its an assumption he makes only after weighing it against the alternative, which makes his essay more appealing to me personally.

He assumes that the Tao is correct in some sense, but does that mean that he supposes goodness or badness to reside in the objects? I'll read it through again. I don't think he needs to assume that, and it would seem contrary to most Christian theology, where the Tao would originate from God.

I think it was MLK, Jr. who said "We have guided missles, but misguided men." And the familiar words of science can tell us how to build a nuclear weapon, but it fails to answer if one should be built at all, or when it's technology should be used.

Thanks for the quote, I'd not heard that one.

What you say about science is true, but I don't see why people go around saying it. If it is foolish to complain of morality that it cannot produce a scientific justification, then it is equally foolish to complain of science that it cannot justify morality: because in both cases we are asking for exactly the same piece of information.

Lewis's difficulties with science were factitious, but possibly, to do him justice, this is because he met "science" not in science books, but in the writings of his philosophical opponents.
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By the way, anyone interested in Lewis who hasn't read That Hideous Strength should read it. It is based on the thinking in The Abolition Of Man, and is his fictional masterpiece.

 

[FireGarden]

Hi, Flick
Tackling all three parts in one post was perhaps too ambitious. But I wanted an overview. That done, ... Time to start from the beginning again!

On the point you raised concerning the "whole-hearted sellout of values". Can you give some examples of your own. Lewis' examples don't convince me there's a sell-out. More of a recognition that my set of values needs as much justification (no more, no less), than yours or anyone else's.

I like the way you get from first principles in Ethics to deciding on the moral case regarding Nukes! You take big strides.

If objects are themselves not inherently carrying any moral properties (the Tao) at all, then we are left to use such a device as our collective self-subjectivity allows.

So you would argue that nuclear weapons are intrinsically ... what? Evil? Dangerous? And that would be the nature of nukes regardless of our own natures? That is to say, it's not a dynamic situation in which our own natures could effect an assessment of how dangerous a nuclear weapon is. A nuke is an evil weapon in the hands of a saint, and just as evil in the hands of a sinner.

The Green Book's Choleridge parable, in Lewis' hands, is also about such intrinsic properites. (I really think that Lewis is overstating the attack upon sentimentality. There are certainly bigger attacks - the percieved intellectual superiority of science over art, for instance.)

In his explanation, Lewis admits that 'The waterfall is sublime' is a claim that the waterfall merits the emotions that are felt. To say that something is awe-inspiring is to claim that it has qualities of its own that are apart from the observer. To call a thing pretty, is merely to express a personal opinion.

Lewis does not say that the waterfall must have intrinsic values of its own in any objective sense. The vary fact that it is a claim raises the possibility of argument.

The man who called the cataract sublime was not intending simply to describe his own emotions about it: he was also claiming that the object was one which merited those emotions. But for this claim there would be nothing to agree or disagree about. To disagree with 'This is pretty' if those words simply described the lady's feelings, would be absurd: if she had said 'I feel sick' Coleridge would hardly have replied 'No; I feel quite well.'

 

[stamenflicker]

He assumes that the Tao is correct in some sense, but does that mean that he supposes goodness or badness to reside in the objects?

You are right he doesn't really assume that... and you are right that he assumes these "intrinsic qualities" were placed there by the Tao, and therefore representative of it. I think maybe for Lewis it was less important for one to believe the qualities were placed upon an object by previous ancestors, but more important to him that the qualities of the object in question are understood by Revelation more often, or at least equal to Reason.

In your previous post you mention the lack of universality in the Tao... that is good point and no where is it more evidenced than in the current debate over human cloning, in which very few Tao-ites agree. Even most of the conservative Christian I know aren't claiming Revelation (or knowledge revealed) on this one, but rather urging caution. Personally, I don't have an objection-- unlike a nuclear bomb, which clearly I do.

So you would argue that nuclear weapons are intrinsically ... what? Evil? Dangerous? And that would be the nature of nukes regardless of our own natures? That is to say, it's not a dynamic situation in which our own natures could effect an assessment of how dangerous a nuclear weapon is. A nuke is an evil weapon in the hands of a saint, and just as evil in the hands of a sinner.

Unlike so many other objects, the nuclear weapon is a construct of man's desire to either a) obtain power; or b) maintain power. This is in my world view obviously. Other arguments from the preservation of the species side of things can be logically deduced as well, but that's just not the ethical principal from which I begin. In that regard, I think a nuclear weapon is intrinsically evil. Not to say that it won't one day be used for good:

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tm...taskscongresstoinvestigatethreateningasteroid

There are certainly bigger attacks - the percieved intellectual superiority of science over art, for instance.

I agree, however I sort of see that as a direct result to what he is arguing... he calls it his first principal, because after this assumption, to him anyway, a whole myriad of judgments can be made... and I tend to think the consequences get graver as one progresses.

The vary fact that it is a claim raises the possibility of argument.

Exactly. I'm surprised at how much this discussion is ringing in my ears in conjuction with the tapeworm thread below... maybe I'm more of Lewis-ite than I think.

In the tapeworm thread, I basically addressed ID vs. Evolution as getting served a Long Island Tea... in the short of it, my LIT is less about generating a factoid as to where it came from and more about acknowledging the wonder of it as it crosses my lips... though granted such knowledge as to its origins may prove to be quite important when considering whether I will enjoy it a second time.

More later,

Flick

 

[FireGarden]

Dr A He assumes that the Tao is correct in some sense, but does that mean that he supposes goodness or badness to reside in the objects?
Flick You are right he doesn't really assume that... and you are right that he assumes these "intrinsic qualities" were placed there by the Tao, and therefore representative of it.


I thought that Lewis agreed with Plato and the others he lists, beginning with Augustine's ordo amoris "in which every object is accorded that kind of degree of love which is appropriate to it"

[TheChild] must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust, and hatred at those things which really are pleasant, likeable, disgusting and hateful.

Lewis merely admits that such an attitude is a claim. One that is subjective, but he defends that by saying all 'debunking' of such sentiments that he holds will suffer the same defect. I don't think he renounces the claim.



Inspired by Flick's reference to the ID/evolution tapeworm thread, I retract my counter-argument

Or do we change Islam from within the spirit of Islam, whilst changing Buddhism from within the spirit of Buddhism. Do we then end up with the same thing?

As evolution shows us, small changes can accumulate overtime. Of course, by the time the two faiths above have converged, at least one will have changed to become something entirely different to how we know it today.

Lewis still has to justify why there would be a convergence. I merely admit to the possibility.

 

[FireGarden]

I've had a bit of a rethink :

Lewis' fear is that, in trying to avoid over-sentimentality, heartless people will be made. 'Men without chests'. He wasn't being subtle, I just missed it! Such heartless people, Lewis says, will be like blank slates on which any system of values can be written.

[Gaius and Titius] may be perfectly ready to admit that a good education should build some sentiments while destroying others. They may endeavour to do so. But it is impossible that they should succeed. Do what they will, it is the 'debunking' side of their work, and this side alone, which will really tell.

[...] By starving the sensibility of our pupils we only make them easier prey to the propagandist when he comes. For famished nature will be avenged and a hard heart is no infallible protection against a soft head.

In spite of the examples he gives, I don't think Lewis is pushing any particular set of values. What he wants is for values themselves to be held in esteem. From that point on, changes within the system will produce new values that are better - with good/bad being judged by the system itself.

I agree on the need to respect values. I had earlier thought that Lewis was implying there was only one valid system of Ethics.

I'm not sure that I share the fear I accuse him of having.

 

[stamenflicker]

FG,

I agree on the need to respect values. I had earlier thought that Lewis was implying there was only one valid system of Ethics.

I sort of see him saying there is only one valid origin for ethics, and that the system is chain reaction of reasoning that stems from the origin.

I thought that Lewis agreed with Plato and the others he lists, beginning with Augustine's ordo amoris "in which every object is accorded that kind of degree of love which is appropriate to it"

Is he saying that? My only question would be what is the difference between Plato's assumption and Juliet's in Shakespeare (I realize that Lewis never mentions this work):

What’s Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot,
Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part
Belonging to a man. O! be some other name:
What’s in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d,
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title.

Lewis seems to be countering Mercutio's Queen Mab speech more than he is justifying Romeo or Juliet's placement of sentiment outside of human naming:

True, I talk of dreams,
Which are the children of an idle brain,
Begot of nothing but vain fantasy,
Which is as thin of substance as the air
And more inconstant than the wind,

I sort of see Lewis countering a rising belief among his intellectual peers, that though sentiment or value of a thing can be placed in the person, or collective wisdom of people, and human beings, none the wiser, can continue the great play without ever slipping into these sentiments or values, but should they? Also, I see him saying (more in parts II and III) that the opinion about dreams, or sentiment, or values being "thin as the substance of the air" give materialist man a feeling of superiority and intellectual completeness that is misrepresentative of reality.

Is Lewis instead more stating a case against a value system rooted in science or materialism, than he is making a case for a value system that is inherent to the Tao?

Flick

 

[stamenflicker]

Section II

The important point is not the precise nature of their end, but the fact that they have an end at all. They must have, or their book (being purely practical in intention) is written to no purpose. And this end must have real value in their eyes. To abstain from calling it good and to use, instead, such predicates as 'necessary' or 'progressive' or 'efficient' would be a subterfuge. They could be forced by argument to answer the questions 'necessary for what?', 'progressing towards what?', 'effecting what?'; in the last resort they would have to admit that some state of affairs was in their opinion good for its own sake.

In part II, Lewis begins to demonstrate that while their may often be a claim in those who would deny a value system outside reason, that really is never true. The fact that one would go to such lengths to remove the Tao from reason, seperate the two is in fact indicative of a value system, or a mean toward an end:

Lewis:

Their scepticism about values is on the surface: it is for use on other people's values; about the values current in their own set they are not nearly sceptical enough.

From here, he moves to a very powerful argument on instinct as the source of values:

In what way does Instinct, thus conceived, help us to find 'real' values? Is it maintained that we must obey Instinct, that we cannot do otherwise? But if so, why are Green Books and the like written? Why this stream of exhortation to drive us where we cannot help going? Why such praise for those who have submitted to the inevitable?

His first rebuttal is a strong one. If our values are truly guided by instinct, why do we even have to debate them? Shouldn't we be following them "automatically" like a bird flies south for the winter?

Lewis:

It looks very much as if the Innovator would have to say not that we must obey Instinct, nor that it will satisfy us to do so, but that we ought to obey it.

And here is the point I was trying to make (with far less articulation) in the Tapeworm thread:

Telling us to obey Instinct is like telling us to obey 'people'. People say different things: so do instincts. Our instincts are at war. If it is held that the instinct for preserving the species should always be obeyed at the expense of other instincts, whence do we derive this rule of precedence? To listen to that instinct speaking in its own cause and deciding it in its own favour would be rather simple-minded. Each instinct, if you listen to it, will claim to be gratified at the expense of all the rest. By the very act of listening to one rather than to others we have already prejudged the case. If we did not bring to the examination of our instincts a knowledge of their comparative dignity we could never learn it from them. And that knowledge cannot itself be instinctive: the judge cannot be one of the parties judged; or, if he is, the decision is worthless and there is no ground for placing the preservation of the species above self-preservation or sexual appetite.
****
Unless you accept these without question as being to the world of action what axioms are to the world of theory, you can have no practical principles whatever. You cannot reach them as conclusions: they are premisses.

So morality from evolution is a premise, not a conclusion, according to Lewis in part II.

Thoughts?

Flick

 

[FireGarden]

Hi Flick,

Is Lewis instead more stating a case against a value system rooted in science or materialism, than he is making a case for a value system that is inherent to the Tao?

I think he is doing both. He emphasises Plato's ideas by repeating them from different sources. I don't see where he renounces them. Maybe he thought that would be inappropriate in this context.

My only question would be what is the difference between Plato's assumption and Juliet's in Shakespeare

I don't see how the Shakespeare helps determine Lewis' position. Yes, Lewis may disagree with dismissing dreams, since dreams can be included in the idea of "sentimentality". That doesn't mean that he renounced Plato's assumptions. Can you quote the bits from Lewis that make you feel he is not agreeing with Plato.

To abstain from calling it good and to use, instead, such predicates as 'necessary' or 'progressive' or 'efficient' would be a subterfuge. They could be forced by argument to answer the questions 'necessary for what?', 'progressing towards what?', 'effecting what?'; in the last resort they would have to admit that some state of affairs was in their opinion good for its own sake.

When Lewis is telling the materialists that they too will end up having to assume that something is good, with nothing to back up their assumption, he is trying to pull the rug out from beneath them. "You try to base everything on reason", he says, "But you have your assumptions, just as we have ours."

The problem here is Lewis' misunderstanding of science.
He sees the building up of a system of theories based on unproven axioms. What he doesn't see is that testing the theories allows us to test the axioms that led to them. When a theory is finally proven false by such a test, the assumptions are modified so that a better theory will follow. As such, science incorporates both the change within the spirit of the system (that Lewis advocates) and more radical change (that I talk about later).

That's why he says

Their scepticism about values is on the surface: it is for use on other people's values; about the values current in their own set they are not nearly sceptical enough.

He thinks that they think their assumptions are untouchable. But scientists do not think that.

The kind of radical self examination that Lewis risks discouraging with his lectures is precisely the kind of thing that allows social pioneers to begin improving peoples values.

Yes, Lewis says there can be change "within the spirit of theTao". But to get big changes quickly, you have to be more radical than that. You have to be willing to say "Our parents were wrong when they taught us that value."

Which brings me back to my "Man is abolished every generation" summary. Lewis wants a return to traditional morality. He doesn't want to investigate what that tradition is based upon, so he debunks the attempts of others to so by saying "You're going to end up needing to make assumptions you can't prove." True, but we can test those assumptions, as I indicated above.

From here, he moves to a very powerful argument on instinct as the source of values:

We have instincts. Our values may to an extent be based on them, but I think rationality tempers that. The main task of evolutionary theory is not to explain how values are based on intinct. It is to explain why we would have a particular set of instincts rather than another. EG: "Why do birds fly south in the winter." The reason is a plain as day. "It's too far to walk!" Birds that try walking would get exhausted and have less energy for procreation.


Always end on a joke

 

[Dr Adequate]

Is it maintained that we must obey Instinct, that we cannot do otherwise? But if so, why are Green Books and the like written? Why this stream of exhortation to drive us where we cannot help going? Why such praise for those who have submitted to the inevitable?

Some similar questions: if love is an instinct, why is there romantic fiction and poetry? If sex is an instinct, why is there lacy lingerie? If hunger is an instinct, why do restuarants advertise? If our sense of what tastes good and what tastes bad is instinctive, what need have we of cookbooks?
______________________

Besides which, the Green Book would not be an example of what he's talking about, since he gives it as an example of something which denies the Tao. If the Tao is founded in instinct, then the Green Book tells us to deny our instincts, and we can then see why "exhortation" is necessary for its authors.

This also suggests why "exhortation" would be necessary on the other side --- to counter the false intellectual arguments which tell us that we should deny our generous instincts.

 

[FireGarden]

Dr A
I'm not sure if you mean to imply it with your list of questions, but ....


If it is true that we must obey instinct, that we cannot do otherwise, then "instinct" becomes the answer to every question.

"Why this stream of exhortation to drive us where we cannot help going?" Instinct.
"Why such praise for those who have submitted to the inevitable?" Instinct.

Not satisfying answers, but consistent answers.


I don't regard instinct that way.

 

[stamenflicker]

FG,

Can you quote the bits from Lewis that make you feel he is not agreeing with Plato.

I don't think so much that he is not agreeing with Plato, only that he is taking things one step further, and that advancing idealism really wasn't his game. To me, Lewis is saying even if you don't agree with Plato, look at the function of the two assumptions and make a rational choice between them.

What he doesn't see is that testing the theories allows us to test the axioms that led to them. When a theory is finally proven false by such a test, the assumptions are modified so that a better theory will follow.

Again, I don't see Lewis having a problem with that, so long as the assumptions themselves are not dressed in fact and paraded in as conquerors. I see him saying that sure, this is one very feasible way of identifying reality, but one is certain to throw out the moral baby with the bathwater, to replace "the thing in itself" to the thing which "I can put in its place."

True, but we can test those assumptions, as I indicated above.

And I think Lewis would say that's well and good. However you still have man making man, power over set against power under, and in his mind you enslave the future for the sake of the present quest.

The main task of evolutionary theory is not to explain how values are based on intinct. It is to explain why we would have a particular set of instincts rather than another.

To which Lewis argues that again, we have men explaining and men generating the axioms, men drawing the conclusions. With every thread of reason we weave, we weave a thread of power and there are consequences that are the direct result of starting with a "first principal of ethics is Reason" assumption... part of that is demonstrated in contempt toward anything claiming objectivity outside of man's five senses.

Again,

Some pleasure in their own ponies and dogs they will have lost; some incentive to cruelty or neglect they will have received;

Flick

 

[FireGarden]

Hi, Flick

Again, I don't see Lewis having a problem with that, so long as the assumptions themselves are not dressed in fact and paraded in as conquerors.

Lewis does have a problem. He thinks axioms are untouchable, and accuses others of having the same fault when he claims that their skepticism is reserved for the values of others.

Here's what he says regarding challenging a system of beliefs:

But wherever any precept of traditional morality is simply challenged to produce its credentials, as though the burden of proof lay on it, we have taken the wrong position. The legitimate reformer endeavours to show that the precept in question conflicts with some precept which its defenders allow to be more fundamental, or that it does not really embody the judgement of value it professes to embody. The direct frontal attack 'Why?'—'What good does it do?' - 'Who said so?' is never permissible; not because it is harsh or offensive but because no values at all can justify themselves on that level.

First he says that something cannot be put to the test directly. (That's empiricism he's arguing against, not materialism). Then he thinks that, since the system is built from the ground up, the only way you can challenge a precept is to show that it doesn't follow from those below.

That's wrong. (A implies B) means (Not-B implies Not-A). So testing the conclusions challenges the assumptions.

I see him saying that sure, this is one very feasible way of identifying reality, but one is certain to throw out the moral baby with the bathwater

That's his argument. But it's based on his conclusion that no "innovative" theories can possibly have ligitimate claim to being superior, since all theories are based (ultimately) on unproven assumptions.

That conclusion is wrong, as I've tried to show.

However you still have man making man, power over set against power under, and in his mind you enslave the future for the sake of the present quest.

Again,
Lewis says that only those with influence can convince, because reason on its own is not up to the task. He seems to have overlooked empirical tests. He doesn't know how science works. Einstein was a humble clerk when he overturned Newton. It didn't take power. And reason alone was insufficient. Experiments were the deciding factor. Observations are what makes science objective.

To which Lewis argues that again, we have men explaining and men generating the axioms, men drawing the conclusions.

But not arbitrarily. That's what he doesn't understand. There is a system of checks and balances which no man is above. Empirical evidence.

 

[stamenflicker]

FG,

First he says that something cannot be put to the test directly.

Let's be specific. He's not saying that "anything" cannot be put to the test, he is writing specifically about values. It trust you aren't inferring that he believes science cannot be put to the test directly because I will have to re-read the book, and I don't want to at the moment.

That's his argument. But it's based on his conclusion that no "innovative" theories can possibly have ligitimate claim to being superior, since all theories are based (ultimately) on unproven assumptions.

Again with regards to a 1st principal of ethics. We can't extrapolate too far beyond that unless we recognize that his criticisms fall on that 1st assumption. That's why I said if we don't get Part I, Parts II and III won't be helpful.

Observations are what makes science objective.

We could agree on this, but I'm certain we will be debating part of it later. I hope I have time to post more.

But not arbitrarily. That's what he doesn't understand. There is a system of checks and balances which no man is above. Empirical evidence.

And that system, Lewis would argue has a major crack in its foundation. Sure it's built just fine, but what assumption is it built upon?

Again, Lewis' logic is more about the function of value than substance. What is the function of the assumption, and does that function bring anything to bear on the present. I think it does, and the more training one is given on substance focus, the less he or she is given on function training, which does as Lewis contends breed the very man all reasonable people dread. He summarizes it best as it often quoted:

We remove the organ, but demand the function.

That's where we need to focus, imho.

Flick

 

[FireGarden]

Hi, Flick

Let's be specific. He's not saying that "anything" cannot be put to the test, he is writing specifically about values.

OK, I can see how perhaps I assumed too much. But what is it about Ethics that makes it different to any other axiomatic system?

To abstain from calling it good and to use, instead, such predicates as 'necessary' or 'progressive' or 'efficient' would be a subterfuge. They could be forced by argument to answer the questions 'necessary for what?', 'progressing towards what?', 'effecting what?'; in the last resort they would have to admit that some state of affairs was in their opinion good for its own sake.

Why does that only apply to Ethics? Surely Lewis has to agree that any system of reasoning and deduction must have at its base an unproven assumption. Something we except for its own sake, or because of experience.

But if he doesn't agree with that...
Limit what I said earlier to Ethics.

And that system, Lewis would argue has a major crack in its foundation. Sure it's built just fine, but what assumption is it built upon?

It is built on the assumption that there is a real world out there against which we can test our theories. Unproveable. Perhaps even unfalsifiable, which would be an even bigger problem for science. But if there isn't a real world, then how can anything matter?

More to the point, how would you justify a claim that such empiricism isn't part of the Tao? I say it is. It is common to many cultures. It has a tradition going back thousands of years. Lewis can't throw it out on the grounds that it is a new-fangled innovation.

Again, Lewis' logic is more about the function of value than substance. What is the function of the assumption, and does that function bring anything to bear on the present. I think it does, and the more training one is given on substance focus, the less he or she is given on function training, which does as Lewis contends breed the very man all reasonable people dread. He summarizes it best as it often quoted:

I find this difficult to understand. My best guess, given the quote "We remove the organ, but demand the function", is that you're referring to Lewis' fear that values themselves are being ridiculed just for being values. His fear that there will be men with no system of ethics at all.

I don't share that fear. And I don't agree that change must always be from within the tradition, though that kind of change is welcome.


Onto a practical matter. [From an idea I've seen ascribed to Freud]
How do we get laws for new situations out of the Tao? Traffic laws, for instance. Can you trace differences in traffic laws back to differences in a culture's understanding of the Tao?

Which is better, to drive on the right or to drive on the left? I could argue on the right is best, since most people are right handed and therefore have a dominant right eye and therefore are more likely to see things in a wing mirror on their right and therefore more likely to notice vehicles trying to overtake (which is supposed to be from the right only, in British law) and therefore have fewer accidents and therefore save lives.

You can argue that my assumptions are wrong, where will that get us? Lewis' nitpick is "Oh look! You've assumed saving lives is important. If you can't justify that then you're as unreasonable as me. No more, no less." Missing entirely that it's the way we modify our assumptions that makes science stand out as a philosphy. It's not the way science builds theories up, it's the way it changes them. Change the theory to fit the facts and you're a scientist. It's on those grounds that science is deemed more reasonable. Not on the grounds that science has built everything up from proven axioms, that's just Lewis' strawman.

 

[stamenflicker]

FG,

I find this difficult to understand. My best guess, given the quote "We remove the organ, but demand the function", is that you're referring to Lewis' fear that values themselves are being ridiculed just for being values. His fear that there will be men with no system of ethics at all.

No, that's not really what I mean. Think of it this way if you find it helpful. The economy is a *real* something. Though it is not real in the sense that we can go out and empirically verify it; it is none the less real because of its function in our lives. We verify the function, not the essence or substance of economy. And it is the function of the economy that is open for discussion, and carries with it certain circumstances based on the assumption that the economy is in fact real in its essence or substance.

One can imagine a world in which there is no economy, or the distribution of goods is based on say, the length of one's toe-nails, or better yet maybe the distribution of goods is solely dependent upon the laws of an accepted invisible pink unicorn. But none of these assumptions really matter at all, because they are not the ones at hand, functionally speaking.

Hence, Lewis though he didn't take my tack in his article, would no less agree (I believe) that a failure to analyze from within the function of X verses Y; and to concentrate analysis on the substance alone of X verses Y can potentially lead us where we don't want to go. And the function of ordering values outside the Tao, will inevitably lead to the power of one group over another, to in short the "abolition of man."

While this is still possible from within the Tao (Lewis isn't a great self-critic), where the debate should really be happening is in the world of function and what circumstances, be they dire or joyful, with regards to man are dervived.

Again, when the essence of value is placed outside the Tao, the function lies here:

Some pleasure in their own ponies and dogs they will have lost; some incentive to cruelty or neglect they will have received;

This speaks of the function, not of the essence of making assumptions about the root of value... much like poverty is a function of the economy, not the substance of an assumption that the distribution of goods should be based on toe-nail length or supply & demand.

Flick

 

[Dr Adequate]

And that system, Lewis would argue has a major crack in its foundation. Sure it's built just fine, but what assumption is it built upon?

That we can learn from experience.

Proof by contradiction: suppose otherwise...

 

[FireGarden]

Hi, Flick

We verify the function, not the essence or substance of economy. And it is the function of the economy that is open for discussion, and carries with it certain circumstances based on the assumption that the economy is in fact real in its essence or substance.

I may still be misunderstanding
Do you mean by "function", the purpose of an economy? And treating the operational, "way it behaves" type thing as the essence of the economy?

Obviously, before you design a tool you need to decide what its purpose is. Similarly, when constructing a system of Ethics, people need to begin by deciding the purpose of Ethics. Lewis says (paraphrase), "For those in the Tao, this is already decided by the Tao. But those that abandon the Tao cannot have a more rational basis than the Tao. They can produce whatever kind of conscience they want, for whatever reasons they want."

Again, when the essence of value is placed outside the Tao, the function lies here: "Some pleasure in their own ponies and dogs they will have lost; some incentive to cruelty or neglect they will have received;"

Lewis doesn't go that far. He says, "our hope even of a `conditioned' happiness rests on what is ordinarily called `chance' - the chance that benevolent impulses may on the whole predominate in our Conditioners."

And the function of ordering values outside the Tao, will inevitably lead to the power of one group over another, to in short the "abolition of man."

Even within the Tao we can have the power of one group over another. The point Lewis makes is that, if we don't all agree to pass on and teach a chosen set of values then different people will pass on and teach different sets of values. More so, the most influential people will have their Ethics more widely adopted. The problem is we have to rely on "the chance that benevolent impulses may on the whole predominate in our Conditioners."

But this all rests on his assertion that no method of studying Ethics can be more reasonable than building things up from the basic values of theTao. ie: That since reason cannot be the judge, only influence can win the argument.

Which takes us back to the arguments I set out above when trying to show that Lewis hasn't eliminated reason as a possible judge.



ETA: too late to edit my previous post. I meant to argue infavour of driving on the left, which is how we do it in Britain. Oh well. I've already got my licence, so I don't need to remember things like that!