Proof of Immortality, VII

[abaddon]

Yet another segment of the immortal thread. As per usual, the position of the thread split was arbitrary. The previous segment is here.

Posted By: jsfisher

- Hopefully, we're getting down to the "nitty gritties" of our disagreement. Again, my objective right now is to nail down our different basic disagreements.
- There is at least two issues in this 'one' disagreement:#1. How many potential loaves of bread are there -- i.e., how many different loaves of bread could we make if we never ran out of time or the necessary conditions?

Suppose, for the sake of argument, one were to make an exact copy of Jabba. There would be thus Jabba the original and jabba the copy both identical. So far so good?

Jabba the copy must perforce be an exact copy of Jabba the original in every respect, else it would not be a copy.

Therefore , Jabba-1 is exactly the same as Jabba-2. Jabba the first must perforce be exactly the same as Jabba the second, right? Perforce, they must be identical. Else, Jabba-2 must not be an exact copy of Jabba-1, right? If Jabba-2 is in any way different from Jabba-1, then Jabba-2 is not a copy in any way. Do you grok that?

 

[JoeMorgue]

"Me" and "copy" are simply labels here, not any sort of metaphysical description.

This needs to reiterated so Jabba can properly ignore it.

Jabba keeps thinking he's trapped us in some masterful gotcha intellectual paradoxes (or more accurately he thinks he's finally properly directed his actors into performing a scene where that happens) because we're not bothering to make linguistic distinctions between intellectual distinctions he recognizes but we don't.

That's why Jabba thinks he's trapped us when we say that the brain is a thing but the mind is a process. The fact that we've established over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over the distinction we are making, he's "winning" because we aren't using his words.

Jabba thinks he's won because we can't or won't talk using his language.

 

[jsfisher]

@Jabba,

After the copying process, which of the two persons would believe he be the original Jabba?

You've already answered this, by the way. Your answer was "both", and you were correct. What does that tell you about your concept of "me"?

 

[MetalPig]

#1. How many potential loaves of bread are there -- i.e., how many different loaves of bread could we make if we never ran out of time or the necessary conditions?

47. The rest are just copies of the originals.

Now what?

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, this isn't any more complicated than the two loaves of bread.

I come out of the cells of my brain.
If you made an exact copy of my brain, an exact copy of me would come out of it.

I do agree that an exact copy of me wouldn't be me (as would anyone who understands the meaning of the word "copy"). I don't agree that this means the brain doesn't produce the self. On the contrary, it's exactly what we would expect if the brain produced the self.

Dave,
- Aren't the hi-lighted statements contradictory?

No. I don't see why they would be. An exact copy of my brain wouldn't be my brain, therefore the self it produced wouldn't be me, it would be an exact copy of me.

- So, when you say "I," you don't mean you.

 

[jond]

- So, when you say "I," you don't mean you.

Jabba, if the duplicate self identifies as Jabba, how, exactly, is it different from being you? (Apart from there now being two, as there are with anything.)

ETA: remember, you keep talking “sense of self” so, that’s what we’re looking at. The duplicate has the same sense of self: it thinks it’s Jabba. It has all the same memories and thoughts as Jabba. But, once duplicated the two selves diverge because they are processes in the functioning brains.

 

[RoboTimbo]

- So, when you say "I," you don't mean you the same soul.

Why do you have to be so dishonest? I've corrected your typed words to your intended ones. I give you permission to read JayUtah's post just a few prior to yours.

 

[Belz...]

- So, when you say "I," you don't mean you.

Stop trying to introduce souls into the discussion.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Jabba keeps thinking he's trapped us in some masterful gotcha intellectual paradoxes (or more accurately he thinks he's finally properly directed his actors into performing a scene where that happens) because we're not bothering to make linguistic distinctions between intellectual distinctions he recognizes but we don't.

- So, when you say "I," you don't mean you.

See?

 

[caveman1917]

Yes, and therefore we can at least talk about the dart tip having an exact center, which has probability 0 of hitting any particular point, but probability 1 of hitting some point.

Yes, exactly like how we can at least talk about the number being exactly specified when guessed.

There is almost always going to be loss of mathematical rigor when trying to illustrate a mathematical abstraction with a real-world example.

And that is why "but you can't write out a number with 1e100 digits" is such a silly argument.

I'm surprised that no one has objected to the dart example on the grounds that where the dart lands is actually deterministic, and thus has probability 1 of landing exactly where it did.

Because that's just confused. A coin toss might be deterministic for all we know, but that doesn't mean that we don't talk about things like "fair coins" with probability 0.5 of landing either side.

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, this isn't any more complicated than the two loaves of bread.

I come out of the cells of my brain.

If you made an exact copy of my brain, an exact copy of me would come out of it.

I do agree that an exact copy of me wouldn't be me (as would anyone who understands the meaning of the word "copy"). I don't agree that this means the brain doesn't produce the self. On the contrary, it's exactly what we would expect if the brain produced the self.

Dave,
- S0, reproducing your self would not reproduce you.
- IOW, your self is determined entirely by the cells of your brain, but you must require something more. When above you say, "I come out of the cells of my brain.", by "I" you mean your self -- but, you do not also mean you.
- And, each new self would be different in that regard.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Dave,
- S0, reproducing your self would not reproduce you.
- IOW, your self is determined entirely by the cells of your brain, but you must require something more. When above you say, "I come out of the cells of my brain.", by "I" you mean your self -- but, you do not also mean you.
- And, each new self would be different in that regard.

No Jabba we don't agree that there is a soul. Stop dishonestly pretending you've skilfully trapped us into admitting we do.

 

[jond]

Dave,
- S0, reproducing your self would not reproduce you.
- IOW, your self is determined entirely by the cells of your brain, but you must require something more. When above you say, "I come out of the cells of my brain.", by "I" you mean your self -- but, you do not also mean you.
- And, each new self would be different in that regard.

No. See my previous response.

 

[The Sparrow]

Dave,
- S0, reproducing your self would not reproduce you.
- IOW, your self is determined entirely by the cells of your brain, but you must require something more. When above you say, "I come out of the cells of my brain.", by "I" you mean your self -- but, you do not also mean you.
- And, each new self would be different in that regard.

Lets count the unsupported assertions:

1. - S0, reproducing your self would not reproduce you.
What? What is missing - asked hundreds of times and ignored

2. your self is determined entirely by the cells of your brain, but you must require something more.
What? What is with must. Says who, why? Support please.

3. by "I" you mean your self -- but, you do not also mean you.
What? you are telling someone else what they mean?
Based on what? When did they indicate that is what they mean?

4. - And, each new self would be different in that regard.
What? You haven't actually shown any of your premises to be true and how you are just stating your conclusion.

 

[JoeMorgue]

"Would another me be me?"

So along with "A copy means it by definition has all the same characteristics and qualities as the original" and "1 and 2 aren't the same number" we will now have to explain what a pronoun is and how it works to a grown man.

Eventually we'll have to do the whole "Who's on First?" routine.

 

[wea]

Dave,
- S0, reproducing your self would not reproduce you.
- IOW, your self is determined entirely by the cells of your brain, but you must require something more. When above you say, "I come out of the cells of my brain.", by "I" you mean your self -- but, you do not also mean you.
- And, each new self would be different in that regard.

No, see any of the previous answers, e.g. jond's

 

[Belz...]

Dave,
- S0, reproducing your self would not reproduce you.

Oh, yes it would. It would be a distinct you, but it would be a reproduction of you.

- IOW, your self is determined entirely by the cells of your brain, but you must require something more.

"You" and "your self" are exactly the same thing, and you just said "entirely". You're trying to have it both ways.

When above you say, "I come out of the cells of my brain.", by "I" you mean your self -- but, you do not also mean you.

Why are you now trying to create a new distinction? You have always argued that "you" was this "self" that reincarnationists talk about. Why do you now change the argument?

 

[John Jones]

Dave,
- S0, reproducing your self would not reproduce you.- IOW, your self is determined entirely by the cells of your brain, but you must require something more. When above you say, "I come out of the cells of my brain.", by "I" you mean your self -- but, you do not also mean you.
- And, each new self would be different in that regard.

Rule of so.

 

[sackett]

Fellers, let's consider what Jabba's up against. He dare not abandon his position, his "claim," by admitting that his arguments are failures. If he ever stops repeating himself, a silence will fall in which the truth of our mortality stands before him, implacably and unavoidably. He's afraid.

Is a fear of nonexistence irrational? Yes; but none of us is rational all the time.

 

[Belz...]

none of us is rational all the time.

Some of us are rational more often than others.