Please explain the "TV set" model of the brain

aggle-rithm

Ardent Formulist
Joined
Jun 9, 2005
Messages
15,334
Location
Austin, TX
Several posters, mainly Ian, have made the analogy that the brain is like a TV set, receiving and interpreting signals from the mind, rather than, in fact, generating the mind.

The analogy seems consistent, up to a point, but I have a few questions:

1. A TV set (or radio, or other receiving device) is meant to be observed by outside entities. It doesn't have a subjective reality (at least, I assume it doesn't), but we do. Does the analogy break down at this point? If not, why?

2. If the brain is simply a "filter" for the outside signal, and diminished cognitive/motor functions are the result of the signal being blocked, then:
A. Shouldn't it be blocked only from the outside entities, and not from the subjective viewpoint? and
B. Since partial damage results in partial "blockage" of the "signal", then wouldn't complete destruction of the brain result in complete "blockage"?

I apologize if I've misrepresented this viewpoint. The questions are based on my best understanding of the analogy.
 
One thing I should make clear: I believe the evidence shows that the subjective experience in cases of mental illness and/or brain damage is consistent with what is observed on the outside. People say they feel "different" and often mourn the loss of their former selves. (if necessary, I can provide references to this.) Therefore, I think the behavior observed by outsiders is a fair indication of what is going on inside, especially in cases of grotesque changes in personality.
 
aggle-rithm said:
Several posters, mainly Ian, have made the analogy that the brain is like a TV set, receiving and interpreting signals from the mind, rather than, in fact, generating the mind.
...snip...
I apologize if I've misrepresented this viewpoint. The questions are based on my best understanding of the analogy.
One thing to clarify - Ian's analogy isn't an analogy of the brain, but an analogy of his theory of consciousness. I only make this distinction because Ian clearly doesn't know the first thing about the actual brain.

As regards to the limitations of his analogy that will be up to Ian to address.
 
The analogy breaks, I believe, because of a simple question: "Why would my brain receive my consciousness instead of yours?"

In other words, what's so unique about any given brain as an "receiver" that it would only tune into one specific entity and not others?
 
jmercer said:
The analogy breaks, I believe, because of a simple question: "Why would my brain receive my consciousness instead of yours?"

In other words, what's so unique about any given brain as an "receiver" that it would only tune into one specific entity and not others?

Past lives? Clairvoyance?

Not that I believe such things are true, just playin' devil's advocate for a moment.
 
Several posters? Who else holds this idea?

Why doesnt work? Because... it is not needed. There is no "anomalous" data that needs to invoque a different theory than the current scientific one (that the mind is produced by the brain).

Well, in fact this is incomplete, I would say that what we call "the mind" is instanciated by the body/world interactions. Its "in between them" so to speak, and not specifically "inside" the brain.

In any case its a difficult subject, thats why some have to invent such weird ideas. But I believe they do it just because they have not read enough about current scientific discoveries. ;)
 
Ratman_tf said:
Past lives? Clairvoyance?

What do these mean, in this context?

How does "clairvoyance" explain why I pick up my own mind, and not, for example jmercer's?
 
Occam's Razor indicates that we have absolutely no reason to posit a separate "mind" that is somehow different from the brain. The "mind" is only the subjective expression of our brain states. That's all.

What evidence does anyone here have that we need MORE ? Present the evidence and I'll listen.
 
Ratman_tf said:
Past lives? Clairvoyance?

Not that I believe such things are true, just playin' devil's advocate for a moment.

Ok... and I'll play the heavenly prosecution. ;)

And... past lives/clairvoyance affect brains in what manner that permits them to tune to a single unique consciousness?
 
new drkitten said:
How does "clairvoyance" explain why I pick up my own mind, and not, for example jmercer's?

:D

Because your clairvoyance tells you I don't swing that way!

:D

(Sorry, couldn't resist! ;))
 
aggle-rithm said:
Several posters, mainly Ian, have made the analogy that the brain is like a TV set, receiving and interpreting signals from the mind, rather than, in fact, generating the mind.

The analogy seems consistent, up to a point, but I have a few questions:

1. A TV set (or radio, or other receiving device) is meant to be observed by outside entities. It doesn't have a subjective reality (at least, I assume it doesn't), but we do. Does the analogy break down at this point? If not, why?

2. If the brain is simply a "filter" for the outside signal, and diminished cognitive/motor functions are the result of the signal being blocked, then:
A. Shouldn't it be blocked only from the outside entities, and not from the subjective viewpoint? and
B. Since partial damage results in partial "blockage" of the "signal", then wouldn't complete destruction of the brain result in complete "blockage"?

I apologize if I've misrepresented this viewpoint. The questions are based on my best understanding of the analogy.

One thing I should make clear: I believe the evidence shows that the subjective experience in cases of mental illness and/or brain damage is consistent with what is observed on the outside. People say they feel "different" and often mourn the loss of their former selves. (if necessary, I can provide references to this.) Therefore, I think the behavior observed by outsiders is a fair indication of what is going on inside, especially in cases of grotesque changes in personality.
The "TV set" theory I suspect wouldn't hold up because functions of the brain as they relate to outwardly manifested behavior appear to be explicable in the same way as the well-understood computational processes of a computer can make clear why a computer "behaves" in the way it does. When it comes to aspects of the psyche amenable to scientific measurement, Occam's razor instructs that we must discard of the "radio waves" of consciousness for purposes of practicality. Your recognition of certain physical pathologies of the brain affecting the state of an individual's personhood as viewed on the outside is an important point in realizing this.
 
Bodhi Dharma Zen said:
Several posters? Who else holds this idea?


I've seen at least one other person make this claim, but I can't remember who it was. Maybe I'm exaggerating a little when I say "several".
 
Re: Re: Please explain the "TV set" model of the brain

Ashles said:

As regards to the limitations of his analogy that will be up to Ian to address.

I'm sure Ian doesn't believe there are any limitations. That's what I would like for him to explain.
 
Re: Re: Re: Please explain the "TV set" model of the brain

aggle-rithm said:
I'm sure Ian doesn't believe there are any limitations. That's what I would like for him to explain.
Well I meant that the "TV set" model of the brain would obviously only work up to a certain point. Even if you take the analogy to it's logical extreme then there are problems with the medium of information transfer, interference, identical receivers, information conversion...

No-one sensible or rational could logically claim that this analogy was useful to an understanding of the way the brain interpreted the idea of consciousness...

Oh. I see what you mean.
 
aggle-rithm said:
Several posters, mainly Ian, have made the analogy that the brain is like a TV set,



Is the Universe likewise like a balloon?

When I used to go to 6th form college (for 16 and 17 year olds), in an English language class, we each in turn had to stand up and talk about a topic for 10 minutes that we were personally interested in. I decided to talk about Cosmology. I was trying to explain about the "Big Bang" and the expansion of the Universe. I explained that it was incorrect to think of it as a normal explosion with Galaxies rushing through space and away from a common centre. In order to try to facilitate the understanding to my fellow pupils, I employed the analogy of a balloon get blown up. On the surface of the balloon are painted little black dots. I asked them them to imagine that the little black dot represented galaxies and the actual surface of the balloon represented the 3 dimensional space-time continuum. Now as the balloon expands the black dots (galaxies) move away from each other, but they are carried along by the fabric (space-time continuum) of the balloon (Universe). Moreover, it can be understood that no one black dot (Galaxy) is at the centre of the balloons surface (centre of the Universe).

One person asks what happens when the Universe pops. I basically said "huh". he said 'if the Universe is like a balloon then it must pop eventually after its expanded so much. I said 'no it won't'. He said then it's not like a balloon then, and he dismissed my entire metaphor.

receiving and interpreting signals from the mind, rather than, in fact, generating the mind.

The analogy seems consistent, up to a point, but I have a few questions:

1. A TV set (or radio, or other receiving device) is meant to be observed by outside entities. It doesn't have a subjective reality (at least, I assume it doesn't), but we do. Does the analogy break down at this point? If not, why?

Because the TV set is being compared to the brain. The brain does not have a subjective reality.

2. If the brain is simply a "filter" for the outside signal, and diminished cognitive/motor functions are the result of the signal being blocked, then:
A. Shouldn't it be blocked only from the outside entities, and not from the subjective viewpoint?

You mean that brain states ought not to affect conscious states?

If the brain only modifies consciousness or minds, rather than being the progenitor of the mind, the question then arises as to why we need brains at all.

The first thing to recognise here is that processes within the brain are akin to any information processing system. As with any such information processing system there are architectural constraints and these serve to limit the mind so we only have access to those perceptions that follow the familiar and regular patterns that we associate with the physical world. This then allows us to function proficiently whilst we subsist in this empirical reality.

Now when the mind operates in detachment from the brain, when it is temporarily or permanently disembodied, then its processing is released from the constraining influence of the arrays of primitive processing units (essentially the brain). It will then have access to all other perceptions apart from our everyday perceptions. Those other perceptions will be driven by some other "engine", and the person may seem to be passing through other worlds. This would be broadly consistent with the anecdotal experiences of some out-of-body experiences, especially near-death experiences - and indeed with reportedly channelled descriptions from the dead, as well as with traditional accounts such as those found in the "Tibetan Book of the Dead".

and
B. Since partial damage results in partial "blockage" of the "signal", then wouldn't complete destruction of the brain result in complete "blockage"?

Only if the self continues to operate through the brain.

To repeat what I've said before:

Imagine if you will 2 very intelligent people from the early 18th century who, by some means or other, are miraculously transported to our present day. Imagine further they encounter a television set showing a film. After being suitably astounded, and after tinkering around with its internal components and finding that tinkering with particular components effects the picture quality in particular characteristic ways, you can imagine one of them claiming that not just the picture, but the storyline of the film must be wholly generated by these internal components since tinkering with them affects the picture. He might claim there is overwhelming evidence that this must be so. The other person, however, will rightly point out that although he grants that the picture itself is generated by these internal components, it cannot be the case that the actual contents of the movie, the actual storyline with its depiction of various emotions and so on, can be generated by just these internal components. This is because there is nothing about the physical processes within the TV set which could conceivably lead to the generation ex nihilo of such a storyline.

So with a television set the state of its internal components will affect the quality of the picture, but this does not entail that the storyline depicted by the picture is affected too. Indeed no matter how poor the picture quality might get e.g. a snowy picture, ghosting etc, a given film will continue to show the same events.

I want to suggest that some useful insights into trying to understand a possible relationship of the self to its brain might be gained from consideration of this television set metaphor. A loose analogy might be drawn between the television set and the brain, the storyline of a TV programme and the self, and finally the picture quality of programme displayed and the mind states undergone by the self. Thus, just as tinkering with the internal components of a television set will have consequences for the quality of the picture displayed, but will not change the storyline of the programme, so too might alteration of the brain’s processes affect states of the mind without bringing about any change in the actual self.

Thus the suggestion here is that just as the storyline of a film does not have its origin in the television set's internal components, neither might the self have its source or origin in the brain. Rather it conceivably could be the case that the self's existence is ontologically self-subsistent and is “filtered” by the brain. What I mean by “filtered” is that although the self does not change as the state of our brains change so as to become a literally different self, the self’s mind states do change. That is to say differing particular mind states change according to the particular physical configuration of the brain. Thus the various mental states we experience during our lives are a result of both the self - accounting for the feeling of a persistent self and the more general dispositions of selfhood - and also the particular physical configuration of the brain the self is “filtered” by. The feeling of a persistent enduring self remains intact, but, due to the change in mind states, our moods, interests and intelligence will vary. This then will account for the correlation between brain states and mind states. This account of the self and its brain which I have provided here is referred to as the transmission theory.

I think this corresponds very nicely with our intuitive notions we have regarding the self. After all, the self is the essential you. To elucidate: although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives. Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states. Thus I (that is the self) might, for example, be in a good mood or a bad mood. But my self is not to be equated by such given mind states. Rather I experience being in a good mood, or a bad mood, or indeed any other mental state. The I or the self is that which endures, but which can experience various mental states such as differing moods. Such a self is known in philosophical parlance as a substantial self.

Note that this notion of a literal same self is difficult to maintain if we suppose that the self is actually generated by the brain. For example, if we happen to be materialists - by far the most common group to hold self is generated by the brain (see the next section for an explication of this term) - we must maintain that any “self” must simply be equated with the brain, or more precisely with the processes taking place within it. Given that brain states are in a constant state of change, it would certainly seem that, in a literal sense, the self must also be in a constant state of change. Be clear as to what this means. It means that there can be no unchanging enduring self, i.e. substantial self, under materialism. Our selves are quite literally equated with our mind states. Later, under the duplicate experiment section, it will be argued that under materialism that we must effectively think of our selves as literally ceasing to be, only to be replaced by an almost exact duplicate, spontaneously springing ex nihilo into being every infinitesimal fraction of a second. Within this scenario it might be difficult to avoid concluding our sense of self is effectively an illusion. Indeed this is precisely what many philosophical materialists maintain.
 
aggle-rithm said:
One thing I should make clear: I believe the evidence shows that the subjective experience in cases of mental illness and/or brain damage is consistent with what is observed on the outside. People say they feel "different" and often mourn the loss of their former selves. (if necessary, I can provide references to this.)



Why should they mourn the loss of a self which is not them? People are very imprecise in their statements. This proves nothing.

Therefore, I think the behavior observed by outsiders is a fair indication of what is going on inside, especially in cases of grotesque changes in personality.

If what the subject says differs from the impression from the 3rd person perspective, then who should we believe?

However if a person truly sincerely believes that he has just come into existence, then that is certainly interesting. But I think they just mean that their mind states are now characteristically different, not that their self has literally changed! :eek:
 
jmercer said:
The analogy breaks, I believe, because of a simple question: "Why would my brain receive my consciousness instead of yours?"

In other words, what's so unique about any given brain as an "receiver" that it would only tune into one specific entity and not others?

An interesting question. I have absolutely no idea. I hope you're not implying that this somehow gives evidence for the hypothesis that consciousness is generated by the brain.
 
Bodhi Dharma Zen said:
Several posters? Who else holds this idea?

Why doesnt work? Because... it is not needed. There is no "anomalous" data that needs to invoque a different theory than the current scientific one (that the mind is produced by the brain).

Well, in fact this is incomplete, I would say that what we call "the mind" is instanciated by the body/world interactions. Its "in between them" so to speak, and not specifically "inside" the brain.

In any case its a difficult subject, thats why some have to invent such weird ideas. But I believe they do it just because they have not read enough about current scientific discoveries. ;)

Bodhi Dharma Zen,

You clearly have not got a faintest clue about the mind-body problem and why it is indeed a problem. Read my website once it's completed.
 
Francois Tremblay said:
Occam's Razor indicates that we have absolutely no reason to posit a separate "mind" that is somehow different from the brain.


But logical incoherence trumps this perverted materialist version of "Occam's razor".
 
Interesting Ian said:
An interesting question. I have absolutely no idea. I hope you're not implying that this somehow gives evidence for the hypothesis that consciousness is generated by the brain.

No. It merely decreases the plausibility of your TV hypothesis.

Evidence against X is almost never for Y, unless Y can be shown to be equivalent to not-X.
 

Back
Top Bottom