My proof that we necessarily must have Free Will

[Interesting Ian]

1. If it were true that I do not have free will, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my behaviour is governed by physical laws.




I suppose you might argue that this only proves mental causation, but free will would seem to be essentially the exercise of such mental powers.

 

[Z]

1. If it were true that I do not have free will, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

By 'conscious' you of course mean:

a) having sensations
b) having an introspective awareness of both sensation and the process of thought and the making of decisions
c) having an awareness of 'self' distinct from other objects.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

This does not follow. A thing which does not fit in a, b, or c above cannot be considered conscious; further, such a thing cannot have a conviction that it is conscious. Thus, ONLY a being which is consious can have the conviction of being conscoius. This says nothing about causal chains, given that neither a, b, nor c above is acausal in nature.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

Which all says nothing about cause-and-effect relationships. In fact, this is necessarily true of the very definition of consciousness.

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

You cannot mistakenly think that you are conscious. Consciousness is the state of being self aware, introspectively aware of thoughts and decision making processes, and the possession of senses (and, implied with this, I think, the ability to process senses). All consistant with physical chains of cause and effect.

As such, the rest of your argument is founded on erroneous premise.

Sorry, Ian.

edited for typo

 

[Dancing David]

1. If it were true that I do not have free will, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.


You could be a dependant series of events that contain processes that are random, chaotic and cognition influenced. This would be a situation where the determinism in your argument does not apply. One break possible in the chain.



2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.


This could be true under all sorts of spiritual schemes as well, where a demon convinces you that you are consious but you aren't.

This appears to be the conflation of the appearnce of consciousness with counsciousness.

Under materialism the appearance of consiousness is consiousness because that is the only determinant. therefore p-zombie are called 'consious' and are assumed to be consious even though they may not be.

Can you have c-zombies , where a being is conscious but exhibits none of the behaviors of consciousness?


3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

That is the materialist argument as well.


4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.



That can be true for scenarios where consiousness in not dependant on events in the brain, therefore your logic train either generalizes to all scenarios or it is illogical. How do you know that as a spiritual event that consciousness could not be faked?


5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my behaviour is governed by physical laws.


Behavior can be 'goverened' by material laws and still not be deterministic, and acausal.


I suppose you might argue that this only proves mental causation, but free will would seem to be essentially the exercise of such mental powers.

I would say that you have demonstrated that you believe that you are conscious.

 

[Yahweh]

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

...

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my behaviour is governed by physical laws.

I suppose you might argue that this only proves mental causation, but free will would seem to be essentially the exercise of such mental powers.

So basically, your knowledge of your consciousness is not of material functions, but rather because you, as an act of freewill, you chose to know of it

(Yeah, I know, my comment is vacuous and meaningless...)

 

[Interesting Ian]

I really don't know why I bother

Is there anybody out there who actually understands my argument or not? Say I'm in error if you like, but does anyone actually understand it?

 

[Mojo]

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

Your conviction that you are conscious is an aspect of the consciousness itself. You cannot have the former without the latter. So point 4 in your argument doesn't follow.

From my viewpoint, of course, you could be a non-conscious entity claiming to be conscious, but that's a different matter, and has no bearing on your argument.

 

[Iacchus]

So basically, your knowledge of your consciousness is not of material functions, but rather because you, as an act of freewill, you chose to know of it

(Yeah, I know, my comment is vacuous and meaningless...)

Either that, or free will is imparted through consciousness, and our minds -- via the brain -- are the vehicles which allow us to do this.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: My proof that we necessarily must have Free Will

Re: My proof that we necessarily must have Free Will

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian
2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Your conviction that you are conscious is an aspect of the consciousness itself. You cannot have the former without the latter. So point 4 in your argument doesn't follow.

Denying free will normally means maintaining that all feelings, thoughts, emotions are wholly parasitical upon their neural correlates. If the world is governed by an unbroken chain of physical cause and effect, then it is not consciousness which is causally efficacious in bringing about the conviction that I am conscious, but rather the neural correlates of consciousness.

It is the neural correlates of consciousness which are causally efficacious, not consciousness. This is what it means to say we do not have free will.

I'm attacking the idea -- widely believed on this board -- that everything we ever do, everything we ever think, all our emotions ever felt, simply follow physical processes in the brain. Indeed I have refuted this notion.

 

[Z]

So far, you have refuted nothing at all.

We understand your argument. We understand that argument to be fallacious. We understand you are in error.

 

[Darat]

I really don't know why I bother

Is there anybody out there who actually understands my argument or not? Say I'm in error if you like, but does anyone actually understand it?

I understand your attempts at trying to come up with an argument that supports your already decided upon conclusion, I also understand where it uses circular reasoning and begs the questions (in the formal sense).

The reason why you do not understand that your argument uses circular reasoning and begs the question are very apparent to me. It is because you are not able to ever consider even for one moment that your "conclusion" is incorrect (summed up in your own words as "I've always known there is an ultimate purpose to life and the Universe, and a life after death. … I've always known )". This means whenever presented with anything that may possibly mean you have to consider your conclusion to be incorrect you close your mind to it.

I know (from your answer in a recent thread I started) that you find the very idea of other possible conclusions frightening but I think that is a fear you need to face if at some time you really want to discuss these types of issues – you shouldn’t let that fear paralysis you. Also until you learn to be open minded you are always going to find discussing these "whichness of the why" questions with people who are open minded very frustrating.

 

[CFLarsen]

The reason why you do not understand that your argument uses circular reasoning and begs the question are very apparent to me. It is because you are not able to ever consider even for one moment that your "conclusion" is incorrect (summed up in your own words as "I've always known there is an ultimate purpose to life and the Universe, and a life after death. … I've always known )". This means whenever presented with anything that may possibly mean you have to consider your conclusion to be incorrect you close your mind to it.

"God allows it".
Interesting Ian.

 

[Interesting Ian]

. . I . . understand where it uses circular reasoning and begs the questions (in the formal sense).

Perhaps you would then be kind enough to show how my argument employs circular reasoning.

 

[Darat]

Perhaps you would then be kind enough to show how my argument employs circular reasoning.

Why since you know you are right?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Why since you know you are right?

Well it certainly seems to me that my proof is watertight. I'm quite unable to see how it could be deemed to be fallacious.

I'm still interested in feedback though.

 

[H'ethetheth]

1. If it were true that I do not have free will, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious.

3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all!

4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious.

5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my behaviour is governed by physical laws.




I suppose you might argue that this only proves mental causation, but free will would seem to be essentially the exercise of such mental powers.

I don't see what consciousness has to do with the presence of free will. Incorrigible belief in ones consciousness combined with the absense of free will simply means that you're not free to think you're not conscious. Does that contradict any experience of consciousness? I don't think so. In fact, it doesn't even mean you're conscious, unless you define consciousness as "the ability to think you are conscious", which appears to be the case.

 

[ma1ic3]

Ok, it sounds like you are saying this:

1) If free will doesn't exist then I believe that Im conscious because of the physical events taking place in my brain.

2) If I believe that Im conscious because of physical events taking place in my brain, then I can believe that Im conscious even if Im not conscious, which means that I don't know if Im really conscious or not.

3) I know for a fact that Im conscious, so number 2 cannot be true, and therefore number 1 cannot be true.

If this is accurate, then you need to explain why #2 follows from #1.

I don't see how this: "If all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious" can be true.

I agree that it's impossible to be mistaken that you're sentient, because non-sentient things aren't even capable of making the mistake that they are sentient. But you seem to think that if sentience is rooted in the brain, that this contradiction would then be possible.

If sentience does rise from the brain, then how does that make it possible for a non-thinking thing to believe that it is thinking?

edit: left out a word

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: My proof that we necessarily must have Free Will

If sentience does rise from the brain, then how does that make it possible for a non-thinking thing to believe that it is thinking?

edit: left out a word [/B]

Remember that sentience can arise from the brain and yet for us to have free will. Indeed interactive dualism is perfectly compatible with sentience arising from the brain.

Anyway, if conscious states follow physical states, then my beliefs follow physical states. My beliefs must simply reflect the underlying physical processes wherever they might lead.

 

[KelvinG]

I really don't know why I bother

Is there anybody out there who actually understands my argument or not? Say I'm in error if you like, but does anyone actually understand it?

I have to wonder why you bother as well. You have already drawn the conclusion that you can't possibly be wrong, and you patronize fellow posters who you claim can't understand your reasoning.

Isn't it pointless to keep going on in this manner?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Here's a wild idea, Ian: Why don't you address each poster's logical analysis of your proof and show how it is incorrect? That would be more productive than "I really don't know why I bother." We all agree that we don't know why you bother.

Also, as usual, you refuse to define free will.

2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious-1 has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious-2 as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious-3 even if I were not conscious-4.

I believe you are mixing two definitions of conscious in this statement. conscious-1 and conscious-4 refer to a consciousness that is not a product of brain function. conscious-2 and conscious-3 refer to a consciousness that is a product of brain function. So you are saying:

1. If it were true that I do not have free will, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am naturally conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect.

2. Thus my conviction that I am supernaturally conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am naturally conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am naturally conscious even if I were not supernaturally conscious.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Here's a wild idea, Ian: Why don't you address each poster's logical analysis of your proof and show how it is incorrect? That would be more productive than "I really don't know why I bother." We all agree that we don't know why you bother.

I don't address some of the posts because they are not remotely coming to grips with my proof. They appear to completely fail to grasp what I'm saying. If I responded I'd simply be repeating what I said in my opening post. I don't see any purpose to this.

Also, as usual, you refuse to define free will.

Mental causation. The ability of consciousness to choose amongst alternatives with consciousness per se finally reaching a decision, even though influenced by the physical world.

I believe you are mixing two definitions of conscious in this statement.

No, there is only one meaning to consciousness. The origin of consciousness is wholly irrelevant.