“Materialism” is an empty word. An incendiary article.

[David Mo]

Some threads in this forum relate materialism with science. The concepts of materialism and science are not homogeneous. Materialism is a philosophical theory. Therefore they cannot be matched. Even worse, “materialism” is a confusing word. At least, this is what Ulises Moulines (University of Munich) says. I will try to summarize his article “Por qué no soy materialista” (“Why I am not a materialist”). I will use his own words as long as I can.

1. Materialism is a confusing theory.
2. Vulgar materialists suppose that everybody know what matter is. But this is false. Nobody knows what the matter exactly is.

(PERSONAL NOTE: I will set aside Mouline’s exam of crude materialism and atomic materialism and I will centre myself in the more complex question: “scientificist materialism” (SM) affirms that matter is what the ultimate components are, according scientists).

3. Scientists have not a unified concept of “basic or ultimate components of matter”.
31. If they are honest they will recognize that there is not any unified theory of the matter and that the theories about “basic or ultimate components of matter” are changing with time.
311. Some examples: force fields, electromagnetic waves, probability waves, anti-particles, quantum vacuum, black holes, etc.
312. So, the concept of matter as “what the scientists say” (SM) is an empty concept.
313. Even such “immaterial” objects as telepathic transmission or astral influences have a similar conceptual structure to the “material” entities mentioned in 311.
3131. We can imagine that telepathy could be present in handbooks of physic or neurology in the future. It will be non sequitur if the materialists include this concept as a “form of matter”.

(PERSONAL NOTE: I respect Moulines’ incendiary example. Other cooler examples –but not less powerful- could be found in quantum mechanics, as the particle that is and not is in the same place at the same time).

4. Materialism has the same problem that all monist (“monolithic”) theory has.
41. If we affirm “All x is P”, and we don’t provide a precise set of restrictive characteristics that identifies P, we are not saying nothing because P can be understood however we want.
42. A predicate that fits everything is difficult to imagine.
43. Moulines thinks that pluralism -the reality is plural- is a more plausible situation.

Conclusion: A restricted materialism contradicts facts; a diffuse materialism says nothing.

(MOULINES' NOTE: Idealism is as contradictory as materialism for similar reasons).

 

[MikeG]

So are you saying that because we don't yet completely understand what the very smallest particles are that we are just a hologram?

 

[Aepervius]

The simple error he makes is that he expect a complete knowledge of a problem before one can conclude on it. This is a falsehood ETA: for physic. Might be true in philosophy for all I care (not). We know enough on a standard level to know what matter is for the standard life environment, and as such mater to be defined properly, and materialism to have a meaning. This is even expandable to non standard environment for which we have models (e.g. quasar, black holes, neutron stars etc...). But even if we did not, there is enough to know for the standard environment, which is enough for materialism in our life.

His moaning of "we don't know everything therefore you can't say everything is X" might make sense on the philosophical level (for which I do not care) but on the physical level it would be more like "if you have a theory which shows part of our world is not *matter* or *particle* as defined in physic, then it is YOUR claim up to you to demonstrate it".

As such from the physic perspective, he is being ridiculous.

ETA: Which is why I frankly laugh at philosopher. The world/universe being matter is one powerful "theory" which allows us to conclude all sorts of claim and put forward more theory. The "materialism is stupid because you can't prove everything" (paraphrased) lead us to nowhere whatsoever in great stride.

 

[David Mo]

So are you saying that because we don't yet completely understand what the very smallest particles are that we are just a hologram?

1. It is not my theory. I am summarizing Moulines' article.
2. "Ultimate components of matter" are not particles only. " Force fields, electromagnetic waves, probability waves, quantum vacuum", etc. are not particles. Matter is a more complex subject than the atomic model.
3. Not just "a hologram". Moulines declares himself to be a pluralist. This is to say: something exists otuside but I cannot say if it is only this or that.

 

[David Mo]

The simple error he makes is that he expect a complete knowledge of a problem before one can conclude on it.

I don’t think so. Moulines is asking for a definition of a basic concept of the materialist theory. This is a previous step of any formulation of a hypothesis (either physical or philosophical). “We are searching for calandrajos” . “What is a calandrajo?”. “Well, I don’t know. But I am a kalandrajist”. Strange, is it not?

We know enough on a standard level to know what matter is for the standard life environment, and as such mater to be defined properly, and materialism to have a meaning.

It sounds promising. Can you give us this “standard definition” of matter, please?

The world/universe being matter is one powerful "theory" which allows us to conclude all sorts of claim and put forward more theory. The "materialism is stupid because you can't prove everything" (paraphrased) lead us to nowhere whatsoever in great stride.

Moulines said that no scientific theory has defined “matter” as something valid to other scientific theories. Scientific theories speak of electrons, force fields, quantum vacuum, wave function… but they don’t introduce a symbol for “matter”, as far as I know. Do you know a scientific theory that uses a universal concept of matter? Thank you.

I am glad you have fun with philosophers, because I suspect you are doing philosophy.

 

[sphenisc]

I don’t think so. Moulines is asking for a definition of a basic concept of the materialist theory...

Don't they have Google in Munich?

 

[Sideroxylon]

Concepts that evolved to have meaning within the scale of everyday human experience fail to provide useful descriptions of things beyond that level of experience. We should be surprised or struggle to make them fit because?

 

[marplots]

1. It is not my theory. I am summarizing Moulines' article.
2. "Ultimate components of matter" are not particles only. " Force fields, electromagnetic waves, probability waves, quantum vacuum", etc. are not particles. Matter is a more complex subject than the atomic model.3. Not just "a hologram". Moulines declares himself to be a pluralist. This is to say: something exists otuside but I cannot say if it is only this or that.

I think that's rather more waffley than I like. Force fields and probability waves are not material things or matter, but rules for how matter will behave. Electromagnetic waves are material with a particle, the photon, associated with them. Quantum vacuum, insofar as it is described by theory, is about material things.

The argument seems to rely on a certain naive idea of how we ought to define "material" as a mental construct, instead of the usual practice of discovery and description. As to it being monolithic, what else are we to think of a discipline that strives for a "theory of everything?" The "everything" in that is what I take materialism to be about.

 

[tuco]

If its empty word, dont use it?

 

[tsig]

Some threads in this forum relate materialism with science. The concepts of materialism and science are not homogeneous. Materialism is a philosophical theory. Therefore they cannot be matched. Even worse, “materialism” is a confusing word. At least, this is what Ulises Moulines (University of Munich) says. I will try to summarize his article “Por qué no soy materialista” (“Why I am not a materialist”). I will use his own words as long as I can.

1. Materialism is a confusing theory.
2. Vulgar materialists suppose that everybody know what matter is. But this is false. Nobody knows what the matter exactly is.

(PERSONAL NOTE: I will set aside Mouline’s exam of crude materialism and atomic materialism and I will centre myself in the more complex question: “scientificist materialism” (SM) affirms that matter is what the ultimate components are, according scientists).

3. Scientists have not a unified concept of “basic or ultimate components of matter”.
31. If they are honest they will recognize that there is not any unified theory of the matter and that the theories about “basic or ultimate components of matter” are changing with time.
311. Some examples: force fields, electromagnetic waves, probability waves, anti-particles, quantum vacuum, black holes, etc.
312. So, the concept of matter as “what the scientists say” (SM) is an empty concept.
313. Even such “immaterial” objects as telepathic transmission or astral influences have a similar conceptual structure to the “material” entities mentioned in 311.
3131. We can imagine that telepathy could be present in handbooks of physic or neurology in the future. It will be non sequitur if the materialists include this concept as a “form of matter”.

(PERSONAL NOTE: I respect Moulines’ incendiary example. Other cooler examples –but not less powerful- could be found in quantum mechanics, as the particle that is and not is in the same place at the same time).

4. Materialism has the same problem that all monist (“monolithic”) theory has.
41. If we affirm “All x is P”, and we don’t provide a precise set of restrictive characteristics that identifies P, we are not saying nothing because P can be understood however we want.
42. A predicate that fits everything is difficult to imagine.
43. Moulines thinks that pluralism -the reality is plural- is a more plausible situation.

Conclusion: A restricted materialism contradicts facts; a diffuse materialism says nothing.

(MOULINES' NOTE: Idealism is as contradictory as materialism for similar reasons).

Does all this philosophical sturm und drang really mean anything in the real world?

 

[HighRiser]

Does all this philosophical sturm und drang really mean anything in the real world?

That a lot of people think it does is what I've never been able to grok.

 

[Nonpareil]

Moulines is asking for a definition of a basic concept of the materialist theory.

The universe exists, is external, and is monist in nature. We call this monist substance "matter".

Quite straightforward, really.

 

[MikeG]

1. It is not my theory.

It's a rather tiresome and fairly recent phenomena around here: new poster posts someone else's guff and then says "yeah, I know, it's probably nonsense. Nothing to do with me. What do you guys think?"........before doing the very same thing again the following week. And the week after. Ad infintum, irrespective of the responses.

I am summarizing Moulines' article...........

So was I. Sarcasm is a useful tool sometimes.

 

[annnnoid]

The universe exists, is external, and is monist in nature. We call this monist substance "matter".

Quite straightforward, really.

You insisted on the other thread that consciousness has some manner of phenomenal existence. Is that 'external' as well?

So what is the evidence that this universe thingy exists as a singular substrate (as you asserted above and below)...besides your vague fantasy that this is the case.

Materialism is the conclusion that the universe and all things in it are made of a single substrate, which we refer to as "matter".

The statement is disingenuous as best…and outright misrepresentation at worst. Science currently has not the slightest idea what ‘basic reality’ actually is. So far it’s reduced to a herd of different particles with something referred to as ‘properties’ (spin, charge, mass) attached.

Particles sound vaguely ‘materialish’ (until you get into QM at least...then all bets are off)…but what variety of material are things called ‘properties’????

 

[theprestige]

I'm confused. Is the topic of this thread an attack on science, for not having a sufficiently philosophical definition of matter?

Or is it an attack on materialism, for attempting a philosophy of matter for which there is no complete scientific definition?

Or is it an attempt to back door paranormal phenomena, on the basis, if forces then maybe The Force?

 

[marplots]

Science currently has not the slightest idea what ‘basic reality’ actually is. So far it’s reduced to a herd of different particles with something referred to as ‘properties’ (spin, charge, mass) attached.

Particles sound vaguely ‘materialish’ (until you get into QM at least...then all bets are off)…but what variety of material are things called ‘properties’????

You are asking for a frame science doesn't provide. Science is an attempt to describe the world we find around us. "Properties" are part of that description. The objection by way of reductionism also falls flat, since descriptions have associated scales. It's fine to stop science at the macro-scale and claim "job done."

So, two points:
1) There is no separation between properties and descriptions of matter in various circumstances.
2) The question series, "But what's that made of?" is not a direct affront to descriptions generally, only a way to say, "How can we describe this on a smaller scale?" Sometimes we can, sometimes we cannot. But materialism as an idea isn't harmed by this.

And back to the other question: "So what's really real then?"

"Well, this is what I've found so far. It seems consistent, coherent, and allows me to predict the outcome of various things I'm interested in. You don't have to call that reality (or "really real"), but it seems to function in all the ways I want reality to function, so I'm just going to go ahead and use it that way."

 

[tsig]

You are asking for a frame science doesn't provide. Science is an attempt to describe the world we find around us. "Properties" are part of that description. The objection by way of reductionism also falls flat, since descriptions have associated scales. It's fine to stop science at the macro-scale and claim "job done."

So, two points:
1) There is no separation between properties and descriptions of matter in various circumstances.
2) The question series, "But what's that made of?" is not a direct affront to descriptions generally, only a way to say, "How can we describe this on a smaller scale?" Sometimes we can, sometimes we cannot. But materialism as an idea isn't harmed by this.

And back to the other question: "So what's really real then?"

"Well, this is what I've found so far. It seems consistent, coherent, and allows me to predict the outcome of various things I'm interested in. You don't have to call that reality (or "really real"), but it seems to function in all the ways I want reality to function, so I'm just going to go ahead and use it that way."

The fact that one is able to do all these semantic squabbles about the meaning of meaning and the reality of what's real says more about the imprecision of language than it does about science.

 

[tsig]

It's a rather tiresome and fairly recent phenomena around here: new poster posts someone else's guff and then says "yeah, I know, it's probably nonsense. Nothing to do with me. What do you guys think?"........before doing the very same thing again the following week. And the week after. Ad infintum, irrespective of the responses.



So was I. Sarcasm is a useful tool sometimes.

i agree with this but that has nothing to do with me, what do you think?

 

[marplots]

The fact that one is able to do all these semantic squabbles about the meaning of meaning and the reality of what's real says more about the imprecision of language than it does about science.

That and a bit of straw man making to fit "science" into the right box.

 

[phiwum]

Some threads in this forum relate materialism with science. The concepts of materialism and science are not homogeneous. Materialism is a philosophical theory. Therefore they cannot be matched. Even worse, “materialism” is a confusing word. At least, this is what Ulises Moulines (University of Munich) says. I will try to summarize his article “Por qué no soy materialista” (“Why I am not a materialist”). I will use his own words as long as I can.

1. Materialism is a confusing theory.
2. Vulgar materialists suppose that everybody know what matter is. But this is false. Nobody knows what the matter exactly is.

(PERSONAL NOTE: I will set aside Mouline’s exam of crude materialism and atomic materialism and I will centre myself in the more complex question: “scientificist materialism” (SM) affirms that matter is what the ultimate components are, according scientists).

3. Scientists have not a unified concept of “basic or ultimate components of matter”.
31. If they are honest they will recognize that there is not any unified theory of the matter and that the theories about “basic or ultimate components of matter” are changing with time.
311. Some examples: force fields, electromagnetic waves, probability waves, anti-particles, quantum vacuum, black holes, etc.
312. So, the concept of matter as “what the scientists say” (SM) is an empty concept.
313. Even such “immaterial” objects as telepathic transmission or astral influences have a similar conceptual structure to the “material” entities mentioned in 311.
3131. We can imagine that telepathy could be present in handbooks of physic or neurology in the future. It will be non sequitur if the materialists include this concept as a “form of matter”.

(PERSONAL NOTE: I respect Moulines’ incendiary example. Other cooler examples –but not less powerful- could be found in quantum mechanics, as the particle that is and not is in the same place at the same time).

I think it's an interesting argument. Let's take another example.

I think materialism is intended to distinguish the "normal" stuff of the universe from the supernatural and I agree that, were telepathy established, it would end up in the "normal" category.

But what about God? Let's think now of the existence of a deity with the ability to alter physical law on a whim. Perhaps, when we see only the alterations without seeing God, we would simply change our laws to reflect the exceptions we have seen. But just as surely, the actual existence of a real, meddling God would be inconsistent with materialism whether or not we could verify that inconsistency.

I don't pretend to have solved the problem Moulines raises, but I merely want to point out that other "incendiary" examples are rather less plausible for his point.

4. Materialism has the same problem that all monist (“monolithic”) theory has.
41. If we affirm “All x is P”, and we don’t provide a precise set of restrictive characteristics that identifies P, we are not saying nothing because P can be understood however we want.
42. A predicate that fits everything is difficult to imagine.
43. Moulines thinks that pluralism -the reality is plural- is a more plausible situation.

Not sure I agree with 42. After all, "self-identical" is not a hard predicate to define and it fits everything.

Conclusion: A restricted materialism contradicts facts; a diffuse materialism says nothing.

(MOULINES' NOTE: Idealism is as contradictory as materialism for similar reasons).

To others aiming to turn this into another dull "science vs. philosophy" tussle: this is a purely philosophical question about a certain foundational claim regarding science. It does not appear to be an attempt to show that science is wrong and hence we ought to do philosophy instead.

Some persons are interested in such arguments. Others are not. It really is as simple as that.